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In 1914 the British government was not interested in national self- 
determination in eastern Europe, but by November 1918 it was deeply 
involved with various eastern European subject nationalities and was 
committed by implication to their independence* It wa6 not legally 
committed to national self-determination but it could not have abandoned 
the subject nationalities without being subjected to accusations of bad
hud
faith against which it would have^the greatest difficulty defending 
itself. This thesis attempts to explain this evolution in British 
policy in the case of the Poles, Czechoslovaks and Yugoslavs, the three 
most important subject nationalities in eastern Europe*
The thesis is based primarily on the official records of the British 
government which have been supplemented with material from private 
collections. The evidence from these records obliges us to believe^and 
therefore the thesis argues,that British policy on national self-deter­
mination developed not as a result of theoretical speculations but as a 
result of the war-time relations between the government and the Polish, 
Czechoslovak and Yugoslav nationality organizations. These relations 
were based not on the government's intrinsic interest in national self- 
determination or the subject nationalities but on its desire to use the 
nationalities as weapons of war* Considering it as an area of secondary 
importance the government sought to use the political problems of 
eastern Europe to improve the Entente's strategic position* In November
1913 the government's stance on the issue of national self-determination 
in eastern Kurope was, therefore, not the product of calculations of the 
long-term political advantages for Britain of the reorganisation of 
eastern Europe but instead the product of its policy for the conduct of 
the war*
This thesis traces the evolution in British relations with the 
relish, Czechoslovak and Yugoslav nationality organizations from August
1914 to November 1918 * It shows how the initial contacts were established 
and how relations developed gradually as the government sought to use 
these organizations in propaganda, espionage and the formation of military 
units. It attempts to assess the effects of this co-operation on the 
attitudes of British officials and the policy of the government. It 
shows that the government's position in 1918 did not develop according
to any preconceived plan but evolved as a result of numerous decisions 
made to solve immediate problems in the conduct of the war.
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5Introduction
In nineteenth century Europe, nationalism was a frequent cause of 
international instability because of the attempts of subject nationalities 
to achieve unity and independence. Unsatisfied national aspirations were 
a constant threat to the status quo. In Britain, during the Firet .oriel 
v ar, the cause of these subject nationalities was taken up and promoted 
by a group of scholars and journalists who might be called liberal 
nationalists in order to distinguish them from those liberals, like 
E.A.L. Fisher and Viscount Bryce, who were sympathetic towards subject 
nationalities but also suspioious of the doctrine of national self- 
determination because of its potential illiberal tendencies. The liberal 
nationalists, as part of their war-tirae propaganda, claimed that Britain 
had traditionally supported subject nationalities struggling to be free, 
huch an interpretation of British foreign policy during the nineteenth 
century might have produced effective propaganda but it was not history. 
iVhile the British public might have traditionally sympathized with the 
struggles for independence of some nationalities, the government had 
always tended to support the status quo, but, when that was not possible, 
had preferred the creation of independent national states to the aggran­
dizement of great powers.
By 1914 the nationality problems in Europe had not been solved.
Since unsatisfied national aspirations were an international phenomenon 
affecting almost every area of Europe, nationalism would inevitably play
6an important role in any major European upheaval. The liberal nationalist & 
claimed that the failure of the European system to satisfy national aspir- 
ations was the real cause of the conflict* It followed that the 
application of national self-determination would create a more peaceful 
Europe* The liberal nationalists' opponents, tho pacifist liberals and 
left-wing radicals centred around the Union of Democratic Control, 
attributed the European conflict not to unsatisfied national aspirations 
but to secret diplomacy, the balance of power, the armaments race and 
imperial rivalry* All of these factors contributed to a tense inter­
national climate in which recurring crises were inevitable* hut that 
was the normal state of international relations* hone of them explain 
why this specific crisis, arising from the assassination in Sarajevo, led 
to war.
In 1903 the balance of power in Europe was tilted in favour of the 
Triple Alliance by the eclipse of Russia as a result of her defeat in the 
Russo-Japanese war* dut German statesmen realized that this Imbalance 
of power, which gave them much greater freedom of action in international 
affairs, was only a temporary phenomenon because military reforms in 
Russia would enable her, by 1917* to resume her former position in the 
European balance* The anticipated re-emergence of Russian power did 
not bode well for Germany's future position in Europe because there also 
existed the danger that Germany's only reliable ally, Austria-Hungary, 
would be seriously weakened, if not destroyed, by internal problems 
created by the subject nationalities. The major threat to Austria- 
Hungary appeared to be South Slav nationalism fostered by Serbia, the 
protegd of Russia. The apparent long-term trends in European relations 
tended to create the feeling within the Triple Alliance that if the
7Serbian problem wae to be solved it had to be done before 1917*
In the July crisis the German government undertook a calculated risk 
by advocating the use of force against S erbia. The Germans hoped that a 
localized war at this time^and on the pretext supplied by the assassination., 
would permanently Eolve the problem of South Slav nationalism at a time 
when Suesia was not in a position, as she would be after 1917> to intervene. 
By the time the German government realized that it had seriously miscal­
culated, the crisiB was out of control and the war could no longer be 
prevented. The essential factor in this crisis which distinguished it 
from previous crises and which made a peaceful solution impossible was 
the calculated risk on the part of the German government undertaken at 
the very beginning of the crisis. In essence Germany and Austria-Hungary 
adopted a position from which they could not retreat but which was 
unacceptable to the Triple Entente* The willingness of the German 
government to risk war can be explained by the imbalance of power which 
gave it some reason to think that the Entente would not interfere in a 
localized Austro-Eerbian war. The German willingness to use force to 
solve a problem in international relations can be explained by the fact 
that previous German history, particularly the events of 1848 and 1870, 
seemed to teach the necessity of force. When the British foreign office 
attributed the war to Prussian militarism, an enormous over-simplification 
it was more accurate than either the liberal nationalists or the Union of 
Democratic Control. The problem of unsatisfied national aspirations was 
an irritant in the European system which contributed to the July crisis, 
but it cannot be considered as the cause of the war*
Problems of nationality were important factors in the course of the 
war. This thesis analyses the British reaction during the war to the
8national problems of eastern Europe, and the reaction to the desire of the 
subject nationalities for national self-determination. It concentrates 
on policy as it was applied during the war, not on the origins of any 
future policy. Events after November 11, 1918 are interesting but 
irrelevant. The study singles out and concentrates on the Czechoslovaks, 
Poles, and Yugoslavs because they were the only eastern European subject 
nationalities to conduct, throughout the war, extensive campaigns in 
Britain for national self-determination. They were, therefore, the only 
subject nationalities to have meaningful relations with the government.
The campaign for national self-deternination, in so far a? it was conducted 
by emigres, was conducted by the leaders of these three nationalities, and 
therefore the thesis concentrates on the governments relations with them.
During the war; the idea that national self-determination should be 
applied in eastern Europe was discussed by those interested in foreign 
policy. It began as the pet idea of a number of amateurs, but as the 
war progressed, the officials began to consider it seriously. In the 
first months of th9 war, emigres representing the subject nationalities 
established contact with the government and offered their services to the 
Entente. When the co-operation proved mutually advantageous, complex 
relations developed between the government and the nationality organiz­
ations. British policy on national self-determination developed within 
the context of these relations.
Previous studies relating to British policy on national self-deter­
mination have confined themselves to the speculative discussions within 
the government on the future of eastern Europe. While not ignoring such 
evidence, this thesis concentrates on the action of the government in its 
co-operation with the nationality organizations. While hypothetical
9statements abound in profusion, and are often worthless, the action of 
the government is real evidence of policy.
After failinu to prevent the outbreak of hostilities, the government 
entered the war for essentially negative reasons, to prevent developments 
in Europe detrimental to fundamental British interests. Although the 
discussions in the cabinet during the crisis centred on the issues of the 
preservation of the great power status of France and of the neutrality of 
Belgium, the essential reason for war was to maintain the existing balance 
of power in western Europe* The two apparent issues were important, not
because of their intrinsic merits, but as essential adjuncts to the real 
issue, the existing balance in western Europe* The balance of power in 
eastern Europe played no positive role in the British decision to declare 
war; it supplied only arguments in favour of neutrality, while national 
self-determination was not even an issue*
In 1914 it was obvious that, as a result of the war, there would 
probably be some changes in eastern ^urope* i'he most obvious possibilities 
were either the expansion of Russia or the expansion of the Central powers. 
The British government had no specific uesiderata in eastern Europe but it 
could not be indifferent to changes there because of their effect on the 
balance of power. Any change in the structure of eastern Europe which 
did not substantially increase uerrnan or Russian power, ana which tended 
to promote stability, would be consistent with British interests. There 
was some hope that as a result of the war eastern Europe would acquire 
greater stability.
With the exclusion of the possibility of the expansion of one of the 
great powers, the alternatives which existed in eastern Europe ranged 
from the preservation of the status quo to the complete application of
10
national self-detemination. Between these two extremes there were a 
number of oorapromise alternatives* self-determination might be given to 
some nationalities, hut not to others. All of these alternatives could 
he said to he in harmony with essential British interests. The alter­
native which would produce the most stable system in eastern Kurope was 
to be preferred, hut there was no way to determine which alternative it 
was. The exponents of various programmes could dispute endlessly the 
merits of their cases, hut they could not prove them. Since the evidence 
on the conditions in eastern -urope did not overwhelmingly favour one 
alternative over another, there was no reason, in terms of the final 
settlement, for the government to choose, during the war, one of the 
alternatives as its policy on the future of eastern Burope. As long as 
the war continued such decisions could be postponed.
During the war the government did not support the status quo, national 
self-determination or any compromise between the two. iihile supporting 
none of the alternatives, it waB prepared to accept any of them. Until a 
decision on eastern our ope was absolutely necessary the government would 
await events. By avoiding a decision which might never have to be made, 
the government was able to avoid unnecessaiy commitments and to retain 
the maximum number of alternative courses of action. The inherent flexi­
bility of this position enabled the government to meet effectively evente 
as they arose. The course of event8 would either make a decision 
unnecessary or would provide more information upon which to base government 
policy.
While the government did not adopt a specific policy for the future 
of eastern Burope, many individuals in the cabinet and foreign office 
tended to have their own personal preferences. Many, possibly even a
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majority, sympathized with the emigres and preferred national self-deter­
mination* Such personal opinions ami preferences were important in the 
development of British policy during the war, hut they were just some of 
the great number of important factors in the determination of policy.
They were certainly not synonymous with polioy.
‘►Strategic necessity made it impossible for the government to follow 
consistently the policy of maximizing its alternatives and minimizing its 
commitments. Situations arose in which it seemed necessary for the 
successful conduct of the war to adopt commitments. In each case, the 
nature of the commitment was not baeed on a programme for the future of 
eastern ^urope, but was the product of the immediate situation and was 
designed to facilitate military success.* There were also instances in 
which the methods used to wage war, while not creating commitments, had 
unexpected repercussions which, in a subtle and complex manner, tended to 
restrict the government's future alternative courses of action. In other 
words, the government at times acted according to the necessity created 
by its own previous action. To some degree the methods of war, not the 
political considerations, determined the results*
The key factor in the development of British foreign policy on national 
self-determination during the * irst World War was not ideology but strategic 
necessity. It was not the only factor, but certainly' the most important 
of many. In the interests of strategy, the government was able to over­
look ideology, war aims, political considerations, and the inevitable peace 
settlement because national self-determination in eastern ^urope was a
* This interpretation is not original. A.J.P. Taylor has argued that war
aims were used as weapons of war. *The War Aims of the Allies in the 
First World war*, Politics in wartime. London 1964, Pp.93-123*
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problem of secondary importance in relation to British interests* At the 
end of the war government policy on national self-determination was the 
result, not of aiiy preconceived plan, but of a host of minor decisions 
often maue without reference to the concept of national self-determination. 
By sacrificing political considerations for military flexibility, the 
government increased the odds of victory at the coiot of losing control of 
the political consequences.
Phis thesis is based primarily on the official documents of the British 
government which have been supplemented with material from private collec­
tions. e or simplicity , abbreviations used in the original documents have 
often been written in full in quotations, and the use of capitals has been 
avoided except, as in the case of the nationality organizations, where they 
are necessary to avoid ambiguity*
ihis study was done under the supervision of James Joil, Stevenson 
Professor of International History at the London School of economics and 
Political Science. 1 m  indebted to him for nis advice, assistance and 
encouragement which made it a pleasure to work under his supervision. For 
financial assistance, 1 am indebted to the Commonwealth Scholarship and 
Fellowsnip commission and the Canada Council. I would like to thank 
Lady namier and Augurt Aaleski for taking time to see me. 1 am grateful 
to Sir t teven -unciman for his hospitality while 1 examined his father's 
papers and to Hugh be ton-..at son for information about his father's 
activities during the war. I would also like to express my appreciation 
to all the institutions and individuals who assisted my work.
13
Chapter I 
The Initial Contaot. 1914
The outbreak of war in August 1914 necessitated a complete readjustment 
of foreign policy and diplomacy to a European situation which was entirely 
different in many respects from anything that had existed since the end of 
the Napoleonic ware. The resort to violence in place of negotiation in 
the conduct of foreign policy was destructive of diplomacy and of the 
restraints on each of the great powers. Violence shattered the sanctity 
of the status quo making the very structure of Europe an issue as it had 
not been before. Aims which had been unthinkable during peace, such as 
the complete destruction of another great power, now became a real 
possibility. The belligerents were confronted with new problems but also 
acquired new alternatives in foreign policy with which to solve them.
The British government was informed of many of the possibilities in 
eastern Europe created by the war by Polish, Czechoslovak and Yugoslav 
emigres who on their own initiative established contact with the government. 
Thus began relations between the government and the nationality organizations; 
relations which were to become increasingly significant during the war.
The government did not commit itself to national self-determination, but 
it did promote relations with the emigres who appeared to be both informative 
and potentially useful.
Since public support was necessary for the successful conduct of the 
war, the government began, immediately following the outbreak of hostilities, 
to explain the decisions it had taken during the July crisis. The prime
14
minister, Herbert Henry Asquith, and some of his colleagues undertook to 
secure public support for the government’s position t irough a series of 
public addresses. On September 18, 1914 Asquith, a liberal imperialist 
with a Gladstonian approach to continental affairs, said that the war was 
being fought*
In the first place, to vindicate the sanctity of treaty obligations 
and of what is properly called the public law of Europe; in the 
second place, to assert and to enforce the independence of free 
States, relatively small and weak, against the encroachments and 
violence of the strong; and in the third place, to withstand, as 
we believe is in our best interests not only of our own Empire, but 
of civilization at large, the arrogant claim of a single Power to 
dominate the development of the destinies of Europe* 1
According to the official interpretation, that single power, Germany,
under the inspiration of Prussian militarism, attempted to upset the
balance of power in its own favour. The officials were aware that
nationality problems had contributed to the crisis in the summer of 1914,
but they considered Prussian militarism, not nationality problems, the
true cause of the war* On September 5» 1914, the secretary of state for
the foreign office, Sir Edward Grey, wrote to a public meeting*
It is against German militarism that we must fight* The whole 
of Western Europe would fall under it if Germany were to be 
successful in this war; but if as a result of the war the 
independence and integrity of the smaller European States can 
be secured and Western Europe liberated from the menace of 
German militarism, for it is not the German people, but 
Prussian militarism which has driven Germany and Europe into 
this war ~ if that militarism can be overcome, then indeed 
there will be a brighter and freer day for Europe, which will 
compensate us for the awful sacrifices that war entails* 2
Since Germany had caused the war, peace would be re-established when
that country was defeated and its attempts to upset the status quo thwarted.
There was reason to hope that such a defeat would so weaken the props of
militarism that it would collapse under its own weight* Beyond doubt,
1 The Times, 19 Sept. 1914* 
^ Ehe Times* 9 Sept. 1914*
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the defeat of Germany would ensure the basic requirements of British 
foreign policy such as the preservation of P*rance and the restoration of 
Belgium. Neither the cause nor the cure for the war could be found in 
the territorial structure of Europe* his. atisfied nationalism had 
certainly contributed to European instability, and therefore territorial 
modifications might be considered in the hope that the settlement would 
create a more stable Europe* hut such measures were of secondary 
importance and were not to obscure the essential aim, the defeat of 
Germany'*
The cabinet and the foreiji office were reluctant to discusB, define
or even contemplate any other aim* Discussion of territorial modifications
so early in the war would be useless and even dangerous. On November 5i
1914y the Marquess of Crewe, lord privy seal and government leader in the
house of lords expressed government policy when he wrote to Viscount
Bryce in reference to the reply to the speech from the throne*
I do not think it is possible now to lay down any principle, 
or even to express any opinion, on the terms upon which peace 
may ultimately be made* For one thing the issue still hangs 
too much in the balance for such discussion to be profitable, 
and for another too many parties are involved to make any 
present conclusion practicable* 3
The officials of the foreign office wholeheartedly supported that view, 
particularly the permanent under-secretary of state, Sir Arthur Nicoleon, who
4
never ceased to emphasize the futility of such hypothetical discussions* In 
reply to the ambassador in St* Petersburg, Sir George Buchanan, Grey wrote on 
November 3, 1914* 'Discussion of terms of peace is academic till war 
has progressed sufficiently to make Germany contemplate the most obvious
Crewe to Bryce, 5 Nov. 1914, Bryce Mss* E29*
^ Nicolson to Hardinge, 1 Dec. 1914, F*0. 800-276.
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terms of peace such as the restoration of two lost provinces to Prance
5
and evacuation of Belgium.*
LVen if the moratorium on the discussion of war aims had not existed,
it is unlikely that the future of eastern xtarope or Austria-Hungary would
have been seriously considered at the beginning of the war. Because
attention was focused on Germany, the primary enemy, war was only reluctantly
declared on Austria-Hungary as late as August 12, 1914* There were no
conflicts with the Hrapira and no specific British aims in eastern Hurope.
The Habsburg monarchy might collapse, but this was not the aim of the
British government. In fact, the idea of a separate peace with Austria-
Hungary was considered from the very beginning) for, as the ambassador
in Paris, Sir FranciB Bertie, recorded in December 1914*
Grey then told me that seemingly well founded reports have 
reached him that Austria is inclined to separate herself 
from Germany and make peace with Russia. He does not think 
that there can be any objection either from a French or 
British point of view provided that terms can be arranged.
We have no animus against Austria. 6
Since it was not an issue, there is very little evidence from this 
period on the official attitudes to the future of Austria-Hungary. The
possibility that the monarchy would collapse had been a matter of 
speculation for years, and its continued survival was a surprise to some 
like Sir Haurice de Bunsen, the ambassador in Vienna, who wrote in iiaroh 
1914 to Nicolsons ’It is a standing marvel that the country still holds
7
together.'' Survive it did, aided by inertia and fear of the consequences
^ Grey to Buchanan, 15 Nov. 1914> F.O. 371-2174-71776.
6 Bertie, IB Deo. 1914, F.O. 80Q-l66-Fr.l4-123. F.B. Bridge, 'The British 
Declaration of War on Austria-Hungary in 1914,' The Slavonic and East 
European Review, vol. XLV1I, no.109, July 1969» pp.401-423*
7
K.T.S. Dugdale, Maurice de 3unsen, Diplomat and Friend, London 1934j 
p.283.
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of its collapse. Alternatives to the monarchy, such as national self- 
determination, had not as yet been seriously considered by the British, 
few of whom had ever heard of the Yugoslavs or the Czechoslovaks.
There was, however, a perfect willingness to accept the destruction 
of Austria-Eungaiy if it became either necessary or inevitable. dany 
accepted the possibility with equanimity. On August 31, 1914 Winston 
Churchill, the first lord of the admiralty, wrote to Bool Buxton, a 
member of parliamentt 'Sooner or later, Germany will be starved and
o
beaten. Austria will be resolved into ite component parts.' The 
British minister in heme, E.A. Grant Duff, wrote on February 1, 1915*
'But the Austro-Hungarian Court and Bureaucracy are past praying for and 
signs are not wanting that the rocks are already in sight on which the
9
HabBburg ship with its motley crew will finally go to pieces.’' The 
collapse was clearly recognized as possible and, if necessary, acceptable. 
British policy was not designed either to maintain or destroy the Empire; 
the government would await events and accept either development. If 
the Austro-Hungarian empire was to survive, it would have to do so without 
British assistance. But if it could, there v/as no reason to destroy it.
In each of his public addresses Asquith emphasized the sanctity of 
treaties, the public law of Europe, the opposition to force and, above 
all, the rights of small states. These vague statements of outraged 
morality and liberal idealism can be used as evidence of the ideological 
interpretation given to the war by the Liberals, but without oorroborative 
evidence they cannot be used as evidence of commitments on specific issues.
® i/.S. Churchill, The norld Crisis. 1911-1914. London 1923, p*487* 
9 Grant Buff to Grey, 1 Feb. 1915, F.O. 371-2241-41098.
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The righte of small states were especially emphasized because the original
crisis involved the two small states, Belgium and Serbia* Their treatment
by the Central powers made good propaganda by appealing to the desire to
defend the underdog* In every speech Asquith spoke of small states, and,
probably tiring of the same phrase, he substituted for it small nations
and small nationalities* Jn September 25, 1914, he said!
room must be found and kept for the independent existence and 
the free development of the smaller nationalities each with a 
corporate consciousness of its own* Belgium, Holland, and 
Switzerland, and Scandinavian countries, Greece and the Balkan 
States - they must be recognized as having exactly as good a 
title as their more powerful neighbours, more power in strength 
and wealth, to a place in the sun* 3-0
Each small nationality mentioned was a small state* On November 9,
1914, he again referred to nationalities!
We shall never sheath the sword which we have not lightly drawn 
until Belgium recovers in full measure all and more than all 
that she has sacrificed; until Prance is adequately secured 
against the menace of aggression, until the rights of the smaller 
nationalities of Europe are placed on an unassailable foundation, 
and until the military domination of Prussia is wholly and 
finally destroyed. 11
Asquith's usage of the term nationality is vague, and there is no 
other evidence of his opinion to elucidate the meaning of his remarks*
In the propaganda for national self-determination the term denoted 
national groups denied a separate state, but it could also refer to a 
nation state* i'rom the oontext of the s^eeohes it appears as if he 
used the term to denote existing states* It is possible that later 
propaganda modified the usage of the term making these speeches appear 
more ambiguous now than they did then* Or possibly Asquith was careless 
in his choice of words* Although these remarks caused some confusion on
10 Times, 26 Sept. 1914*
11 The Times. 10 Nov. 1914*
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the subject of war aims, it was never to the advantage of the government 
to clarify its position# Without further evidence, it is necessary to 
assume from the context of his speeches that he was only referring to 
small states# In The Truth About the .treaties David Lloyd George, the
chancellor of the exchequer, in reference to Asquith’s speech quoted
above, stated that*
In effect that declaration merely assured the security of small 
independent countries like Belgium and Serbia against aggression 
of powerful neighbours# But there was nothing in the way of 
emancipating the oppressed races of Europe and the Turkish 
Empire from the bondage imposed upon them by alien conquerors#
It was a war of protection for weak nations against arrogant 
and aggressive militarism and not a war of liberation for 
oppressed races# 12
Churchill, in some of his public statements, went much further than 
Asquith in his comments on nationality# On August 31, 1914, The Times
published the following*
If wo succeed, and if, as a result of our victory, Europe is 
re-arranged, as far as possible with regard to the principle 
of nationality and in accordance with the wishes of the people 
who dwell in the various disputed areas, we may look forward 
to a great relaxation and easement# 13
12 D. Lloyd George, The Truth About the Treaties# London 1938, vol.II,
p#7i>2.
Harry Kanakj in Great Britain and aus t riar-amuaiy/ During the irst 
florid war. London 1962, pp#57-58} in regard to Asquith’s statements 
claims that the 'doctrine of nationality' was accepted as an official 
war aim by the government - whatever that means# In 'The Government, 
the Foreign Office and Austria-Hungary 1914-lf 18,' The Slavonic and 
Last European review. vol.XLVII, Ho#10d, Jan# 1^69, P»l6l, referring 
to the same statements, he implies that they meant something but 
refrains from elaborating# G#A# kacartney and A#fl# B aimer; in 
Independent Eastern Europe# London 1966, p#39? ia referring to these 
statements with overpowering common sense, write that* 'he was thinking 
in tezms, not of self-detexmination, but of collective security; a 
speaker of a few years later, to express the same thought, would 
certainly have used the word "states" in place of "nationalities".
Ho different meaning can be read into other official British pronounce­
ments, couched in similar language#'
13 The Times, 31 Aug. 1914•
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It is not clear whether Churchill was referring to all of Kurope or 
merely to the disputed areas. His remarks were probably inspired by 
the Balkan negotiations in which he was particularly interested* Churchill 
was not stating an aim, a policy or a commitment - this is obvious from 
the text - he was stating a belief, common among officials, that the 
nationality principle, the drawing of political x'rontiers consistent with 
national divisions, was a convenient guide to foreign policy in disputes 
involving subject nationalities in which British interests were not 
directly involved* ‘Ihe idea had some appeal because it was democratic 
with the slight difference that people would be allowed to choose not 
necessarily their form of government but the country in whioh they 
preferred to live. On the basis of previous experience with nationality 
problems, particularly in the Balkans, it was assumed that the application 
of the nationality principle would be the best solution because it would 
satisfy the aspirations of those involved in the disputes, fhe satisfaction 
of national aspirations woulu contribute to the peace ana stability of 
Europe. fhe nationality principle was, therefore, accepted by British 
officials as a means and not an end* In June 1^1 uj  Grey wrote to Bertiei 
'The Allied Powers hope that, as a result of the wax*, the political balance 
in the Balkans will be established on a broader and more national basie, 
and thereby acquire greater stability.’
'fhe nationality principle was to be used uo solve crises and to 
maintain the status quo by allowing for minor adjustments in political 
frontiers. If carried to its logical extreme, the nationality principle 
became national self-determination* the right of each nationality to
14 Grey to Bertie, 19 Jun. 1915, f“»0. 371-226&-79008.
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constitute a state and choose its own form of government. The two terms 
often used interchangeably, might have been theoretically consistent, but 
were certainly different in practice. The application of national self- 
determination would have involved a complete revolution in the structure 
of Europe. The foreign office might use the nationality principle when 
it was expedient, but it could not accept national self-determination 
because it had neither the power nor the desire to revolutionize Europe.
The foreign office dealt in compromise and the art of the possible, not in 
theoretical absolutes. The acceptance of the nationality principle was, 
in essenoe, the acceptance of a very limited and pragnatic form of national 
self-determination.
Yet in 1914, it was not an iBsue, and if attitudes existed in the 
cabinet on national self-determination, there is almost no evidence of 
them. But the Liberals, imbued with the traditions of Gladstone, were 
sympathetic to nationalities struggling to be free. John Stuart taill 
had written*
When the sentiment of nationality exists in any force, there is 
a prlma facie case for uniting all members of the nationality 
under the same government, and a government to themselves apart.
This is merely saying that the question of government ought to 
be decided by the governed. ^5
Asquith had admired Garibaldi and had sympathized with the struggle
for Italian unityChurchill, Grey, and Lloyd George all professed
17sympathy for nationalism. In 1914 if they had been asked, in a purely
15* J.S. Mill, Utilitarianism, Liberty. Representative Government, London
1968, pp.360-361.
16
R. Jenkins, Asquith, London 1964, pp*18-19•
17 Times, 21 Sept. 1914.
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hypothetical sense, whether they would like to see Europe divided according
to nationality, they might well have eaid yes. If they had been asked
whether Britain should enforce such a division, they would have undoubtedly
eaid no. To answer otherwise would have been insanity because iirit&in so
obviously lacked the necessary power. Sympathy is seldom of any value,
but the attituae of the government made it ver., susceptible to the doctrine
of national self-determination. The situation might be quite different
if the government ever had the opportunity and the power to champion
national self-determination.
The adherents of liberal nationalism disagreed with the offioial
interpretation of the war in believing that it was caused, not by Prussian
militarism, but by the failure of the European system to satisfy national
aspirations. Unlike the officials, who had practical considerations,
they believed that national self-determination should be applied to Europe.
The disagreement was not on basic principles, but in degree and emphasis —
between the practical and the theoretical.
In 1914 the liberal nationalists set out to convert the government
to the doctrine of national self—determination. Their case was presented
in a collection of essays published shortly after the outbreak of war
called The Aar and democracy. In the introduction Alfred Zimmern,
formerly a fellow of New College Oxford, stated:
The political causes of the present war, then, and of the half 
century of Armed Peace which preceded it are to be found, not 
in the particular schemes and ambitions of any of the governments 
of Europe, nor in their secret diplomacy, nor in the machinations 
of the great armament interests allied to them, sinister though 
all these may have been, but in the nature of some of those 
governments themselves, and in their relations to the peoples 
over whom they rule. 1©
18 — ■ - a  - i- 1 1 - 1
A.E. Ziimnem, 'Introductory1, 'The War and hemocraoy, London 1914, 
pp.8-9«
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In one of the essays entitled 'The Issues of the War', Robert W.
Eeton-Watson, the author of a number of works on Hungary, wrote* ’The
Europe which we have known has gone beyond recall; the new Europe which
is coming to birth will be scarcely recognisable to those who have known
19its predecessor'. He went on to suggest that Austria-Hungary should
be broken up by the application of national self-determination. On
nationality he wrote*
The principle of Rationality is not a talisman which will open 
all gates, for in some parts of Europe the different races are 
so inextricably intermingled as to defy all efforts to create 
ethnographic boundaries. This does not, however, affect the 
central fact that Nationality is the best salve for existing 
wounds, and that its application will enormously reduce the 
infected area. 20
'The liberal nationalists supported the continuance of the war to a 
decisive conclusion even more strongly than some of the officials. Such 
support was necessary on the part of anyone who wanted access to the 
government because the officials could tolerate some disagreement but 
not opposition to the war itself. While the pacifists lost all influence 
in official circles by their opposition to the war, the liberal nationalists 
were able, despite disagreements, to increase their influence. Their 
absolute support of the war made them valuable to the government in its 
propaganda campaign. Vhen the emigres began to work in Britain for national 
self-determination, they found the liberal nationalists, some of whom they 
had known from before the war, valuable allies because of their official 
contacts and their knowledge of British politics. These allies were able 
to act as advisers and as links between the officials and the emigres.
1 9---------------------------------------------------------------------




While the government did not consider national self-determination, 
the future of Austria-Hungary, and other related questions of war aime 
and the future of eastern Europe, developments were taking place at the 
lower echelons of the administration which would bring these questions to 
its attention. The committee of imperial defense had decided, because 
of administrative and logistic problems, that in the event of war only 
enemy aliens considered dangerous would be interned. In 1914 the plan
broke down because of the spy scare find the nervousness of the war office
at the thought of enemy aliens being at large. The authorities began to 
intern all enemy aliens fit for railitaiy service, but the task was found
almost impossible because of the number of aliens and the lack of
facilities. Among the energy aliens were Poles. Czechs, Slovaks, Slovenes, 
Croats and Serbs who were citizens of enemy countries but were, in fact, 
friendly to the cause of the Entente.
In September 1914 two Polish organizations, the Polish Information 
Committee and the Polish Society of London, separately approached the home 
office and offered their assistance in determining which Poles could be 
trusted and therefore not interned. They wanted the authorities to 
recognize Polish nationality, to exempt those Poles considered trustworthy 
from internment, and to give their organizations the authority for the 
issuing of certificates of nationality to the exempted Poles. These 
manifestly unorthodox proposals were not well received by the home office 
officials who seemed to take an immediate dislike to the Polish organizations. 
Polish nationality could not be legally recognized nor could the government 
authorize the use of certificates of nationality which would constitute 
de facto recognition. Despite certain doubts as to the authority of 
these organizations to speak for the resident Poles, some concessions were
25
made. In reply to a question in the house of commons on September 10,
1914; the home secretary, Reginald McKenna, announced#
It is not at present possible in law to recognize ’’Polish
nationality” as distinct from the nationality of the Sovereign 
State of which residents in the various parts of Poland are 
subjecte. Jut in the administration of the Aliens Restriction 
order, all possible consideration will be shown to those persons 
of Polish race who, though technically ’’alien enemies” are in 
fact friendly to this country. 21
The foreign office agreed with McKenna’s pronouncement but emphasized, 
in a letter to the home office, that it was undesirable to give any further
recognition to Polish nationality or to self-appointed organisations like
22the Polish Information Committee. The 'all possible consideration' 
mentioned by McKenna was left to the discretion of the commissioner of 
the Metropolitan police, Sir cdward Henry. A police memorandum written 
a year later on the xolish Information Committee recounted his action as 
follows#
It was then necessary for the Commissioner to obtain same
assistance in dealing with the Poles under the A.R.O.
/Aliens Restriction Order/ and he consulted Mr. Wickham Steed 
/foreign editor/ of the Times. He also consulted the Russian 
Embassy and the opinion of both was that the Polish Information 
Committee was the best body to deal with. 23
It appears from what happened later, that the Serbian ministry and
the London Czech Committee also approached the police on behalf of the
Austrian Lerbs and Czechs. Since Wickham Steed had closer relations with 
the Czechs than with the Poles, it is possible that when consulted by the
21
The evidence on the initial relations between the joles and the home 
office is in H.O. 45-10740-262173* Since many of the papers are 
missing and the information is on the file covers, individual papers 
are not cited.
22 Law to H.O., 9 Oct. 1914, H.O. 45-10740-262173*
2 3
Memorandum on Polish Information Committee, 22 Dec. 1915* Mepol. 2-1635* 
H.W. i teed, Through Thirty Years, London 1924, vol.II, p«41*
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police he also recommended special treatment for the Czechs. It is an 
interesting coincidence that Steed, an associate of B.W. Seton-Wataon and 
an ardent campaigner for national self-determination, was consulted by the 
police. It is not surprising that the advice he gave was very favourable
to the emigres.
On October 30, 1914, the commissioner formulated a comprehensive
policy for the treatment of enemy aliens friendly to the Entente* Enemy
aliens approved by authorized organizations would be exempt from internment
but not from the other regulations of the Aliens Restriction Order* The
Serbian ministry, the Polish Information Committee, and the London Czech
Committee were selected as the agencies to vouch for the Austrian Serbs,
the Poles, and the Czechs respectively. While the Polish Information
Committee had been approved by the Russian embassy, the London Czech
Committee had no suoh sponsor. According to the commissioners
There are strong reasons why this group should be treated with 
consideration. Unfortunately no Diplomatic guarantee is 
possible in this case, but Mr. Wickham Steed vouches implicitly 
for the honour and good faith of Mr. Kopecky /of the London 
Czech Committee/ who is competent to answer for the names put 
forward. 24
25
On November 3, 1914, the home office approved the police policy.
It appears that similar provisions were not made at this time for the
Yugoslavs, possibly because they were not as quick as the others in
26approaching the government. On the recommendation of the foreign office,
2lf Henxy memorandum, 30 Oct. 1914, H.O. 40760-269116.
Troup (H.O.) to Henry, 3 ^ov. 1915, H.O. 45-l°760-2691l6.
26 Yugoslav refers to Habsburg subjects who supported the creation of a 
Yugoslav state. Citizens of the kingdom of Serbia are referred to as 
Serbians. The Serbian government supported the idea of a 'Greater 
Serbia' which meant merely the expansion of the Serbian kingdom. The 
Yugoslavs supported the idea of the creation of a federal Yugoslav 
state whioh might or might not include Serbia.
however, exemption from police detention was given to one Yugoslav, a
Croat from Dalmatia, named Frano Cupilo. George Clerk, a senior clerk
in the war department of the foreign office, explained this request to
Sir basil Thomson of Scotland Yard by saying that bupilo might be valuable
27
to the Allied cause. * Measures for the protection of other Yugoslavs 
were not, however, initiated at this time.
In December 1914, the home office and the war offioe gave permission 
to the representatives of the London Czech Committee to visit the internment
camps to arrange for the release of friendly Czechs who had been interned
28before the policy of exemption had been implemented.4' A similar request
by the Polish Information Committee in January 1915 was refused by the
29
war office. The evidence, although meagre, suggests a pro-Czech, anti- 
Polish bias.
The home office and the police acted almost entirely alone in making 
these decisions. Foreign office approval was necessary because of the 
danger of international complications, but it had been given in a general
30
sense on October 9> 1914, before the detailed policy had been formulated. 
During November and December the foreign office seems to have known the 
general trend of home office policy without knowing the details.^ It 
was as late as January 12, 1915 > that the home office, in response to an
enquiry, informed the foreign office of the exact policy on the treatment
32of friendly alien enemies.
27 Thomson to Hardinge, 27 Feb. 1917, P.O. 371-2862-52214.
pQ
'Home Office Circular to Chief Constables', 15 Dec.1914, H .O.45-10761-
269578.
29 Cubitt to Polish Information Committee, 24 Jaa.1915* Mepol. 2-1635*
30 Law to H.O., 9 Oct. 1914, H.O. 45-10740-262173*
&  Grey to Fpring Rice, 17 Nov. 1914, F*0. 115-1776-400.
H.O. to Nicolson, 12 Jan. 1915> H.O. 45-1076l-269p78.
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The home office and the police had no interest in foreign polio? and 
were not lenient because of humanitarian considerations. 'The? were 
concerned with the xaagpituue of the alien problem and wanted to reduce 
the numbers interned* It was a problem of administration and security,
not foreign policy. In the context of the whole war, the problem was
trivial) out the policy was to have important repercussions. The 
decision not to intern all enemy aliens enabled the emigres to move freely 
and work, with a minimum of inconvenience. The campaign for national self- 
determination could not have been fought from an internment camp* The 
future relations between the government and the nationality organizations 
all rested on this initially unimportant polio? adopted in October 1914 
by men who had no connection with foreign policy. Their decisions made 
the campaign for national self-determination possible.
The foreign office had good reason to approve the home office policy 
on the treatment of aliens. While the home office was considering the 
problems of internment, the foreign office was being approached by emigres 
representing the subject nationalities of eastern *urope, each with a 
programme for national liberation. The officials were well aware that 
these emigres were too valuable to be interned.
The partition of Poland tended to unite Germany, Russia and Austria- 
Hungary because they shared the desire to maintain the existing Polish 
settlement In war, however, Poland could become a problem because each 
empire would be tempted Co use the Poles against the others. The Russian 
government made the first attempt to win Polish support during the war 
when Grand Duke Hikolai Hikolaievich, the commander-ir*»chief of the Russian 
anny, issued a proclamation to the Poles on August 7? 1914, promising 
unity and autonomy as a result of the war. The proclamation had only
29
limited effect in Poland because many of the Poles would never be satisfied 
with autonomy and could never trust the Russian government.
The foreign office received the news with approval because of the 
prospect of Polish support and the possible advantages of a more satisfactory 
settlement of the Polish problem. According to Sir Eyre Crowe, an assistant 
under-secretary of states 'There would however be real attraction to Poles 
in any scheme under which all the Polish nation was united and I consider 
the Russian proclamation a statesmanlike move in the right direction'.33 
The proclamation was also welcomed because of its propaganda value; on
August 14, 1914, Grey approved a suggestion that it should be cabled in
34full to the American newspapers.
It was dangerous for the foreign office to give more than silent 
approval of the actions of the Russian government on a question which, 
regardless of other interpretations of international law, the Russians 
considered to be a matter of internal policy. The sensitivity of the 
Russian government on all matters related to Poland made the Polish problem 
one of the most dangerous political issues to confront the Entente during 
the war. If Poland was not an issue, the three empires might, as in 
1914, come into conflict regardless of their mutual desire to maintain 
the Polish settlement. But, if tneir interests in Poland were threatened 
from the outside, there would be good reason for the three empires to sink 
their other differences and unite in defense of the status quo in Poland.
It could be the germ of a separate peace between Russia and the Central 
powers if Prance or Britain even appeared to consider a solution to the
33 Crowe minute, 14 Aug. 1914, P.O. 371-2095-39209.
34 T. Healy to Grey, 16 Aug. 1914, P.O. 371-2095-39631
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Polish problem not entirely consistent with Russian interests* Since 
defeat of the Central powejrs without Russian support was impossible, the 
alliance with Russia was far more important than the welfare of the Poles* 
The British had good reason to adopt a policy consistent with and in 
support of Russian policy in Poland, but since the Russians considered it 
a matter of internal policy, that meant that Britain could have no Polish 
policy at all*
When Dr* Josef Hettinger, representing a committee of conservatives
in Warsaw under the leadership of Count Zamoyski, asked the British
government on August 31, 1914, to guarantee the Russian promises on Poland,
the foreign office quite naturally reacted unfavourably. Bettinger was
not particularly important in Polish politics but had the advantage,
because he had numerous contacts in Britain, of being the first credible
Polish politician to approach the foreign office*3^ Clerk, who interviewed
him, replied to his requesti 'that a guarantee to Poland from France and
Great Britain of Russian sincerity was out of the question and that it
was impossible for the two fonner countries to imply any doubt of the good
faith of their ally*. But Clerk did not believe in discouraging the Poles*
I would however submit with all deference that it is well worth 
while to get Polish feeling wholeheartedly with us and that if 
an occasion offers itself of welcoming the measure announced by 
the Grand Duke Nicholas in a way which can be made known in
Poland it would have an encouraging effect there and would make
it morally difficult for Russia to evade her pledge* 36
35 ‘
Interview with August Zaleski, president of the republic of Poland,
13 August 1969* A. Bennett, The Journals of Arnold Bennett, vol*II, 
1911-1921, London 1952, p*102. Also see below, pp. 134-35* Hettinger 
had a long but mysterious career in Polish politics. Because he worked 
as an independent he was not in the future, despite his contacts, 
taken seriously by the government*
36 Clerk minute, 31 Aug. 1914, F.0* 371-209>46074*
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Crowe disagreed, while kicolson stated emphatically» 'We should leave
this matter alone* I was ashed to see this gentleman but declined to
have anything to do with so foolish a matter*1 They were probably
thinking of the danger to the Entente in British involvement with the
Poles, but they were overruled by Urey who wrote * 'I do not think he
should be snubbed* Mr* Clerk might tell him that H*M* Govt* were in
thorough sympathy with the Russian manifesto and that it was welcomed
cordially by public feeling here*. Clerk followed Grey's instructions in
37a letter to Hettinger which he was later given permission to publish*
But not every Pole was as well received by the foreign office* The Polish 
Society of London and a group of Poles in the United States offered to 
form a legion to fight for the Entente but the war office, with the approval
■jO
of the foreign office, rejected the idea* The time had not yet cane
for the adoption of unorthodox methods of warfare. Even if the war office
had been more daring, the Russian government would have never tolerated
the formation of Polish units in the British anay.
On behalf of the Polish Information Committee, the organization
co-operating with the Metropolitan police, M.G* de Resco-Bogdanowicz
submitted a number of memoranda to the foreign office arguing in favour
39of the independence of Poland* At the same time the foreign office 
was warned by Miss Laurence Alma-Tadema, an authoress and daughter of the
37 Clerk to Rettinger, 4 Sept* 1914, P.O. 371-2095-46074* Clerk to 
Rettinger, 11 Sept. 1914, P.O. 371-2095-47287* 
3^  Reichel to U*0., 27 Aug. 1914, Cubitt (w.O*) to Reichel, 3 Sept. 1914, 
H.O. 45-1^740-262173* Spring lice to Grey, 4 ttov. 1914, F*0.115-1960-15*
3^  Hesco-Bogdanowicz memorandum, 19 Sept. 1914, P.O. 371-2095-50881*
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painter 8ir Lawrence Alma-Tadema, that Bogdanowicz was unreliable and
should not be taken seriously.^ Alma-fauama was known to be well-
acquainted with the Polish community in London and therefore spoke with
some authority* The foreign office- seemed to consider her reliable,
probably because she was well-known and possibly because she appeared
more respectable than a socialist like Bogdanowicz. Acting on Alma-
Tadema's advice, the foreign office gave no encouragement to Bogdanowicz
who, in any case, appears to have made a bad impression* The variety
of Poise to approach the foreign office and the political disputes which
split the Polish community caused Harold kicolson, a member of the war
department, to writes
It is characteristic of Polish politics that several self-styled 
representatives of Polish feeling have all produced different 
schemes as to the future of Poland. In this connexion I heard 
yesterday that M. Filipowicz who had been in correspondence 
with the F*0* has gone off his head and had to be placed in an 
asylum. 41
The foreign office maintained contact with Poles like Hettinger who 
appeared to merit serious consideration while it discouraged others like
Bogdanowicz* The feuding among the Poles made a bad impression and doubts
/  /remained as to the right of any of the emigres to represent the Polish 
community. But contact had been established with the Polish emigres 
which could serve as the basis for more complex relations. When Grey 
decided not to snub Hettinger, he was making a decision to maintain and 
foster contacts with the ioles* In spite of Hussia, Britain was to have 
a Polish policy. In public, the government would always act with the 
greatest care not to upset the Hussians by making statements on Poland
AO
Alma-Tadema to Arthur Hicolson, 8 tept. 1914 > F*0. 371-2095-47911• 
^  Harold Nicolson minute, 12 Bov. 1914» F*0. 371-1900-69905*
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inconsistent with Russian policy. In private, the government would act 
independently of the Russians in fostering contacts with the Polish emigres* 
i ince the Poles might be useful) the government was maximizing its 
alternatives by supporting Russian policy in appearance but not in reality* 
The future value of the Poles was not immediately obvious, but the trans­
mitting of the Brand Luke’s proclamation to the American newspapers 
indicates that the foreign office might have realized their potential 
value in propaganda.
The contact between the British exponents of national self-determination 
and the foreign office began sometime in September 1914 when Wickham Steed 
introduced Seton-WatBon to Georg© Clerk* Sine© the foreign office was 
involved in negotiations in the Balkans and interested in the potential 
conflict between Serbia and Italy in the Adriatic, Clerk asked Seton-Watson, 
as an expert, to write a memorandum on the South S l a v s S i n c e  there is 
no official record of the request, Clerk was probably acting on his own 
initiative* At about the same time G#M* Trevelyan, am authority on 
Italy and a supporter of national self-determination, recommended Seton-
A \
Batson as am expert on the South Slavs to Harold Mcoleon*
In the memorandum, submitted October 2, 1914, Seton-Watson attacked 
both nustro-Hungarian rule over the South Slavs and Italian olaime in 
Lalmatia* tie stated that the best solution to the problems of this area 
of the Balkans would be the creation of a federal Yugoslav state consisting 
of Serbia, Montenegro, Bosnia, Herzegovina, Croatia, Slavonia, Lalmatia 
and the Slovene territories. According to his own interpretation, this 
42
H*W* Seton-Watson, Masaryk in bn^and, Cambridge 1943, P*39*
 ^Harold tiicolson minute, 20 Oct. 1914, F*0. 371-1905-55136.
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programme was consistent with British policy*
The abstract principle already laid down by Sir Edward Grey,
Mr. Asquith and Mr. Churchill in their apeechee since the 
outbreak of war - that in any settlement due regard must be 
shown for the^principle of nationality - only requires to be 
translating into concrete facts. 44
On receiving the memorandum Clerk merely noted that 'eton-Watson 
was an apostle of the Slavs, but Arthur Ricolson stated* Via*. Seton-Watson 
is one of the ver., few who comprehends the Southern Slav question, and his 
views should be treated with sound respect.' He added that on the basis 
of his own experience he agreea with Eeton-V«atson and concluded: 'When
the terms of peace come to be discussed and the rearrangement of the Dual 
Monarchy's possessions has to be considered we should keep these remarks 
of it. Seton-Watson in mindl'
On the outbreak of war a number of Yugoslav politicians left the 
Habsburg monarchy to work for Yugoslav independence. They quickly 
realized that war presented the opportunity for which they had been waiting. 
Some of the emigres went to Italy where they were watched by the ambassador 
in Rome, Sir Rennell Rodd, who kept the foreign office informed of their 
activities. '  The most important emigre was Frano Supilo, a Croat from 
Dalmatia, who as a journalist and politician had fought for the Yugoslav
cause. In October 1914 he arrived in Britain and by the special request
46
of the foreign office was exempted from police detention. In December 
Clerk asked him to submit his views to the foreign office in a memorandum 
and later, in his report, said of Supilo* 'He speaks with great and real
44 Seton-Watson memorandum, 1 Oct. 1914, F.O. 371-1905-55136.
4i> Rodd to Grey, 29 Sept. 1914, F.O. 371-1900-56371.
Thomson to Hardinge, 27 Feb. 1917, F.O. 371-2862-52214* See above,
P.27.
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authority for the Yugo-blavs, and the views he expressed call for serious
47consideration by H.M.G.
In the memorandum, submitted on January 12, 1915? Supilo gave a 
detailed account of conditions in the South ilav areas of Austria-Hungary 
and, rejecting Italian claims in lalmatia as well as any form of Habsburg
rule, proposed the creation of a Yugoslav state* He claimed that the
value of a Yugoslav state would be in its ability to act as a barrier to
JQ
German expansion towards the Hast* " This theory, wnioh had some obvious
appeal to the British, was to become a major theme in Yugoslav propaganda,
especially after the publication in Germany of Friedrich Baumann's
.Aitteleuropa* The foreign office considered the memorandum important
enough to have it printed for the cabinet.
Unfortunately, there are few records from this period of the
government's reaction to the idea of a Yugoslav state. Arthur Nicolson
49undoubtedly agreed with Supilo as he had agreed with Seton-V<atson.
Clerk pointed out the immediate value of the Yugoslavs when he wrote on 
the filet
The time is not yet come for a detailed consideration of these 
questions, - we have still to beat Germany - but their importance, 
particularly as regards Italian pretensions, is great, for here 
lies Serbia's real avenue to progress and the justification for 
the cession to Bulgaria whioh can alone secure for us united 
Balkan support.
P.B. Ostovic, The Truth About Yugoslavia. Hew York 1952, P*56, sa^e 
that bupilo was introduced to the foreign office by Seton-Watson and 
Wickham bteed and that he also saw Asquith. There is no evidence in 
the Asquith papers or in the official documents of what transpired 
during the interview. Clerk minute, 31 Tec. 1914, F .0.371-1900-8B470. 
Steed, Thirty Tears, p*53«
AR
L ° bupilo, 'Memorandum Respecting the Southern Slavs', 7 Jan. 1915t
P.O. 371-2241-4404.
49
Arthur Hicolson minute, 4 Oct. 1914, P.O. 371-1905-55136. See above, 
p.34.
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The idea of a Yugoslav state might have had some appeal because of
its own intrinsic merits. That appeal was strongly reinforced, as Clerk
pointed out, by the fact that the Yugoslav prograireae might help to promote
the negotiations in progress in the Balkans and particularly those to
bring Bulgaria into the war on the Allied side. The Yugoslav areas
could be used to compensate Serbia for concessions to Bulgaria* Clerk
did not record hie views on the future of Austria-Hungary, but Arthur
50
Bicolson assumed that it would not survive the war. Both Clerk and
fiicolson accepted the Yugoslav programme, but that constituted nothing
more than personal opinion and in no way reflected government policy.
The government took heed of the Yugoslavs, but remained uncommitted.
Arthur Bicolson accurately represented official opinion on the discussion
of war aims when he wrote)
it is too early to discuss these probleine, as I myself am 
convinced that this campaign will be a long one. It is no 
use our talking of terms of peace until we havs brought 
Germany into the position when she will be forced to accept 
any terms that we may offer, anu it will be a long time before 
we are able to bring her into that position. 51
On November 5> 1914, Seton-Watson submitted to the foreign office a 
memorandum entitled 'The Future of Bohemia1 which was based on conversations 
in Rotterdam with Thomas Masaryk, the leader of the Czech Realist party 
and soon to be the leader of the Czechoslovak emigre movement* The
memorandum proposed the creation of a new state in central L.urope consisting
52
of uohemia, Moravia,.Silesia, and the Slovak districts of Hungary* The 
^ } Nicolson to Buchanan, 8 Jan. 1915* F*0. 800-377*
Jl ibid*
^  Seton-Watson, 'The Future of Bohemia', 5 Nov. 1914, F*0*371—1900-67456•
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idea must have seemed incredible in 1914 for Cleric was prompted to reassure 
the foreign office by writing on the file* ’Hasaryk is a man of great 
weight among the Czechs, and the ideas here advanced are Lerious and worth 
hearing in mind’ . It was too earl,/ even to comment on the subject, but 
at least Maearyk gave the foreign office something to ponder*
Like the home office, the foreign office seemed to show, from the 
ver,y beginning, a preference for the Czechoslovaks anu ths Yugoslavs but 
not for the Poles. The explanation may be that the former were strongly 
supported by Wickham Steed, Seton-Watson and Trevelyan, while the latter 
had to act alone without the support of men respected by the officials*
The Polos also made a bad impression by their attacks on one another, 
while the others seemed to act in perfect harmony* Indeed, the Czecho­
slovaks and the Yugoslavs worked together in Britain as they had done
53before 1914 within the Habsburg monarchy* These preferences were to 
become more pronounced and more significant later*
53 Hasaryk was influential among the South Slavs before the war and had 
assisted Supilo in the Friedjung trial* Connections between the 
Czechs, Yugoslavs, and some of their English allies had been 
established before 1914 which explains the speed of development of 
the movement in Britain after the outbreak of war* V. Dedijer,
The hoad to Sarajevo, London 1966 , p*179s Seton-Watson,
Masaryk in England> London 1943, P*17« The Serbian Belief Fund, 
established in September 1914, brought together many who favoured 
national uelf-determination and gave them some form of organization* 
Wickham Steed also held weekly meetings, every Saturday afternoon, 
in which strategy was co-ordinated. These meetings were attended 
by the representatives of a number of eastern European nationalities* 
Early in 1919 Gzech national Committee and the Yugoslav Committee 
were formed and assumed the leadership of their respective national­
ities while co-operating with each other* The details of these 
organizations and their activities can be found in Harry lianak’s 
Great Britain and Auetria-Hun^ary during the First World War* London 
1962, which is a thorough study of these two nationality organizations*
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The war made the creation of Czechoslovak:, Polish and Yugoslav states 
possible* The leaders of these nationalities were the first to realize 
the new possibilities presented by the war, and the,/ immediately began 
to work for national independence. The government w&b too involved in 
the immediate problems created by the war to give any thought to many of 
the new alternatives in foreign policy. Official thought concentrated 
on issues in western not eastern Europe* The emigres took the initiative 
in establishing contact with the government and began the process of 
informing it of the nev; alternatives in eastern Europe* The government 
responded with cautious interest and some encouragement. Although 
definitive evidence is lacking, the encouragement probably stemmed from 
the realization that the Poles would be useful in propaganda, while the 
Yugoslavs would be useful in the Balkan negotiations.
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Chapter II
Yugoslavia in the Balkan Kegotiations* 1914-1915
Whan the British government was approached by the emigres, it accepted 
no commitments to national self-deteimination because there was no immediate 
advantage in adopting utopian programmes for the future of Burope. Commit­
ments were avoided unless they were expedient* Since the government had 
no specific war aims in eastern Europe, it was not compelled to adopt 
strategy to produce specific results, but could ub§ political issues to 
support military policy. During the Balkan negotiations, from August 1914 
to December 1915, strategic necessity and the nationality principle 
influenced the formation of British policy* Since nationalism appeared 
to be the root of Balkan problems, the nationality principle represented 
to the British a political consideration for the future* Yet when the 
nationality principle came into conflict with strategic necessity, the 
latter determined policy*
/ /
The relations between the government and the Yugoslav emigres 
developed within the context of the Balkan negotiations because they 
temporarily gave the Yugoslavs a position of importance. Those officials 
who were aware of the Yugoslavs showed a distinct preference for the 
creation of a Yugoslav state. Yet such a preference, while influencing 
policy, by itself was not enough to determine policy. When it was 
advantageous, the government did not hesitate to sacrifice Yugoslav 
aspirations. When the Yugoslav program ie was consistent with British
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Balkan policy, and when it presented valuable opportunities in the
negotiations, it was supported by the government. The future of Austria-
Hungary was never a serious consideration.
In August 1^14, all of the Balkan states, except Serbia and dontenegro,
remained neutral awaiting a suitable opportunity to take advantage of the
hostilities. The overweening territorial ambitions of these states and
their mutual hatred made the recently established status quo highly
unstable. - erbia, Greece, and Buoania were on good terms because they
shared the desire to retain the territories they had taken from Bulgaria
in the seoond Balkan war. Bulgaria wanted revenge and the return of
the lost territory. Serbia and montenegro supported the Entente, Greeoe
favoured the Entente, Bumania was neutral and Bulgaria was pro-Austrian.
'The belligerents saw in the Balkan neutrals potential allies and were
willing to pay for their support. The neutrals were willing to be
bought by the highest bidder*
The Entente hoped to create a Balkan league of Greece, Serbia, Bulgaria
and I lanania directed against the Central powers.*" If the Balkan powers
fought one another, there would be no advantage in their participation in
the war. If, however, they formed a league, as they had against Turkey
in 1912, their combined military strength might be enough to tip the
2
balance in favour of the Entente. In order to facilitate the formation 
of a league, the Allies were willing to offer enemy territory to the 
Balkan states.^ According to Churchill«
* Asquith to George V, 11 Aug. 1914» Cab 41-35-27•
^ Grey to Bax-Ironside, 13 Aug. 1914, 371-190G-38675*
 ^Asquith to Grey, 17 Jan. 1915» 800-100.
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It is only by reclaiming from Austria territories which belong 
naturally to the Balkan races that the means can be provided, to 
satisfy the legitimate needs and aspirations of all the Balkan 
states. Without taking Austrian territory, there is no way by 
which any Balkan state can expand except by internecine war. 4
If a league was to be formed, Serbia, Greece, and possibly Rumania
would have to make concessions to Bulgaria to compensate for the losses
in the second Balkan war. The Entente offered enemy territory to Serbia
and Greece as an Inducement to make concessions to Bulgaria but, in the
5
first months of the war, the policy met with no success.^ A possible
alternative was to exert pressure on Greece and Serbia, but Grey refused
to adopt cuoh methods for fear of alienating them.^
By February 1915, a Balkan league was as unattainable as it had been
in August 1914* Arthur tficolson had the best explanation for the failures
'these wavering Balkan states will not be influenced by promises or
assurances but will be guided simply by the events of the war and by their
7
estimate as to which combination is likely to be the winning one ••••* 
Despite the lack of progress in the negotiations, the belief persisted 
that a Balkan league could be created. It was assumed by the British 
that if Balkan territory could be redistributed along national lines, 
thus eliminating the disputes between the Balkan states, a league could 
be formed. It was this assumption which prompted Grey to tell the
4 W.S. Churchill, The World Crisis. 1911-1914. London 1923, pp.486-7.
^ Bax-Ironeide to Grey, 24 Aug. 1914, F.O. 371-1900-42748•
 ^Grey minute, Hicolson to Grey, 23 Sept. 1914, F.O. 371-1901-52127- 
Grey to Bertie, 17 Aug. 1914, F.O. 371-1900-40166. Grey to Buchanan,
3 Sept. 1914, F.O. 371-1901-45931. Grey to Des Graz, 5 Feb. 1915,
F.O. 371-2242-15388.
 ^Hicolson minute, Buchanan to Grey, 4 Sept. 1914, F.O. 371-1901-46469*
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Bulgarian rainieter* ’that I was as favourable to Bulgaria getting 
districts which were Bulgarian as I was to Serbia getting districts that 
were Serbian. I was in sympathy with the national aspirations of Bulgaria
Q
on national lines.’ The foreign office raw in the Yugoslav programme a
possible solution to Balkan problems because, if Serbia was offered the
Yugoslav territories of Austria-Hungary, the Serbian government might be
9
willing to give Macedonia to Bulgaria. Macedonia was a necessary part 
of either a Greater Serbia or a Greater Bulgaria but not of a Yugoslavia. 
Therefore, a Greater Bulgaria could not co-exist with a Greater Serbia, 
but could with a Yugoslavia. If the Serbian government would abandon the 
Greater Serbian programme in favour of the Yugoslav programme, the aspir­
ations of both Serbia and Bulgaria could be satisfied and a league could 
be formed. During the negotiations, the British government, under the 
influence of the Yugoslavs, overestimated the strength in Serbia of the 
exponents of Yugoslavism. The flaw in the British approach to the Serbo- 
Bulgarian problem was that the Serbian government was never willing to 
abandon the Greater Serbian programme and therefore never willing to cede 
Macedonia to Bulgaria.
On February 19? 1915? the British navy began the campaign against 
the Dardanelles. Following Nicolson's theory that diplomacy would be 
influenced by the course of the war, the campaign was undertaken, among
8 Grey to ilax-Ironside, 13 i’.b. iyl5, 7.0 . 371-2242-17234.
9
Clerk minute, Supilo, ’Memorandum Respecting the Southern Slavs’, 7 Jan. 
1915? *•<>• 371-2247-4404.
Lederer, Yugoslavia at the Paris Peace Conference. London 19&3? 
PP«4-5* 0stovi6. Yugoslavia, p.58.
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other reasons, in the hope that a serious military defeat of Turkey would
induce Bulgaria to join the Entente.^ On February 13, 1915, Grey wrote
optimistically to Buchanans
To reinforce my point that diplomacy in the Balkans must be 
co-ordinated with strategy} you might point out to M.F.A. 
that if our attack on Dardanelles opens well and makes 
progress next week it will much improve the opportunity for 
diplomatic steps at Sophia and elsewhere. ^
The campaign seemed to have little influence on Bulgaria, but on
xiarch 4, 1915, the Italian government expressed its willingness to join
the Entente in exchange for promises of rather large areas of the tiabsburg
monarchy. Among other things, the Italians wanted Dalmatia which was
inhabited predominantly by South »lavs and coveted by the berbians and
the Yugoslavs. As a result of the work of Seton-Watson and Supilo the
foreign office knew that Italian possession of Dalmatia would be a
violation of the principle of nationality. It was for that reason
considered the most objectionable of the Italian claims. A report from
Buchanan in October 1914 that the Russian government would bitterly
oppose Italian designs in Dalmatia prompted Arthur Nicolson to writes
Mr. basonov ^ Russian foreign minister/ is quite right. Dalmatia 
is Slav and anxious to unite with Croatia-Slavonia and she would 
bitterly resent Italy attempting to incorporate her and we
should have a South Slav question with Italy instead of with 
Austria.
To agree to Italian demands and, thereby, to violate blatantly the 
principle of nationality in dealing with a people as nationalistic as 
the South Slavs could only be considered a most short-sighted policy
11 Grey to Bertie, 11 Mar. 1915, F.O. 800-177*
^  Grey to Buchanan, 13 Feb. 1915* F.O. 800-75*
^  Nicolson minute, Buchanan to Grey, 7 Get. 1914, F*0 . 371-2008-57G95*
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because, as Nicolson pointed out, it would inevitably create problems.
But the foreign office had even more immediate reasons for opposing the
Italian position. The Russian government would certainly oppose the
Italian claim to Dalmatia, and the solidarity of the Entente necessitated
at least some support for the Russian position. If a Balkan league was
to be created by the application of the nationality principle and the
transformation of a Serbian state into a Yugoslav state, the nationality
principle could not be so openly violated by giving Yugoslav territory
such as Dalmatia to Italy. It would hardly induce the Serbian government
to make concessions to Bulgaria. It might also alienate the Yugoslavs
and drive them to support Austria-Hungary against Italy . 'The Habsburg
monarchy would be strengthened, and the Entente would lose potentially
valuable allies* The foreign office waB well aware of this danger, for
Rodd had written that when he asked Supilo how the Southern Slavs would
react to the war* * Supilo replied if you come in the character of
liberator the Slavs will fire in the air as they have been doing in
action against the Russians, but if you come with annexationalist views
they will fight you.**4
mhen the terms were first received by the foreign office, Clerk wrotet
'‘This, to my mind, is quite inadmissable. On the basis of nationality
15and local sentiment, there is no foundation for the Italian claim**
Arthur Nicolson agreed and warned Grey of the dangers involved in agreeing
16
to the Italian demands. At first both Clerk and Nicolson hoped that
14 Rodd to Grey, 9 Dec. 1914, F.O. 8OO-65.
^  Clerk minute, 6 kar. 1915, F.O. 371-2507-28275•
16 Nicolson to Grey, 9 &ar. 1915> F.O. 371-2507-29374. Nicolson to Grey,
22 Mar. 1915, F.O. 371-2507-34055* H. Nicolson, Peacemaking 1919.
London 1933, P*l60.
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the Italians might be kept out of Dalmatia by being promised all of 
17Istria. When this possibility failed, both tended to support the
Hussian opposition to the Italian demands. Clerk and Nicolson, who had
both reacted favourably to the Yugoslav programme, were the two officials
most directly involved in the Italian negotiations and, in so far as there
was a foreign office opinion on the Italian designs in Dalmatia, they were
its representatives. Grey agreed that the Italian demands were excessive,
and on March 17, 1915* be wrote that the claim to Dalmatia*
leaves to Serbia very restricted opportunities and conditions for 
her outlet to the sea and it shuts in the Jugo-Slav provinces who 
have with reason looked to this war to secure for them the 
legitimate possibilities of expansion and development of which 
they have hitherto been deprived. 18
A few days later he wrote to Buchanan that* 'The Prime Minister and
some of my colleagues had discussed the Italian conditions yesterday and
we had all felt that the Italian conditions left no real outlet for Serbia
19or the Jugo-Slavs. • Supilo seems to have influenced Grey, for he wrote
of the Yugoslavs* 'National unity and commercial liberty and opportunity
20was what I would claim for them'. Regardless of such sentiments, which 
may or may not have been sincere, Grey had absolutely no intention of 
opposing the Italian demands for the sake of the Yugoslavs or the Serbians. 
In October 1914, he had been informed that if Italy joined the Entente, 
Rumania would follow suit; the Rumanian intention was confirmed again
^  Clerk minute, Buchanan to Grey, 13 Mar. 1915* F.O. 371-25°7-29374*
^  Grey to Rodd, 8 Mar. 1915* F.O. 371-25°7-30446. Grey to Buchanan,
17 Mar. 1915* F.O. 371-2507-30931.
^  Grey to Buchanan, 20 Mar. 1915* F.O. 371-2507-32897*
20
Grey to Buchanan, 25 ilar. 1915> Cab. 37-126-30.
46
on March 18, 1915*2* On March 4, 1915* he had written to Bertie that 
Italian participation might end the war. Grey was faced with a choice 
between two courses of action, both of which night create a Balkan league. 
He could continue the policy of using Lalmatia as an inducement to the 
Serbians in an attempt to create a £erbo-Bulgarian agreement which would 
lead to a Balkan league. Or, he could accept the Italian position, while 
risking the alienation of Serbia, in the hope that it would create a
chain reaction in the Balkans in which Rumania, then Greece and finally
22Bulgaria would join the Entente. terbo-Bulgarian relations gave little
reason to think that the first course of action would be successful# On
March 22, 1915, Grey clearly stated hi* position to Buchanans
We must therefore decide either to admit the Italian claim or 
forgo the proepect of Italian co-operation. Italian co­
operation will decide that of Roumania and probably some other 
neutral states. It will be the turning point of the war and 
will very greatly hasten a successful conclusion. ^
On March 24, 1915, Asquith wrote to the king* ’The importance of
bringing in Italy without delay appeared to be so great that it was
agreed to give a general consent to what she asks and to press on Russia
24to do the same ...’ During the negotiations Grey did not oppose the
Russian government so openly as to damage the Lntente, but neither would
25
he support the Russian opposition to the Italian claims. ' He sought a
23 Grey to Bertie, 1 Oct. 1914, F.O. 800-71. Barclay to Grey, 18 Mar.1915,
F.O. 371-2243-31886.
22
Grey to Bertie, 4 Mar. 1915, F.O. 371-2375-25017. Grey to Buchanan,
19 April 1915, F.O. 371-2508-46726.
23 Grey to Buchanan, 22 Mar. 1915, F.O. 371-2507-34053*
Asquith to George V, 29 Mar. 1915? Cab. 37-126-21.
2^ Grey to Buchanan, 27 Mar. 1915, F*0* 371-2507-35979*
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compromise and applied pressure on either whenever it seemed necessary*
Although the negotiations were protracted, a compromise was finally
reached largely because of the efforts of the British government. The
Italian claim to Dalmatia was accepted although, due to Russian opposition,
slightly reduced. The treaty of London, signed on April 26, 1915>
promised Italy northern Lalmatia, many of the Laimatian islands, and
other Ilabsburg territories like Cisalpine Tyrol, the Troutine and most
of Istria. The British government played an important role in the
negotiations and shared the responsibility for the final agreement.
There can be no doubt that the policy of the government was based on
immediate strategic considerations, while the future political repercussions
of the treaty, although anticipated, were disregarded. On April 1, 1915*
Ore* had written to Roddi 'Th® Allies have, in order to meet Italy,
allowed serious inroad upon the principle of nationalities, for which they
26
hope this war will secure general recognition.'
The negotiations were supposed to be secret, but on April 3, 1915 j 
Sasonov disclosed the terms to Supilo. According to one account Supilo
tricked Sasonov, but it is equally possible that iasonov leaked the terms
27
intentionally. Since the negotiations were still in progress, he 
might have thought a leak would strengthen his position. His action, 
however, only served to embarrass the Entente and to x^ roduce unfortunate 
reactions among the Serbians and the Yugoslavs who were justifiably 
outraged by the Italian terms. Supilo informed ttickham Steed who, on 
April 14, 1915, wrote: ’My informant adds that the demands are being




vigorously supported by our F.O. This I rather douht, though I have not
28
at the moment any definite information.* phe foreign office had been
so receptive to Yugoslav ideas that the nows seemed incredible.
Steed, 1 eton-Watson, Arthur Evans and the other supporters of the
Yugoslavs immediately began to put pressure on the government to modify
its policy. On April 23, 1915* the campaign began with a letter to
The Times by Seton-Watson in which he vigorously attacked the Italian
claim to lalmatia as a violation of the principle of nationality. If
Italy annexed Balraatia*
In that ©vent the entire population will offer a desperate 
resistance to the Italian invader, and Austria-Hungary, by 
representing the Entente Power* as the ins; irers of an anti- 
Slav conspiracy will have one last chance of rallying her 
disaffected Southern Slav population. For Britain and France 
to yield on this question would not merely destroy for ever 
their prestige and influence in the Balkans, but it would 
also go a long way towards weakening the Entente. ^9
Both NicolBon and Clerk are supposed to have seen the letter and
approved of it before publication. On April 24t 1915* Wickham Steed
wrote: 'It may interest you to know that Seton-Watson's letter has the
complete approval of some very high people in the F.O.'^ Again, on
April 29, 1915, he wrote* 'I begin to understand George Clerk's remark
to Seton-Watson on Monday that unless Italy comes in at once and turns
the scale seriously against Austria and Germany, Grey, Delcasse and
32Sazonof will deserve to be hanged.'
^  Steed to McClure, 14 April 1915> Steed to Robinson, 29 April 1915*
Steed Mss.
29 ‘The Times, 23 April 1915-
---
Interview with Hugh Seton-Watson. A#J • May, "Seton-Watson and the 
Treaty of bondon", Journal of ouorn history. vol.XXIX, no.l, pp#42-48. 
May supplies the information on ilicolson but does not distinguish 
between Arthur and Harold both of whom were capable of such action.
^  Steed to McClure, 24 April 1915* Steed Mss.
^  Steed to Robinson, 29 April 1915 > Steed Mss.
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While there is not enough evidence to clarify Nicolson's role in 
this incident, or even to identify the Nicolson involved, Harold or 
Arthur, the information on Clerk is undoubtedly correct* Although 
Clerk favoured the nationalities, there is reason to believe that he was 
not entirely straightforward in his relations with Seton-Watson* On 
April 9, 1913) he wrote of the Yugoslav reaction to the negotiations}
'We wish the war to be ended as far as possible, on the basis of nation­
alities, certainly', but we did not set out on a Nationality Crusade**33 
Seton-Watson wanted a Yugoslav state because of its own intrinsic merits* 
Clerk may have shared Seton-Watson' s attitude, or he may have only 
supported the idea because it would assist the creation of a Balkan league* 
fie may have exaggerated his support for the Yugoslavs when speaking to 
Seton-Watson in order to maintain contact with him regardless of the 
nature of government policy*
The campaign also involved appeals to those who might be able to 
influence the negotiations, like Count Benckendorff, the Russian
ambassador, Walter Runciman, the president of the board of trade, Asquith 
34and Grey* It was, however, too late for the campaign to affect the 
negotiations with Italy* But the government could not entirely overlook 
the dissatisfaction manifested in the campaign because, if alienated, 
the Yugoslavs could be a great nuisance* The foreign office was warned
by Rodd that attacks in the British press on Italian policy could seriously
35affect Anglo-Italian relations. The Yugoslavs were useful as a source
33 Clerk minute, Buchanan to Grey, 31 Mar* 1915, F*0* 371-2241-41096.
^  David Davies to Seton-Watson, 3 Mey 1915, Seton-Watson Mss. IV.
Evans to Grey, 27 April 1915, P.O. 371-2376-51706. Steed to 
Benckendorff, 25 April 1915, Steed Mss.
35 Rodd to Grey, 28 April 1915, P»0. 371-2376-51340.
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of information on the Balkans and, as Lord Eustace Percy, a member of the 
war department, pointed out in a memorandum on May 2 , 1915* their allies, 
particularly Seton-Watson, were doing valuable work in combating the
anti-war propaganda of the Independent Labour party and the Union of
Democratic Control* Percy warned that it would be not only unfortunate 
but also dangerous to lose this support because the campaign against 
Italy sight assume far greater proportions* He recommended that Seton- 
Watson should be taken into the confidence of the government on the 
assumption that he could be reconciled to government policy.^ Possibly 
as a result of this memorandum, Grey wrote to Seton-Watson on May 3, 1915* 
and saw him on ths following day*
Grey*s reaction to the criticism from the supporters of the Yugoslavs 
might have been influenced by a guilty conscience for agreeing to accept 
terms which he knew would create future problems and for giving Italy 
Yugoslav territories while professing sympathy for their aspirations. No
doubt he wanted to salvage as much as possible from the situation created
by Sasonov's disclosure of the terns. He informed Seton-Watson that as 
a result of an Allied victory Serbia would receive the adjoining Slav 
territory under Austrian rule and wide access to the Adriatic in southern 
Dalmatia$ the terms were not defined precisely but he addeds
i
Hie greater part, at any rate, of the Slav districts will becoras 
free and enabled to settle their own destiny. Whether, for 
instance, Croatia remains an independent state or wishes to unite 
with other Slavs, we presume to be for her to decide* 37
36 Percy minute, 2 May 1915t 800-95*
Grey to Seton-Watson, 3 May 1915> P*0* 800-112* According to Hugh 
Seton-Watson, Grey said the same in the interview as he had written 
in the letter*
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He then pointed out that since the Slavs were going to gain so much,
it was hardly fair of them to deny the Entente the means to achieve
victoiy or to expect the complete satisfaction of their aspirations* As
a result of Grey’s efforts, Seton-Watson and his associates reluctantly
accepted the need for Italian support* The attacks on the treaty
diminished although, to the discomfort of the foreign office, they never
entirely ceased* Grey's action enabled the relations between the
government and the Yugoslavs to continue without impairment, but the price
of reconciliation had been the recognition by Grey of the right of self-
determination for the most important Yugoslav area, Croatia*
It was not enou$i to placate the Jugoslavs, for the Serbian minister
also protested against the rumoured terms of the treaty of London and
there were reports that there was so much dissatisfaction in Serbia that
in some circles, particularly the army* a separate peace with Austria-
Hungary was being considered. To counter this difficulty, Grey sent
a letter to Charles Pes Graz, the minister in Belgrade, who on Gay 7j
1915, with the support of his French and Russian colleagues, delivered
it to Nikola Pabic, the Serbian prime minister. After indicating that
as a result of the successful conclusion of the war Serbia would receive
dosnia, Herzegovina, and wide access to the Adriatic, the letter went on
to state* ’Whether the Federation of Croatia will follow will naturally
39be a matter to be decided by the Croats themselves*’ '  The letter 
seemed to have some pacifying effect on the Serbian government although
38 Dae Graz to Gr*y, 30 April 1915, P.O. 371-2257-52833.
3^ D*b Uraz to Gr*y, 2 May 1915, f.O. 371-25°8-53085. Gray to u.B Graz,
4 May 1915, 371-2257-53757* Des Graz to Grey, 7 May 1915»
F.O. 371-2257-56420. Grey to Rodd, 31 July 1915, F.O. 371-2263-105071.
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no mention was made of the fact that it did not represent any binding
obligation on the part of the British government. Grey had acted on
his own initiative without consulting the cabinet bo that the letter
represented, according to his own interpretation, only a personal, not
official, obligation. It is doubtful whether anyone in the government,
outside of the foreign office, ever knew of the letter which, overshadowed
by later negotiations, was eventually forgotten. The letter was never
considered by the government as representing an official commitment, but
it did eventually have some embarrassing repercussions. Grey was not
to escape the consequences of the deception or stupidity involved in
confusing his official and private roles.
As Grey had hoped, the treaty of London led to negotiations with
Rumania. But these negotiations showed that a chain—reaction among the
Balkan states was not a simple process by which a Balkan league could be
formed. On April 2^, 1915* the Rumanian government signified its
willingness to join the Entente in exchange for southern Bukovina,
Transylvania and the Banat. If the Italians had large appetites, they
were surpassed by the Rumanians whose claims, if accepted, would almost
double the size of their country. The possible effect of these claims
on Austriar-Hungary prompted Arthur fiicolson to writes
We cannot blot Austria and Hungaxy out of the map and convert 
them into large SwitzerlandB with no access to the sea.
Promises hastily made now for an inmediate object will be 
most embarrassing to realize when peace terms come to be 
discussed. 40
The most annoying of the Rumanian claims was for the whole of the 
Banat, the south-west comer of which was inhabited by South Slavs and
40
Mcolson minute, Barclay to Grey, 24 April 1915* F.O. 371-2244-49484.
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bordered on the Danube just across the river from Belgrade# The Serbians
naturally aspired to some cf the Banat so that their capital would not be
adjacent to the territory of a foreign power* The situation was almost
exactly identical to the Italian negotiations with almost the same reasons
for and against the acceptance of the proposed terms# But this time
the foreign office was more aware of the possible Serbian reaction and
more unwilling to facs it.
The negotiations were conducted uiroctly betweon St# Petersburg and
Bucharest with the British government playing only a secondary role.
Grey gave the itussians a free hand except for the stipulation that
Serbian interests in the Banat must be safeguarded/'* He wrote concerning
Serbia to Buchanans 'I could not urge that she should agree to the handing
over to someone else of people of Serbian nationality who were living at
the very doors of her capital.'4c Since the Rumanians would not compromise,
no progress was made in the negotiations through Bay and June# Grey
continued to maintain his position:
I am of opinion that Allies must adhere to their attitude about 
the Banat# Serbian feeling is very excited and resentful over 
offer of Macedonia to Bulgaria, and very suspicious of what has 
been arranged as regards Adriatic coast with Italy# I think 
that it would be neither fair nor prudent to sacrifice Serbian 
interests in the Banat. 43
But the Entente had gone so far in attempting to create a chain
reaction in the Balkans that it could hardly stop now. On June 28,
1915, Clerk pointed out that 'if the advent of Rumania and Bulgaria 
really means the beginning of the end of the war, and still more if it
41 Grey to Buchanan, 10 day 1915, F*0# 371-2258-57127.
4^ Grey to Buchanan, 20 itfay 1915* F.O. 371-2258-63946.
43 Grey to Buchanan, 19 June 1915* F.O. 371-2259-80322.
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means the difference between success and failure in the .Dardanelles,
44then arguments in favour of sacrificing Qreece and Serbia are very strong**
In the first week of July 1913 the Russian government, faced by Rumania's 
complete refusal to compromise, accepted the Rumanian terms with the 
approval of the British government .4  ^ Although the treaty was not 
signed until 1916, and Rumania did not enter the war until then, the tenas 
had been settled in July 1913* '*he Rumanian negotiations were an exact 
parallel with the Italian negotiations in that politically regrettable 
terms were accepted for strategic reasons* Fortunately the negotiations 
remained secret*
At this time the government was still working to prevent friction 
between the Italians and the Yugoslavs. G.M* Trevelyan, the most pro- 
Italian of Seton-Watson's colleagues, was sent by the foreign office to 
Italy to work for an understanding between the Yugoslavs ana the Italians.4 *^ 
On July 22, 1915, he wrote to Herbert Montgomery, as assistant clerk in 
the foreign office* *1 have therefore written to Seton-Watson (with 
whose views I entirely agree) that as a matter of tactics I think that 
he and Evans had better now let the subject rest awhile, in the interest 
of the object they have in view. ,4  ^ Eric Drummond, drey's private 
secretary, also attempted to stop attacks on Seton-watson by A* Cippicio, 
an Italian lecturer at University College, London* The closeness of 
the relations between the government and the Yugoslavs was indicated by
44 Clerk minute, 28 June 1915, F.O. 371-2245-85777- 
Crewe to Bertie, 7 July 1915, F.O. 371-2259-92014*
46 Nicolson to Rodd, 9 June 1915, F.O. 371-2377-72816.
4 ^ Trevelyan t o  Montgomery, 22 J u ly  1913, F .O . 371 -2568-8845°•
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the decision of the home office, with the approval of the foreign office,
to give the Yugoslavs similar rights of exemption from internment as those
4.8
enjoyed by the Czechs and the Poles* The Yugoslav Committee was not 
given quite the same status as the London Czech Committee and the Polish 
Information Committee because instead of operating independently it was 
expected tc work through the tertian ministry* While it can be shown 
that the Yugoslavs were in constant contact with the foreign office 
throughout this period, it is difficult to determine the degree of their 
influence.
The Rumanian refusal to join the Entente in 1915 ended the possibility, 
which had inspired the negotiations, that a Balkan league could be formed 
by a chain reaction among the Balkan states precipitated by the Italian 
declaration of war* The Entente therefore reverted to the earlier policy 
of seeking a Oerbo-Bulgarian agreement in which Serbia would cede to 
Bulgaria, in exchange for support, that part of Macedonia termed the 
uncontested zone in the Serbo-Bulgarian treaty of 1912. In August 1915» 
in an attempt to open negotiations, the four powers of the Entente offered 
to guarantee in precise terms the territories the Serbians could expect 
as a result of the war on condition that the proper concessions were made 
to Bulgaria* The negotiations which preceded the offer to Serbia were 
long and protracted because it was almost impossible to find a formula 
both appealing to the Serbians and acceptable to the four powers of the 
Entente* The conflict centred on Croatia and Slavonia which the Russians 
wanted to promise to Serbia. The Italians objected because they were
^  Nicolrxw to Seton-Watson, 28 July 19I5» Seton-Watson Mes. VIII.
Waller to Bigham, 10 April 1917 H.O. 45-10831-326555.
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reluctant to see a large ilav state created on the Adriatic.4^
The British government, primarily concerned to achieve agreement on 
a note which would be a real incentive to the Serbians to abandon their 
intransigence towards Bulgaria, as usual acted as a mediator between 
Italy and Russia* In the negotiations the foreign office tended to 
favour a solution equivalent to the creation of a Yugoslav state because 
the only possible compensation for the Terbian loss of Macedonia was in 
the Yugoslav areas of the Habsburg monarchy. In the negotiations Grey- 
suggested that Serbia should be promised Slavonia and a guarantee to 
facilitate a union with Croatia, subject to the wishes of the Croatians. 
The refusal of the Italian foreign minister to accept these proposals 
created some embarrassment, for as ercy pointed out; ’*e have already
51pledged ourselves to the "freedom of Croatia" - at least by inference*
Grey was forced to waive his proposals because of the Italian objections, 
but since the note hud to mention Croatia and Slavonia in some form, the 
following clauses were adopted* ’If the future of flavonia is in the 
hands of the Allies at the end of the war*, it shall be assigned to
Serbia***. The future of Croatia ••• is reserved without prejudice to
52be decided at the final peace.*J The note, as it was finally presented 
to the Serbian government, also promised to Serbia, Boenia, Herzegovina,
49 Rodd to Grey, 3 July 1915, F.O. 371-2259-88943* Buchanan to Grey,
9 July 1915, F.O. 371-2259-925^6.
50 Grey to Rodd, 31 July 1915, F.O. 371-2263-105071.
^  Percy minute, Rodd to Grey, 2 Aug. 1915, F.O. 371-2263-10545°*
j 2 Grey to Rodd, 5 Aug. 1915, F.O. 371-2263-106337* Buchanan to Grey,
9 Aug. 1915, F.O. 371-2265-109489. Grey to Dec Graz, 10 Aug. 1915,
F.O. 371-2265-109491. Rodd to Grey, 11 Aug. 1915, Grey to Bertie,
12 Aug. 1915, F.O. 371-2265-111103*
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and wide access to the Adriatic in southern Dalmatia in precise geographical
53terms.'
In Hay, Russia, France and Britain had promised that in the event of 
victory Serbia would receive Bosnia, Herzegovina and wide access to the 
Adriatic, while Croatia would have self-determination. The four power 
note of August might appeal to the Serbians because, for the first time, 
the areas were defined in precise geographical terms and because Slavonia 
was mentioned. But the reference to Croatia in the later note constituted 
less than had been said in May* The note of August also stated that 
these guarantees were subject to Serbian concessions to Bulgaria in 
Macedonia; a condition never previously mentioned. The Serbian government 
would, therefore, have been quite justified in thinking that the Entente 
was now offering less at a far higher price. By making unofficial 
promises Grey had manoeuvred himself into a ridiculous position. The 
note failed to convince the Serbian government to make the desired 
concessions to Bulgaria.
These negotiations show that Italy was beginning to assume in Anglo- 
Yugoslav relations the position of Russia in Anglo-Polish relations. It 
was a role that the Italians were to play for the rest of the war. The 
Italian opposition to the creation of a Yugoslav state made it impossible 
for Britain to openly espouse the Yugoslav cause. It even made Anglo- 
Yugoslav relations Aifficult because the foreign office had to discourage 
the public activities of the Yugoslavs to avoid annoying the Italians. 
Austria-Hungary was never as great an obstacle to Anglo-Yugoslav relations.
The Italian attitude was a source of great annoyance to the foreign
53 Des Graz to Grey, 15 Aug. 1915, F.O. 371-2265-112986.
office which obviously preferred the Yugoslavs, if only because the
Italians were a much greater nuisance. No sooner had Italy joined the
Entente than it began to make negotiations in the Balkans impossible.
Drummond echoed foreign office opinion when he wrote to Grey*
I do not think that the Italian policy as regards Croatia and 
Slavonia is altogether to be trusted and I feel that we ought 
not to identify ourselves with it. konsieur Supilo thinks 
that Italy does not wish to see Croatia and Slavonia Servian 
or federated with Cervia which I am convinced it is our 
interest to encourage. 54
The foreign office might have preferred the Yugoslavs, but it
considered the Italians more important in the conduct of the war.
Whenever there was a conflict of interests between the Italians and the
Yugoslavs, the government supported the Italians. Yet regardless of the
Italian government, relations between the Yugoslavs and the government
continued. A report on August 30, 1915» from Sir Cecil Spring-Rice,
the ambassador in Washington, that the Yugoslav organizations in the
United States were assisting the Bntente by working against German-
inspired strikes in munitions factories supplying the Allies, substantiated
the view that the Yugoslavs were too valuable to be alienated unnecessarily
The foreign office even gave facilities to a Yugoslav agent to recruit
56for the Serbian army in the Couth American Yugoslav settlements. On
behalf of the Yugoslavs in London, Seton-Watson offered to supply the war
57office with information regularly smuggled out of the Central powers.
The emigres had their own courier system which enabled them to maintain 
oontact with their compatriots in Habsburg territoiy. The offer was
Drummond to Grey, 14 Aug. 1915, F.O. 371-2268-112839•
55 Spring-Rice to Grey, 30 Aug. 1915, P.O. 115-1856-39*
56
J Percy minute, 16 Aug. 1915, P.O. 371-2264-113137*
^  Percy minute, 26 Aug. 1915, F*0. 371-2241-115057*
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readily accepted and the information was, in future, channelled through 
the British authorities in Switzerland. These incidents, while not 
necessarily important in themselves, indicate the willingness of the 
Yugoslavs to work for the entente and the confidence placed in them by 
the foreign office.
On August 30, 1915, Grey told Supilo that he was willing, if the 
Serbian government agreed, to promise self-determination to Bosnia,
Herzegovina, southern Dalmatia, Slavonia and Croatia in the event of the
59successful conclusion of the war. Qrey*B proposals on these areas 
in the previous negotiations, if carried out, would have created a 
Yugoslav state unappealing to many of the Jugoslavs because it would 
have been, in essence, merely an enlarged kingdom of Serbia. This 
latest proposal made to Supilo, and undoubtedly inspired by him, was a 
more truly Yugoslav solution since it would give the Yugoslavs the power 
to negotiate a union with Serbia instead of being merely absorbed by it. 
The offer, however, was vetoed by the Serbian government which was more 
interested in a Greater Serbia than in a Yugoslavia.^
Throughout the Balkan negotiations, in all of his references to 
Croatia, Grey insisted that its future must bo determined by the Croats 
themselves. It was an indication of the influence of the Yugoslavs 
because they were the only possible source of the idea} it would never 
have come from Italy, Serbia or Bussia. The only possible explanation 
for his insistence upon such an idea was either his belief in the Yugoslav 
programme or his desire to please the emigres. Although the Yugoslavs
^  ieton- vatson to Clerk, 26 Aug. 191^» F.O. 371-2591-121565• s®® below,
p.71.
59 Clerk minute, 30 Aug. 1915, F.O. 371-2255-12315$•
60 Des Graz to Grey, 5 Sept. 1915, F.O. 371-2258-125871.
60
were in constant contact with mahy of the foreign office officials, it is 
impossible to determine, in most oases, the degree of their influence 
because the necessary connections in the transference of ideas cannot be 
established. Grey’s references to Croatia, and the general preference 
of the foreign office for the Yugoslavs, are at least indications that 
their influence was significant*
On September 1, 1913> Serbia accepted in principle the cession of
the uncontested zone to Bulgaria, thus appearing to fulfill the conditions
stated in the four power note.^* On August 7, 1915> Grey had agreed
that while the uncontested zone must be ceded its borders could be 
62modified* The Serbians used this loop-hole to propose so many 
modifications as to make the cession unacceptable to Bulgaria. It could 
be argued, depending on the interpretation of the four power note, that 
despite the modifications the Entente was committed to fulfill its 
promises to Serbia since the Serbians had agreed to cede the uncontested 
zone. According to the Entente, however, the Serbian response was 
unsatisfactory, and therefore the guarantees proposed in August did not 
become commitments. Grey's promises in May, overshadowed by the offer 
in August, had been forgotten.
In October 1913 Bulgaria joined the Auetro-German campaign against 
Serbia which, being attacked both in the north and east, quickly collapsed. 
The Balkan negotiations were over and the Serbian value to the Entente 
extremely reduced. The failure of the negotiations was blamed on Serbia 
for its unwillingness to negotiate an agreement with Bulgaria. On 
November 29, 1915> brummond wrotei
61 Dee Graz to Grey, 1 Sept. 1915, F.O. 371-2265-123653 
Grey to Deo Graz, 7 Aug. 1915, F.O. 371-2263-107472.
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Eir mi ward asks me however to point out that it was not Russia 
hut Serbia who wae so slow in responding to our proposals. We 
feel here that if Serbia had been really willing to assent to 
the cessions of territory which we urged, Bulgaria would certainly 
have not gone to war and would probably have come out on our s i d e . ° ^
Serbia was the scapegoat because the government would not recognise
its own miscalculations. It had believed that an equitable division of
the Balkans on national lines would lead to the creation of a Balkan
league. Grey wrotet 'Our general desire is that redistributions of
territory should be according to nationality of inhabitants.Bulgaria
was not interested in an equitable division but rather in the highest
price, and the Central powers could always outbid the Entente. If the
Central powers had been losing the war or if Turkey had been defeated at
the Dardanelles, Bulgaria might have settled for a lower price and joined
the Entente. But, as it was, Bulgaria accepted the highest bid, and
the expectation that she might have acted otherwise was merely wishful
thinking. In December 1915 the French government suggested a guarantee
to Serbia of its territorial integrity and of its expected gains as a
65result of the war. The suggestion was rejected by the British government. 
Since a Balkan league wae no longer possible, such promises were unnecessary.
During 1915 the government had promised, or had been willing to 
promise, vast areas of Austria-Hungary to Italy, Serbia and Rumania.
Although it might well be assumed that at some time a decision had been 
made to destroy the Habsburg monarchy) in fact the issue was never 
seriously considered and the decision was never made. While Habsburg 
territory was promised because it was necessary in order to create a
^  Drummond to Lord Grey, 29 Nov. 1915, F.O. 800-95.
64 Grey to Barclay, 12 April 1915, F.O. 371-2244-41741.
* *  Grey to Bertie, 30 Dec. 1915, F.O. 371-2281-200194.
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Balkan league, little thought wae given to the repercussions of these
promises. In December 1914 the government expressed interest in a
separate peace with Austriar-hungary. Dut when the possibility actually
arose and it became a choice between a separate peace and a Balkan league,
the government chose the latter.^ The decision was not to destroy the
Habsburg monarchy but just to give it no special consideration.
On isiarch 30, 191p> Drummond, in reference to public comments on the
breakup of the Habsburg monarchy made by J.D. Gregory, an assistant clerk,
expressed the official indifference or indecision on the future of Austriar-
Hungary when he wrotet
I will send Gregory a warning that he must be extremely careful 
about discussing these very big questions, all the more so as I 
believe Sir Edward is of opinion that things are not sufficiently 
advanced to enable him to take any definite line as regards 
Austrian eventuality. 67
There was never any consideration given to the idea of making 
sacrifices in order to preserve the Empire. Indeed, there seemed to 
exist a willingness, although not a desire, to destroy the monarchy.
Few seemed to be aware of the ultimate effect of the war on Austria- 
Hungary, and it is possible that many assumed that the Empire would 
continue to exist regardless of territorial losses. Arthur Hicolson was 
alone in expressing the significance of the promises of Habsburg territory. 
On July 21, 1915, he wrote* 'At the same time 1 cannot disguise the fact
that the concessions which we offered to her, and which comprise practically
one half of Hungary, cannot be realized until we have actually pulverized
68Hungary and Austria. * To fulfill the promises, even to Italy alone,
^  Grey to nuchanan, 29 Dec. 1915, F.O. 371-1904-86748. Grey to Bertie,
19 Jan. 1915, F.O. 371-2505-7101.
^  Drummond to Bertie, 30 iAar. 1915, F.O. 800-101.
® Mcolson to Hardinge, 21 July 1915, Hardinge Mss. 95-65a«
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the Em. ire indeed hud to he 'pulverized*. It was extremely doubtful 
that the monarchy could survive such losses or the defeat necessary 
before such losses would be accepted. The treaty of London was eventually 
to prove an insurmountable barrier to a separate peace with the Empire 
because the Habsburgs would never accept the treaty, Italy would never 
accept less than the treaty, and the Entente would fulfill its obligations. 
The monarchy wae, in a sense, doomed by the treaty of London. It is 
ironic that to the Yugoslavs and their supporters the treaty of London 
was one of the most iniquitous acts of the British government. Yet 
beyond any doubt, the acceptance of the treaty did more than any other 
single act of the government to destroy the monarchy and to ensure the 
creation of a Yugoslav state. In essence, the British were indifferent 
to the future of the Habsburg monarchy They might not desire its 
destruction, but they would not alter strategy to preserve it.
The Balkan negotiations gave the Yugoslavs a position of far greater 
importance in British policy than that possessed by the Poles or the 
Czechoslovaks. The official preference for the Yugoslavs was strengthened 
by the possibility that the Yugoslav programme might facilitate the 
creation of a Balkan league. After 1915 the Balkans ceased to be an 
area of primary importance and, therefore, while the relations with the 
Yugoslavs continued, they lost much of their significance. The preference 
for the Yugoslavs continued, but when it was no longer allied to the self- 
interest involved in the creation of a Balkan league, promises to the 
Yugoslavs were no longer considered. when the French government suggested 
guarantees to Serbia in .December 1915* Percy, a sympathizer with the 
nationalities, stated* 'we all know perfectly well that we cannot and
64
69will not continue this war until Jugo-£lavia is constituted*'
When the Central powers launched their attack on Serbia in October 
1915» Seton-Watson and Bonald Burrows, the principal of King*® College,
The Strand, tried unsuccessfully to convince the government to deploy
70large military forces in the Balkans to prevent the Serbian collapse.
leton-Watson could accept the treaty of London, but not the failure of
the government to help Serbia. In December 1915> be wrote an article,
"The Failure of Sir Edward Grey’1, in which he attacked Grey’s Balkan
71policy and his handling of the negotiations. The publication of the 
article in February 1916 considerably weakened his influence in the 
foreign office although hie relations with many of the officials continued.
During 1915 little conflict exiBted between the war office and the 
foreign office although the potential for conflict was inherent in the 
situation. The explanation lies, to some extent, in the attitude of 
the forei^i office. It was generally assumed, particularly by Grey and 
Gicolson, that diplomacy in war would achieve nothing unless it was 
supported by favourable military action. In practice, this assumption 
led to the adjustment of diplomacy to strategy. Foreign policy was 
therefore determined not by long-term political considerations, but by 
immediate strategic necessity. The foreign office, by its own will, 
subjected policy to military considerations and therefore provoked no 
conflict with the war office. According to ^ercy* ’Sir Edward Grey 
tended to make a virtue of this necessity by his dictum that, in war, a
^  Percy minute, Grey to Bertie, 30 Dec. 1915> F*0* 371-2281-200194*
* y Burrows to Bonar Law, 29 Oct. 1915> Bonar Law ka. 51-4—33*
R.W. Seton-watson, ’The Failure of Sir Edward Jrey*, English heview.
Feb. 1916, p.135*
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72Foreign Secretary could have no policy but to do what the soldiers wanted.*1
Urey's policy had merit particularly when victory was uncertain, but
its justification is insufficient to explain its adoption. During the
first year of the war, the foreign office began to disintegrate. In
December 1514 Eyre Crowe was transferred to the contraband department
because he supposedly lost hie head and was insubordinate to Grey. In
the spring of 1915 William Tyrrell, Crey's private secretary, suffered
a serious breakdown as a result of the death of his son anti was replaced 
74by Drummond. Arthur ificolson, never a very capable administrator,
seems to have been unable to adjust to the war anu the changes in
diplomacy. Although still capable of excellent advice, he seems to have
75suffered a loss of faith. Runciraan wrote in February 1915* 'Grey
nearly broke under the strain ^ August 19147 fcut is now well again,
76
althou^i greatly aged.1 In October 1915 Bertie observed that Grey
77was no longer capable of making an^  virile decision. Grey seems to 
have been going through the same process as hicolson, made worse by his 
growing blindness and feelings of guilt over the outbreak of war.
Possibly his willingness to tailor policy to strategy resulted from a 
disillusionment with di.plomacy because of its failure to prevent war.
£uoh a reaction would be reasonable in a period when the major issues 
72
E. Percy, Some lAemories, London 195&, p.42.
Bertie diary, 19 Bee. 1$14, F.O. 800~l63~FO 14-1.
74 Chirol to Hardinge, 28 April 1915, Hardinge ttss. 93-388.
^  H. Nicolson, A Study in Old Diplomacy. London 1930, p*427*
76 Runciman to Robert Chalmers, 7 Feb. 1915, Runciman m s s .
< ! Bertie diary, 24 Oct. 1515, P.O. 800-167* The best study of the foreign 
office during this period and particularly of Grey's reaction to the 
war is E.G. i^kstein-Frankel, ’The Development of British *iar Aims,
August 1914-March 1915', London Ph.D. 1969*
were being settled by force. The disintegration of the foreign office 
probably explains, in part, its unwillingness to accept a dominant role 
in the making of policy and its willingness to submerge political 
considerations for the sake of strategy. The foreign office abdicated 
its dominant role in foreign policy and fatalistically accepted the course 
of event- as they arose without trying to impose its own will upon them.
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Chapter III 
Espionage and iropaaanda, 1914-19X6
Since the initial relatione between the government and the nationality 
organisations were established by the emigres, the government responded 
on the merits of each particular case without reference to any clearly 
defined comprehensive policy for the treatment of the enemies' subject 
nationalities. The officials were quick, however, to realise that the 
disgruntled emigres were potential weapons Of war* But the Entente also 
possessed subject nationalities, and the Central powers came to the same 
conclusion. Since the use of subject nationalities as weapons of war 
began gradually, almoet imperceptibly, it is difficult to determine which 
belligerent acted first. The British may have begun the process, but 
throughout the war they acted as if they were merely responding to German 
initiatives. The British government was at liberty to aocept or reject 
the use of the emigres in unorthodox warfare against the Central powers, 
but once it was clear that the enemy intended to use subject nationalities 
against the Entente, the government had little choice but to retaliate 
in a similar fashion or accept the unfortunate consequences of enemy 
policy. Circumstances seemed to compel the government to use the 
nationalities. This unorthodox type of warfare was not new* nevertheless, 
it was a symptom of the development of total war.
The Germans used the Indian and Irish nationalists while the British 
used the Yugoslavs and the Czechoslovaks. The Poles, however, were
68
unique in that their national cause was not necessarily committed to 
either the Entente or the Central powers. The belligerents were able 
to use the Poles but, in contrast to their relations with the other 
nationalities, also had to compete for Polish support. During 1915 
and 1916 the use of the subject nationalities by the belligerents and 
the competition for Polish support was concentrated in the United States 
as part of the Anglo-German rivalry for American support. But, before 
discussing this rivalry in the context of Anglo-American relations, it 
is necessary to examine the type of assistance offered by the emigres 
and its relationship to the administration of the British government* 
Co-operation between the government and some of the nationality 
organizations developed shortly after the outbreak of war* While no 
agreement existed on ultimate aims, the desire for the defeat of the 
Central powers constituted a common basis for co-o eration. Agreement 
on this one aim was reinforced by the immediate advantages of co-operation 
for both the officials and the emigres. It has already been pointed out 
that the nationality organizations assisted the government on the question 
of the treatment of enemy aliens and that the Yugoslavs supplied the 
government with information on conditions in the Balkans and the Habsburg 
empire during 1915*^ These specific examples represent only a small 
and relatively unimportant part of the co-operation primarily in espionage 
and propaganda which developed between 1914 and 1916. The role of the 
government in this co-operation was purely opportunistic and unrelated 
to the question of war aims. The officials were perfectly willing to 
accept assistance from nationalities for which the government planned to
* See above, pp. 24-28, 55, 58-59*
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do nothing at the peace conference* The assistance accepted by the 
government was offered unconditionally and promises about the future of 
eastern Lurope were not given in exchange*
The government was able to avoid commitments but not, ultimately,
j y
the consequences of its own action* As the emigres had anticipated, 
the assistance tended to create among British officials a feeling of 
indebtedness to the nationalities* Those emigres who assisted the 
government were able to prove both their political ability and their 
dedication to the Entente, thereby winning the respect and even the 
admiration of the officials* While numerous representations were made 
to the foreign office during this period on behalf of national self- 
determination in eastern Kurope, relations between the government and 
the nationalities were dominated by the experience of practical co-operation 
which had far more effect on official attitudes than any number of 
memoranda* The co-operation tended to convert those officials involved 
into supporters of national self-determination and they, in turn, were 
in a position to influence policy* Official assistance to the nationality 
organizations also contributed to their campaign for national liberation.
'The use of the subject nationalities against the enemy and the competition 
for their support focused public attention on national self-determination* 
Kventually the campaign began to have some effect and it produced results 
which could not be overlooked in the formulation of British policy* Thus 
the government contributed to the creation of conditions which were to 
limit future British alternatives*
An analysis of the degree of co-operation which developed is severely 
limited by the lack of evidence. The co-operation existed primarily in 
propaganda and espionage - two fields of government activity in which
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little documentation survives. After the war the records of the
2
propaganda agency of the British government were destroyed. Some 
relevant documents survived in the record3 of other ministries, but they 
represent only a fraction of the original material and, because they 
relate only to incidents involving other ministries, do not accurately 
represent the activities of the propaganda agency. The destroyed 
records presumably related to the daily operations and detailed activities 
of that agency which can now only be reconstructed with great difficulty* 
There are, therefore, many unanswerable questions about British propaganda. 
While it is possible to show that the agency had close relations with 
certain nationality organizations, tho details Of those relations can 
never be ade ;uately determined* The study of espionage ie even more 
difficult. No documents on the subject should exist because the 
intelligence agenoies commit little to paper and destroy as much 
documentation of their activities as possible. During the war the 
foreign office sought to keep all reference to the secret service out of 
its records, and when such references appear, they are often so circum­
spect as to be almost meaningless.3 Fortunately same documents have 
survived, and on that basis some discussion of the role of the nationalities 
in British espionage is possible. Due to the scarcity of documents on 
both propaganda and espionage, all that is possible ie a minimum estimate 
of the degree of co-operation. It may only be the tip of the iceberg.
The most obvious type of assistance given by the emigres was in the 
supply of information. From the very beginning of their relationship
2
Inf. 4-la. This file contains correspondence on the disposal of the 
records on propaganda.
3 Nicoleon to Bertie, 4 Feb. 1916, F.O. 800-190.
with the government, the Yugoslavs and Czechoslovaks followed a policy 
of passing on any useful information collected by their organizations.
In order to maintain contact with their compatriots in Austria-Hungary,
y /
these emigres established, early in the war, a courier system through 
4Switzerland. The system supplied a flow of information on internal 
conditions within the Central powers until the Austrians, late in 1915, 
established tighter security along the Swiss frontier. During the spring 
of 1913 the emigres sent this information, which was not easily accessible 
to British intelligence, directly to the foreign o f f i c e I n  August 1915, 
as a result of a suggestion by Ceton--atson, a regular system was 
established by which the information could be passed directly to the 
British intelligence authorities in Switzerland.^
The emigres were also a source of information on developments in the 
United States. While the British had no difficulty in acquiring infor­
mation about developments in the mainstream of American politics, the 
collection of information about the activities of the various national 
minorities was much more difficult because they tended to form closed 
communities. Through their compatriots in the United states the emigres 
had access to this type of information which they supplied to the officials
^ £• Benels, My War Memoirs, London 1926, p*74. Steed, Thirty Years, p.129*
5 Clerk minute, 1 July 1915, F.O. 371-2510-67436. MaBaryk to F.O.,
20 July 1915, F.O. 371-2241-98064. Rodd to Grey, 25 Dec. 1914,
F.O. 371-2241-216.
6 Grey to Callwell and Hall, 19 Aug. 1915, F.O. 371-2241-115057. Bene^, 
Memoirs, p*74« Seton-watson, Masaryk. p.77*
 ^Seton-Watson to F.O., 10 day 1916, Cab. 37-147-22. Forman to F.O.,
10 Jan. 1917, F.O. 395-136-8297. Namier to Butler, 9 March 1917,
F.O. 395-108-51960. Stanmore to Seton-watson, 22 July 1916, Seton- 
Watson Mss. IV.
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Suoh information often related to propaganda or censorship as, for example, 
a list forwarded by Seton-watson in August 1915 on behalf of the Yugoslavs 
containing the names of a number of American Slavic language newspapers 
which opposed the iitotente* The list enabled the government to ban the 
circulation of these newspapers in British territory and to warn British
g
fizms to cease advertising in them.
once the emigres had proven their reliability, the officials began 
to seek their assistance. On one ocoasion Clerk asked Seton-Watson to
arrange for the translation from Czech of letters intercepted by the
9 / /
government. When approached by hitherto unknown emigres, the foreign
office often checked their bona fidea with the known and reliable emigres,
like tnose on the i<ondon Czech Committee. Since the foreign offioe
tended to follow their recommendations, the established emigres acquired
the power to eliminate competition by merely advising the foreign office
to have no relations with their political opponents Such incidents
were of little importance in themselves, but they were symptoms of the
growing confidence of the officials in the emigres* If the total of
all of the information smpplied by the emigres during the war could be
calculated, it might prove to be of considerable importance*
In August 1914, a number of Czechs in New York, unconnected with
Masaryk but with similar aims, formed an organization later designated
as the Bohemian National Alliance.** 'This organization, which was to
o
Seton-Watson to Clerk, 26 August 1915» Clerk to Seton-Watson, 6 Sept*
1915, JP*0. 371-2591-121585*
^ Clerk to Seton-Watson, 24 Sept. 1915* F*0 * 371-2241-134164•
*°Druramond minute, 12 June 1916, F*0* 800-96*
**Bene£, Memoirs, p*98*
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become a major source of funds for the Czechoslovak movement, contacted
Masaryk and accepted his political leadership through Hmmanuel Voska,
iiasaryk's agent in America. Voska becarae the head of the section of
the bohemian Rational Alliance for propaganda in the eastern United 
12States. Through Michael lupin, a professor at Columbia University and
the Serbian consul general in the United £ tates, and Madame Slavko Grouic,
the wife of the Serbian charge d1 affaires in London, Voeka met Captain
Sir Guy Gaunt, the naval attache in Washington and the head of British
naval intelligence in the United States.^ The date of this meeting
is uncertain, but from Voeka*s account it appears to have been not later
than June 1915* Since Gaunt was trying to establish an intelligence
organization in the United States, he readily accepted Voska*s offer of
the services of his organization to British naval intelligence. Voska
was inspired by the thought that; 'we must make ourselves so useful
that when Britain and France dictated peace they could not deny our claim
14to an independent republic.* Czech agents could be of inestimable 
value to Gaunt because as American or Austrian citizens they could work 
in the United States, particularly against the Austrian. , with greater
T. Capek, The Cechs in America, Now York 1920, p«270.
^  B. Voska, Spy and Count er-lpy, London 1941, p.29* V# Dedijer,
The Road to Sarajevo, London 1967, p.275* Madame Grouic was in 
the United States working on Serbian Relief. Steed, Thirty Years, 
pp.43-46. Steed claims that he arranged for Voska to meet Gaunt.
14 Voska, Spy, p*20.
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15effectiveness than a British agent. If their activities were exposed,
it would he difficult to prove that the,/ were working for the British 
government*
These agents cannot he considered merely ’reliable sources* who 
occasionally contributed information to Gaunt. They were, in effect, 
ajentG working for the British government. Documentary evidence on 
this subject is rare, but the files of the British embassy in Washington 
for Februaiy 1917 show that like other British agents they had oode 
numbers for identification*^0 According to Voska, hie organization 
initially worked without financial support from the British government 
because his agents worked without salary* In 191&* however, arrangements
17were made to supply his operating expenses from secret service funds, 
iiasaryk later claimed that he made these arrangements in London because
IB
the Bohemian National Alliance lacked the funds to support Voska’s work*
This testimony is to some degree substantiated by a letter Gaunt wrote to 
Spring Hice on December 20, 1915*
^  T. kasaryk, The -taking of a State. 1914-1916, London, p.241* G. Gaunt, 
The Yield of the Years, London 1940, p*l67* Voska, Spy, p*29* Benes, 
Memoirs. p*74* Seton-Watson, Masaryk. p*96. B* Thomson, The Scene 
Changes, Garden City 1937, P*323* G*J. Viereck, Spreading Geras of 
Hate. London 1931, p.72. W. James, The Lyes of the NavyI A Biographical 
Study of Admiral Sir Reginald Hall. London 1955*
These sources agree on the essentials of Voska*s connection with 
Gaunt and his work for naval intelligence. Where those accounts are 
consistent with one another or when backed by documentary evidence 
the information has been considered reliable. The most detailed 
account of Voska's work can be found in his own autobiography* There 
is ample reason to suppose that he was prone to exaggeration and since 
many of his claims cannot be substantiated by documentary evidence 
they must be viewed with some suspicion. For that reason and for 
reasons of space the details of hie work have not been used in the text.
Agent 45 to embassy, 26 Feb. 1917, F.O. 115-2183*
^  Voska, Spy, p.36*
^  Capek, ^echs, p.268.
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Would it be possible for me to be allowed a small sum not 
exceeding five Hundred rounds to be placed at my disposal for 
use in connection for the information that is supplied to me*
As I t o l d o u  before, I have an office and a stenographer here 
/New loi^/ in connection with the Czech movement - though of 
course the girl does not know of my existence and recently I 
have had to do the same thing in Chicago on account of German 
activities being shifted to that city ....
In addition to these small items occasional expanses, such as 
for instance, secret mission which left hurriedly for Philadelphia 
and other Austro-German Consulates. It was most important to 
know what their object was and I allowed the expenses of a 
patriotic man to keep in touch with them. Personally he gets 
no pay, his travelling expenses alone are allowed*
1 have kept careful account of the sum that was allowed me
before, a considerable portion of which has been used in keeping 
one or two men on the road who have influence among the Slav
races with a view to counteracting the German propaganda. *9
It was obviously not the first such request. Although the letter
contains that element of circumspection always found in official
correspondence on espionage, there can be little doubt that Gaunt was
referring to hie Czeoh agents. On the basis of a strong recommendation
from Spring Rice, who did not mention the Czechs, the request was
20
approved by Nicolson who controlled the secret service fund.
Working for Gaunt, Voska*s agents were active in espionage, counter-
intelligence and propaganda aimed at thwarting Austrian and German plots
against the Entente in the United States. It seems that the Czechs
achieved notable success in this i/rork, contributing to a number of well-
known Allied espionage coups by infiltrating the Austrian embassy as
21
well as a number of German organizations. In exchange the British
^  Gaunt to Spring Rice, 20 Dec. 1915? F.O. 115-1971-141 • Hew York and
Chicago had the largest concentrations of the relevant ethnic minorities*
20
Spring Rice to Nicolson, 21 Dec. 1915» Nicolson to Spring Rice,
22 Deo. 1915, F.O. 115-1977-141. Nicolson to Spring Rice, 7 Bee.
1915, F.Q. 115-l8o9^1090. Nicolson to Bertie, 4 Feb. 1916, F.0.800-190.
21 Gaunt, The Yield, pp.167-168. Voska, Spy, p.38*
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authorities assisted the Czechs and thereby indirectly furthered the
campaign for national self-determination. For example, when the
Bohemian National Alliance wanted to transfer funds to Masaryk, it was 
22arranged. when members of the organization wanted to travel to
21
Europe, the British embassy in Washington supplied the passports.
When the courier system through Switzerland broke down late in 1915>
the British authorities helped Voska establish a new system for American-
24Czeoh couriers through Holland. On at least one occasion when 
Masaryk wanted to send messages to Prague, the courier, en route from 
the United States to Holland, was detained by British authorities so
25that a meeting could be arranged with Masaryk without arousing suspicion.
In Deoember 1915. Sir William Wiseman became the head of the British
secret service(m.I.Ic) in the United States. Before leaving London
Wiseman met Masaryk through Seton-Watson, and it was arranged that Voska
26should henceforth work for Wiseman's organization. According to 
Wiseman, securing the services of Voska was 'the luckiest thing that
22 Gaselee minute, 23 Jan. 1917 > F*0. 371-2862-12976.
2  ^Gaunt to Spring Rice, 29 Nov. 1915* F.O. 115-1955* Voska, Spy, pp.47-48.
According to Voska the British and French authorities gave visas which
would permit travel within Allied countries to those agents of Austrian
nationality who could not travel on Austrian passports.
24 v*Benes, Memoirs. p*74*
2^ Ibid. p.132. Voska, Spy, p.48. Voska claims that this was a 
regular procedure for arranging contact between Masaryk and the 
couriers.
26
Wiseman to Masaryk, 31 July 1968, Wiseman Mss. 91-80. The basic 
structure of British intelligence is outlined in R. Beacon, A HiBtory 
of the British Secret Service. London 1969* M.I.lc under Captain 
Mansfield Gumming received its funds from the foreign offioe and was 
responsible for espionage and, in neutral countries, counter-espionage. 
M.I.5 under Colonel Vernon Kell received its funds from the war office 
and was responsible for counter-espionage in British territory.
C. Mackenzie, My Life and Times, vol. IV, London 1965, p.29*
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27
happened to me on that side of my work' . Arthur Willert, a member of
Wisemans staff, claimed that by December 1913 Voska had eighty agents
working for him. Many years later he wrote* 'Voska, whose code name
was ’’Victor”, must have one of the most outstanding of the "secret agents”
28of the first war.’ The relationship between the Bohemian National 
Alliance and the British intelligence agencies was a good example of 
mutually advantageous co-operation because each needed the other* As in 
all such relationships the government gained more because the kaigres 
were satisfied to wait for a future reward* The work done by the Czech 
agents in the United States, which will be more thoroughly discussed 
later in the context of Anglo-American relation?, was the most valuable 
assistance given to the Entente by any nationality organization before 
19X7-29
Another emigre who worked as a British agent was Count Jean Marie 
de Horodyski, a Galician Pole* In the spring of 1915 Horodyski, throu^i
contact with Gregory, began to work for the foreign office under Drummond's
30direction* In the foreign office documents Horodyski is always referred 
to in such vague terms that little is revealed about his status. J.H* 
Priestly of M.I.I., however, not accustomed to the subtlety of the foreign 
office, stated in a report* 'Count de Horodyski arrived on Sunday 13/8/16
r i  i n  t  - r m r n  a w — i n  i T — f T n  ih t t tm  r . « _ i m  . ii~ ~ i~ ~  -  —  u lfTn  m i j t u  ^ ~ r  i .  r i r  — ■ - - T - T r i — ~ t  r~ J '   — — — — — — — — — ■
27 A* Willert, Road to Safety* A tudy in An,do-American Relatione* London 
1952, p*24* Willert does not seem to be aware that Voska was already 
working for Gaunt before Wiseman arrived in America* A great deal of 
Jealousy existed between Wiseman and Gaunt and there is very little 
evidence on the degree to which the work of their separate organizations 
was co-ordinated, if at all* Gaunt worked under the director of naval 
intelligence, Admiral Sir Reginald Hall*
pQ
Ibid. p.23*
^  Voska, Spy, p*39« Gaunt, The Yield* p*22l* See below, pp. 83-84, 
102-1047^ 01-203.
^  Massey to Drummond, 16 July 1915* Drummond to Rodd, 6 July 1918,
F.O. 800-66. J.D. Gregory, On the Bd^e of Diplomacy. London 1929, p.103.
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an routs for London to see the Foreign Office, for whom he is now 
working.... He ... has been engaged in obtaining political information 
for the British Foreign Office.'^ Although Horodyski began working in 
Europe, he was sent in 1916 to work among the Polish organizations in 
the United States. Unlike Voska, he appears to have had no organisation 
of his own, but by working directly for the foreign office, as will be 
explained in greater detail later, he was in a better position to influenoe 
policy.^
In August 1914, the government created at Wellington House a 
propaganda agency under the direction of Charles Francis Masterman, the 
chancellor of the duchy of Lanoaster* The creation of such an agency 
to influenoe opinion in neutral countries showed that the goverzimont was 
aware of the importance of neutral opinion in influencing the policies 
of neutral states and their relations with the Entente. The staff of 
Wellington House consisted of authors, journalists and academics who had 
some knowledge of public opinion and the ability to produce propaganda.
Most of the propaganda was in the form of pamphlets dealing with the 
issues of the war which wer8 either selected from those already on the 
market or commissioned by Wellington House. They were published 
commercially without any official markings so that their true origin 
remained secret. Great effort was always taken to surround Wellington 
House with a shroud of secrecy so that its propaganda would be more 
effective.^
^  Priestly report, 23 Aug. 1916, W.O. 106-1511-26.
32 Drummond to Rodd, 16 June 1916, Drummond to Bodd, 6 July 1916,
F.O. 800-66. See below, pp. 88, 113-115? 134-136.
Report on Wellington House, 2 Dec. 1914, F.O. 371-2207-88913* Hewe 
department memorandum, 2 Feb.1915, Report on Wellington House, 7 June 
1915, F.O.371-2555-12467. Report on Wellington House, 1 Feb.1916,
Inf. 4-5*
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The pamphlets were distributed in the United States, the most 
important target, by mail* The section for propaganda in America, under 
the direction of Gilbert Parker, the Canadian novelist, compiled a list 
of prominent Americans — academics, journalists, politicians, lawyers, 
clergy and civil servants - to whom they sent selected pamphlets* Each 
package contained a letter from Parker giving the impression that he was 
a private individual sending the pamphlets on his own initiative* Hie 
theory was that if these individuals could be influenced they would, in 
turn, influence the general public. By June 1915, the list consisted of 
at least 14,000 prominent Americans.34
Any issue which reflected unfavourably on the eneqy, such as the 
treatment of subject nationalities, was used for propaganda* The Germane 
followed the same policy by using the Irish problem to discredit Britain* 
One of the first pamphlets produced by Wellington House was The Submerged 
Nationalities of the German Empire and similar ones followed*3^ Regardless 
of the intentions of Wellington House, propaganda which dealt with subject 
nationalities helped the emigres by focusing attention on their plight 
and on the ist;ue of national self-determination. Even if national self- 
determination was never openly' discussed, it was the obvious conclusion 
of any pamphlet which dealt with the suffering of subject nationalities 
under German, Austrian or Hungarian rule.
34 Report on Wellington House, 7 June 1915, P.O.371-2555-12467* By 
December 1917 the list had expanded to 170,000. R. Donald, ’Report on 
the Purchase and Publication of Books’, 7 Dec.1917# Bonar Law Ms.62-7-7*
35
' E. Barker, The Submerged Nationalities of the German Empire Oxford 1915* 
Also seei J.B. Bury', Germany and lavonic Civilisation. London 1914*
G»M* Trevelyan, The Serbians and Austria. London 1915• i»« Hamier,
Germany and Eastern Europe, London 1915* A.J. Toynbee, The Destruction 
of Poland, London 1916} and H. Rosendahl, The Problem of Danish 
• chleswig. London 1916. All of the pamphlets attributed to Wellington 
House are taken from an official list in T. 102-20.
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Besides focusing attention implicitly on national self-determination, 
some of the pamphlets came very close to actually promoting the idea*
Ernest Barker, for example, stated in Great Britain’s Heason for Going to
■vari ’England stands for the right of each national group to enjoy the
26form of government to which it aspires*1 G*M. Trevelyan in The Serbians
and Austria wrotei 'when Eastern Europe is directed as far as possible
on racial and national lines, there may at last be peace and content in
27those unhappy regions*’ In Germany and Eastern Europe Lewis Namier
recommended independence for Czechoslovakia and wrotei 'Europe has to be
38rearranged in accordance with nationality* ’ These are only a few
examples of the type of comment relevant to national self-determination
39found in the pamphlets produced between 1914 and the end of 1916*
while these pamphlets were being distributed, neither national self- 
determination nor the promotion of that idea were part of British foreign 
policy. If this material went slightly beyond the limits of approved 
policy, the explanation can be found in the refusal of the government to 
define its war aims* With no direction from the foreign office on the 
nature of war aims and what might be published on that subject, and with 
no foreign office scrutiny of the propaganda, the officials of Wellington 
House had only Asquith's early speeches as a guide* Those speeches had
^ E. Barker, Great Britain's Reason for Goin^ to War* London 1915 > P*10*
27 Trevelyan, ’The Serbians* p*10.
38 Namier, Germany* p.126.
29 «Also seel Anon*, Hungary and the war, London 1915* G* Brereton, who is
Responsible* London 1914* J*W* Headlam, The Issue* London 1916*
T* Jonescu, The Policy of National instinct* London 1918* T* Masaryk,
The Slavs Among Nations, London 1916} and Anon*, The European Wars
Repl./ to the Appeal of German Theologians, London 1915*
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been so vague that they could easily lead to a divergence between policy 
and propaganda* &any of the writers, like Trevelyan and Namier, were 
supporters of national self-determination» and it was quite natural for 
their pamphlets to reflect such sympathies* Regardless of the inter­
pretation of the exaot meaning of these vague references to the 
nationalities, there can be no doubt that the distribution of these 
pamphlets substantially contributed to the emigres* campaign for national 
self-determination* It is almost impossible to evaluate the effect of 
propaganda, but it may well be that Wellington House did more to win 
public support for national self-determination particularly in the United 
States than the emigres who lacked the resources of the British government* 
The use of the nationalities as a weapon of propaganda undoubtedly 
stimulated in Wellington House an interest in the nationality organizations* 
Early in 1915» °® the recommendation of his good friend Lord Eustace Percy, 
Lewis Namier was employed by Wellington House to write summaries of the 
Polish press and to advise on propaganda* Namier was uniquely' suited 
for this work because he came from an eastern Galician Jewish family which 
had converted to Catholicism and which had brought him up as a member of 
the Polish gentry* Before the war he had studied at the London School 
of Economics and Political Science and at Balliol College, Oxford and 
had worked in the United States for the American Association of Foreign 
Language Newspapers* He undoubtedly knew more about Poland than anyone 
else in the British government - British officials were abysmally ignorant 
of the subject - but he was particularly valuable to Wellington House 
because of his knowledge of the eastern European minorities in the United 
States* While his enemies were correct in saying that his advice on 
Polish affairs was distorted by his own personal bias, it must be remembered
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that informed, unbiased advice on Polish affairs did not exist* Namier
was responsible for bringing the importance of the Polish-Americans to
the attention of British officials and for establishing contaot between
Wellington House and the Polish emigres.^
Aware of the dangers from Russia of any British action on the Polish
issue and holding the lowest opinion of Polish emigres, Namier opposed
government involvement with them. In a report on his relations with
the emigres he wrote*
I don't however, for a moment defend the policy of the Polish 
Information Committee - nothing could be worse advised than to 
*hat any official encouragement# They try to make the 
Polish Question, which Russia considers an internal problem of 
her own, into an international question, and they advocate 
Polish independence# But for the same reason, in my belief, 
no support or encouragement should be given to any Polish 
politicians or organizations whatever because all of them agree 
on these two points, which are diametrically opposed to the 
programme of Russia and therefore of the Entente# The 
differences between Polish politicians are merely in the degree 
of personal honesty or dishonesty in the direction of their 
intrigues* usually they intrigue against the Power by which 
they profess to stand. 31
When Namier began to compile a list of prominent American Poles for 
Gilbert Parker's system of distribution, he found that he had to overoome 
his aversion to woiking with the Polish emigres and seek their support.
He made an arrangement with the Polish Information Committee whereby 
they were supplied with pamphlets which they addressed to prominent 
American Poles and then returned to Wellington House. The officials 
sealed and mailed the packages, thus having total control over the contents.
T > Interview with Lady Ramier, 25 Aug. 19&9* Berlin, 'Lewis Namier* 
A Personal Impression', A Century of Conflict. 1850-1950* Essays for 
A.J.P. Taylor# London 1966. A.J• Toynbee, *Eir Lewis Namier', 
Acquaintances, London 1967*
^  Namier to Gowers, 15 Lee. 1916, F.O. 395-26-255781 •
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As Namier pointed out, the real advantage of the arrangement was that
the divergence of policy between the government and the c omit tee would
aiake it difficult for anyone to trace the pamphlets back to the British 
42government. The recipients would be under the impression that they
earae from their own compatriots. Wellington House also produced and
distributed pamphlets like Poland Under the barmans and teiman^s Economic
43Policy in Poland which originated with the Polish Information Committee.
The commit tee was therefore distributing its own propaganda at the expense
of the government. By the end of 1916 Wellington House distributed
propaganda relevant to Poland on a large scale. Pamphlets were being
produced in Polish and were distributed to over six hundred prominent
Poles in the United States as well as through other Polish organizations
44like the Agence Polonaise Centrale and the Polish National Alliance.
The latter organization was based in Chicago and was associated with 
Horodyski’s work in the United States on behalf of the Entente.
The Yugoslavs may have assisted Wellington House but, other than a 
few comments, there is little evidence of it in the docunents. After 
the treaty of London, the anti-Italian flavour of Yugoslav propaganda 
made such co-operation difficult. 'The Czechs, not suffering from such 
inconveniences, probably established contact with Wellington House through 
Namier or Trevelyan. During 1913 and 1916 Wellington House produced and 
distributed Masaryk* s two pamphlets* The Slavs Among Nations and Austrian
42 Namier to dowers, 14 Dec. 1916, P.O. 395-26-255781.
4  ^Polish Information Committee, Germany *s Economic Polic:. in Poland,
London 1915J Poland Under the Gennana, London 191 o*
44 Parker minute, 8 Dec. 1916, P.O. 395-5-247999* Montgomery to Gowers,
23 Dec. 1916, F#0. 395-26-261032.
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Terrorism in Bohemia. as well as Memorial to the International From the 
Bohemian Branch of the Socialist Party in America, originating from the
A
London Czeoh Committee* Distribution of British propaganda in the
United States was carried out by Voska*s section of the Bohemian National
Alliance which, unlike the Polish Information Committee, was allowed to
work without the constant surveillance of Wellington H o u s e T h e s e
differences in the relations between Wellington House and the various
nationality organizations seemed to be determined largely by Namier's
own preferences. On May 31, 1916, he wrote: 'None of the American
Poles seem to be an element on which one could rely, or with whom one
could work as one can with the Tohechs or Jugoslavs • ••' By October
1916, about 20,000 pamphlets had been distributed by the Bohemian National 
48
Alliance, and by early 1917 it had expanded its distribution to include 
49Eouth America. Information from the Czeoh agents also helped Wellington
50House assess the type of propaganda needed in the United States.^
There can be no doubt that the Poles and particularly the Czechs 
gave valuable assistance to Wellington House in the production and 
distribution of propaganda. The emigres oould be more effective in the
45 T. Masaryk, The Slavs Among Nations. London 1916} Austrian Terrorism 
in Bohemia. London 1916. London Czeoh Committee, Memorial to the 
International From the Bohemian Branch of the Socialist Party in 
America. London 1913*
^ Namier to Gowers, 15 Dec. 1916, P.O. 393*26-255781. Drummond to Miss
Etevenson, 2 Nov. 1916, F.O. 800-102. Also see above, pp. 73-77.
^ Namier, 'Observations on Polish Activities in America1, 31 May 1916,
P.O. 395-10-106874.
48 Setan-Watson, Masaryk. p.100.
49 Hamier to fCoppel, 31 Har. 1917, F.O. 395-75-68868.
^  Hamier to Butler, 9 Mar. 1917, P.O. 395-108-51960.
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distribution of pamphlets because of their contacts in the United States
and because they had no apparent connection with the government. The
emigres benefited because much of the propaganda of Wellington House
promoted their own cause. They also received, in effect, an indirect
subsidy' when Wellington House produced their own propaganda and supplied
them with it. Although the effectiveness of British propaganda cannot
be evaluated, it undoubtedly contributed to the campaign in the United
> tatec for national self-determination.
The nationality organizations also assisted the Entente by recruiting
their compatriots for military servioe. Although some emigres had
expressed a willingness to serve at the very beginning of the war, such
offers were not initially accepted because there was no shortage of
manpower and therefore no compelling need to adopt the complex and somewhat
unorthodox methods for the recruitment of enemy aliens. Only when the
shortage of manpower became evident did the war office abandon its
original reluctance to recruit aliens and begin, despite considerable
misgiving in the foreign office, to press for the enlistment of Poles,
Czechoslovaks and the Yugoslavs.
during 1915> South Slavs in Britain were released from internment
for service in the Serbian army, and efforts to recruit South .lavs in
51neutral countries were given limited and secret government support.
Since the British army accepted only British subjects, those Czechs and
52
Poles who wished to serve were cent to the French Foreign Legion.
^  Percy to Seton-Watson, 2 Aug. 1915» F«0* 371-2264-103085* Trunbic to 
W.O., 20 Oct. 1915, H.O. 45-10795-303789*
52 Sargeant to H.O., 17 Mar. 1916, H.O. 45-10818-317810.
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.During the 6uinmer of 1916, Yugoslav recruitment became a serious issue 
because of the difficulty in finding replacements for the Serbian army* 
Since the only source of replacements were the Yugoslav communities in 
neutral countries, a plan for recruiting there was supported by the 
Yugoslav organizations, the Serbian government and the French government. 
The foreign office was reluctant to become involved in any recruiting
scheme which would involve the United States, but the plan was supported
53by the war office and the cabinet. Under pressure Grey agreed, with
the greatest reluctance, to a plan whereby recruiting in the United States
would be done by Yugoslav or Serbian agents who would send their recruits
to Canada for training before being sent to the Serbian army. The costs
involved in recruiting, training and shipment would be borne equally by
the British and French governments. Grey stipulated, however, that no
British official in the United States was to be involved in any way with
this programme. If the recruiting agents needed assistance, they would
have to look to the French authorities who, Grey believed, could act with
54greater impunity in the United States. Grey*s sensitivity on this 
issue stemmed from difficulties in Anglo-American relations caused by 
British consular officials in California who had recruited for the British 
army. He was not as particular about the South American states, for he
53 Grey to Bertie, 11 May 1916, F.O. 371-2615-83401. W.O. to F.O.,
5 Sept. 1916, Grey to Gambon, 12 Sept. 1916, F.O. 371-2615-176290. 
Pribicevic memorandum, 2 0*ct. 1916, F.O. 371-2615-195116. Col. Hilan 
Pribi^evic, an Austrian Couth ■ lav, was responsible for recruiting in 
the United States. F.O. to Reading, 8 May 1918, F.O. 371-3135-63181.
54 P.O. to treasury, 16 Nov. 1916, F.O. 371-2615-222822. War committee, 
20 Nov. 1916, Cab. 42-24-13* Bonar Law to Devonshire, 21 Nov. 1916, 
F.O. 371-2615-236571.
87
instructed British officials there to give all possible assistance to
Serbian and Yugoslav agents.^
Unlike the Yugoslavs, the Czechoslovaks and the Poles had no army
to join other than the French Foreign Legion - an unappetizing prospect
even for the most ardent patriot. The situation began to change in
June 1916 when the war office decided to permit the enlistment of friendly
aliens, which included Russians, but not German or Austrian, Poles. In
August the war office went even a step further by permitting the enlistment
of enemy alien ’friendlies' (Poles and Czechoslovaks) not in the anoy but
56in labour units. An exception was made, however, for the Czechs who 
were allowed to join the army as if they were British subjects. On 
November 10, 1916, an instruction from the Army Council stated* ’Czechs 
who are in possession of a green registration certificate, duly authenti­
cated by the Czech Committee, ... may be accepted in any category of
57service in whioh British subjects are now accepted.*^ As a result of
this decision, the London Czech Committee began to recruit in the Czech
colony, and it has been estimated that ninety percent of the able-bodied
58Czechs in Britain volunteered for the British army.
The decision of the war office to recruit the citizens of an enemy 
power was quite remarkable, but it never gave any explanation of its
55 Grey to Tower, 11 Deo. 1916, F.O. 371-2615-24489.
^  Army Council Instruction 1156, 8 June 1916* W.O. 32-4773* White
(W.O.) to Nolan (H.O.), 22 Aug. 1916, Wainwright to Smith, 16 Nov. 1916, 
Huggins to Nolan, 9 Dec. 1916, H.O. 45-10818-317810.
^  Army Council Instruction 2120, 10 Nov. 1916, H.O. 45-10818-317810.
^  Hanak, Great Britain, pp. 117-118. By July 1917 an estimated 200 Czechs 
had been recruited for the British army. Seton-Watson, ’Memorandum on 
the Bohemian Army’, 6 July 1917» ^*0. 371-2804-137257* Steed, Thirty 
Years. p*48. Steed claims that he convinced the war office to recruit 
Czechs.
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obviouB favouritism towards the Czechs and its discrimination against the 
Poles. If the German and Austrian Poles were accepted into the British 
army, there would be little to distinguish the British treatment of them 
from the treatment of the Russian Poles. It may well be that fear of 
the possible Russian reaction to the failure of the British government 
to distinguish between Russian Poles and Austrian or German Poles, which 
might be interpreted as a tacit recognition of the indivisibility of the 
Polish nation, inhibited the war office. Or this favouritism might be 
explained by the fact that the Poles were not entirely trusted in any 
branch of the government while the Czechs had already proven their 
ability and loyalty to the Entente by servioee in espionage and propaganda.
While the Poles in Britain were not accepted into the British aimy,
arrangements were made for the recruitment of American Poles. In October
1916, horodyski was sent to the United States to reoruit Poles to be sent
to Canada for the Canadian array. Although hie mission was jointly
sponsored by the war office and the foreign office, and his expenses were
supplied by the government, he was instructed by Drummond before he left
that while in the United States he was not a representative of the British 
59government.'
The enlistment of the nationalities, which began in 1916, was to 
become far more important later in the war. It was inspired by the war 
office and only reluctantly accepted by the foreign office. As in all 
cases of co-operation with the nationality organizations, it was based 
on immediate needs resulting from the war regardless of future peace terms. 
59 Drummond memorandum^ 17 Oct. 1918, Drummond to Grey, 19 Sept. 1918,
F.O. 800-96. Drummond minute, 23 Aug. 1918, P.O. 800-102. ~.R. Pliska,
’The Polish American Army, 1917-1921’, The Polish Review, vol. X, no.3, 
1965, p«50.
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It is important to not# that, while the foreign office was involved 
in the various aspects of co-operation discussed above, the action tended 
to come from other branches of the government, such as Wellington House 
and the war office, more specifically ori#ntat#d to the conduct of the 
war. The foreign office co-ordinated the co-operation but seldom 
initiated it* It is also significant that the Czechoslovaks wore pre­
eminent among the nationalities for their willingness and capability to 
contribute to the war effort*
Between 1914 and 1916 the relations between the government and the 
nationalities were most significant in relation to the United States*
While the foreign office in a general sense conducted Anglo-American 
relations, the war office, the admiralty and Wellington House used the 
nationalities in the United States for their own specific purposes. To 
some extent the foreign office oversaw and co-ordinated these activities 
if only to ensure that they were not carried to such an extreme as to 
rebound unfavourably on the government* While often unrelated to the 
daily conduct of Anglo-American relations, the co-operation and the 
reasons for it were an integral part of British foreign policy, particulmrly 
on Anglo-American relations. Only on occasion were the examples of co­
operation significant enough to appear on the surface of Anglo-American 
relations, but, however unseen, they were always present.
The position of the United States in relation to the war was of the 
greatest importance to the Entente because, even if America remained 
neutral, the character of that neutrality could determine the course of 
the war. The success of the blockade depended upon a favourable reaction 
on the part of the American government. If the Americans decided to 
disregard or break the blockade because of the disruption of their
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commerce and the irritation of commercial restrictions, it could have 
fatal consequences for the Lntente. Or if the American government 
decided to retaliate by restrictions on traue with the Lntente, it might 
cripple the Allied war effort. As the most powerful neutral and a 
major source of raw materials, munitions and loans, the United States 
was in a position to affect substantially the course of the war* Anglo- 
American relations were, therefore, the most important problem handled by 
the British foreign office during the period of American neutrality.
The Central powers were equally aware of the importance of the United 
States and, like the Entente, sought to win American support. An intense 
rivalry developed in which both sides tried to influenoe the American 
government. Since that government would be influenced by public opinion, 
both sides attempted to win public approval, if not public support. The 
recognition of the importance of Ameriomn public opinion haa contributed 
to the British decision to establish Wellington House. The British 
authorities were also aware that the population of the United States was 
not noruogeneous in that it contained large and politically significant 
ethnic minorities whose support or opposition could be decisive. Grey*s 
decision in August 1914 to cable to the American press the full text of 
Grand Duke Hikolai Uikolaievich’s proclamation to the Poles suggests an 
awareness of the importance of Polish-Amerioan opinion.^J On September 29, 
1914, Parker wrote* *The importance of influencing the public opinion of 
Chicago and the State of Illinois cannot be overestimated.••• It is 
apparent that the foreign population of Chicago is very powerful and needs 
very careful handling.1^
60 Healy to Grey, 16 Aug. 1914, F.O. 371-2095-39631.
Parker, ’Memorandum on the Attitude of the American Press', 29 Sept.
1914, Lloyd George Ms. c/25/21/1.
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The initial contacts between the eiaigres and the British embassy in
62W ash ing ton  were e s ta b lis h e d  w i t h in  a few  months of th e  outbreak: of war.
i*OFt of these c o n ta c ts  were insignificant, e xce p t in the case  of the
Bohemian National Alliance whioh appealed to Spring Bice for the release
o f  in te rn e d  Czechs. S p r in g  R ica  was able to reassure them about the
Czechs in England and able to arrange for Czech and even Croat agents
to visit internment camps in Canada to arrange for the release of their
compatriots.^^ He sought to satisfy them; for as he wrote to Greyi
* It is desirable to conciliate Bohemian opinion in U.S. as far as
64possible as it is strongly on the side of the Allies.' He was undoubtedly 
motivated by the growing opposition to the Entente whioh was becoming 
evident among other minorities in the United States. In addition to 
fears about the Irish, Jewish and Catholic Americans, he was becoming 
increasingly alarmed, as hie reports for January and February 1915 show, 
by the activities of the Genaan-Americans. In these reports he claimed 
that the German-Ai/iericans, with considerable financial backing, were 
organizing politically in order to put pressure on Congress, influence 
elections and conduct German propaganda. ‘Their immediate aim was the 
imposition of an embargo on the sale of arms to the Entente. If they 
gained the support of the Irish-Americane, whoBe leaders Spring Rice
^  Pacak to Spring Rice, 3 Oct. 1914, F.O. 115-1775-295* spring Rice to 
Grey, 2 Nov. 1914, F.O. 371-1900-69905.
^  Spring Rice to Grey, 16 Feb. 1915, F.O. 371-2445-27311* Spring Rice 
to Grey, 14 Nov. 1914, F.O. 115-1776-398. Grey to Spring Bice, 17 Nov. 
1914, F.O. 115-1776-400. Voska to Spring Rice, 8 Jan. 1915, F.O. 115- 
I856-I. Spring Rice to Pupin, 12 April 1915, F.O. 115-1856-23.
4 Spring Rice to Voska, 27 Jan. 1915, F.O. II5-I856-3. Spring Rice to 
Grey, 10 Feb. 1915, F .O . 115-1856-7*
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65believed were in German pay, they might even succeed. On January 5* 
1915, he wrote*
American opinion has on the whole been favourable to the Allies •
A considerable section of it, however, that is the opinion of 
the German-Americans has been furiously on the side of Germany, 
and the average politician has much more to fear from this 
active, violent and Interested position of the minority than 
from the rather tepidly taken position of the majority.
The dangers, while possibly exaggerated, were very real. The German
and Irish Americans were unalterably opposed to the lintente and because
of their size, organization and political awareness were the two most
powerful ethnic groups in the United States. Their combined opposition
67
was a threat of considerable proportions. Spring Rice did not recommend 
any measures to counteract the activities of the German-Americans, but
he did warn that the creation of a counter-balancing foreign movement
68was not the solution. Yet this idea was implicit in his reports.
On February 12, 1915, be wrote that one American politician had said*
The Allies should refrain from following the example of the Germans 
and undertaking race propaganda. It was evident however that if 
one race organized in its own interest all the others would follow 
suit and as the Germans were not in the majority among the foreign 
element, their organization would in the end cost them dear. °9
^ Spring Rice to Grey, 25 Aug. 1914, F.O. 800-84-2. Spring Rice to Grey, 
11 Dec. 1914, P.O. 115-1776-461. Spring Rice to Grey, 15 Jan. 1915*
F.O. 115-1898-8. Spring Rice to Cecil, 2 Feb. 1915, F.O. 800-241.
Some Irish-American leaders were in contact with the Gei'man embassy.
D.R. Esslinger, 'American-German and Irish Attitudes Towards Neutrality, 
1914-1917* A - tudy of Catholic minorities’, Catholic Historical Review, 
vol. 53, p.208.
^  Spring Rice to Urey, 5 Jan* 1915, F.O. 115-1879-38.
67 L.L. Gerson, The Hyphenate in Recent American xolitics and Diplomacy, 
Lawrence 1964, P*5°* C* Seymour, Woodrow Wilson and the World War.
New Haven 1947, PP*75-78. R. Lansing, War Memoirs, New York 1935, 
PP*54-72* Additional information on the German-Americans can be found 
in C. Wittke, Geiman-Americans and the World War. Columbus 1936 and 
C.J. Child, The German-Americans in politics. 1914-1917. Madison 1939*
68
Spring Rice to Grey, 12 Feb. 1915, F.O. 800-241*
69 Spring Rice to Grey, 26 Feb. 1915, F.O. 800-241.
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Unfortunately those ethnic minorities in the United States whioh were
potentially anti-German - the Czechs, Slovaks, Serbs, Croats, Slovenes,
and Poli:s - were disorganized and politically inactive. These minorities
were not as numerous as the Germans or Irish and did not have their
tradition of political involvement in the United States. They were not
as yet factors in American politics and did not constitute a counter-
70balancing force to the German-Americans. But the formation of the 
Bohemian National Alliance in 1914 showed that the situation was changing.
Late in February 1915> Namier wrote an analysis of Polisb-American 
opinion for Wellington House. He pointed out that the loles were roughly 
divided into pro-Austrian and neutral factions with Austrian agents 
working vigorously to win the support of all of the American Poles. The 
neutral faction, led by Jan Smulski of the Chicago Journal, while anti- 
Russian, was not opposed to Britain or France. If some effort was made, 
possibly through Slav emigres like Masaryk, their support might be secured. 
He continued!
There is an interesting practical point in Smulski's political 
programme. He is in favour of a closer understanding between 
all the Slav nationalities in the United States.... Whatever 
we may think of that idea, one thing appears clearly from it, 
namely that the only way of approaching "the neutrals" amon,: 
the American Poles and of gaining their support for our side 
is through the intermediary of the other American Slavs.
However impracticable a Slav Union may be in Gurope it is by 
no means impracticable in the United States and it might give 
excellent results. 71
70
L.L. Gerson, Woodrow Wilson and the Rebirth of Poland, New Haven 1953, 
p.46} The Hyphenate, p.60.
71 Namier, 'Preliminary Report from L.B. Namier based on some Polish- 
Amerioan Newspapers', 12 Mar. 1915» F*0. 371-2450-29614* The date on 
this memorandum signifies, not when it was written but, when it was 
submitted to the foreign office. Percy submitted it after writing 
his own memorandiaa but it appears, from the contents of each memorandum 
that Namier's preceded Percy's.
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This memorandum} which might never have been seen outside of
Wellington House, was brought to  the attention of the foreign offioe by
Hamier* e close friend, Eustace iorcy, who in a separate note added his
own views. After emphasizing the threat posed by the Austrian agents
in the United States, Percy wrotes
the Allies want Polish opinion in America as a makeweight to 
the Berman vote, .... It is very possible that on the whole 
Polish-American opinion is with us, but the annexed appeal 
shows clearly that it is not with us in any positive way ....
There is, I believe, some idea at present of starting a 
campaign to form Slav opinion in America. Mr. Seton-iSateon 
has, I believe, some idea of this kind.
Percy emphasized that the work among the American Poles had to be 
done by the Russians working through prominent Poles like Smuleki. In 
addition, the greatest secrecy was necessary so as not to offend the 
American government which was naturally sensitive to intervention in its 
own internal affairs. Since the Russian government claimed priority on 
th e  Polish issue, the Polish-Amerlean problem was its responsibility. It 
was obvious that Russia would be more effective in dealing with the Poles 
because it, unlike Britain, had something to offer them. It would also
be preferable if Russia not Britain took the risks involved in meddling 
in American internal affairs. If the Russians could be induced to 
tackle the problem themselves, th e  foreign office could also avoid the 
danger of offending the Russian government by working for Polish-American 
support•
As a result of these memoranda, the foreign office requested the
views of Spring Rice, and instructed Buchanan, if he thought it prudent,
71to draw Sazonov's attention to the problem. Urey was so sensitive
^  Percy, 'Poles in America', 3 Mar. 1915, F*0*. 371-2450-29614 
73 Grey to Spring Rice, 19 Mar. 1915, P.O. 371-2450-29614.
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about mentioning the Poles to  th e  Russians t h a t  he did not go so far ae
to make any positive proposals. The despatch, however, contained a
memorandum that ouchanan, at his own discretion, could show to Sasonov.
It dealt with the dangers to the Entente of Austrian attempts to win
Polish support in the United States and stated*
it might be of great use to the Allies, as the war proceeds, 
to have in Polish American feeling, a counter-balancing 
influence to the German vote in the United States, though of 
course no action must be taken which would arouse the 
suspicion that we are interfering in American politics by 
organising a pro-Allies vote. It is obvious that no 
influence can be brought to bear on the American Poles 
except through Russia and equally obvious that H.M.Q. must 
do nothing which would be distasteful to the Russian govern­
ment in this connection. 74
The memorandum ended with a statement to which both the British and 
the Russians could agree* 'The whole question seems to be one which must 
be treated from the point of view of relations with the U.S. and not from 
the point of view of the Polish question in Europe.'
On April 1, 1915> Spring Rice replied to the query that a counter­
weight to the German vote would be most useful but that his embassy could
75not become involved in its formation. Before Buchanan could reply, 
an incident in the United States added a sense of urgency to the Polisb- 
American problem. On April 5» 1915? almost four hundred American foreign 
language newspapers published an appeal for an embargo on the sale of arms 
to the Entente. The appeal had been engineered by Louis Hammerling, the 
head of the American Association of Foreign Language Newspapers. Control 
over the advertising accounts, which were a major source of income for 
these small newspapers, gave Hammerling some power over their editorial
^  Grey to Buchanan, 13 har* 1915> F.O. 371-2450-29614* 
^  Spring Rice to Grey, 1 April 1915» F*0. 115-1960-4*
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policy which enabled him to arrange for the publication and endorsement
of the appeal. Of those newspapers involved; forty-eight were Polish
76
and twenty-seven were Austrian Slav. The possibility of an arms 
embargo resulting from such a campaign was an immediate and direct threat 
to the interests of the Entente. Hammerling'8 control over the foreign 
language press was a serious threat because, although most of the American 
Slavs were not opposed to the Entente, they could, over a period of time, 
be alienated from it because of the influence of their own press. If the 
Entente was ever to win their support, Hammerling's influence had to be 
destroyed.
With greater urgencyt Grey addressed another despatch to Buchanan in
which he emphasized that the threat of an arms embargo now made action on
the rolishr>American problem a military necessity. An accompanying
memorandum stated*
In general it may be said that the agitation against the export 
of anas is the one form of German agitation in the United States 
whioh is, on the whole, making distinct headway. The possibility 
that agitation will have some measure of success ... is the one 
distinct danger to the relations between the Allies and the 
United States. 77
The British foreign office did not want the Russians to organise the 
American Poles) that was neither possible nor prudent. Organization of
Hamier, ’Analysis of the S ignatures in the Manifesto', 13 April 1915, 
F.O. 371-2450-43258. Hammerling came from the same part of Galicia 
as Namier and was closely connected to Namier's family. Before the 
war Namier worked for Hammerling in the United ftates and was, 
therefore, able to supply the foreign office with information about 
Hammerling'e activities. Interview with Lady Namier, 25 Aug. 1969* 
Toynbee, Acquaintances, pp.71-72. Berlin, 'Namier', pp.223-4* 
Viereck, Genas of Iiate. pp.100-101. Pupin to Spring Rice, 31 Mar. 
191^, F.O. 371-245 < M 3258. Martin Egan to Smith, 15 Mar. 1915t 
F.O. 371-2450-41805. Spring Rice to Grey, 9 April 1915, F.0.115-1962
179.
77 Grey to Buchanan, 23 April 1915, F.O. 371-2449-46628.
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the Poles had to he done by their own leaders* The foreign office wanted
the Russians to produce propaganda on the Polish issue and to attempt to
win the support of the Polish organizations by working through Polish
leaders favourable to the Entente. But the appeals to Sazonov had little
effect because neither he nor the Russian ambassador in Washington showed
78
any enthusiasm for working with the Amerioan Poles*' Sazonov did not
reject the idea, but he took no action* By June 15, 1913) the foreign
office realized that further appeals to Sazonov were useless and abandoned
them* It had raised the issue with some trepidation and would not
continue to risk offending the Russians.
While these negotiations were in progress, the British officials were
working among the other Austrian Slavs in the United States as they hoped
the Russians would work among the Poles* But while the support of the
Poles had yet to be won, the other Slavic minorities were already potential
supporters of the Entente* The problem was how that support could be
used most effectively The British authorities wanted the various Slavic
minorities to state publicly their support for the Entente and to be seen
to organize for politioal purposes so as to offset the potential German-
American influence on the American politicians*
On April 11, 1915, Q#M. Trevelyan arrived in the United States on
79the invitation of Harvard University to speak on Serbian Relief* He 
appeared to be merely a private citizen, although he carried with him five
^  Grey to Buchanan, 4 May 1915, F.O* 371-2430-43258* Buchanan to Grey,
30 May 1915, P.O. 371-2450-68990* Buchanan to Grey, 22 April 1913»
F.O. 371-2450-53258. Grey to Buchanan, 1 June 1913, F.O.371-2450-68990* 
Buchanan to Grey, 8 June 1915, P.O. 371-2450-73841. Spring Rice to 
Grey, 29 May 1915, F.O. 115-1960-7.
79 Trevelyan, ‘Report on Observations, Made on Tour in the United States,
April 12-May 22, 1915', 4 June 1915, Cab. 37-129-13-
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hundred Wellington House pamphlets on eastern Europe The original
suggestion of the visit was made sometime before March 9, 1915? about 
the same time that Peroy brought the Polish-Amerioan issue to the 
attention of the foreign office." On March 14 ? 1915* rrevelyan wrote 
to Buncioant
It has been settled that I am to go to Ameriea, but only if and 
when I am invited to lecture on Serbia etc. by Harvard or some 
other University. Steps are being taken to see if such an 
invitation can be got. Meanwhile the affair is private and I 
am not tellinCi those whom it does not concern.
Like Namier, Trevelyan worked for Wellington House which had, in
conjunction with the foreign office, arranged the trip. Hie invitation,
arranged after it was decided to oend him, was merely a cover. Reasons
of security diotated that the real purpose of Trevelyan* s mission was
never clearly stated in any official document* Spring Bice was, for
example, always concerned about the security of his reports and was
therefore always circumspect in dealing with sensitive issues. He once
wrote to hrummonds 'It is dangerous to give intimate personal details 
84in writing.' Since the greatest mistake of German agents in the 
United States during the war was to keep thorough written records, this 
concern for security was justified. Trevelyan's official status was 
secret, he was a friend of Seton-Watson, and he was a supporter of national 
self-determination} if the government wanted someone with great influence
ftn
Grey to Spring Rice, 31 Mar. 1915, P.O. 115-1962-156.
61 Trevelyan to Runciman, 9 Mar. 1915, Hunciman Mss.
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Trevelyan to Bunciman, 14 **ar. 1915» Hunciman Mss.
^ Report on Wellington House, 7 June 1915, Cab. 37-130-35* Urey to 
Spring Rice, 11 Mar. 1915, F.O* 115-1961-127*
^  Spring Rice to Brummond, 23 Jan. 1916, P.O. 800-86.
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among the nationalities to act as a liaison between the British authorities
in Washington and the various merican Slavic leaders, it could not have
mads a better choice than G.M. Trevelyan* Despite government secrecy,
a number of official references to Trevelyan’s work, along with what ie
known of his movements in the United States, give an indication of the
nature of his mission* On April 1, 1915* Spring Rice, who always claimed
that his officials could have nothing to do with the organization of the
American Slavs, wrote*
The organization of the American Slavs here is a matter which 
they must arrange themselves* I have no doubt however that 
the advent of a gentleman like Mr* Trevelyan who can present 
the Slav cauee before the Americanjpublic will be of immense 
service in bringing home to them ^ rthe Elavj^ the duties they 
have to the interests of their races in this continent, •••
/In organizing against the Germarw\mericans/. 85
Trevelyan arrived in the United States a week after the publication 
of the appeal for an arras embargo* In discussing possible measures to 
counteract Hammerling’s campaign, such as organization of the Amerioan 
Slavs, Percy showed that Trevelyan was expected to do more than discuss 
Serbian Reliefs ’The nourishment of a pan-Slav feeling of this kind 
cannot be much helped on by the P.O* and it may be left in the hands of
those people who are already doing a good deal to foster it - especially
86
Mr* Seton-Watson and Mr* Trevelyan*' It ie difficult to believe that 
the government was so concerned about Serbian Relief as to send Trevelyan, 
particularly since the sending of lecturers to the United States was 
contrary to the policy of Wellington House. In his own report, written 
after his return on May 22, 1915» and submitted to the cabinet, Trevelyan
^  Spring Rice to Grey, 1 April 1915» 115-1960-4*
^  Percy minute, 14 April 1915> 371-245°-43258.
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wrote: 'My only public activity was lecturing on Serbia and the Austrian
and Balkan questions*' He also stated:
... Croats, Serbs, Slovaks and Czechs are all strongly pro-Ally.
I saw their leaders at Chicago and New iork. These various 
branches of the Slav race are drawing together and being 
organized politically to counteract the German vote and influence.
If Trevelyan's sole interest had been Serbian belief and Balkan
questions, why did he contact the Czech and Slovak leaders in Chicago and
New York? According to James i tepina, the treasurer of the Bohemian
National Alliance, in their meetings Trevelyan urged the various Slav
leaders to oppose Hammerling and those newspapers which had supported
88the appeal for an aims embargo. It is also probable that Trevelyan 
urged the leaders of the Czechs, Slovaks, Croats and Serbs to organize 
their supporters for political purposes, to co-ordinate their activities 
and to work towards that union of Slavs which Namier thought possible 
and the foreign office desirable. The true reason for the .revelyan 
mission was probably to promote, in hie own words, political consciousness 
among the Slavs. According to Spring Nice, his work was ' extraordinarily 
useful1
The work of Spring Rice on this issue is difficult to determine 
because his own reports cannot be accepted at face value. He always 
disclaimed any involvement in the organization of the various Slavic 
minorities because it was not diplomatically correct for official 
representatives of the British government to advise American citizens on 
the subject of American politics. Yet he never opposed Gaunt*s use of
Trevelyan, 'Report', 4 June 191p> Cab. 37-129-13*
oo
Stepina to Seton-Watson, 11 i^ay 1915> F.O. 115-1960-11.
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Spring Rice to Grey, 30 April 1915» *'.0 . 800-85*
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90the Czechs for naval intelligence* On March 20, 1915, he even recommended
that Supilo should he sent, at the expense of the government, to the United
91states to work on the organization of the American Slavs* His remarks
on protocol obviously referred only to known representatives of the
government and not to agents like Trevelyan who were secretly employed.
He was not opposed to involvement but merely the appearance of involvement*
Possible action by Spring Rice on this problem was limited} he could
not himself organize the Slavs* He was, however, in contact with the
various Austrian Slavic leaders and from them learned the prevailing mood
among the ethnic minorities. kuch of the infomation he used in his
reports probably came from such Ppurces# While he might not have given
them advice on American politics, he undoubtedly expressed his opinion
that political organization and co-ordination among the various Slavic
minorities was in their own interest in view of the political influence
92of the Geiman-Americans. He may have even encouraged them. By
April 17, 1915, be was able to write optimistically* 'The Slavs are at
last beginning to organize and are setting to work in earnest to defend
themselves against the constant and virulent German attacks to which
93they have been exposed and which they deeply resent•'
The efforts of Trevelyan and Spring Rice to use the Austrian Slavs
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See above, p.75*
91 Spring Rice to F.O., 20 Mar. 1915, F.O* 371-2559-32960.
b2 Pupin to Spring Rice, 6 April 1915, F.O. 371-2450-52170. Pupin to 
Spring Rice, 12 April 1915, Spring Rice to i up in, 16 April 1915,
F.O. 115-1962-184. Spring Rice to Grey, 1 April 1915, F.O.371-2450- 
43258. Spring Rice to Grey, 6 June 1915, F.O. 371-2450-81776.
^  Spring Rice to Primrose, 17 April 1915, F.O. 115-1962-189*
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in America against the German-Americans were supported by the propaganda 
campaign of Wellington House on eastern European questions which was now 
gaining momentum and which was to be a continuing influence throughout 
1915 and 1916* Some of the political organization was don© by Voska who
informed Masaryk in March 1913 that contact had been established between
94the Czechs and Slovenes. Czech agents were al3o active in counter­
acting German intrigues among the Slovaks who had been slower than the
95Czechs to organize. By June 1915, the various Slavic minorities;
Serbs, Croats, Slovaks, Czeohs and Slovenes; seem to have achieved some
degree of co-ordination with one another. Concerted action had been
96initiated to offset the influence of the Uerman-Americane. The desired
Slav union now seemed possible although much still needed to be done.
Hamraerling' s campaign for an arms embargo was a more immediate and
tangible threat to the Entente than the Gerraan-American vote. The
danger could be eliminated by weakening Hammerling’s hold over the foreign
language press. Both Trevelyan and Spring Rice urged the leaders of the
nationality organizations to repudiate Hammerling and to establish
political control over their own press. On April 7, 1915, Spring Rice,
who was not above veiled threats, wrote to Pupin, the most important
South Slav organizer in the United States*
I fear that friends in Europe will not fully understand how it 
happens that anyone however influential has been able to obtain 
the assent of the leaders of Slav public opinion, as represented 
by the newspapers to such a declaration as we have seen printed.
It would be very regrettable if this policy were to be continued.^
94 Voska to Masaryk, 14 March 1914, F.O.371-2241-53359• Voska, Spy, p.32. 
Percy minute, 31 *ny 1915, F.O. 371-2450-68990. 
96 Percy to T. Spring Rice, 10 June 1915, F.O. 115-1960-11.
97 Spring Rice to Pupin, 7 April 1915 F.O. 115-1962-176.
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On the same day he urged the foreign office to acts 'Please draw
attention of ‘.lav and Jewish leaders in England to the disastrous result
to their interests among the allied countries of allowing their national
98press to be misused for such purposes. fteps are being taken here.*
fthile the government had never promised national self-determination in
exchange for support, it was quite clear that any group which opposed
the Entente could expect nothing. The emigres were left to draw their
own conclusions. Seton-Watson was asked to bring the matter to the
attention of all Czechoslovak agents going to the United States. In
May 1915* apparently as a result of the efforts of Spring Rice and the
foreign office, the bohemian Rational Alliance and the Slovak League of
America publicly repudiated any support for an arms embargo. The
Bohemian National Alliance, undoubtedly under Voska*s guidance, also
convinced many of the Slavic newspapers to repudiate the appeal for an
99arms embargo they had originally endorsed. This action contributed
to the ultimately successful British campaign to eliminate Hammerling as
a serious threat.
It was not enough, however, to stop the campaign for an arms embargo
because German agents were also sabotaging the sale of arms to the Entente
by promoting strikes in munitions factories. One hundred and three such
100strikes in a three month period of 1913 were not pure coincidence.
^ Spring Rice to Primrose, ^ April 1915* F.O. 371-2560-41690.
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On June 10, 1915: Spring Rice wrote to Grey* 'Violent efforts are being 
made by the Germans to induce the labourers employed in the arms factories 
to strike. The leaders of the Italians and the Slavs are doing everything
in confronting this threat can be seen by a report by Nicolson which stated*
The Foreign Office have had several rumours about strikes in 
the United States engineered by German agents.••• Efforts 
were being made some time ago among the Czech and Slovak 
workmen, but a good deal has been done lately by European 
Czech emissaries to counteract these intrigues, and the 
workmen of these two races are probably safe now. 102
The nationality organizations counteracted the attempts to promote
unrest in the munitions industry by warning their compatriots not to
strike} much of the work being done by Voska and his agents An
unsigned report in the embassy files dated June 28, 1915* probably from
Gaunt, gives an indication of the type of work done by Voska*
About two months ago at a General Meeting of the Federation of 
Labour at New York it was decided to have a big strike in the 
Ammunition Works turning out goods for the Allies. That 
resolution was referred to the Executive Committee in Chicago 
with Gompers sitting as Chairman. The result was an equal 
ballot, •••• About ten days ago Congressman Buchanan of 
Illinois brought the matter up again and ... it had been
wind of it, and the vote went againEt them by a majority of 
one, though I regret to state that the two votes oost Mr.
Vaska two thousand dollars apiece* 104
The original source of the four thousand dollars was never disclosed. 
The document gives a sample of Voska*s work for naval intelligence and 
substantiates, to some degree, the published accounts. Space does not
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Seton-»Vatson, Masaryk. p*98* Voska, Spy, p.130. See above, pp.73-77*
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to prevent it
1
vote* Fortunately Mr* Vaska /sic/ (a Bohemian gentleman) got
105
permit a thorough discussion of his work on propaganda, espionage and
counter-intelligence^ in which he achieved a reasonable degree of success,
but there can be no doubt that it was a substantial contribution to the 
105Entente. x Until the United states entered the war, Voska continued 
this work which was a major aspect of the British use of ,he nationalities 
in America.
By July 1915, when it was obvious that the Russians would do nothing
about the American Poles, the British authorities had achieved some
success in promoting political consciousness among the Yugoslavs and
Czechoslovaks in the United States. These nationalities were organizing
and working in their own interests, and those of the Entente, against
the German-Americans. They publicly supported the ntente and privately
106continued to assist the government in espionage and propaganda.
Although their relations continued with the admiralty, war office and
Wellington House, the fact that their support had been secured and
channelled into desired directions meant that they ceased to be an
important issue for the foreign office. Attention was now directed
toward* the American Poles who were as yet uncommitted.
The American Poles were important to the Entente because their
numerical strength was greater than all of the other Slavic minorities 
107combined. The Czechs, though few in number, might be important
105 ” ~ '
See above, pp*73-77*
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Fisher to Spring Rice, 11 Sept. 1915, F.O. 115-1656-40. Colville 
Barclay to Urey, 27 Sept. 1915, F.O.371-2241-149001. Gaunt to Spring 
Rice, 20 Bee. 1915, F.O. 115-1977-141. Spring Rice to Grey, 30 Aug. 
1915, F.O.115-1856-39- 
107 Were about four million i olish-Americans, one million Yugoslavs,
500,000 Czechs (not Slovaks) and about eight million Geiman-Americans. 
J. Rou^ek, Poles in the United States of America. Gdynia 1937, P-11- 
Wittke, Uerman-Americans, p.3. Sapek, Ceche, p.59. R.J.Kemer, 
Yugoslavia, Berkeley 1949, P*59» These statistics are not entirely
(cont •)
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because of their work for the government, but the Poles were a necessary 
part of any effective counterbalancing force to the German-American vote. 
Eore than any other Slavic minority in the United States, the Poles could 
become a real and important factor in American politics. During 1913 
the government confined its activities on the Polish-Amerioan problem to 
propaganda and it does not appear as if any significant contact was
10S
established with the *olish-Amerioan organisations. The government
coula not deal with the Poles as it had dealt with the others. Diplomatic 
protocol gave the initiative to the Poles who, unlike the others, did not 
appear willing to donate their services to ihe entente.
The American Poles were disorganised and politically divided. While 
their leaders often favoured Austria or the Entente but were never entirely 
committed to either, the bulk of the Poles were neutral. Unlike the other 
nationalities, the Poles had a choice, albeit betwuen the lesser of evils, 
because they could expect little from either the Entente or the Central 
powers. The American Polish community would ultimately favour whatever 
side offered roland the most and therefore the leading Poles could hardly
afford to commit themselves to one side as the Czechoslovaks and Yugoslavs
109
had done. If the Poles were to be used as a counterweight to the
German vote, their support had yet to be won and similar efforts by
Austrian agents had to be thwarted. In competition with the Austrians,
however, the British were placed in an almost impossible position by the
reliable particularly in the case of the Jugoslavs and Czechs who, 
in any pre-war census, were listed as Austrians. But there can be 
no doubt that the Poles were the largest Slavic minority and that 
they did not equal the German-Americans.
Grey to Buchanan, 14 June 1915> 371-2447-76757*
Gerson, Woodrow Wilson. pp.pO-52.
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Rue el an government because nothing could be offered in exchange for 
support. Possibly the most the British could achieve would be to 
neutralize Polish opinion so that it would not support the Central powers.
The competition for Polish support began in earnest over the issue 
of Polish relief. The idea had been discussed early in 1915» but it did 
not become an important issue until September, after the German occupation 
of Russian P o l a n d . T h e  foreign office disliked the idea of Polish 
relief, assuming that it was promoted by the Germane to embarrass the 
cuitente and win the support of the American Poles. While the British 
government attributed food shortages in an agricultural country like 
Poland to German requisitions) It could, as the blockading power, be made 
to appear responsible for the failure of assistance to reach Poland.
Although allowing relief appeared equivalent to aiding the Central powers 
by making food requisitioning easier, the idea could not be entirely 
rejected without appearing responsible, especially to the Poles, for any 
ensuing starvation in Poland.
Serious negotiations on Polish relief began in January 1916 on the 
instigation of the Commission for Belief in Belgium and the American 
government, both of which attempted to mediate between the belligerents.
The active role of the American government in these negotiations was an 
unmistakable sign of President Wilson's developing interest in the Polish
problem."*^ Bow the British government could not avoid the issue without
110 '*
Grey to Spring Rice, 19 ^ar. 1915, F»0. 115-1960-3* Grey to Buchanan,
23 April 1915, F.O. 371-2449-46628. Grey to Buchanan, 23 July 1915,
Grey to Buchanan, 29 July 1915, F*0. 371-2449-96430. Crewe, 'Memorandum
on Polish Relief, 2 A Dec. 1915, Cab. 37-139-52*
Gerson, Woodrow Wilson, pp.55-66. According to Gerson, Wilson's
interest in Poland was based on the size of the i olish-American vote.
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risking the alienation of the American government, the ioles, and neutral 
112
opinion* Throughout the negotiations, the knowledge that German agents
were active in the United States trying to win Polish support and that 
they would use this iseue for that purpose inspired the foreign office to 
handle the negotiations with the greatest care so as to throw the blame 
for the failure of any relief programme on the Central p o w e r s W i t h  
that in mind the uitente accepted, on May 10, 1916, a programme for relief 
suggested by the American government on condition that the Central powers 
cease requisitioning food in occupied j oland. To this offer the German 
government never replied, and although the mediators continued to work 
for Polish relief, the stalemate between the belligerents was never oveo>- 
come. By conditionally accepting the American programme, the British 
government was able to prevent Polish relief on unacceptable terms while 
avoiding the appearance of responsibility for its failure* Through the 
careful handling of these negotiations, it avoided alienating the Poles, 
but it is doubtful whether it won any additional Polish support*
During the negotiations, the propaganda of Wellington House on issues 
related to i oland increased* It was probatly during this period that 
tfamier began, on behalf of Wellington House, to use the Polish Information
112
'Correspondence Respecting the Relief of Allied Territories in the 
Occupation of the ibiemy', 31 Aug* 1916, F.O. 39>-26. This collection 
of correspondence was published as part of the propaganda following 
the negotiations* It contains the more important letters and gives 
an outline of the negotiations. It has been cited in preference to 
citing all the correspondence as separate items*
Spring l ice to Drummond^ 30 Jan* 1916, Spring Rice to Drummond, 23 Mar. 
1916, F.O* 800-86. Spring Rice to F.O., 24 Mar. 1916, F.O.115-2124-9* 
Spring Dice to F.O., 6 April 1916, .0. 115-2124-17* Gaunt to Spring
Rice, 12 April 1916, F.O. 115-2124-20. Spring Rice to Grey, 18 April 
1916, F.O. 371 2818-03773. Hugent to Spring Rice, 24 April 1916,
F.O. 115-2124-28. Spring Rice to Grey, 3 July 1916, F.O.371-2818-12867.
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Committed for the distribution of pamphlets in the United States. After
the negotiations, the production of Polish propaganda became intensive
114and continued well into 1917* It was accompanied by an equally
intensive German propaganda campaign and, while each oampai^pi might have
neutralised the effect of the other on the Polish Americans, the combined
effect of all of the propaganda strengthened the Poles in the United
States by bringing their cause to the attention of the general public.
The issue of Polish relief marked the real beginning of American sympathy
115for the Polish cause.
The negotiations also led to contacts between the British embassy
and Polish leaders like Jan Smulski and Ignacy Paderewski.1 In May
1916, Spring Rice arranged for one of Paderewski*s supporters to visit
internment camps in Canada to arrange for the release of interned Poles)
a step which usually signified the development of close relations between
117the government and the nationality organizations. But, althou^i
contact was established, close relations did not develop as they did 
with the other nationalities. The others offered concrete assistance 
unconditionally whereas the Poles offered nominal support in exchange for 
concessions on Polish relief. Since the government did not want any 
programme for Polish relief to succeed, it merely wanted to cast the blame 
for failure on the Germans, vague promises of Polish support were not
114 Papers relating to propaganda on Poland can be found in abundance 
in F.O. 395? volumes* 5, 10, 26, 41, 69, 75* 96, 108, 139*
115 E. -iaohray, Poland. 1914-1931. London 1932, p.59* H.H. Fisher,
America and the Hew Poland, Hew York 1928, pp.75-91*
11^ Smulski to Spring Rice, 26 Jan. 1916, F.O. 115-2124-2. Spring Rice 
to F.O., 24 Mar. 1916, F.O. 115-2124-9. Paderewski to Spring Rice,
2 April 1916, F.O. 115-2124-17• Gerson, Woodrow Vvilson, p.48-
11^ Paderewski to Spring Rice, 20 May 1916, F.O. 115-2124-42.
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118worth such concessions* Until at least September 1916, there is no
evidence of any Polish organization in the United States co-operating
with or assisting the British authorities as the Czechoslovaks and
Yugoslavs had been doing for over a year* Paderewski and Smulski warned
Sx>ring Rice that unless concessions were made on Polish relief the mass
119of the Poles might turn against the entente* These warnings .iade
the officials careful but did not endear them to the Poles* Along with
the reports of the pro-Austrian activities of many ^oles, they gave the
British officials the impression that the Poles were politically unstable
and, unlike the others, not entirely trustworthy.
If British policy on Polish relief and the accompanying propaganda
had any effect on Polish-American opinion, it was not obvious to the
British authorities. The activities of enemy agents may have been
thwarted and the status quo of Polish opinion maintained, but it did not
appear as if Polish support had been won* On July 1, 1916, Spring Rice
wrote of the Polish vote*
The result is rather uncertain - they drift one way or the other*
But they are not solidaire with either one side or the other and 
though Catholic are Slav* But the general result is vague; you 
cannot say for certain which way a Pole will go*
Throughout 1916 the American presidential election, due in November,
was a major preoccupation of Spring Rice. Wilson, a Democrat, was 
running for his second term against the Republican candidate Charles E* 
Hughes, a former member of the supreme court* Had the candidates favoured
Grey to Buchanan, 29 April 1916, Cab. 37-146-28.
119 Spring Rice to F.O., 24 Mar. 1916, F.O. 115-2124-9*
120 Spring Rice to F.O., 17 April 1916, P.O. 115-2124-20. Spring Rice
to Grey, 18 April 1916, F.O. 371-2818-83773*
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different sides in the war, the election would have had great significance
for the belligerents who might have been inspired to interfere in American
politics. But on July 21, 1916, Spring Rice wrote to Greyi
Ab I have frequently had occasion to observe the British 
Government has no interest in the success of either party.
The platforms do not differ in any essential point «•••
Neither one candidate nor the other can be said to have 
strong leanings towards either one party or the other in the
European conflict. They both publicly profess absolute
neutrality. ^
The interests of the Entente were not bound to either candidate
although some officials .night have preferred Wilson. The government,
regardless of such preferences, took paine to appear completely disinterested
in the election. In October 1916, the foreign office warned members of
the cabinet not to give any interviews to American newspapers and warned
123the British press to make no comment on the American election.
There is, indeed, no evidence of any involvement in the promotion 
of either of the candidates. On June 2, 1916, Gaunt wrote to Spring Rice 
that he had been asked, probably by the Czechoslovaks and Yugoslavs, which 
candidate was to be supported. Spring Rice replied! 'Say they are
better judges than we are and we raujt not give any advice as principle we 
go on is non-interference as against German interference. Please destroy 
draft of your tel. No. 79 at once by fire.'^2^
Although the outcome of the election was a matter of indifference, 
ipring Rice was deeply concerned about the election campaign. From
122
Spring Rice to Grey, 21 July 1916, F.O. 115-2126-21.
^2  ^Cecil to cabinet, 17 Oct. 1916, F.O. 395-7-208730. 'Memorandum on 
American Election', 5 Oct. 1916, H.O. 139-39*
124 Gaunt to Spring Rice, 2 June 1916, F.O. 115-2l2>-7*
*2^ Spring Rice to Grey, 3 May 1916, F.O. 115-2125-10.
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January until Hovember he eent countless despatches to the foreign office
concerning the growing strength of the German-American vote and its
126effect on the campaign* To the parliamentary under-secretary of state
and minister of blockade, Lord Robert Cecil, he wrote on February 12, 19161
'The governing fact in the situation is that the Gerraan-Amerioan voters
are organized and the other foreigners are not* This gives a large
organized mass like that of the Genuane, *•• a preponderating influence
127in the country**
Spring Rice was concerned not about who would win, but how they would
win* He feared that one of the candidates, in order to gain the support
of the German-Americans, would secretly agree to adopt certain pro-Geiman 
128
policies. This fear was reinforced by the apparent danger that the
Irish, Jewish, Hungarian. Catholic and Polish voters would ally with the
German-Americans to form a voting bloc bo large that no politician could
129afford to overlook it. On July 14, 1916, he wrote to Lord Hardinge,
who had replaced Nicolson as permanent under-secretaiy of states • Homebody
said that the German vote was like a Ford oar or a mistress* More people
130
would like to have it than to be seen with it'.
The obvious way to counteract this threat was not to support one 
of the candidates but to create a counterweight to the German vote so that
126 Spring Rloe to P.O., 1 Feb. 1916, F.O. 115-2125-3. Spring Sice to 
Grey, 12 Feb. 1916, Cab. 37-142-35-
127 Spring Rice to Cecil, 12 Feb. 1916, F.O. 800-195-
^  Spring Rice to Grey, 1 May 1916, F.O. 115-2125-5- Spring Rice to
Grey, 19 May 1916, F.O. 800-242. Spring Rice to F.O., 30 May 1916,
F.O* 800-86. Spring Rice to Grey, 2 June 1916, F.O. 115-2125-9*
Spring Rice to F.O., 16 June 1916, F.O. 800-86.
* ^ Spring Rice to Grey, 31 Mar. 1916, F.O. 899-10-146.
Spring Rice to Hardinge, 14 July 1916, Hardinge Mss. 23*
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none of the politicians would benefit by a deal with the German-Americans* 
The factions would cancel out on© another, and the candidates would be 
able to retain their position of neutrality. The Czechoslovaks and 
Yugoslavs were already a counterweight but of insufficient size to be 
important* The solution to the problem lay with the Poles.
On July 6, 1916, Drummond asked Eodd to arrange a visit to the
Vatican for Count Horodyski. He explained that the visit was important
131because of the Polish vote in the United States. A day later, after
reading one of Spring Rice's pessimistic despatches, he wrote to Grey*
I do not think we need at all despair of getting the Polish 
vote in the United States generally on the side of the Allies 
when the time oomes for the Presidential elections .... the 
Austrians have been working hard among the Poles in the U.S. 
and have had some success, but not of such a character that 
when the right moment arrives for our friends to go to work, 
which I am told is just before the elections, the position 
oannot be completely changed in the Allies favour. *32
On August 23, 1916, Drummond asked Spring Rice about the possibility
of Horodyski being sent to the United States to work on the Polish vote.*33
Spring Rice replied that British officials could not advise American
citizens on how to vote and that the outcome of the election did not
matter, but he added* 'What is required is a body of voters animated by
resolve to counteract weight of German vote which at present is prevailing
134factor. Change the wind and you will change the weathercock. ' Arrange­
ments had already been made with the war office to send Horodyski to the
United States, at the expense of the government, to recruit Poles for the
Canadian army.*3** Drummond instructed Horodyski that he was not, while
*3* Drummond to Rodd, 6 July 1916, P.O. 800-66.
*3^  Drummond to Grey, 7 July 1916 F.O. 371-2818-128677*
■*“33 Dx^ anmoncl to Spring Rice, 23 Aug. 1916, P.O. 800—86.
*34 Spring Rice to Drummond, 6 £ept. 1916, P.O. 8(X)-86.
135 See above, pp.87-88.
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recruiting in the United States, a representative of the British government.
In a report to Grey on these instructions, he wrote:
... I told him that while we would of course be very glad to 
see the Polish vote consolidated in order to counteract the 
German vote, we could not possibly offer any advice as to on 
which side it should be cast and that if he wished to do anything 
ha had better go out there and judge for himself, but that in 
this case also it must be perfectly clear that he was not acting 
as our agent in any way, nor could we provide for any expenditure.
Phis description of Korodyski's status, probably the result of
Drummond*e desire for secrecy, cannot for a moment be taken seriously.
Becruiting of Poles in the United States for service in the armies of the
Entente was a political activity requiring organization. The distinction
between organization for enlistment and organization for the election
was completely artificial* While not a representative of the government,
HorodyBki was its paid agent. Since it must have been perfectly obvious
that if sent to the United States he would become involved in political
organization for the election, officials like Drummond, who sent him,
cannot entirely disclaim responsibility for his subsequent action
regardless of the conditions which they appeared to stipulate prior to
his departure. Horodyski arrived in the United States in October 1916
and did some political work among the Polish voters, although the details
117cannot be determined. Gaunt acted as his official contact, and it is
no coincidence that shortly after his arrival Paderewski's organization,
118the Polish National Alliance, began to distribute British propaganda.
1^ 6 ~
Drumnond to Grey, 19 Sept. 1916, F.O. 800-96.
Horodyski to Drummond, 14 Nov. 1916. Drummond to Horodyski, 24 Nov.
1916, F.O. 800-106.
Montgomery to Gowers, 21 Dec. 1916, F.O. 395-26-261012. Drummond 
minute, 18 Jan. 1918, F.O. 800-384.
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After the eleotion Horodyski claimed, with some accuracy, that Wilson
119wae r e - e le c te d  by  the Polish v o te .  Horodyski*e mission was signi­
ficant as th e  f i r s t  important example of co-operation between the 
governm ent and come of th e  Polish organizations in th e  United States.
3>uring 1915 and 1916 the British government became deeply involved 
with the nationality organizations, not because it accepted their aims 
but because it needed them as weapons of war- This involvement was 
related more to the United States than to Europe because it resulted 
from the competition for American support. To the British the use of 
the nationalities seemed necessary in order to counteract German initiatives. 
'The organization of the Gerraan-American vote, the threat of an arms embargo, 
and the promotion of strikes in munitions factories all demanded a response 
from the British government whose agents naturally turned to the other 
minorities in the United States as convenient weapons against the German- 
Americans. This Anglo-German competition in the United States in turn 
affected American politics.
In 1914, the Yugoslav, Czechoslovak and Polish minorities in the 
United States, being unorganized and politically passive, were not 
sufficiently important factors in American politics to influence American 
government policy. After the outbreak of war the situation began to 
change because these national minorities underwent a political awakening 
which led to organization for the purpose of influencing American politics.
Although the potential influence of the Czechoslovaks and Yugoslavs was
Gerson, Woodrow ;■11son, pp.65-66. Gerson claims that Wilson, facing 
a very difficult eleotion, also wanted the Poles to organize the 
Polish vote into a solid bloc. He also shows in this study that the 
Polish vote was an important contributing factor to Wilson’s victory. 
There seems to be little doubt that Wilson's interest in Poland was 
based on the internal political situation.
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severely limited by their size by the end of 1916. the Poles had become 
a real and important factor in American politics. The interest of the 
American government in Polish relief showed that it wan aware of the 
importance of the °olish vote.
National self-determination as a specific political programme for 
eastern Europe W38 not an indigenous American idea, but one imported from 
Europe by the belligerents and the emigres. The interest of the American 
public in national self-determination for eastern Europe was the product 
of the work of the emigres as well as the propaganda whioh resulted from 
the competition between the belligerents for American support. The 
growth of the political power of the nationalities and the interact of 
the general public in their cause inspired American politicians, for the 
first time, to interest themselves in the question.
Ho single group was solely responsible for the development of these 
general trends in American politics. But in the distribution of propa­
ganda and in the assistance and encouragement given to the nationality 
organizations the British government made a substantial contribution to 
the spread of the idea of national self-determination and to the growth 
of the nationality organizations. In doing so, the government helped to 





During 1913 the relatione between the government and the Yugoslavs 
centred on the Balkans while thoee with the Czechoslovaks and roles were 
concerned with the United States. The officials were interested in the 
nationalities as weapons of war but not in their war aims. Nicolson 
accurately reflected official opinion when he wrotes 'It is no use our 
talking of terms of peace until we have brought Germany into the position 
when she will be forced to accept any terms that we may offer, and it will 
be a long time before we are able to bring her into that position.'^
During 1916, deepite increased discussion of war aims, the policy of 
the government on the future of eastern Europe remained the same - the 
retention of the greatest flexibility for the future formulation of policy 
by avoidance of open support for any of the basic alternatives and avoidance 
of all commitments unnecessary to the conduct of the war. As in the case 
of the Italian negotiations, commitments would be dictated not by theory 
but by strategic necessity. While government policy remained static, 
however, the situation was evolving, if not towards commitments, at least 
towards the reduction of Britain's future alternatives in eastern Europe. 
During 1916 the relations between the emigres and the officials continued 
to develop. Although policy did not change, it was a period in which 
many of the individuals who might later influence policy began to develop, 
in some cases under the influence of the emigres and their work for the
 ^Nicolson to Buchanan, 8 Jan. 1913* 800-377•
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government, their own personal preferences on the question of national self- 
determination* Aiore significantly, the co-operation between the government 
and the emigres, by its success, began to influence the conditions under 
which the intents waged war* By adjusting to these newly created conditions 
according to calculations of strategic necessity, the British government 
eventually limited to some degree those future alternative courses of action 
most detrimental to the cause of national self-determination* While the 
emigres had no reason, therefore, to rejoice over the nature of British 
policy, the course of the war seemed to be moving in their favour and 
forcing the government along with it.
The failure of the Balkan negotiations brought an end to serious con­
sideration or active support of the Yugoslav programme* The negotiations 
had enabled the Yugoslavs to make extraordinary progress, compared with 
the Poles and Czechocovaks, in establishing relations with and presenting 
their policy to the government. The foreign office had even supported the
idea of the creation of some form of Yugoslav state but had been unwilling
2
to pursue the issue in the face of opposition from Serbia and Italy. That 
opposition was to remain a constant obstacle preventing the British govern­
ment from giving any open support to the Yugoslavs* Nevertheless the 
attitude of the foreign office towards the concept of a Yugoslav state 
changed very little after the end of the negotiations for, while no support 
was given to the Yugoslav programme, it remained the dominant preference 
of the foreign office insofar as it was consistent with the treaty of London
which the government fully intended to honour.^ On aay 15» 1918, following
2
See above, pp. 67-69.
 ^Percy minute, 8 Feb* 1916, F.O.371-2804-28967• Drummond to drey, 3 Mar. 
1916, F.O.8OO-96. Clerk minute, 20 June 1916, F.O.371-2804-117933.
Clerk minute, daselee to Dormer, 27 June 1916, F.O.39>>2-130202. Grey 
to Rodd, 4 Oct. 1916, F.O.371-2627-199194.
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a conversation with Paul Miliukov, a leading Russian Constitutional Democrat,
Grey wrote to Buchanan* 'M. Miliukof told me that M. Sazonof wished the
Slav element to be retained in Austria to neutralise the German element*
4I said personally I had favoured the liberation of the Slav element*•
The amount of contact between the Yugoslav Committee and the government 
declined during 1916 because there were fewer issues of mutual interest 
after the end of the Balkan negotiations and because the Serbian government 
pre-empted the position of the Yugoslav Coaiuittee in South Slav affairs.
The Serbian government established a sphere of influence over Yugoslav 
affairs which the British government did not challenge. Contact between 
the Yugoslav Committee and the government was weakened further in June 1916 
when Supilo, who had conducted Anglo-Yugoslav relations, resigned from tho 
committee in protest over its subservience to the Serbian government. But 
throughout 1916 those relations which did exist between the Yugoslavs and 
the government were cordial although they did not produce significant
5
changes in the already pro-Yugoelav attitudes of the officials. The 
Italian government made relations with the Yugoslavs difficult, but it is 
significant that the foreign office, despite repeated requests from the
6
Italian government, refused to place any limits on Yugoslav propaganda.
For the present nothing could be done until changes in the Balkans made a 
Yugoslav state possible. If it became possible, it would not be opposed 
by the British government.
 ^Grey to Buchanan, 15 &ay 1916, F*0. 371-2818-93751*
5 Bertie to Grey, 22 Mar.1916, F.O.371-2615-58909* De Bunsen minute, 3 May 
1916, F.O.371-2615-84528. Bertie to F.O., 5 May 1916, F.O.371-2258-55031. 
Seton-Watson to F.O., 10 May 1916, Cab•37-147-22. Paget minute, 16 June 
1916, F.O.371-2804-117933. Supilo memorandum, 14 Bov.1916, F.O.371-2634- 
260531. 0stovi6, Yugoslavia, p.8l.
^ Gregory to Drummond, 24 Feb.1916, F.O.371-2602-47196. Rodd to Grey,
29 April 1916, F.O.800-66. Rodd to Grey, 4 Dov.1916, Cab.37-159-23-225393. 
Kodd to Grey, 10 Nov.1916, Cab.37-159-49-231670. Drummond to Rodd, 29 Hov. 
1916, F.O.800-66.
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The Czechs, without an Immediate issue to focus attention on their
cause, had rauch g re a te r  difficulty than the Jugoslavs in presenting their
views to the foreign office* Few had ever heard of the Czechoslovaks, so
that when J*D* Gregory su^ested, in March 1915* the creation of Polish
and Bohemian states, Drdiamond could only commentt ’The proposals put
7
forward i n  the enclosure seem to me somewhat fantastic•*
On May 1, 1915» Masaiyk submitted to the foreign office a long and 
exhaustive essay entitled ’Independent Bohemia*• It was a thorough expo­
s i t i o n  of the Czechoslovak case dealing with the facts about Czechoslovakia 
and the reasons favouring its creation* Masaryk proposed the inclusion of 
Bohemia, Moravia, Silesia and the Slovak areas of Ilungary into a Czecho­
slovak state, and after listing every possible objection, countered each 
i n  turn. He argued that Austria - Hungary was no longer an independent 
great power but merely a German vassal, so that the creation of a Czecho­
slovak state, which would be anti-German, would benefit the Entente by 
w eakening Germany* He also maintained that an independent Czechoslovakia, 
in  c o n ju n c t io n  with an independent Yugoslavia, would act as an effective
g
b a r r i e r  to the German drive towards the Hear East*
The obvious impossibility of acting on Uasaryk's programme in the 
foreseeable future, combined with what must have appeared in 1915 b© 
the sheer incredibility of his proposals, dictated a cautious but not 
7
Drummond minute, Gregory to Drummond, 14 ^ ay 1915> *‘*0* 0OO-67•
g
feton-Watson, Masaryk, “Independent Bohemia”, pp*ll6-135» De Bunsen 
minute, 10 April 1915> 371-2241-5®359• Seton-Wataon to Clerk,
1 May 1915, F*0* 371-2241-53297* “Independent Bohemia” was distributed 
toi Robertson, Hankey, Esher, Wilson, Fisher, Hall, Chamberlain,
Balfour, f-amuel, Bonar Daw, Lanedowne, McKenna, Runciman, Crewe, Kerr, 
Hicolson, Clerk, Percy, Drummond, Paget, Cecil, Hardinge and Spring Rice. 
Seton-Watson Mss* IV.
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hostile reaction from the foreign office* On the file Clerk: wrote a ’The
Allies have a long way to go before the joints in this memo can come up
for their practical consideration! but Prof* uabaryk is a recognised leader
9
of Czech political thought and this paper should be borne in mind*'
Hicolson was more sceptical, but not hostile: ’Mr* Masaryk is the leader,
if I am not mistaken, of the young Czechs, and can hardly be considered 
an exponent of the views of the more moderate sections of the Czech party* 
btill he is an important man*'"^
As might be expected, no action followed, but good relations, encour­
aged by the foreign office, continued with the Czechs who were by this 
time co-operating with various branches of the government* Although such 
co-operation might be expected to have influenced the attitude of the 
foreign office, and might have done so, there is little evidence of it 
during 1^16* hut, at best, time was necessar,, for such influences to 
have effect* It is also probable that during this period the full extent 
of Czech co-operation, related as it wae to sensitive issues, was not 
widely known in the foreign office.
The Czech issue was not seriously discussed again until August 1916, 
when the Czechoslovak and Yugoslav emigres requested a letter of support 
from the prime minister to be read at a public meeting on the anniversary 
of the outbreak of war* Since the emigres were planning to pass a 
resolution proposing the destruction of the Habsburg monarchy, drey wrote 
to i&asarykt
I am afraid that the text of the proposed Resolution, ••• 
goes beyond any official pronouncement hitherto made in this 
or any Allied Country, and the Prime minister could scarcely
9 Clerk minute, 3 May 1919, F.O. 371-2241-93297* 
10i!iicoleon minute, 6 hay 1919» F.O* 371-2241-93297*
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send an official letter on an occasion of this kind which 
would be tantamount to an endorsement by him of a policy 
which has not yet been discussed by the Allies. ^
It is an indication of the amicable relations that existed between
the foreign office and the Czechs that the idea was rejected, not because
of the Czechs, but because, the^igoslavs being involved, such a letter
12
might offend the Italian government.
Unlike the Yugoslavs and the Czechs, the Polish nationalists were 
not united. Among the numerous parties in Poland there were two easily 
recognizable and antagonistic groups which adhered to quite different 
policies for the creation of a Polish state and which competed with each 
other for recognition abroad and support at home. The left wing, which 
centred around the Polish Socialist party, was led by Jozef Pilsudski and 
was essentially anti-Russian. While neither pro-Germannor pro-Austrian, 
Pilsudski was prepared to undertake limited co-operation with the Central 
powers against AuBsia because he believed that the defeat of Russia was 
necessarily the first step in the liberation of Poland. He gambled that 
the Central powers would collapse shortly after Russia, thus creating a 
momentary power vacuum in which a Polish state could be established. 
Pilsudski*s opposition, the Polish right wing, consisted of a conservative 
coalition of the realists and the national Democrats under the leadership 
of Roman Dmowski. He dismissed Pilsudski*s idea of the simultaneous 
defeat of nussia and the Central powers, and he believed that some form 
of Polish independence could only be achieved in co-operation with the 
Russian government. Seeing Ueimany as the greatest threat to the Polish
Grey to Masaryk, 10 Aug. 1916, F.O. 8OO-IO9 . 
^  Clerk to Drummond, 10 Aug. 1916, F«0. 8G0-96.
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nation, he was therefore prepared to work for the Entente. Although 
sharply divided in their opinions on Russia, neither Polish group was 
hostile to Britain or France* In turn, the British government had no 
reason to assume that Pilsudski was an enemy unless it accepted the 
unlikely assumption that the enemies of Russia were, by definition, the 
enemies of Britain.
Wherever there were Poles the political split existed, although in 
various manifestations. In the United States, the i olish Left adopted 
a pro—Austrian attitude and created a considerable degree of uneasiness 
among British officials.^ These Poles were justifiably considered as 
enemies of the Entente and treated as such* In contrast, the Polish 
Right under Lmulski and Paderewski established relations with Spring Rice 
and began to co-operate with the entente after Horodyski*s arrival in the 
United States* British officials first became aware of this split and 
its significance for their own interests through developments in America 
where the action of pro-Austrian Poles cast a suspicion, never shown 
towards the Yugoslavs and Czechoslovaks, on all of the Polish emigres, 
particularly those of the left wing* This suspicion was not always 
justified because, while the Polish Right in the United States and the 
countries of the Entente formed one loosely united coalition, the left- 
wing Poles in Britain do not appear to have been in contact with their
^  A. Bromke, Poland*s Political Idealism v.s* Realism, Cambridge 1967? 
p.14* 0* Halecki, The Cambridge History of Poland, Cambridge 1951 >
pp.462-470. T. Komarnicki, Rebirth of the Polish Republic. London 
1957> pp•30-141* R* Machray, Poland. 1914-1931* London 1932, pp.39-94*
O.S. Pidhaini, The Ukrainian-Polieh Problem in the Dissolution of the 
Russian Empire, 1914-1917, Toronto 1962, pp.2^-51.
14 See above, pp. 93-97, 105-110 • H.H. Fisher, Amerioa and the New 
Poland. Bew York 1928, pp.58-59*
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American counterparts and could not, therefore, be associated with their 
15action. Contact with the pro-Austrian roles in the united States or
the adoption of a pro-uuotrian policy would have discredited the Polish
heft in Britain and would have led to internment. But, even in the
absence of such contact, the left-wing Poles in Britain were always more
vulnerable than their right-wing opponents to charges of being pro-Austrian,
thus: giving the right-wing a natural advantage, which the,* did not hesitate
to use, in the competition among Polish emigres for official British support.
At the beginning of the war the Polish Left in Britain, controlling
the Polish information Coraaittee, had the advantage of superior organization
not possessed by the right-wing which was represented only by Horodyeki and
nlma-Tadema. At this time, British officials, unaware of the split and
incapable of distinguishing one Polish politician from another, were
willing to accept the assistance of Polish etaigres regardless of their
political orientation. Horodyski worked for the foreign office while the
Polish Information Committee worked with the Uetropolitan police and
16
Wellington house. Hegardless of being anti-Bussian, the committee was 
prepared to work with the British government, and was initially more 
successful than its opponents in establishing relations. But this early 
success was not to go unchallenged once Dmowski's supporters were 
sufficiently organized.
During 1915 Alma-Tadema began to attack the established position of 
the Polish Information Committee in the hope of replacing it with her own 
organization, The Polish Exiles Protection, in dealings with the authorities
15
Interview with August Zaleeki, 13 Aug. 19^9*
16 See above, pp. 24-33, 87-88, 113-115-
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17on the subject of enemy aliens. 'Whatever organization was used by the 
authorities to handle l'olish aliens had great power because it oould 
arrange for the release of its supporters and the internment of its
opponents. Alma-Tadema was in a strong position and had little difficulty
18in attaclcing the committee*
In 1914 the home office had only reluctantly accepted the use of the
Polish Information Committee and was only too willing to reconsider the
19arrangements for Polish aliens. x The home office prejudice against the
committee was never explained, but it may have resulted from the feeling
that the committee and its members were not entirely respectable. In
contrast, Alma-Tadema had both influential friende, like John Buchan,
20
Arthur Steel-Maitland and Arthur Nicolson, and a social position. As
a follower of Dmowski, she also had the support of the Russian embassy
which alone was enough to turn the scales in her favour. When she
approached the home office, she justified the replacement of the committee
by accusing its members of accepting bribes and of releasing aliens
dangerous to the Entente. She offered no evidence to substantiate these
charges, but that did not deter the home office from the immediate resolve
21
to replace the committee with the Polish hxiles Protection.
17 Sienkiewicz to Repphan, 2 Aug. 1915, H.O. 45-10836-330094* H. Sienkiewicz, 
the famous Polish novelist and president of the Comite General du Secours 
pour les Vic times de la Guerre en Polo.qie, seems to have initiated the 
move to replace the Polish Information Committee.
18
The negotiations between the home office and Alma-Tadema between Sept.
1915 and May 1916 are covered in the home office files (H.O. 45)* 
10740-262173, 10836-330094, 10836-330095, 10818-317810, and Mepol 
2-1635-839&01.
19 See above, p.24.
20
Alma-Tadema to Steel-Maitland, 4 May 1915, Steel-Maitland GD193- 
165-2. Buchan to Seton Watson, 28 Aug.1916, Seton-Watson Mss. IV.
^  Waller minute, 2 Sept.1915, H.0.45-10837-330095* Pedder minute, 11 Oct. 
1915, Waller minute, 12 Nov.1915, H.O.45-10836-330094.
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The Metropolitan police, who were working- with the committee and who 
were more particular on the question of evidence, opposed the change.
Since Alma-Tadema's accusations were only supported by the testimony of a 
former member of the committee, Hosoo de bogdanowica, who the police 
considered the most disreputable, their refusal to believe these accusations 
was justified. The police only bowed to the decision of the home office
after consulting ttiokham Steed and after it waB obvious that Alma-Tadema
22
had the support of the Russian embassy. By May 1916, the polish Bxiles 
Protection was the recognised committee for consultation on the release of 
interned Poles. It was the first victory for Pmowski in his struggle to 
eliminate his Polish opponents in Britain.
At the request of the home office, Alma-Tadema’s accusations led to
investigations by Scotland Yard and military intelligence (M.I.5) of the
21members of the Polish Information Committee. Although no evidence was
found, Alma-Tadema had effectively cast a pall of suspicion over the
committee and its associates which never completely disappeared. Since
the committee was never confronted with these acoueations, it had no
opportunity to defend itself.
Similar attempts seem to have been made late in 1916 to destroy the
relationship between the polish Information Committee and Wellington 
24[
House. Namier, who had established the connection, was able to thwart 
this attempt by showing that the committee was only used as an addressing 
22
Waller to Henry, 8 Oct. 1915* Henry minute, 26 Oct. 1915* Waller to 
Thomson, 25 Feb. 1916, Waller to Bighara, 29 May 1916, Henry minute,
17 April 1916, Mepol 2-1635-639601. Waller to Henry, 12 April 1916,
H.O. 45-10836-330094.
2i
Curry report (C.I.D.), ^ April 1916, Kell (M.I.5) to Thomson, 9 Jan- 
1916, Mepol 2-1635-639601.
24
Montgomery to Cowers, 6 Bee. 1916, F.O. 395-26-231967.
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25
agency and could not possibly be a threat to the work of Wellington House.
The arrangement was maintained although Wellington House also began to
distribute propaganda through the Polish Relief Fund, another of Alma-
26Tadeaa *s organi zatione•
During 1915 1916 the foreign office strictly adhered to the
position that Poland was a Russian question* The only public statement
that showed any British interest in Poland came on March 2, 1915» when
Grey expressed, in the house of commons, sympathy with Grand Duke Nikolai
27Nikolaievich*s proclamation to the Poles. But when the issue again 
arose in the House in August 1916, Cecil statedt ’It is not the intention
of His Majesty's Government to make any recommendation on a matter of
28
internal policy of another £tate.* The government not only maintained
a public stanoe thoroughly consistent with the wishes of the Russian
government but also undertook no steps to influence Russian policy* For
example, when the foreign office urged the Russians to act on the Polish-
American question in the spring of 1915> it made no reference to any
29
possible change in Russia’s Polish policy. Again in March 1916, when
Dmowski urged the foreign office to act on the idish question, the
suggestion was not only completely rejected but also Buchanan was specifi-
30
cally instructed to avoid any discussion of the Polish issue* The 
wisdom of this decision was shown when the French ambassador approached
^  Namier to Gowers, 14 Dec. 1916, Namier to Gowers, 15 Dec* 1916, F*0* 
395-26-255781. See also above, pp.82-84.
26
Wellesley to Buchanan, 30 Dec. 1916, F.O. 395-26-261032.
27 _ ^
Grey, reply to question in the house of commons, 2 Mar. 1915> F.O*
371-2445-27478.
28
Parliamaitary Debates, Commons. vol*85, col.2671» 23 Aug. 1916*
29
See above, pp. 93-97*
30 F.O. to Buchanan, 23 Mar. 1916, F.O. 371-2747-53114.
128
Sazonov on the subject and only succeeded in provoking a violent outburst 
of temper.33
The British government justifiably refused to jeopardize unnecessarily
its relations with an ally as important as Russia* 2ven if the risk had
been slight, which is doubtful, the government would have been irresponsible
to accept it while engaged in what appeared to be a war for survival.
Grey feared that if provoked on the Polish issue Russia would make peace
12with the Central powers. On August 24, 1916, lie wrote that the German
government might use the Polish issue to obtain a separate peace with
Russia.33 On November 21, 1916, he wrote: ’For England and Prance to
intervene further /in the Polish question^/ would be to split with Russia
34and to destroy all chance of victory by the Alliesj •••'
In spite of official policy, the foreign office always hoped that
the Russian government, to win Polish support, would voluntarily modify
its Polish policy.3^ On Uay 19, 1915, Grey wrote to Buchanan about hie
conversation with kiliukovi
I said it was hardly for us to make suggestions about Poland* I 
hoped Russia would fulfil in a liberal spirit, the proclamation 
of autonomy that she had issued at the beginning of the war* I 
was eure there would be disappointment here if that was not done.-**
3* Lindley to Grey, 19 April 1916, F*0. 800-75* Buchanan to F.O.,
26 April 1916, F.o. 371-2747-79517*
32 Bertie diary, 17 Aug. 1916, F.O. 800-178. Howard to flardinge, 6 Oct. 
1916, Hardings Mss. 26.
33 Grey to Bertie, 24 Aug. 1916, F.O. 371-2804-170012. Hardings to Howard,
27 Oct. 1916, Hardings Mss. 26.
34 Grey minute, 21 Nov. 1916, F.O. 371-2747-238962.
3^  Bertie diary, 30 Oct. 1915, F.O. 800-177* Lindley to Grey, 19 April 
1916, F.O. 800-75* Clerk minute, Bertie to Gray, 4 A^ay 1916, F.O. 
371-2747-86893* Oliphant minute, Buchanan to Grey, 8 July 1916,
F.O. 371-2747-132843. F.O. to Buchanan, 10 July 1916, F.O. 8OO-75.
36
Grey to Buchanan, lp May 1916, F.O. 371 2818-93751.
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A more liberal Russian policy on Poland i-dLght solve tne . o3 ish-American 
problem which perplexed British officials throughout 1915 1916.3  ^ It
might also thwart the widely rumoured German efforts to win support in
■jC
oland and indirectly strengthen the Russian war effort* On September
15, 1916, Lord Kardinge of Penshurst, who had replaced Nicolson as
permanent under-secretary of state, wrote1
It is so unfortunate that the Russians are so blind to their own 
interests that they are doing absolutely nothing at present to 
conciliate Polish opinion, which, in spite of the inborn hatred 
of Germany in Poland, is slowly but steadily veering round to 
Germany. 39
Despite the very real and sincere desire in the foreign office for 
changes in Russian policy, there was nothing that could be done. But to 
offset the danger of losing Polish support inherent in that policy, the 
foreign office promoted relations with the Polish emigres within the 
limits allowed by the attitude of the Russian government but without its 
support. Prom the very beginning of the war the foreign office and its 
diplomatic officials had been approached by numerous, often insignificant, 
Polish emigres, but close relations had not been established with any 
particular faction.40 The warnings of Alma-Tadema in September 1914 had 
created a suspicion in the foreign office about the Polish Information 
Committee which prevented it from establishing a pre-eminent position as
37
See above, pp.93-97, 105-110.
3® Grant Duff to de Bunsen, 7 Sept.1916, F.O.371-2747-1777^5* committee,
7 Nov.1916, Cab.42-23-9* Bertie to F.O., 4 ttay 1916, F.O.371-2747-86893. 
F.O. to Buchanan, 10 July 1916, F.O.800-75* F. FiBcher, German./*e Aims
in the First V»orld vt.ar« London 1967, PP*120-141, 245*
39 Hardinge to Bertie, 15 Sept. 1916, F.O.8OO-I78.
4U Grant ^uff to F.O., 20 Dec. 1914, F.O.371-2095-84689. Grant Buff to 
Grey, 25 Jan. 1915, F.O.371-2445-11258. A. Staniszewski to F.O.,
8 April 1915, F.O.371-2445-40846. J. de Lipkowski to F.O., 5 July 1915, 
F.O. 371-2445-89634.
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41it had done with the home office.
On March 3, 1915, August Zaleski, Piliiudski,s representative ana a 
member of the Polish Progressive party, arrived in Britain to assume the 
leadership of the left wing Poles. Zaleski was a close friend of Namier 
with whom he had been a student at the London School of Economics and 
Political cience and, through contacts with Seton-Watson and burrows, he 
was, to some extent, assimilated into that group of emigres and academics, 
centred around Seton-Watson and Wickham Steed, who worked for national 
self-determination.4** On March 23, 1915, Zaleski explained Pilsudnki’s 
programme to Drummond and submitted to the foreign office a memorandum
which explained that* while not anti-British, Pilsudski was anti-Russian
43and was working for the complete independence of I oland. Zaleski received 
little attention and was denied the facilities, which he had requested, to 
travel to Switzerland.44 The foreign office was not hostile to Zaleski, 
but there seemed to be no immediate advantage in assisting him. According 
to Percy* ’he is probably not entitled to more consideration than a host 
of other Poles.1 The most significant aspect of this brief encounter 
was that Zaleski's obvious anti-Russian bias caused neither comment nor 
opposition.
In November 1915 L mow ski arrived in London seeking British and Prench 
support .4^ He had attempted through the Russian government to find a
See above, p. 32.
^  Interview with August zaleski, 13 Aug. 1969* Interview with Lady Namier, 
25 Aug. 1969* During the war Zaleski taught Polish at King’s College,
The Strand, and contributed to Seton-watson's periodical, The New Europe.
Drummond minute, 23 Mar. 1915, F.O. 371-2445-34420.
44 Drummond minute, 27 Mar. 1915, F.O. 371-2445-35952* According to Zaleski 
the facilities were, in fact, given. Interview, 13 Aug. 1969*
4 5 Peroy minute, 31 Mar. 1915, F.O. 371-2445-35952*
4° Komarnicki, Rebirth, pp.48-49*
solution to the Polish problem such as autonomy vfithin the Russian empire.
Now disillusioned with Russia, ho sought the internationalization of the 
Polish issue which he hoped would lead not to autonomy but to independence 
Opinion in the foreign office on Dmowski was divided. On December 7» 1915 
Percy commented:
It would I think, be well if we kept clear as far as possible of 
Mr. bmowBki who is hanging about London. 1 do not know him and I 
do not know what his "game" is, but I do know that he has been 
informing all the Poles in London that he is in the confidence of 
the F«0. ahd has been helping us to draft our "notes to Germany 
about the relief of the population of Russian Poland".
In the foreign office Percy tended to be a spokesman for Nonier, who
was to be Dmowski's most determined antagonist, and this minute may have
reflected Namier's opinion.^ Nicolson, who had known Dmowski in ft.
/ /
Petersburg and probably preferred him to other Polish emigres because he
appeared pro-Russian, reacted strongly to thie minute by writing a defence
50
of Dmoweki who, he claimed, wae an exception among Polish politicians.
Percy remained unconvinced, but Nicolson's friendship ensured Dmowski
51access to the foreign office.
Dmowski had an advantage over other Polish emigres in that, as the 
leader of the Polish members of the second Duma, he was a recognized 
political leader representing a considerable segment of Polish opinion.
Gregory , "Notes Obtained From a Reliable Source with Regard to the 
Polish Conference at Lausanne”, 20 Mar. 1916, "The Polish Care for 
Internationalisation of the Polish iue-tion”, 23 Mar. 1916, F.O. 371* 
2747-63471* The reliable sources were almost certainly National 
Democrats or other conservatives allied to Dmowski with whom Gregory 
had contact. Dmowski seemed to be moving towards a more radical 
independence policy although he played it down in order not to upset 
Russia and its allies.
Percy minute, 7 Dec. 19lDi F.O. 371-2510-107164*
49
Gee above, pp.93-95* 
j 0 Nicolson minute, 10 Deo. 1915, ?.0. 371-2510-187184. 
^  Percy minute, Nicolson minute, 17 Deo. 1915, i'»0« 371-2449-193104.
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He could not be dismisBed as Zaleski and others had been* Although he was 
becoming more anti-Russian, a fact probably not fully appreciated by the
foreign office, he appeared to be, as the leader of the pro-Russian faction,
/ / 52the safest emigre with whom the British government could deal. In March
1916, Dmowski submitted a memorandum to tho foreign office recommending 
the internationalization of the Polish problem. He was careful to avoid 
the difficult question of the future structure of Poland but appears to 
have made verbal references to a Poland sufficiently independent to have 
its own king ana arn^. Unlike other Polish memoranda, it was read by
most of the members of the war department and even sent to Lord Lansdowne,
53a member of the cabinet. Contrary to xmx>w8ki'e hopes, no action was 
taken in Petrograd, but when Grey instructed Nicolson to consult Benckendorff
on the Polish problem, he was undertaking more action than had been inspired
54by any previous Polish memorandum.
In March 1916, a conference of Polish emigres in Lausanne, attended
by Dmowski, decided unanimously to work for the internationalization of
55the Polish issue. ^ As a result of umowski*s activities during this
52
Dmowski seems to have been cautious about mentioning independence to 
British officials* In his written submissions to the foreign office 
the plans for the future structure of Poland are vague although he 
seems to have spoken on occasion to some officials about independence.
It is significant that Nicolson, who always supported Dmowski, did not 
support the idea of independence but only autonomy. G’Deime minute,
22 Mar. 1916, F.O. 371-2747-53414.
^  Dmowski memorandum, 21 Mar. 1916, Dmowski to Cecil, 11 Mar. 1916, 
Lansdowne to Cecil, 18 Mar. 1916, F.O. 371-2747-53414- A. Dallin,
’The Future of Poland', Russian Diplomacy and Pastern Durope. 1914-1917. 
New York 1963» P-37-
F.O. to Buchanan, 23 Mar. 1916, Grey minute, 22 Mar. 1916, Nicolson 
minute, 24 Mar. 1916, F.O. 371-2747-53414*
fee above, footnote 47-
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conference| Namier stated in a press summary for 'Wellington House that
Dmowski had become pro-Austrian and had abandoned his former principles*
In these press summaries, Namier freely expressed his personal opinions
both on the Polish emigres and the attitude the government should adopt
towards them* These opinions were pro-Russian and were entirely consistent
with the British policy that Poland was an internal Russian problem beyond
the scope of British foreign policy* By discussing matters of foreign
policy in his press summaries, Gamier obviously went beyond the limited
prerogatives of his own rather unimportant office* But in the past his
advice had been sound and had been of value to the government because he
56was pre-eminent among the officials for his knowledge of Poland. On
this occasion, however, he went too far*
Someone in the government showed the report to Dmowski who immediately
57sought the support of nicolson against Namier* Nicolson protested in
writing to Grey and addedt '1 hear that M* Namier is employed at Wellington
House 1 remember Miss Alma-Tadema warned me about him* And I believe Mr*
Gregory* s Austrian Polish friend ^ orodysfci/ has no high opinion of him* *^
Dmowski, Horodyski and Alma-Tadema had good reason to dislike Namier, who
reciprocated in kind. On May 31, 1916, he wrote* ‘Polish politicians in
general incline towards being unbalanced and are easily swayed, and their
59politics are frequently tortuous and dangerousj..**^ It is incredible,
however, that Nicolson accepted without question these accusations against
56
See above, pp.93-95*
57 A copy of the press summary cannot be located* The leak might have 
come from Gregory who was the most pro-Polish.
^  Nicolson to Grey, 6 hat, 1916, F*Q* 395-25-95630*
59 Namier, 'Observations on Polish Activities in America*, 31 May 1916,
F.O* 395-10-106874*
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a government official despite their obvious bias. The result was that
60i.'amier was warned to restrict himself in future to strict press simKaaries. 
But if Dmowski thought that he had eliminated his'Polish Austrian Jewish* 
antagonist) he was very much mistaken. In fact Dmowski had made an enemy 
who was particularly dangerous because of his intelligence, his pugnacity 
and his determination,
A similar incident showed the influence Dmewski's supporters could 
have over British officials. In May 1916, Clerk was approached by 
Hettinger, an independent, who had been the first Polish emigre to contact 
the foreign office in 1914*^ His proposal that Britain and Prance should 
finance a Polish resistance movement in Austria went far beyond anything
yet considered by the government and therefore had little chance of accep-
62tance* But it was not immediately rejected even though Bicolson wrote*
Our attitude is to consider the future of Poland chiefly a Russian 
question^ and 1 would deprecate any encouragement to the numerous 
Polish emissaries who are wandering about with out and dried schemes 
of their own, I understand that Dr, Hettinger is of small account
among Poles.
Clerk, who had no particular bias on the Polish question but was sympathetic
to national self-determination, seemed somewhat interested in the idea, A
decision on the proposal was still pending when, on June 12, 1916, Drummond
wrote the following minute*
Count Horodyski spoke to me yesterday with regard to M,M, Hemir 
/sic/, Zaleski and uetinger /sic/• He said that he thought that 
these three gentlemen were, perhaps unwittingly, being used for 
pro-Austrian purposes and he urged that their correspondence
Montgomery minute, 19 ;>iay 1916, P.O. 395-25-95630.
^  Clerk memo, on Rettinger, 25 May 1916, F.O, 371-2747-98112,
62 Clerk minute, 1 June 1916, P.O. 371-2747-119621. Rettinger to F.O.,
17 July 1916, P.O. 371-2747-138666.
 ^Rioolson minute, 3 June 1916, P.O. 371-2747-119621.
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should be closely watched and that it was desirable that they 
should not be allowed to travel about but should be confined 
to this country. °4
Horodyski, in supplying no evidence for this accusation, was following
Alma-Tadema*s tactics of slander recently used with considerable success
65on the home office. In Namier*s case, as a British subject, it was 
virtually an accusation of treason. Like Nicolson in the previous 
incident, Drummond accepted the truth of theBe accusations without question 
and without the slightest consideration that Horodyski might have some 
ulterior motive in slandering his opponents. On June 14, 1916, the foreign 
office informed M. 1*5 of the acousation against Zaleski, Rettinger and 
Namier, and although an investigation followed, the results were incon­
clusive. Drummond also informed Cecil and added* 'I do not like the way 
M. Namier is always trying to have a hit at M. Dmowski who I believe to be 
entirely reliable and a strong pro-Ally•' Cecil agreed but added* *A11 
the same Dmowski is rather too clever for my taste
Horodyski*s accusation discredited Rettinger and destroyed any chance
67
that his proposal might be accepted. * To avoid alienating Rettinger,
the foreign office did not actually reject the proposal but only gave a
68polite, non-committal reply. The same sequence was re-enacted in 
December 1916 when Rettinger again approached a British official. On
this occasion, Drummond issued instructions that €*11 relations with him
69were to be dropped. This incident shows the degree of influence





Bray, ’Report on August Zaleski', 20 Sept. 1917, F«0. 371-3016-216797* 
Drummond to Cecil, Cecil minute, 15 June 1916, P.O. 800-96.
67 Drummond minute, 21 June 1916, P.O. 371-2747-119621.
68 Grey to Buchanan, 22 July 1916, F.O. 371-2747-138666.
69 Drummond to Rumbold, 23 Dec. 1916, P.O. 800—197*
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acquired, by Horodyski through his work, for the foreign office and the
complete willingness of some members of the foreign ofELce, because he had
proven his loyalty, to accept his views without any critical analysis*
Although Hicolson, Drummond and Gregor y supported Dmowski, Percy
remained in opposition. On July 5> 1916, he wrote to Clerks
There are two opinions about Dmowski * one that with him and the 
pro-Russian party lies all hope for Poland - the other that he is 
a self-seeking politician surrounded by all that is least efficient, 
least trustworthy and most effete in Poland. Officially the first 
attitude is the only one we can adopt, but as it isn't a very
sound one, probablv, it seems best that we shouldn't adopt any
attitude at all.
In this dispute, although he might have been tempted to agree with
Percy, Clerk remained neutral. Although continuing to defend Namier
against the attacks of other officials, Percy could not, as a minor
71official, effectively oppose those who supported Dmowski. Power among
the permanent officials obviously rested with Dmowski'e supporters.
The Uamier-Dmowski feud arose again in June 1916 when the Russian
government, to discredit Dmowski, published a report of his activities
in Lausanne containing accusations similar to those made by Namier. On
June 30, 1916, the Polish Club in Russia, probably at Dmowski*s instigation,
published a refutation of these accusations which stated* 'The author of
accusations against R. Dmowski ... is a certain Namier, who has recently
72
been unmasked in London by the British Government authorities'. The 
secrecy surrounding gamier, as an employee of Wellington House, must have 
given Dmowski the false impression that he had actually eliminated his
Percy to Clerk, 5 July 1916, P.O. 395-26-131839*
Gregory minute, 21 Aug. 1916, Percy minute, 29 Aug. 1916, F.O.395-10- 
162422.
^  F.O. ( Drummond to Duchanan, 23 Aug. 1916, F.O. 800-75*
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antagonist* On August 23, 1916, in response to this attack on Namier,
Drummond wrote Buchanant
We naturally do not want to identify ourselves with anything 
hostile to Dmowski or take sides in these Polish squabbles at 
all but as Namier wrote what he did write with the sanction of 
his immediate official superior it seems fair that he should be 
protected as far as possible*
Drummond seems to have adopted, for no apparent reason, a more 
objective attitude towards the Namier-Dmowski feud* The following state­
ments had been deleted from the final draft of the despatch*
Long before this time iimowski had tried to throw suspicion on 
Namier and he appears, for a variety of reasons, to have his 
knife into him**** We have no doubts as to Namier and his 
information has been very useful to us in many ways* The feud 
between him and Dmowski is probably due to a question of 
MSemitioismM ••• 73
While Namier's attacks on Dmowski were based on reasons of foreign
policy, he might have been influenced by Dmowski's open and rabid anti- 
74semitism. When Buchanan replied that a Galician Jew was a very 
unsuitable person to advise on Polish polioy because the Jews in that 
area were notoriously pro-Austrian, Drummond merely dropped the issue*
By this time Percy had convinced him that Namier's views were perfectly 
consistent with official British policy
These episodes, in a dispute which was to continue until the end of 
the war, showed the influence acquired by the National Democrats over the 
foreign office* Dmowski and Alma-Tadema had influenoe over Nicolson who, 
like Grey, preferred the idea of a united, autonomous Poland within Hussia 
but would not have gone further and would certainly not favour an anti- 
Russian Polish polioy. Horodyski, because of his services, had influenoe
^  F*0* (Drummond; to Buchanan, 23 Aug. 1916, F*0* 800-75*
74 Rose, Polish Democracy, p*76. i&achray, Poland, p*75*
7 w
Drummond minute, Buchanan to Drummond, 29 Aug* 1916, F*0. 800-75*
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over Drummond and Gregory who were the strongest Polish advocates in the 
foreign office and who probably preferred complete independence* Both 
Drummond and Gregory were Catholic and, althou^i in Drummond's case it 
is uncertain, there can be no doubt that Gregory, nicknamed the Jesuit,
76
saw the Poles as the defenders of Catholicism against Russian Orthodoxy* 
Rainier thought that the Poles were useful for propaganda but that relations
with the emigres were inconsistent with official policy* Unlike Nicolson,
/ /
who favoured Dmowski above other emigres because he appeared pro-Russian,
Namier was aware that Dmowski was moving towards a more radical independence
policy which made him, in terms of British policy towards Russia, no
different than the other emigres* Because he had only the support of
Percy, who could scarcely challenge urummond and Nicolson, he could not
change the dominant trend in the foreign office* iiis position was also
weak because the secrecy of Wellington House tended to reduce his official
77status and his Jewish origins cast doubt on his expertise* During 1916, 
the National Democrats became the major Polish influence on the foreign 
office* At the same time, a National Democratic organization replaced 
the Polish Information Committee as the recognized authority on Polish 
aliens* Ruthless and unscrupulous tactics had proven successful* On 
November 30, 1916, Seton-WatBon, who preferred Zaleski to Dmowski, wrotes
^  Gregory to Drummond, 11 iiay 1915, F.O* 371-2445-61430*
77 Toynbee wrote of Namier's period at Oxford* '••* most of Bernstein's
JWamier/‘ and my contemporaries at Balliol persisted in their state of 
invincible ignorance about has tern Durope till they were overtaken by 
the outbreak of war in August 1914* They failed to profit by the 
opportunity of learning about Bernstein's world at first hand from 
Bernstein himself because they were allergic to him and therefore to 
his homeland* They did not take him seriously, and they therefore 
could not recognize that his world, too, was real*' p*64, Acquaintances. 
One must suspect that had he been a native of Britain rather than Galicia 
he would have been taken more seriously, as was Seton-Watson*
U 9
the Russophil ^oles here - I won't mention names - have been 
engaged, for over a year on a whole series of extremely under­
hand intrigues against our people . they affect King4*
College ^jwhere Zaleski taught Polish/, the F.O. and our 
propaganda in neutral countries. 7°
Dmowski had established influence over the foreign office while 
opposing the established polioy of the government by proposing the inter­
nationalization of the Polish issue. Namier lost influence and waB even 
accused of treason by consistently supporting the official British policy 
that Poland was an internal Russian question. Nothing shows more clearly 
the divergence between official policy and the personal preferences of 
the pro-Polish officials like Drummond, Jregory and Ricolson. While the 
government refused to support the internationalisation of the Polish issue, 
the dominant preference of the foreign office varied between a united, 
autonomous Poland within Russia to the more radical polioy of Polish 
independence.
During the summer of 1916, the British goverrment for the first time, 
seriously considered the problem of war aims. The discussion of these 
aims was prompted by two aspects of the general strategic situation.
During the spring of 1916, the belief was widespread in the government, 
based on numerous reports, that President Wilson would attempt to mediate 
in the European conflict. Before the government could respond to such an 
initiative, some formulation of aims was necessary. In addition, the 
military prospects of the Entente in the spring and summer of 1916, based 
on the ^omae offensive, the Brusilov offensive and the Rumanian entry into 
the war, created a general but shortlived feeling of optimism conducive to 
the study of war aims. Under these general conditions, the impetus to
^ Seton-Watson to Allison Phillips, 30 Sov. 1916, Seton-Watson Mes. III.
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discuss these aims apparently developed simultaneously but separately in
79various branches of the tjovernment.' *
Since the beginning of the war, the foreign office, under the influnnoe
80of Nicolson, had avoided any systematic study or discussion of war aims.
Hardinge, who replaced Nicolson in June 1916, reversed this policy* Ke
established a committee, under ir «*illiara Tyrrell, a senior clerk:, and
 ^ir Ralph L aget, an assistant under-secretary, to undertake a thorough
8l
review of possible war aims. Excluding the text of the final report, 
there is no evidence on the structure of the committee, the documents it 
used or how it reached its conclusions* In some cases, however, the 
original but not immediate sources of the recommendations are obvious 
because of their uniqueness. Unfortunately the process by which these 
ideas reached the committee cannot alwayB be determined. The report was 
not a statement of policy but merely a series of recommendations which 
tendeu to reflect the dominant preferences within the foreign office. Its 
treatment of eastern urope indicated the degree of progress achieved by 
the emigres.
The report, completed by August 7* 1916, stated that the recommen­
dations were based on the principle of nationality as enunciated by members
82of the government in 1914* It would be applied subject to economic 
factors, treaty obligations, Allied war aims and, above all, British
^ War oommittee, 21 Mar. 1916, Cab.42-11-6. P. uuinn, British strategy
and Politics. 1914 to 1918* Oxford 1965, PP.121-191*
80 c, , _ _ 
bee above, p. 15*
fiardinge to Chirol, 9 Aug. 1916, Hardinge Mss. 24. Paget to Findlay,
2 Oct. 1916, Paget Mss. 51256.
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Paget and 'Tyrrell, ’Suggested Basis for a Territorial Settlement in 
Europe’, 7 Aug. 1916, Cab.24-2-7&*
141
interests* These exceptions were so extensive as to allow for almost 
any application of the general principle; but at least in that sense the 
statement was consistent with Asquith's speeches at the beginning of the 
war* In stating elsewhere in the report that the 'Allies who went to war 
for the emancipation of nationalities will inevitably be called upon to 
deal with the Polish question', Paget and Tyrrell showed that they had 
adopted, through a strong bias in favour of national self-determination, 
an interpretation of Asquith's early speeches which went far beyond
O 1
an^tuing that he had intended*
The authors recommended, in accordance with the principle of nation­
ality, that the Habsburg empire should be destroyed* They based this 
proposal on Masaryk's and Supilo'e argument that Austria-Hungary was and,
if it survived, would remain subject to Germany regardless of the outcome 
84
of the war. To weaken Germany, Austria-Hungary had to be eliminated.
In place of the Empire , they first recommended the creation of a Yugoslav 
state. Since they deplored the violations of the principle of nationality 
in the treaty of London, they hoped that it mi^it be voluntarily modified 
by the Italians. If the Italians refused, Paget and Tyrell recognized 
the necessity of fulfilling the obligations of the treaty, but they 
maintained that a Yugoslav state could still be formed from territories 
not covered by the treaty. This state, which the government should 
support, was to be *a free and voluntary union, not imposed from without 
implying subjection of any one portion to the other’ * Since it was to 
include Serbia, Paget and Tyrrell were rejecting the concept of a Greater 
Serbia in favour of Supilo's concept of a federal union of South Slavs.
8 ^
See above, pp* 17-19.
4 See above, p p .35-36, 120- 121.
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They also opposed the resurrection of Montenegro and, in opposition to
85Italian policy, the leaving of Croatia to Hungary. On a question in
v/hich there were almost an infinite number of variations, the authors
positively rejected the Serbian, Italian and Montenegrin solutions in
favour of a proposal which in all essentials was identical to Supilo's
Yugoslav programme* They even used Supilo's argument!
We consider that Great Britain should in every way encourage and 
promote the union of Serbia, Montenegro and the Southern Slavs 
into one strong federation of states with a view to its forming 
a barrier to any German advance towards the hast*
It was assumed that such a state, supported by Britain, would be
pro-British. Although the proposal represented the strongest endorsement
ever given to the Yugoslav position by any British official and, in
contrast to similar proposals during the Balkan negotiations, was made
regardless of any current negotiations, all of the evidence suggests that
87
it reflected the dominant preference within the foreign office.
The proposals in the report on the future of Czechoslovakia bore no 
resemblance to any Czechoslovak programme. Paget and Tyrrell considered
85 See above, p. 56. There can be no doubt that the foreign office in 
general shared the opinion that Montenegro should cease to exist.
King Nikita of Montenegro was suspected of treachery during the 
Balkan campaign in 1913 and considered by the foreign office unworthy 
of consideration* In September 1916 Grey wrote* ’There is no 
occasion for our authorities to put themselves out to please the 
King of Montenegro who tried to sell the allied cause as far as 
Montenegro was concerned to the Austrians.' (Bertie to Hardinge,
7 Sept* 1916, Hardinge m s s . 25). The Montenegrin government was 
still recognized and, to some extent, financially supported by the 
British government but only because the French and Italian govern­
ments were doing likewise. In contrast to their attitude towards 
the Yugoslavs the British were unlikely, should an opportunity arise, 
to give assistance to the Montenegrins. Grey to Bertie, 13 Sept* 
1913, F.O. 371-2268-127443. Hardinge to Kodd, 4 Oct* 1916, Hardinge 
mbs. 26*
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See above, pp. 35- 36 , 42.
J^  See above, p p .118-120.
the possibility of an independent Bohemia, but in listing the various
alternatives did not include uiasaryk's idea of a state consisting of
bohemia, Moravia, Silesia and the Slovak areas of Hungary* Since this
was an essential point in Masaryk*s programme, it can only be assumed
that the authors did not consult the memoranda, like * Independent Bohemia
88which Masaryk had submitted to the foreign office* After listing the 
various alternatives, which showed a slight knowledge of Czechoslovak 
views, they proposed that Bohemia should be attached to an independent 
lolish states 'As far as we understand, this solution is desired both 
by far-Beeing Czechs and Poles*•*• The Czechs fully appreoiate that they 
would benefit by the superior culture and civilization of the Poles*’
This astounding proposal certainly did not come from Czech sources* 
It is difficult to imagine where Paget and Tyrrell found the far-seeing 
Czechs they claim to have consulted; for there is no evidence that any 
of the Czechs ever considered or suggested union with Poland* The Czechs 
were not about to trade Austrian for Polish rule, particularly since the
Poles in Austria-Hungaiy had, prior to 1914, supported the status quo in
8 9opposition to the Czechs and South Slavs. Nor would the Czechs agree 
with the authors on 'the superior culture and civilization of the Poles*1 
Since the proposal never appeared in any previous foreign office document 
it is impossible to determine its origin* There is also no reason to 
assume that it reflected the opinion of those officials, like Clerk, who 
were very close to the Czechs and their supporters* It did, however, 
reflect the lack of any dominant preference in the foreign office on this 
11 b See above, pp.120-121* A copy had been sent to Paget.
^  A*J*P. Taylor, The Habsburg monarchy, 1809-1918, New York 1965* 
pp.203-204•
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issue as well as the inability of many of the officials to conceive of a 
reasonable solution to the Czechoslovak problem* While the Yugoslavs had 
succeeded in convincing the foreign office, the Czechs had as yet failed, 
despite the fact that during this period they were, in co-operation with 
other branches of the government, making a greater contribution to the 
Entente than either of the other nationalities. Robert Cecil later
90
claimed that he first heard of Czechoslovakia only in December 1916.
On Poland, the report rejected both total absorption by Russia and
autonomy within Russia. It proposed the establishment of an independent
and sovereign kingdom of Poland to be ruled by a Russian Grand Duke but
in no other way connected to the Russian state. The authors did not deny
the difficulties involved in this proposal, but they speculated that at
the end of the war Russia might need Allied assistance in freeing its
territory from German occupation. In this event Britain and Prance would
be able to intervene in the Polish question in favour of an independent
kingdom. By decreasing the power of both Germany and Russia and by
acting as a buffer state between these two powers, an independent Roland
would be in the best interests of Britain. In March 1916, after consulting
various Polish emigres, Gregory had made the same proposal using the same
justification, claiming that it was the solution most preferred by the 
91Poles, Since he was a close friend of Horodyski and a supporter of 
Dmowski, the emigres he consulted were undoubtedly National Democrats.
Paget and Tyrrell probably based their recommendation on this report which, 
in turn, was based on Dmowski*s policy. While Gregory would have supported 
the recommendation, it was probably too radical for others, like Grey and
90
R. Cecil, All the fray, London 1949* p.141*
91
bee above, p.131, fn.47«
145
Moolson, who seemed to prefer Dmowski's earlier programme of a united,
92
autonomous Poland within the Russian empire*
The sections of the Paget-fyrroll memorandum on eastern Europe were
an exposition on the practical application of national self-determination.
It was based on the belief, constantly expounded by the emigres, that
national self-determination would be in the interests of Britain because
the newly created states would be pro-British# The willingness of the
emigres to co-operate with the government in the conduct of the war gave
substance to this belief* when the report was submitted to the foreign
office in September 1916, Hardinge wrote* 'This is an interesting report
requiring a good deal of digestion*.• • It seems premature at present to
93express any decided opinion1. Although he did not express his opinion
on national self-determination, it seems, from other sources, that ho
94agreed with the report* Drummond, Clerk and Percy, while possibly 
having reservations on specific points, undoubtedly approved of the 
support expressed by the authors for the nationalities*
urey's opinion is always hard to determine because of the lack of 
evidence. His only comment on the report - ’It seems to me to be very 
ably done' - gives little indication of his views* But his promises to 
fupilo and his conversation with x d^liukov show that the report's emphasis 
on national self-determination reflected his own personal preference for
92
See above, pp.137-139-
^  Hardinge minute, Paget-Tyrrell memorandum, 11 Sept. 1916, P.O.371-2804-
180310.
^  Paget to Findlay, 2 Oct* 1916, Paget Mbs. 51256* Seton-Watson conver­
sation with Hardinge, 25 July 1916, Seton-ttatson Mss. VI. Bertie diary,
11 Aug. 1916, F.O. 800-171.
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95the future of Europe* But Grey was responsible for the policy on war 
aims that commitments unnecessary to the conduct of the war were to be 
avoided in order to preserve the greatest freedom of action* It was 
unlikely, therefore, regardless of his own preferences and those of his 
officials, that he would do more than agree that such recommendations 
were theoretically desirable. luring 1916, Grey was sufficiently 
interested in the possibility of a negotiated peace attained through
American mediation that he would never make negotiations impossible by
96the adoption of extreme war aims.
j&ost members of the foreign office would agree with Grey that these
recommendations, while desirable in principle, were completely impractical
in the present political context. The exception was Cecil who, unlike
the others, had absolutely no sympathy for nationalism and who could be
expected to oppose such recommendations on both a theoretical and practical
basis* In Lecember 1916, he wrotet ’Nationalism whether Irish or Slav
97arouses all the worst passions of B^ y nature ’. Lany of the Paget-Tyrrell 
recommendations had been made before but had been rejected as unfeasible 
because of interallied relations* The situation had not changed* The
Grey minute, Paget-Tyrrell memorandum, 11 Sept.1916, F.O.371-2804-160510.
Also see above, pp.50-51, 56, 59-60, 119, 128 . At times Grey seems to 
have accepted the idea that Austria-Hungary was no longer an independent 
great power Grey to Laughlin, 7 Aug. 1916, I #0. 115-2130-230.
^  Bertie diary, 11 Aug.1916, F.0.800-171• Bertie diary, 15 Aug. 1916,
F.O.600-175* Grey to Lloyd George, 29 Sept.1916, Lloyd George ds.L2-13-5« 
Bertie to Hardinge, 24 Aug.191 >, Hardinge Ass.24. Hardinge to Bertie,
4 Oct.1916, Harding© to Bertie, 10 Oct.1916, F.0.800-172. Bertie to 
Hardinge, 15 Oct.1916, F.O.800-178. Bertie and Hardinge may have 
exaggerated Grey's interest in a negotiated peace but it was a possibility 
which certainly disturbed them.
^  Cecil minute, Lruramond to Cecil, 23 Dec. 1916, F.O.371-2634-260531*
Cecil, •j’rinciples of foreign lolicy', undated, Cecil Mss*51195* Cecil 
seems to have had little influence in the foreign office before Lecember 
1916.
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preferences of the foreign office and the personal views of officials on 
hypothetical questions neither reflected nor as yet influenced actual 
policy* No one in the foreign office seriously suggested the immediate 
incorporation of these proposals into Dritish foreign policy. When the 
memorandum was sent to the cabinet, it was sent as a suggested basis for 
future not immediate policy.
On August 10, 1916, the war committee discussed the possibility of
98formulating armistice terms in preparation for any attempt at mediation.
On August 17, 1916, Field Marshal Sir William Robertson, the chief of the
imperial general staff, wrote to Lloyd George, the secretary of state for
war, expressing his belief in the need for a discussion of war aims.
Robertson feared that the French, with their war aims carefully formulated,
would be able, in the event of negotiations, to seize the initiative to the
detriment of British interestsi
We may be sure that M. Briand ^ premier of France/ will have very 
decided views, carefully worked out for him under his general 
direction by the clever people who surround him and who do not 
appear on the surface of political life. 99
Robertson seemed aware of the Paget-Tyrrell committee, but it is 
unlikely that he was aware of their report which had not yet been submitted 
to the foreign office. With the letter he enclosed his own meraorandus 
on war aims which was the antithesis of the Paget-Tyrrell report in that
98
War committee, 10 Aug. 1916, Cab. 42-17-5*
99
Robertson to Lloyd George, 17 Aug. 1916, W*0. 106-1510. Robertson's 
fears about Briand may have come from Viscount Esher who had consider­
able influence in the war office for whom he acted as an 'observer' 
in Paris. On August 11, 1916 he expressed similar fears in his 
diary in almost identical terms. Viscount Esher, Letters and Journals, 
vol. IV, London 1938, pp.47-46•
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100it emphasised, the balance of power instead of the nationality principle. 
Robertson neither mentioned national self-determination nor showed the 
slightest concern for subject nationalities, he proposed the maintenance 
of a diminished ..»ustria-Uungary including Bohemia and Moravia which, he 
believed, could not be independent. He recognised the necessity of 
accepting Russian policy in Poland and supported the Greater Serbian 
concept by proposing to give Serbia Bosnia, Herzegovina and Slavonia.
For the emigres, nothing could be worse than these proposals except the 
victory of the Central powers.
At one point in the memorandum Robertson stated: 'Of far greater
import to the matter under immediate consideration is the intention to 
break up Austria-hungary'. He came to this conclusion after examining 
the promises of Habsburg territory to Serbia, Italy and Rumania. The 
decision had never been made and the intention never expressed, but in 
view of the territorial promises it was not an unreasonable assumption.
But it was an assumption which showed that confusion existed within the 
government on the nature of foreign policy.
At a meeting of the war committee on August 30, 1916, Asquith asked 
the members of the cabinet to submit their views on war aims. His state­
ment that 'Everything indicated that M. Briand considered that we should 
be face to face with this question before the end of the autumn' creates 
the suspicion that the impetus for Asquith's request came from RobertsonP^ 
As a result of this request, the Robertson and Paget-Tyrrell memoranda
100 Robertson, 'General Rtaff demorandum Submitted in Accordance With 
the Prime Minister's Instructions', 31 Aug. 1916, Cab. 29-1-4*
War committee, 30 Aug. 1916, Cab. 42-18.
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were submitted to the war committee and they were followed, in October 1916,
by another memorandum by Arthur James Balfour, the first lord of the
admiralty# In January, he had written: 'If the map of .Europe was brought
by the present war into close harmony with the distribution of nationalities,
102
one perennial cause of international disturbance would be mitigated#'
In hie appreciation of nationalism, Balfour was an exception among his 
Conservative colleagues who, because of the Irish problem, abhored nation­
alism in any forra#'1’0  ^ In a paper submitted to the cabinet in May 1899, 
on the South African question, Balfour had written*
were I a Boer ••• nothing but necessity would induce me to adopt 
a constitution which would turn my country into an English Republic 
or a system of education which would reduce my language to the 
"patois” of a small and helpless minority# 104
Balfour was not a nationalist, but he had a sympathy for subject
nationalities which was the product of his remarkable ability for real
understanding of the many sides of any question# He could appreciate the
feelings which motivated the emigres, and he understood very clearly the
importance of nationalism in European affairs.
In his memorandum, Balfour recognized both the necessity to solve
some of the European nationality problems and the possibility that the
102 Balfour, 'Irresponsible Reflections on the Part which the Pacific 
Rations Might Play in Discouraging Future Wars', 19 Jan# 1916,
Cab. 37-141-11.
' In discussions of nationalism in eastern Europe Ireland was seldom 
mentioned# The similarities may have been too obvious to merit 
comment but they were undoubtedly apparent to those who considered 
the problem of national self-determination# The problem of Ireland 
obviously made it difficult for the government to approach the Russians 
on the Polish issue# '.Yhen action on behalf of Finland was suggested 
Crewe wrote, 'We might get in return some good advice how to deal with 
Sein Fein'. Cler/w to dicoleon, 27 April 1916, F.O#371-282^-80250#
i). Judd, Balfour and the British Empire# London 1968, p #165, Cab. 37- 
49-29# Also see A.J. Balfour, Opinions and Argument, London, pp.88-89# 
A#J. Balfour, 'Race and Rationality* , The Transactions of the Honourable 
ooiety of Cymmrodorion. Session 1908-1909, London 1910, p.240.
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nationality principle could be used to achieve the Entente*b cardinal aim
105of the weakening of Germany. As a convenient principle upon which to 
base the territorial reduction of the Central powers, national self-deter­
mination was more a means than an end. Balfour opposed the creation of 
an independent Poland, rejecting the Paget-Tyrrell proposal, because he 
feared that it would succumb to the same weakness that had led to the 
partitions. He doubted its effectiveness as a buffer state which, in any 
case, would not be in the interests of Britain because it would relieve 
iermany of Russian pressure. Instead he favoured, as did many in the 
foreign office, a re-united autonomous Poland within the Russian empire.
He disliked the idea of the German sections of Austria joining Germany and 
therefore desired to see the continued existence of the Dual monarchy shorn 
of its Italian, Rumanian and South Slav possessions. In reference to the 
Czechs he etateds
To Bohemia Germanic civilization is profoundly distasteful. The 
Czechs have been waging war against it for some generations, and 
waging it under grave difficulties with much success. Whether an 
independent Bohemia would be strong enough to hold her own, from 
a military as well as from a commercial point of view, against 
Teutonic domination ... I do not know; but I am sure the question 
deserves very careful consideration. If the change is possible 
it should be made.
Although Balfour did not elaborate, presumably if independence was 
not possible, Bohemia would remain a part of the Bual monarchy. While he 
could offer them little, Balfour singled out the Czechs for special con­
sideration without apparent reason. By its context, the statement 
indicates that he had been influenced by Czech propaganda. It may be 
that he was influenced by knowledge of Czech assistance to the government; 
for he was first lord of the admiralty while Voska was working for naval
Balfour, *The Peace Settlement in Europe1, 4 Oct.1916, Cab.37-157-7•
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intelligence. Balfour did not refer to the Yugoslav programme but appeared 
to support the idea of a Greater S erbia by recommending that it should 
receive the South Slav areas.
The Balfour memorandum was, perhaps unconsciously, a compromise 
between the previous memoranda. His recommendations were based on a 
synthesis of the balance of power and the nationality principle which 
avoided the impracticability of Paget and Tyrrell and the laclc of relevance 
to European problems of Robertson. While Robertson's proposals most 
accurately reflected the stated official policy of the British government 
in 1916» Balfour'e proposals probably reflected the dominant preference of
the cabinet, if such existed, on the subject of war aims in eastern Europe.
/  /
In that the emigres could find little comfort.
The submission of these memoranda to the cabinet was not followed by
any discussion of war aims. The optimism of the summer had not survived
the military reverses on the Somme, in Galicia and Rumania, and there was
no longer any need for haste in the discussion of war aims. The policy of
the government remained, therefore, as it had been since 1914, one of
flexibility through the avoidance of unnecessary commitments in areas of
secondary importance. On specific issues such as the future of Austria-
Hungary or the application of national self-determination, it cannot be
said that the government had a policy.
Since national self-determination was not important enough to be
discussed by the cabinet, there is little evidence of the personal views
of its members. Asquith and Runciman probably shared the limited sympathy
for the nationalities shown by Urey and Balfour but would not have gone 
106further. In contrast, there is no reason to assume that Lansdowne,
See above, pp.21, 49, 98 • Delme-Radcliffe to Bonham Carter, 27 April 
1916, P.O. 371-2602-66039-
1^2
Curzon, Bonar Law or Chamberlain had any sympathy whatever for the subject
nationalities. Lloyd George at least appeared to be a supporter of
national self-determination; for on August 27, 1916, in a conversation
on war aims, he said to H*A*L. Fisher:
It is clear to me that Germany must be strong. «e have to consider 
Russia**.* What would be the objection to joining German Austria 
to Germany? I would cut off Hungary from Austria* Hungary should 
be an independent kingdom* It is very unwholesome for Hungary to 
rule the Slavs* They should be separated* I admit that Bohemia 
is a difficulty*
Lloyd George was not particularly well informed about the distribution
of nationalities in eastern Lurope. When Fisher suggested that the Slovaks
might also be a difficulty, he replied:
Who are the Slovaks? /Fisher7  Well the; are Slavs, peasants, and 
about 2 million strong /Lloyd George' Where are they? I don't 
seem to place them. /FiBhej^ ' On the west of Hungary* /Lloyd 
George/ where are the Ruthenians? ^iBher/ On the Morth.
Lloyd George also stated that 'The Austrian Kmpire must be broken up’ 
and expressed his support for a Yugoslav state, characteristically adding: 
'I am attracted by the Serbs. They are like the Welsh.* These comments 
show where Lloyd George s sympathy lay, but they should not be taken too 
seriously because he ended the discussion by saying: 'I am against dis­
cussing the settlement of ^urope in public* The war spirit is a madness*
While it is on you cannot pledge yourself to anything profitably* You
107must keep everything indefinite.'
The foreign office, but not the cabinet, was subject to influence
/  /
from the emigres because it conducted relations with them* hxcept for
Grey and perhaps Balfour, members of the cabinet were probably not aware
of the co-operation that existed between the emigres and the various
branches of the government. Between 1914 and 1916, these relations were
Fisher, 'Hotes on conversation with Lloyd George1, 27 Aug* 1916,
Fisher Mss. 24.
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conducted entirely by officials without reference to the cabinet* The 
war aims memoranda were the first occasion upon which the idea of national
self-determination officially reached the cabinet level* Cabinet members
/ /
were subjected to memoranda from various emigres which they undoubtedly 
left unread because their relations with the emigres lacked the ingredient 
of co-operation which existed in those between the foreign office and the
emigres* A cabinet member had no reason to read such memoranda, but an
/  /
official who wanted assistance from the emigres had to take their political 
programmes seriously* It was therefore inevitable that the foreign office 
would be subject to far greater influence from the emigres* This situation 
created the possibility that in the future a definite split might develop 
between the cabinet and the foreign office on the subject of war aims.
Since the sympathy for the nationalities in the cabinet seemed, with the 
exception of balfour, to exist among the Liberals but not the Conservatives, 
the possibility of a split would increase with the weakening of the Liberal 
element in the government.
In Lev ember 1916 > . aurice Iiankey, the secretary of the war committee, 
listed those war aims upon which there seemed to be general agreement* On 
eastern urope the list included the following! ' (iii) That some 
arrangement should be made in regard to Poland which is acceptable to
1 /-\Q
Russia.**. (vi) That berbia should be re-established.• Hankey's
memorandum cannot be considered a definitive statement of war aims but, 
because of his undoubted knowledge of the views of the cabinet, it ie an 
indication of both the lack of support for national Belf-determination 
and the general desire in the government to avoid the subject of non-
lu8Han*.y, •The General Review of the War', 31 Oct*1916, Cab*24—2-92*
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essential war alias. The government was only prepared to accept commit­
ments under the greatest pressure. Iiankey also wrote*
it is impossible to contemplate with equanimity the prospect of 
a discussion of peace terms at any date, however remote, until 
the balance of advantage has inclined far more decisively than 
at present to the side of the Allies, ...
Although some members of the cabinet were extremely pessimistic about
the military and naval situation in the autumn of 1916, the majority of
the cabinet, backed by the military authorities, agreed with Hankey that
the unfavourable strategic situation made the prospect of peace negotiations
109
highly undesirable. It must be added that whenever peace was discussed,
national self-determination was never considered a reason for rejecting 
negotiations. The war would not be continued for non-essential aims in 
areas of secondary importance. Despite the reluctance to negotiate, it 
was obvious that in the near future President ftilson would attempt some 
form of mediation. During the last six months of 1916, rumours to this 
effect were numerous although no one was certain when he would act.^° In 
an attempt to forestall mediation, Lloyd George gave an interview in 
September 1916 to an American reporter in which he absolutely rejected 
the idea of outside interference in the conflict.Nevertheless the 
Entente was still heavily dependent upon the United States for the
109
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110 Spring dice to Grey, 17 July 1916, P.0.115-2090-20. Bertie diary,
15 Aug. 1916, F.0.800-175* Crowe to Paget, 14 Oct. 1916, Paget Mss. 
51256. Spring Rice to Grey, 28 Nov. 1916, P.O.115-2090-43*
111
Grey to Lloyd George, 29 Sept .1916, Lloyd George Us.E2-13-5* Grey 
feared that the interview would offend Wilson and destroy the possibi­
lity of future mediation. Scott diary, 2-3 Oct.1916, Scott Mss.50903* 
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maintenance of the war effort so that any attempted mediation would he
most embarrassing because the negotiations would have to be avoided
112without giving offence to Wilson and the American public*
On December 5» 1916, Asquith resigned and Lloyd George formed a new 
government dedicated to the more vigorous prosecution of the war. Runciman 
and Grey followed Asquith while Balfour became the secretary of state for 
foreign affairs. The change meant the decline of those who seemed most 
sympathetic to the nationalities, although this trend was offset by 
Balfour's appointment. But that sympathy had been of little value to the 
emigres. The ultimate success of national self-determination depended 
not on the sympathy of British statesmen but on the course of the war.
The destruction of the Central powers brought about by a more vigorous 
conduct of the war would contribute more to the cause, regardless of the 
intentions of the victors, than all the sympathy of all the Liberals.
On December 20, 1916, President Wilson addressed a note to the 
belligerents asking for an authoritative statement of war aims.333 The
request could be answered by a simple rejection of outside interference, 
but if Lloyd George now acted on the views he expressed in September, he 
would seriously risk alienating the United States* On December 22, 1916, 
Cecil proposed that the reply should be a positive statement outlining 
Allied objectives and designed to appeal to ftilson and the American public* 
He warned that rejection of the note might alienate Lilson and lead to
112 Grey to Kunciman, 30 Sept. 1916, Runciman Mbs* Bertie diary', 11 Aug* 
1916, P.O.800-171.
113 Cecil to i pring Rice, 20 Dec. 1916, Cab.37-161-44-
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retaliation.**^ Cecil was acting on advice received by the foreign
office from numerous sources, particularly Spring Rice, who was adamant 
that the reply had to be positive and designed to appeal to Wileon.**^
Bven after that advice had been accepted he could not stop stressing the 
p o i n t . O n  December 23, 1916, the cabinet approved the proposal 
without opposition and asked Cecil and Balfour to submit drafts of a 
reply
To ensure that the reply would appeal to Wilson, Cecil, in writing
his own draft, consulted the American ambassador in London and referred
to the views expressed earlier in the year on the future of Europe by
118B.M. House, Wilson’s unofficial adviser on foreign policy. On
December 21, 1916, Drummond suggested that Cecil should consult House’s 
memorandum on peace terms and even suggested consulting House through 
secret service channels on the text of the reply. On the same day Cecil 
circulated the House memorandum to the cabinet with an accompanying minute 
stating that it represented Wilson’s own views. If necessary this could 
be verified* 'Secret means exist to communicate direct with Colonel House,
114
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and it would be possible, if thou Jit desirable, to inquire of him whether
the Memorandum of February 22nd still holds good in its entirety, and
119whether the President still concurs in its terms.1 The issue was
again considered by the cabinet on December 26, 1916, but the actual 
drafting of the reply was referred to the Anglo-French conference meeting 
in London later that day.*^ At the conference* 'M. Ribot ^ French 
Minister of Finance said it came to this* nas our reply to be a diplo­
matic Dote or an answer to the American People? The Conference agreed
121that the essence of it was an appeal to democracy •'
At a second session, on December 28, 1916, a preliminary draft was
approved. Balfour later claimed that the reply was primarily a combi-
122
nation of his and Cecil's drafts. A comparison of these drafts with
the final tort bears out Balfour’s claim, with some exceptions on those
123parts of tho reply related to eastern Europe. The reply, delivered
to the American government on January 10, 1917, stated that Europe had to 
be reorganized on the basis of, among other things, ’the respect for 
nationalities' • In elaborating on this point the following terras were
Drummond to Cecil, 21 Deo.1916, F.O.800-197. Cecil, cabinet minute,
21 Doc.1916, Lloyd Oeorge Mb .F16o^1-4. Guinn, British Strategy, 
pp.124-25* L. Woodward, Great Britain and the war of 1914-1918* 
London 1967, pp.217-223* The government had contact with House 
through Gaunt* W.D. Fowler, British-Amerioan Relation., 1917-1918i 
Princeton 1969, PP*14-15*
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the liberation of the Italians, as also of tkie Slavs, Humaneo, 
and Czecho-Slovaks from foreign domination; ••• The intentions 
of his Ilajesty the Emperor of Russia in regard to Poland have
been clearly indicated by the manifesto he has just addressed
to his armies. 124
These statements, while very carefully phrased, sounded like an
endorsement of national self-determination. Had there been a change in
official war aims policy? Cecil, who disliked nationalism yet supported
the inclusion of these statements in the note, stated on December 26, 1916 s
'The probable result of the Allied discussions will be a formless note of
125
no significance whatever*. In referring to the note much later in
the house of commons, Cecil stated that the government was not pledged to
126
any particular form of liberation. In the process of drafting the
note, the sole consideration had been its potential appeal to American 
deiaocracy. Do one ever suggested that it was to be an accurate reflection 
of war aims policy, and no consideration was given to the real significance 
or possible interpretations of the terms. Although half our probably took 
the contents of the note seriously, as they reflected his own personal 
views, there is no evidence that anyone else agreed with him. The note 
cannot be considered an accurate reflection of British war aims policy 
which was designed to avoid such commitments. The aims stated in the
G.L. Dickinson (ed.) Documents ana Statements Relating to Peace 
Proposals and War Aims. London 1919, ’The Allies' Reply to President 
Wilson’s Note of December 18th. January 10, 1917*> pp*10-13* The 
Russian proclamation referred to in the note was the tsar’s Order of 
the Day for December 25, 1916 • It stated that one of the tasks of 
the war was to create a free Poland consisting of all of its three 
parts. In this context 'free' undoubtedly meant autonomous.
Komarnicki, Rebirth, pp.46-47.
Cecil minute, Crowe to Cecil, 26 Dec. 1916, F.0.371-2806-262697•
126
Parliamentary Debates, Commons, vol*96 col.1202, 24 July 1917*
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note would never have been publicly endorsed by t he government without
external pressure of the type that Wilson could exert upon the Entente.
The note must be considered not as part of a war aims policy but as part
of a strategic policy which allowed for the acceptance of commitments
whenever necessary for the maintenance of the war effort*
The terms of the note, by their vagueness, did not commit the Entente
to any specific solution to eastern European problems* Since liberation
could mean autonomy as well as independence, the Entente's freedom of
127action to meet further contingencies was not unduly restricted* But
the note was important regardless of official intentions* As the first
occasion upon whioh the government publicly referred to the Czechoslovaks,
it was for them a form of recognition whioh drew public attention to their
cause* The note also supplied ammunition to those, like Seton-Watson?
who had always argued, regardless of the facts, that the government had
oeen committed to national self-determination since 1914* Regardless of
official intention, the note gave the impression and was widely interpreted
as a commitment to national self-determination* If in the future the
government failed to meet the expectations created by the note, it would
128inevitably be subject to recriminations that it had broken its word*
The note also had an immediate effect on official British propaganda which 
now openly advocated national self-determination thus supplying even more
127
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evidence upon which to base future racrirainations against the government# 
Since such recriminations aro always better avoided, the government had, 
by stating these aims, to some extent limited its future alternatives#
The reference in the note to Poland, insisted upon by Balfour and
Cecil, was undoubtedly motivated by the desire to satisfy the American
z  ,  130
government as well as the iolish emigres. The idea might have
originated with House whose views Cecil used in writing his draft#^3*
The well-known interest of the /jnerican government in this problem was
confirmed on December 28, 1916 when Spring Rice telegraphed that a state-
112ment on Poland would have a good effect on Wilson# 'The inevitable
Russian objections to the reference were only overoome through the 
application of great pressure by the Allied ambassadors in Petrograd 
acting on Halfour*b statement that 'the omission would probably produce 
a bad effect in the United States* .^3j
Pince the Czechoslovaks and Poles were mentioned elsewhere in the 
note, it might be assumed that the reference to 'Slavs' meant Yugoslavs# 
Come have even assumed that 'Yugo' was delated because of Italian
The following pamphlets (T102-2Q) reflect the greater emphasis on
national self-determination in Wellington House propaganda during 
1917* J#W# Headlam, The Peace TennB of the Allies. London 1917J 
L#H# Hamier, The Case of Hohenia. London 1917? L.B. Ramier, The 
Czecho-Slovaks. London 1917* These are just a sample which indicate 
a definite shift in the emphasis in British propaganda following the 
reply to President Wilson#
Balfour draft, 30 Dec. 1916, Cab#37-162-31# Cecil draft, 24 Dec. 
1916, F#0.371-280>-260746•
*3* See above, p.156*
Spring Rice to Hardinge, 28 Dec.1916, F.0#11J>-2091-109* Spring Rice 
to Balfour, 29 Dec#1916, Balfour Mb s .49740. See above, Ch# III.
133 Balfour to Buchanan, 3 Jan.1917, P.O.371-3075-2031# Buchanan to F.O. 
1 Jan#1917, F.O#371-3075-1290. Buchanan to Hardinge, 2 Jan#1917, 
Hardinge Mss#29* F.O# to Buchanan, 6 Jan.1917, F#0.371-3075-4588. 
Buchanan to F.O., 5 Jan.1917, F.<0#371-3075-5269# Buchanan to F.O.,
8 Jan.1917, F.O.371-3075-6675*
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134o b je c t io n s #  The phrase originated in Cecil’s d r a f t  as 'the liberation
115o f  the Slav peoples from German d o m in a t io n . ' There is no evidence of
Italian objections although Cecil might have used this wording in anti­
cipation of such opposition# Since Cecil had no sympathy for the subject 
nationalities, this phrase was undoubtedly motivated by his general aim 
o f  satisfying the United States#
Since it did not occur in either the Balfour or Cecil drafts, the 
reference to the Czechoslovaks is more mysterious# It does not appear to 
have been discussed at the sessions of the Anglo-French conference and it 
cannot be found in any of the English texts of the note# According to 
Eduard denes, Masaiyk* s lieutenant in Paris, Briand inserted it at the 
last moment.*3^  The total lack of coiarient by the British on its insertion 
leads to the conclusion that they were consulted, for unilaterial French 
action would have undoubtedly elicited some reaction# Almost twenty years 
later Cecil wrotet 'If I am right in my recollection, it was the first
time that Czechoslovakia appeared in a diplomatic document and I am
137ashamed to say I  had some doubts as to what it was'# This statement 
su g ges ts  that Cecil was consulted on the insertion# On December 13,
1916, Wiseman, in reference to the reply to the Ueiman peace note, cabled
t o  Londons
134  ^ ,Macartney, Eastern Europe, p#67# Hanak, Great Britain# p#2l6. The
theory seems to have originated with Leton-Watson# Cecil's original
wording probably referred to Slavs in general# The reference to
Czechoslovaks was added later and the Italians may have prevented
the addition of a more specific reference to the Yugoslavs#
Cecil, 'Proposed Action in Regard to American Note', 22 Dec. 1916,
Cab#37-162-12.
1 Benes, memoirs, pp.153-157*
13  ^Cecil to Lugdale, 14 May 1934, Cecil Mss# 51157-
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If British reply to German peace proposals contains no mention 
of Bohemian aspirations, it is probable that the work done for 
us here by Czechs will suffer, and possible that if too much 
discourages they might listen to bids from Central Empires.
This might cause us considerable haria. 138
Although it was an official cable, there is no indication to whom it 
was addressed - the secret service or the foreign office. A copy exists 
in the Mseman papers but, not unexpectedly, cannot be found in the govern- 
ment records. If the secret service had some influence on the reference 
to the Czechoslovaks, it is unlikely that a record of that influence would
survive, but it is as plausible an explanation of the reference aB any
other that has been offered. It could have been Voska's reward.
The reply included references to national self-determination in order 
to appeal to President Wilson and American democracy. The Allies, with 
justification, believed that Wilson was becoming interested in the nation­
alities, particularly the Poles. That interest was based largely on the 
political influence of the nationalities as well as the general public 
interest in national self-determination. These conditions in the United 
States to which the Entente responded were obviously related to previous 
British action. For almost two years British propaganda had promoted 
the idea of national self-determination in the United States. At the 
same time, British officials had encouraged and supported the efforts of 
the various nationalities to acquire political influence through organi­
zation. In replying to President *ilson and in making references to 
national self-determination, the government was responding to a necessity 
which its agents had helped to create. The methods adopted by various
 ^ Wiseman cable, 13 Dec. 1916, V/iseman Mss. 9°~38.
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branches of the government for the conduct of the war were beginning to 




Britain and Austria-Hungry, 1917-1918
In January 1917 the British government was committed neither to the 
preservation nor to the destruction of the Habeburg monarchy* To a 
government involved in a war for survival, and concerned with the immediate 
problems of its own preservation, the future of Austria-Hungary was an 
issue of at most secondary importance* The government was not totally 
indifferent to the future of eastern Europe but its aims in that area were 
of a general nature, and might be achieved by any one of a number of 
solutions proposed for the final settlement. Any solution which did not 
increase the military potential of the Central powers and which was 
conducive to peace and stability was acceptable* It could be argued that 
these aims would be satisfied by the preservation of the Habeburg monarchy, 
by the absolute application of national self-determination or by any one 
of a number of compromises between these two which in practice would mean 
self-determination for Borne nationalities but not others* While the 
relative merits of each solution were debatable, conclusive evidence did 
not and could not exist by whioh the policy-makers could predict whioh 
solution would best satisfy their general aims in eastern Europe* The 
solutions could be tested only by application* While the war was in 
progress and the future of Europe uncertain, there was no overwhelming 
need for the government to choose the programme for eastern Europe that 
it would favour during peace negotiations* Many officials, particularly 
in the foreign office, had their own preference, usually for national
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self-determination, but the government remained uncommitted and unconvinced. 
The government was prepared to accept binding commitments based on strategic 
calculations designed to promote the conduct of the war, but not prepared 
to accept commitments based on its own calculation of its long-term 
political interest in the future structure of eastern Europe* By avoiding 
commitments which were not immediately necessary the government was able 
to maximize its alternatives and use the resulting flexibility to increase 
itB military potential* National self Hie termination, as an alternative 
to the status quo, had been considered by the foreign office during the 
first years of the war, but had never been discussed by the cabinet* The 
preservation of Austria-Hungary, in contrast, was not seriously considered 
by anyone in the government* Excluding the attacks by the exponents of 
national self-determination few references to the question of the future 
of the Habeburg monarchy appear in the existing records. In this case 
the lack of evidence of interest within the government, and particularly 
within the cabinet, cannot be attributed either to a conspiracy of silence 
or to the destruction of documents; it must be considered as evidence of 
indifference* Before 1917 no one in the government argued that Austria- 
Hungary ought to be preserved* No one argued that its existence would be 
the best solution to the problems of eastern Europe, that it was necessary 
for the balance of power or in the interest of Britain* No one suggested 
that any sacrifice however small should be made for the preservation of 
Austria-Hungary* Despite overwhelming provocation from the exponents of 
national self-determination, no one rose to the defence of Austria-Hungary. 
Despite the preferences within the foreign office, the government was 
indifferent to the future of the Habeburg monarchy* Its survival or 
destruction would be equally acceptable to the government as long as the
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settlement in eastern Europe tended to promote peace and stability while
not increasing German power*
Although uncommitted on the future of Austria-Hungary, the government,
acting on considerations of strategic necessity, had accepted binding and
far-reaching commitments to Italy and Rumania which, if fulfilled, might
well destroy the Habsburg monarchy. By the treaty of London Italy had
been promised the Trentino, Cisalpine Tyrol, Trieste, Gorizia, Gradieca,
Istria and northern Dalmatia.^ Rumania had been promised Transylvania,
2
the Banat and the Bukov in a. There was good reason to assume that the
monarchy could never survive such amputations. Any government which 
accepted such terms would risk extinction because of the internal reaction, 
particularly from the Magyars. The effect of rmch losses on the prestige 
of the monarchy might be more than it could stand. But as no Habsburg 
government could accept such terms, the Allies were committed, as long as 
Italy and Rumania continued to fight, to continue the war until the Habsburg 
army was destroyed. From that, Austria-Hungary could hardly survive. 
Remarkable as it may seem, in the negotiations with Italy and Rumania, the 
government had failed to consider the effect of these terms on the future 
of the monarchy. Since enemy territory was considered forfeit, the 
negotiations were conducted without reference to Austria-Hungary• Robertson, 
who assumed that it might survive, incorrectly concluded from the negotiations 
that the government intended to destroy Austria-Hungary.^ Several comments, 
during the negotiations, show some awareness that these terms would neces­
sitate the military defeat of the Habsburg army, but it seems to have been
 ^Bee above, pp. 43-49*
2
See above, pp. 53-54*
 ^See above, p. 148.
assumed, that despite defeat and the anticipated amputations the monarchy 
could survive.^ Paget and Tyrrell would not have argued for its des­
truction had they believed that its fate had already been decided* Balfour 
assumed that a Habsburg monarchy comprising only those areas which were 
ethnographically Geiman-Austrian and Hungarian was a practical possibility, 
despite losses of territory so enormous as to change it beyond recognition. 
The significance of the agreements with Italy and Rumania was clearly 
misunderstood, and thought davoted to the future of the monarchy extremely 
confused, not because the situation was so complex as to be incomprehensible, 
for Robertson had recognized the significance, but because few addressed 
themselves to the problem. Those not interested in the survival of the 
monarchy had no reason to ponder its future. The government had always 
been extremely careful in its relations with the nationalities in order to 
maintain various alternative courses of action. But what it had guarded 
with its right hand it had, as subsequent events were to show, unwittingly 
given away with its left.
A separate peace with Austria-Hungary had always been a possibility 
and had been, on occasion, considered by the foreign office. Once, during 
the Balkan negotiations, the foreign office had rejected the idea of a 
separate peace, but there was no indication, after those negotiations had 
finished, that further Austrian approaches would be rejected. But in the 
absence of such approaches the possibility was not seriously considered.
A separate peace which would enable Austria-Hungary to survive would not 
signify or necessitate any alteration in the war aims policy of the British 
government for, as has been explained, the government had no particular
4 See above, pp. 62-63*
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objection to its survival or desire for its destruction. A separate peaee
would, however, necessitate a fundamental alteration in British strategic
policy because those anti-Habsburg elements which the government had alwaye
encouraged would have to be abandoned.
During 1917 government thought on the future of eastern durope was
dominated, almost to the exclusion of all else, by the possibility of a
separate peace with Austria-Hungary • In this situation the policy-makers
had to contemplate, for the first time, the problems of eastern Kurope in
an immediate and practical sense. As a result, the preferences for
national self-determination which had emerged in previous hypothetical
discussions receded into the background and little consideration was given
to the cause of the nationalities. For the emigres the year had begun
with the reply to President Wilson. It had been the most significant
statement by the Allied governments on the cause of the nationalities^
and had justifiably created great expectations. But it was a false start,
for nothing that followed during 1917 satisfied these expectations. No
sooner had the reply been given than it was forgotten.
On January 10, 1917 > the British minister in Christiania informed
the foreign office that he had received approaches, apparently official,
5
from Austrian agents on the subject of a separate peace. Despite ample 
evidence that Austria-Hungary was labouring under such severe economic 
conditions as a result of the war and the blockade that it rai^ it desire 
a negotiated peace, the foreign office was quite sceptical about the
J Findlay to F.O., 10 Jan.1917, F.O. 371-3079-7661. The best and most 
thorough study of negotiations for a separate peace is W.B. Fest, 'The 
Habsburg Monarchy in British iolicy, 1914-1916', Oxford D.Phil., 197°* 
Fast has outlined the negotiations in exhaustive detail but exaggerates 
the British desire to maintain the Habsburg monarchy.
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feasibility of a separate peace because the agreements with Italy and
Rumania seemed to be insurmountable obstacles to any negotiations.**
Although, on January Id, 1917, the war cabinet instructed Balfour to
follow up these approaches, and although a special emissary was sent to
7
Christiania, nothing came of this incident. The cabinet's decision to 
respond to these approaches marked the beginning of a long and fruitless 
exploration by the British government, lasting well into 1918, for the 
illusory eparate peaoe.
The immediately favourable reaction of the cabinet to the idea of a 
separate peace with />ustriar-Eungary must be seen within the context of 
the strategic position in 1917 i'he campaigns in the summer of 1916 in 
ualicia, in Rumania and on the Somme had been fought at great cost and 
with little success. The deterioration in Russian military strength, 
already apparent to the Allies, made optimism about the future course of 
the war difficult. In 1915 the Allies had sought a quick solution to 
the war in a oalkan league, in 1916 they placed their hopes on Rumania, 
and in 1917* with equal ^elf-deoeption, they sought the solution of their 
military problems in detaching Austria-Hungary from Germany. On January 
10, 1917» when the cabinet discussed the issue, the military advantages
g
led Robertson to support the pursuit of a separate peace. Throughout 
1917 the war office never wavered in this support, which even increased
k Graham and Balfour minutes, 11 Jan. 1917> F.O. 371-3079-7661.
7
Hankey, 'proceedings in Regard to a Separate feace with Austria', Cab.1-27* 
War cabinet 37a, 18 Jan. 1917, Cab. 23-13* Paget to Hardinge, 17 Jan.
1917, F.O. 371-3079-13580. Hardinge to Findlay, 19 Jan. 1917, F.O. 371- 
3079-7661. Hardinge to Paget, 2 Feb. 1917, Paget to Hardinge, 9 Feb.
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Lloyd George to Balfour, 17 Feb. 1917, Lloyd George Ms.F3-3-13* Hopwood 
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as the strategic situation deteriorated with the collapse of Russia.9 The
military failures of 1917 so severely shook the confidence of the war
office that by the end of the year it was ready to admit that total victory
was unattainable. On December 29, 1917, Robertson wrote in a memorandum
for the war cabinets
there is no prospect of ever acquiring all those vast enemy 
territories which the different members of the Entente have 
been promised or wish to acquire) and, therefore, leaving 
aside these ambitious territorial gains, the question is can
we get what we must get if we are to secure the future peace
of the world.
On January 21, 1918, the commander-in-chief of the British Expeditionary
Force, Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig, who was usually extremely confident,
told General Jan C. Smuts, the South African representative on the imperial
war cabinet, that there was little value in continuing the war as both
the French and the Italians might soon c o l l a p s e T h e  war office was
concerned solely with the military aspects of a separate peace, and showed
no interest whatever in the terms upon which it might be negotiated* On
a number of occasions Robertson argued that Allied aims should be moderated
and that the agreements with the lesser Allies, Italy and Rumania, should
be reconsidered* He believed that they had failed to contribute to the
defeat of the Central powers, but was never able to suggest how the engage-
12ments could be renegotiated without fragaenting the Entente* In essence,
9 War cabinet 121, 17 April 1917, Cab.23-2. Robertson, 9 May 1917, Cecil 
Mss.51093* War cabinet 200, 13 July 1917, Oab*23-13* Robertson to 
Lloyd George, 29 Sept. 1917, W*0* 106-1515*
^Robertson memorandum, 29 Dec* 1917, W.O* 106-1517*
^Himuts to Lloyd George, 21 Jan* 1918, Lloyd George ua. F45~9“9*
12
Robertson memorandum, 29 liar. 1917, W*0. 106-1512-13. Robertson, 9 May 
1917, Cecil Mss* 51093. General staff memorandum, 7 July 1917, W*0* 106- 
1516. War cabinet 200, 13 July 1917, Cab. 23-13* Robertson, 29 July 
1917, Cecil Mss. 51093.
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Robertson wanted the lesser Allies to abandon their aims without abandoning
the war.
The only branch of the government which was unalterably opposed to 
a separate peace with Austria-hungary was the intelligence bureau of the 
department of information. It was staffed by exponents of national self- 
determination like Gamier and oeto»-«at8oa. The head of the bureau, 
k&Jor general Count uleichen, and its other members, J.&. headlam, R. Leeper 
and A.h.a . Leeper, were also supporters of the nationalities.^ The bureau 
disagreed with government policy because it approached the problems of 
diplomacy in war from an entirely different basis* Its officials, like 
haulier and feton-^atson, based their aavice on the assumption that the 
war aims of the government should be founded on calculations of the long­
term political interests of the British government in eastern Europe. 
Overestimating the power of the government, they thought thut it should 
set out its ideal aims ana then fight until they were achieved. In contrast, 
the other branches of the government felt compelled to adjust war aims to 
a realistic analysis of the power of the British government. The war office 
overlooked political considerations} the intelligence bureau disregarded 
the dictates of military necessity. Since the intelligence bureau did not 
have to solve immediate strategic problems, military expediency did not 
play a significant role in its calculations, hut since strategic necessity 
played a primary role in the formation of government policy, it was almost 
inevitable that the intelligence bureau would be in opposition now just as 
its members had opposed previous actions of the government based on similar
^  Intelligence bureau, 'Office Orders', 1 June 1917> F.O.395-148-117714. 
Namier memorandum, 11 May 1917, r,*0* 371-2862-97435* Gleichen memorandum, 
15 May 1917, Cab.24-14. Headlam to Drummond, 29 July 1917 > F.0.800-197. 
Hanak, Great Britain, p.176.
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14
conaiderations as in the case of the negotiations for the treaty of London.
Such disagreement had existed since the beginning of the war, but had had
little or no effect on official policy. Buring 1917, while the government
sought a sepax'ate peace with Austria-Hungary, the intelligence bureau
campaigned against this policy with the only weapon at its disposal, the
15weekly x'eports it circulated to various branches of the government.
Bamier well represented the views of the intelligence bureau when he wrote
in one of these reports*
Austria-Hungary is bound to remain in international politics 
dependent on Germany because Germany is the only Power which 
defends the basis on which the Habsburg Monarchy rests - 
German preponderance in Austria and Magyar dominion in 
Hungary; and this is the only basis on which the Habsburg 
Monarchy can exist. 16
But these reports had no discernible effect on British policy; they
may not even have been read. The bureau certainly failed to divert the
government from its chosen course of a separate peace.
The abortive attempt to initiate negotiations with Austrian agents 
in January 1917 inspired the members of the foreign office to consider, 
for the first time, the possibility and the repercussions of a separate 
peace with Austria-Hungary. Hardinge thought that the Allied agreements 
with Italy, Serbia and particularly Rumania might be insurmountable barriers 
to negotiations, an opinion almost universal in the foreign office. Never­
theless, he still favoured further investigation of the possibility of a
^  2ee above, pp. 47-49*
beton-Watson memorandum, 15 May 1917, F.O. 371-2862-94508• Intelligence 
bureau memorandum, 24 day 1917, F.O. 371-2862-103995• Weekly report,
18 June 1917, F.O. 371-2862-129141. Weekly report, 9 July 1917,
Milner m s s . 108-1.
Namier memorandum, 11 May 1917, F.O. 371-2862-97435*
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separate peace because it would make the defeat of Germany 'comparatively
easy'• He did not contemplate abandoning the solemn pledges the govern-
ment had made to its lesser allies, but he believed that there was a
slight possibility that they might reduce their war aims* Although he
forgot the Czechoslovaks, he suggested that the other nationalities could
be satisfied by giving Bosnia, Herzegovina and access to the Adriatic to
Serbia, by ceding Galicia to the autonomous Russian Poland, and by
establishing within the Habsburg monarchy an autonomous Yugoslav state
made up of those South Slav areas not ceded to Serbia* The primary
British objective in eastern Europe, the formation of a barrier to the
German Drang nach Oaten, would be achieved by a reconstituted Habeburg
monarchy, which having deserted its allies and having made a separate
17peace, would be alienated from Germany* '
On February 12, 1917» Drummond expanded the ideas already suggested 
by Hardinge* He accepted the need for a barrier to the German drive to 
the East but believed that the Habsburg monarchy could be such a barrier 
if, by making a separate peace, it was alienated from Germany* It would 
be an even more effective barrier if it was reconstituted into four 
autonomous states of Austria, Hungary, Bohemia and Yugoslavia* Serbia 
would be given Bosnia, Herzegovina and part of Dalmatia, while Galicia 
would be ceded to Poland* Drtanraond admitted that Serbia, Italy and 
Rumania might block negotiations, but he was more optimistic than Hardinge 
that such obstacles could be overcome* He also believed that peaoe with 
Austria-Hungary would not affect Italy's belligerent status because of
17 Hardinge minute, 18 Jan. 1917, P.O. 371-3079-13580* Hardinge to 
Beaumont, 1 Fab. 1917, Hardinge Has. 29. Harding* to Paget, 7 Feb.
1917, F.O. 371-3079-25651*
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Italy's desire for territory in Asia Minor. The remarks with which he
prefaced his memorandum clearly show his own preference for the future of
eastern Europe and his reasons for supporting a separate peacei
If the Allies were certain that the result of the war would he so 
decisive that they would he able to impose their own terms on the 
Central Powers, I still believe that the solution outlined in the 
Paget-Tyrrell memorandum is the best for the future of Europe#
But if such terms are unlikely to he secured in their entirety, 
or if a different solution would materially shorten the war, the 
possible advantages of a separate peace with Austria by some 
such scheme as I have ventured to outline somewhat roughly are,
I think, worth careful consideration# 18
Throughout 1917 Drummond consistently supported efforts to initiate
negotiations for a separate peace, and within the foreign office remained
19one of its major advocates. ' Although the others did not express their
views in as much detail, it is apparent that Clerk, Gregory, Paget, Tyrrell,
Sir Kona Id Graham, an assistant under-secretary of state, and Lancelot
Oliphant, an assistant clerk, all supported the general argument put
forward by Hardinge and Drummonds not that a separate peace should be
made to preserve Austria-Hungary but that, if a separate peace were a
military necessity, as they all believed it to be, the continued existence
of a Habsburg uionarchy irreparably alienated from Germany would be consistent
20with British interests. Graham, Clerk and Oliphant, however, doubted
21whether such a peace was possible. Cecil was the exception in the
n D  ■ - M M m o i
Drummond memorandum GT43, 12 Feb# 1917, Cab. 24-6.
^  S# Roskill, Hanke.yt Man of Secrets, vol.I, 1877-1918, London 1970, 
pp.401, 507.
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1 Feb. 1917, F.0 . 371-3079-25651* Oliphant minute, Graham minute, 15 Jan. 
1917, F*0.371-3079-11312. Gregory memorandum, 18 Hov. 1917? F .0*371- 
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* Oliphant minute, 2 leb. 1917, F.0.371-3079-25651* Oliphant minute,
Graham minute, 12 itar. 1917, F.O.371-31 33-45538.
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foreign office. In his reply to .Drummond' s memorandum he stated that the
preservation of a reconstituted Habeburg monarchy would be the best solution
22for the future of eastern Europe because it would prevent balkanization.
He added that a separate peace would almost certainly break the blockade 
of Gennanyf but in future deliberations within the government on the 
question of a separate peace this detail, along with so many others, was 
neglected when the military advantages of a separate peace were calculated. 
His general attitude towards the nationalities was best expressed in a 
letter he wrote in November 1917 to J. St. Loe Strachey, the editor of 
the Spectatora
I must honestly admit to you that I am to some extent a heretic.
I recognize, of course, that we must do all we can for the Poles 
and the Yugo-Slavs and the Czechs, but I must add that I cannot 
look forward with much enthusiasm to the success of our efforts.
As far as I can see the Slavs have never shewn the slightest 
capacity for self-government. Steed and his friends would no
doubt regard this as ignorant folly, but they will treat this
aspect of European politics from a crusading point of view. They 
believe in nationality as if it were a religion. I can only 
regard it as one of the greatest international forces which it 
would be folly to disregard. 23
Balfour, whose views had not changed since writing his war aims
memorandum in the autumn of 1916, thought that a separate peace was
impossible and that negotiations with the Austrians were dangerous as 
well as useless. ^ In replying to Drummond’s memorandum Hardinge ?/rote*
'It must be remembered, in considering this question, that no peace can 
22
Cecil minute GT43, 19 Feb. 1917, Cab. 24-6.
Cecil to St* Loe Strachey, 13 Dov. 1917, F*0. 800-196.
^  Balfour minute, 11 Jan. 1917, F»0. 371-3079-7661. Thornton diaxy,
26 Mar. 1917, Milner Mss. 299. Imperial war cabinet minutes, printed 
in Papers Relating to the foreign Relations of the United Statesi The 
Lansing Papers, 1914-1920. vol.II, p.19* Hoskill, Hankey. p.401.
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be satisfactory for Great Britain which does not auecessfally bar the road
25
to Germany towards the hast.' This idea which had been originally
suggested by Masaryk was now accepted within the foreign office as an
26axiom of British policy in eastern Europe. But the foreign office,
despite the preferences of many of its members, was at least prepared to
attempt to achieve this aim by a method which would be fundamentally
unacceptable to Masaryk and his colleagues.
The possibility of negotiations with Austria-Hungary arose again in
April 1917 when Prince Sixte do Bourbon presented to the French government
a letter from his brother-in-law, the Emperor Karl, expressing his desire
27for a negotiated peace. The letter did not mention a separate peace, 
but was vague enough to allow that interpretation by those who had a 
weakness for wishful thinking. Lloyd George enthusiastically welcomed 
the opportunity presented by this letter, and at the Allied conference on 
April 19, 1917, at St. Jean de Maurienne, discussed the issue of negoti­
ations for a separate peace with Austria-Hun^aiy. His hopes that the
letter might lead to negotiations were destroyed, however, by Sonnino’s 
28opposition. Although Lloyd George at first refused to abandon this
opportunity for negotiations, continued Italian opposition prevented any
29response to the emperor’s letter.
^  Hardinge minute GT43, 17 Feb. 1>17, Cab. 24-6.
2  ^See above, p. 120.
27
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Like many othere Lloyd George saw a separate peace as the solution 
to Allied military problems, but it is doubtful whether he saw it ae 
anything more. On way 9, 1917» be told the war cabinets 'If we failed 
to induce Austria to make a separate peace, he could see no hope of that 
sort of victoiy in the war that we desired.' At this meeting it was 
agreed that* 'our diplomacy should, if possible, be used to assist the 
military situation, and that if Kussia should go out of the war, every
possible effort should be made to secure compensation by a separate peace
30
with Austria.' Having stated his preference in 1916 for the destruction
of the habsburg monarchy, Lloyd George now snowed no concern for its
preservation.3  ^ At the same time he was equally unconoemed about the
subject nationalities, to whom he seldom referred. At a meeting of the
war cabinet on June 8, 1917, he stated, in reference to the possibility
of detaching Lulgaria from the Central powersi
Peace with Bulgaria should not be difficult to arrange, if only 
the Serbs would carry out their threat to walk into the Austrian 
camp. Personally he would not regard this as a misfortune if it 
resulted in Austria's dependence on Slav races instead of on 
Qeimans, but he believed he stood alone in this view. $2
Lloyd George refused to recognise that the government had any formal
commitment to Serbia despite the promises Grey had made in 1915*^ Since
Grey had acted on his own authority without consulting the cabinet, his
34promises could now be repudiated. If Lloyd George was indifferent to
30 war cabinet 133a, 9 Aay 1917, Cab. 23-13*
3* Gee above, pp.151-52 . V .T. Mamatey, The United States and East Central
Europe, 1914-1918* A Study in Wilsonian Diplomacy and Propaganda, 
Princeton 1957, P*59*
32
War cabinet, 8 June 1917, Cab. 23-16.
3j Imperial war cabinet minutes, printed in Papers Relating to the Foreign 
Relations of the United States* The Lansing Papers, 1914-1920, vol.II, 
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34 Gee above, pp.51-52.
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the cause of . erbia, that country which, in his own words, was one of the 
’vessels by which • *• ^ odj *.* carries the choicest wines to the lips of 
humanity,' that nation which he so admired because it reminded him of the
vtelsh, it is not surprising that he failed to consider the other national-
35ities. The factor that inspired Lloyd George to enthusiasm about a
separate peace was strategic necessity resulting from the decline of
Russia ^  On June 21, 1917» he told the cabinet committee on war policy*
'If Russia went out of the war while Austria still remained in we could
not win* If the Lastem armies of Germany were released we should have
37no chance of eventual victory*' Although there were disagreements on
how the negotiations with Austria-Hungary should be conducted, most of
the individuals associated with the war cabinet, like Curzon, Smuts,
hankey, Robertson, Major General Sir Frederick Maurice, the director of
military operations, ana Admiral Sir John Jellicoe, the first sea lord,
38
agreed with Lloyd George on the need for a separate peace* Hone of 
these individuals had ever shown the slightest interest in, or even 
knowledge of, eastern Lurope, and when a separate peace was first contem­
plated they showed no particular interest in the terms upon whioh it
might be negotiated* Curzon thought that the only vital British interest
39in Lurope was the independence of Belgium. The strongest advocates of
^  Lloyd George, speech at Queen's Hall, The Times, 21 Sept* 1914*
36
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a separate peace were either military technicians like Kankey and Robertson,
or imperialists like '-nuts and Cursson who believed that the future of
eastern Europe was one of the least important considerations for the
British government* Viscount Milner, a member of the war cabinet,
represented the imperialist position and was the exception among his
colleagues in considering the subject nationalities* Ho supported
endeavours to seek a separate peace and like becil was dubious about the
value of national self-determination* According to the historian Sidney
how, diner told him that*
regards the creation - as part of the war settlement - of Czecho­
slovakia, Jugoslavia, enlarged Runania, as impracticable* Very 
doubtful if these changes are in themselves desirable, but if 
they are, should be left for a post-war settlement*.• • We did 
not go to war for Czechoslovakia, Jugoslavia or Riaaanians, or 
Poles* We ought to try to make arrangements for their autonomy 
and etc; but we ought not to insist that we will go on fighting 
till their aspirations are satisfied, that is till Austria,
Turkey and Bulgaria are disintegrated.
After the conversation Low noted* ’I gather that this is Milner*s 
personal view; but that he has not yet got his colleagues to agree to 
it.' ^  On April 11, 1917 > Leopold Amery, the assistant secretary of the 
war cabinet, wrote a memorandum for the imperial war cabinet’s committee 
on the territorial tenas of peace. Amery was one of .diner’s followers, 
but while agreeing with him that the Bxdtish empire should be the primary 
consideration of the government, he did not share .diner’s indifference 
to the future of eastern Europe. Amery pointed out that if Germany 
controlled eastern Europe it would have a stronger base from which to 
attack the Empire, ne concluded, tnerefore, in reference to central
^  D. Chapman-Huston, The Lost Historian* A Memoir of fir Sidney Low. 
London 1936, pp.267-268, 28 -*ar. 1917*
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Europe and the Balkans j
That the whole of this region should remain under the direct 
control of the enemy Powers is not consistent with our safety 
or with our obligations towards our Allies. But the particular 
mode in which the problems of this region are solved is not a 
vital British interest.
This was, in fact, a reasonably accurate statement of the policy 
that the government was in the process of following. Amery considered 
that the maximum realization of the wishes unu the ideals of the Allies 
would include an independent Poland, a Yugoslav state formed by uniting 
the South llav areas of Austria-Hungary to Serbia and tne creation of a 
bzecaoslovak state. he foresaw difficulties in carrying out this poliey 
because of the impossibility of creating ethnographically homogeneous 
national states in eastern rurope, and because these national states 
might not, in the existing economic and geographic situation, be self- 
sufficient. Since the Allies were unprepared to fight until these aims 
were achieveu, and since failure to secure a complete victory might 
necessitate a compromise peace, these aims might have to be reduced or 
abunaoned. Amery never doubted that if some aims had to be abandoned 
it would be in the best interests of Britain to abandon those in eastern 
Europe so that its aims elsewhere could be achieved. Although Amery did 
not specify to what extent the aims in eastern Europe should be reduced, 
he speculated that, if necessary, autonomy for Poland, Czechoslovakia and 
Jugoslavia would be acceptable.^* In a later memorandum Amery developed 
further brummond's idea of a reconstituted Habsburg monarchy by suggesting 
that xiumania and Eerbia might be added to the Habsburg dominions to form
Amery, *?oysible Terms of Peace', 11 April 1917» Cab. 29-1.
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42a large middle European federation. Although Amery considered such
solutions acceptable in terms of British interests, he did not suggest
that they were the most desirable solution to the problems of eastern
Europe. He was also extremely pessimistic about the possibility of
negotiations for he saw no evidence that Austriar-Iiungary wanted a separate
peace, and believed that as the situation in Austria-Hungary deteriorated
43that country would only become more dependent upon Germany. The imperial
war cabinets committee on the territorial terms of peace accepted Amery's
basic statement on British policy in eastern Europe, but carefully avoided
any statement of specific ainu=. It concluded thati
As regards the settlement of the Al sac e-Lorraine, Polish and 
Austro-Hungarian questions, the precise mode in which the object 
is to be achieved is a matter which, in the main, concerns our 
Allies more than ourselves. The principal British interest in 
the settlement to be aimed at is that, while it should effectively 
reduce the military power and resources of the Central Powers, 
it should correspond as far as possible with the wishes of the 
populations concerned, and be inherently stable and calculated 
to promote a lasting peace.
This general statement left the government free to adjust its war
aims whenever it chose to the realities of the strategic situation. The
committee also statedi 'In Eastern Europe the Committee have been
impressed with the extreme importance of securing an effective barrier
to the extension of German power and influence, both political, economic
44and commercial, over the Near East.' The editor of the Manchester 
Guardian. C.P. icott, who was very close to Lloyd George, had his own 
opinion about the tendency of officials, like Drummond and Amery, to
42 Amery, 'The Russian Situation and Its Consequences', 20 May 1917* 
Cab. 24-14.
43 n Amery memorandum, 10 July 1917> Milner Mss. 108-1.
^  Imperial war cabinet, 28 April 1917* Cab. 29^ -1-17.
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speculate on the terms of peacet
My own view as to the government’s policy was that all the talk 
as to particular terms was at bottom insincere and that the one 
condition which to the mind of the government was fundamental 
was a military victory - not necessarily the "knock-out blow" 
of which Ll.G. prated, but still something sufficient to break 
the prestige of the German military autocracy. 45
Failing to convince the Italians to agree to negotiations with Austria- 
Hungary, Lloyd George adopted a plan by which he believed that Italian 
objections could eventually be overcome. He proposed that the British 
and French armies should participate in a major offensive against the 
Austrians on the Italian front in order to wrest from Austria-Hungary 
those areas, like Trieste, most coveted by the Italians. The failure of 
the Hivelle offensive in the spring of 1917 undoubtedly reinforced the 
strategic arguaents for a separate peace while increasing Lloyd George's 
dislike of the dominant view of the Allied strategists that the war had
to be won on the western front. Once the areas coveted by Italy were
in the possession of the Allies, the Austrians might be more willing to 
make concessions to Italy, and the Italians, with greater assurance that
their essential desiderata would be fulfilled, mi^it be more willing to
46 /•undertake negotiations. At an Allied conference on July 26, 1917*
Lloyd Georges
pointed out that if the Russians collapse, Roumania's collapse 
was also inevitable, and that in such circumstances it would
be very difficult to exact the claims of the Entente’s Eastern
Allies against Austria. This rendered it more desirable to 
concentrate on the claims of Italy, who was co-operating with 
us to her full extent.... If we still continued in the 
expectation of winning Galicia, Bukovina, Banat, Temesvar,
^  Scott diary, 24 August 1917* Scott Mss. 5°9C4»
^  Cabinet committee on war policy, 21 June 1917* Cab. 1-27-1. Cabinet 
committee on war policy, 10 Aug. 1917> Lloyd George Ms. F161-2. Lloyd 
George to Robertson, 26 Aug. 1917? Lloyd George Ms. F30-2-24. RobertBon, 
20 June 1917* Lloyd George Ms. F161-2.
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Transylvania, and all the Serbian claims, we really were lacking 
the courage to face the facts. 47
The fatal flaw in the plan was that by subordinating military con­
siderations to diplomacy, even if the diplomacy were ultimately based on 
strategic necessity, opposition from the war office was almost inevitable. 
Despite Lloyd George's vigorous campaigning for this change in Allied 
strategy, it was never accepted by the Allied governments because of the 
British and French military authorities' opposition to shifting the 
military emphasis away from the western front. As a result, one of the 
major obstacles to a separate peace, the incompatibility between Austrian 
and Italian aims, still could not be overcome. Any possibility that this 
solution might be adopted later was destroyed by the overwhelming defeat 
of the Italian army at Caporstto late in October 1917*
During the autumn of 1917 the strategic situation deteriorated further. 
The Russian offensive in Galicia which began in July 1917 had failed and 
it was obvious that little more could be expected from the Russian army.
The British government now had to consider the possibility that Russia
might withdraw entirely from the war. There was little doubt that such
48
an act would make total victory, and possibly any victory, impossible.
The campaign on the western front which the war office had favoured in 
preference to a major offensive in Italy had failed to produce results 
which might offset the deterioration of the eastern front. During the
late siuaner and autumn the government continued to receive reports about
the worsening of conditions in Austria-Hungary and of the Austrian desire
^  Allied conference, 26 July 1917? Cub. 28-2-24*
^  Allied conference, 8 Aug. 1917? Cab. 28-2-25* V»ar cabinet, 24 Sept.
1917, Cab. 23-16.
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for a negotiated peace, but it received no actual approaches from Austrian 
49agents. In this situation the government avoided all statements of
50war aims and awaited Austrian approaches.-^  A certain reserve marked the
governments relations with the various subject nationalities who vainly
attempted to pressure it into making a statement on national self-detej>- 
51mination.
The degree of pessimism which existed in government circles about 
the future course of the war cam be seen in the discussions of the war 
cabinet. At a meeting on August 14, 1917, Lloyd George explained how he 
would conduct negotiations with Austria-Hungary. According to Hankey's 
own cryptic notes, Lloyd George said* 'Begin with Italy) then Serbia) 
if you have agreement you put up your fight on Rownania. If it comes to 
pt jyoi-nXj' would have no hesitation. *^ One must assume that Lloyd 
George meant that he would not hesitate to abandon Rumania. If he was
prepared to overlook formal commitments, what could the PoleB, Czechs
51and Yugoslavs expect from a separate peace?^ By September 1917 the 
government was so pessimistic that it began to consider negotiations 
with Germany in which it would have to abandon eastern Lurope to the 
Central powers in exchange for concessions in western Europe. At a 
meeting of the war cabinet on September 24, 1917, at which it was decided 
to receive any approaches from the Germans., Lloyd George stated* *If we 
49
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came to the conclusion that the Soviet was going to destroy our prospects
54of success, then Russia ought to pay the penalty.* Nothing came of
this willingness to negotiate with Uermany, but it was to remain a
possible alternative which the government would not reject out of hand.
There can be no doubt that in such negotiations conducted at the expense
of Russia and eastern burope, negotiations in which the British would
have to abandon their one essential aim of a barrier to the German Drang
nach Osten, the subject nationalities would also be abandoned.
During this period the foreign office became more sceptical about a
separate peace. On August 22, 1917, Nicolson wrote that a separate
peace was impossible but reoommended that*
we should consider the possibility of entertaining negotiations 
with these Austrian Representatives from the point of view, not 
of detaching Austria from the Alliance (which is impossible) but 
of placing the German Government in a position which it would be 
difficult for them to justify either to their own people or to 
their Allies. 55
Oliphant, Graham, hardinge and Clerk shared Nicolson*s estimate of 
the impossibility of a separate peace, and began to look upon negotiations
not as a means to achieve a real settlement, but as a weapon to embarrass
56and weaken the Central alliance. This idea had also occurred to the
57war office. 1 On October 31, 1917, the government was presented with 
another opportunity for negotiations with Austria-Hungary when it was 
informed by Horace Rumbold, the minister in Berne, of an Austrian request
^  «ar cabinet, 24 Sept. 1917, Cab. 23-16.
^  Nicolson memorandum, 22 Aug. 1917, F.O. 371-2864-164751*
^  Oliphant, Graham, Hardinge minutes, 23 Aug. 1917, F.O. 371-2864-164751* 
Clerk minute, 27 Aug. 1917, F.O. 371-2864-15557S. Hardinge to Townley,
30 Nov. 1917* Hardinge Mss. 35*
^ General staff memorandum, 7 July 1917, W.O. 106-1516.
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that the government send a representative for official conversations about
cQ
peace. The government responded by sending Smuts, one of the most 
enthusiastic advocates of a separate peace, to Switzerland in December 
1917 for discus sions with Count Mensdorff, the foimer Austrian ambassador 
in London. This opportunity did nothing to allay the pessimism of the 
foreign office. Nicolson, expressing the views of his colleagues, wrote 
that Austria-Hungary had only two alternatives - destruction or subser­
vience to Germany. He added th a t  while Austria-Hungary desired a
59negotiated peace it showed no desire for a separate peace• Balfour was
p a r t i c u la r l y  concerned about the risks involved and for that reason
opposed negotiations. On December 15, 1917) he explained the difficulty
of conducting any negotiations;
If we make proposals fully satisfactory to all our Allies, they 
will be regarded as utterly unreasonable by all our enemies.
If, on the other hand, we make tentative qualifications in their 
extreme demanus, and the negotiations nevertheless break down 
(as I rather think they will), then we shall have given a most 
powerful instrument into the hands of our foes for making mischief 
between us and our friends. 60
On December 29, 1917 Balfour wrote to Cecil about the cabinet
discussion of war aimst
There was the usual endless talk about defining v>ar Aims, - a 
problem in which I take no great interest, because, as it seems 
to me, there is not the slightest difficulty in defining what 
ends we want to attain by the war. ^Balfour still adhered to 
the views expressed in his war aims memorandum in 1916*7 Th© 
real difficulty is to find out how far we shall be able to 
attain them, and how far our Allies are prepared to fight till 
they are attained; - and no amount of defining will help us to 
aolve these problems. 61
^  Koskill, Mankey. pp.467-70. F.O. to Kumbold, 26 Nov.1917* F.O. 371- 
2864-224082.
^  Nicolson memorandum, 5 Dec.1917, F.O.371-3086-230895* Oliphant, Graham, 
Hardinge and Clerk minutes, 10 Dec.1917) F.O.371-3086-230895* Gregory 
minute, 18 Dec.1917, F.O.371-3002-238348-
/a
Balfour memorandum, 15 Dec.1917> F.O.800—241* Balfour to Lansdowne,
, 22 Nov.1917, Cab.24-34.
61 Balfour to Cecil, 29 Dec.l917» Balfour Mbb.497o3«
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Balfour feared that the negotiations could not he kept eecret and
62that they would discourage the lesser Allies. c Subsequent events showed 
that it was impossible to maintain the secrecy of the Smuts-Mensdorff 
conversations.**3 He understood and sympathized with the attitude of the 
subject nationalities, later writing to Houses ■Various Slav peoples have 
so often been fooled by phrase " self-government" that they will be disposed 
to regard all schemes which are so described as giving them old slavery 
under a new name*' In the same letter he gave another reason for opposing 
negotiations*
The future of the war largely depends on supporting Italian 
enthusiasm and on maintaining anti-German zeal of Slav 
populations in Austria, doth Italians and Slavs are very 
easily discouraged and are quick to find evidence in foreign 
speeches that their interests are forgotten or betrayed* I 
fear Austrian statesmanship will not be above using any 
indication that President had a tenderness for Austrian 
Lmpiro as a mean.: of convincing Slave that having nothing 
to hope for from the Allies they had best make tanas with 
Central Powers* ^4
Balfour’s warnings were to no avail because the government, in the 
pursuit of peace, was prepared to undertake such risks* Iiis opposition, 
justified by the information available to the foreign office and by 
subsequent events, only made him and the foreign office unpopular among
the optimistic advocates of a separate peace, like Ilankey and Ailner, who
65thought Balfour incompetent. Such optimism was not entirely dead within
66
the foreign office for Cecil and Brummond still favoured negotiations.
62
Balfour to Lloyd George, 10 Bee*1917? F.0* 800-199*
63 Kumbold to F.O., 3 Jan. 1916, F.0* 371-3133-2002* Kumbold to P.O.,
20 Jan. 1918, F.O. 371-313>12697*
^  Balfour to House, 27 Feb* 1918, F.O. 800-222.
^  Milner to Paget, 16 Oct. 1917? Paget Mss. 51257* Thornton Diary>
28 Oct. 1917, *Ailner ass. 301* Koekill, Hanker. p*467•
^  Cecil to Lloyd George, 5 Bee* 1917* Lloyd George Ms. F6—5-10* Cecil 
to Balfour, 28 Bee* 1917, F.O. 800-207.
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On December 10, 1917* Drummond wrote another memorandum on possible terms 
of peace which showed that his views had changed since February 1917*^
He nov/ maintained that the establishment of independent Slavic states 
would no longer achieve the primary aim of barring the German Dran& nach 
Os ten since, with the complete collapse of Russia, they would laok support 
from the rear. Such a barrier could be established only by a reconstituted 
Habeburg monarchy which would include the autonomous states of Bohemia, 
Poland and Yugoslavia, including Serbia. Although anticipated in rather 
vague terms by Amery, Drummond's recommendation on Poland was an innovation 
because the Polish question had been considered, prior to the collapse of 
Russia, as separate and distinct from the Austrian question. Hardinge, 
Gregory and probably' others in the foreign office found these terms 
acceptable, but there is no evidence that the foreign office agreed with
Drummond that this was the best solution to the problems of eastern
68Europe. Although Clerk did not express his opinion on the whole
programme, he did comment on the Polish proposals 'If the iolee themselves
adopt this policy, well and good, but it is so completely opposed to all
our public assurances - and in my humble opinion to our real interests -
69
that any such move on our part would have a deplorable effect.'
Regardless of the foreign office, the government was determined to 
send Prnuts to l witzerland. The intention of the Bolsheviks to make peace 
undoubtedly contributed to the government's pacificism which now reached 
its zenith and increased the cabinet's desire to find a diplomatic solution
 ^Drummond memorandum GT 2976, 10 Dec. 1917» Cab. 24-35*
A A
Hardinge minute GT 2976, 10 Dec. 1917, Cab. 24-35* Hardinge minute,
23 Jan. 1918, F.O. 371-3133-14351* Gregory minute, 26 Jan. 1918, 
F.O. 371-3277-16767* 
69 Clerk minute, 23 Jan. 1917, F.O. 371-3133-14351*
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to its strategic problems. On December 28, 1917, Lloyd George told Scotti
I warn you that I am in a veiy pacifist temper. If people really 
knew, the war would be stopped tomorrow. But of course they don't 
know, and can't know.... The thing is horrible and beyond human 
nature to bear and I feel I can't go on with this bloody business!
I would rather resign •••• 70
Before his departure Smuts set out the basis upon which he intended
71to conduct hie discussions with Mensdorff. His proposals were similar
to those already made by Drummond as he believed that, in the absence of
liussia, Austria-Hungary was a necessary counterweight to Germany. The
reconstituted Qabsburg monarchy envisaged by Smuts would include an
autonomous Poland and possibly an autonomous Yugoslavia including Serbia.
This last point would be reserved for discussions between Austria and
Serbia and the latter would only be guaranteed restoration but not
acquisition of Bosnia, Herzegovina or part of Dalmatia. Smuts forgot
Bohemia. As the object of hie mission he sought to split the Central
powers so that Austria would either make a separate peace or support the
Allies against Germany in negotiations for a general peace. At their
meeting, when Mensdorff asked him about the implication in the reply to
President Wilson that the Allies intended to break up Austria-Hungary,
Smuts responded! 'that note never had had such an intention, and that
its object, and still more our object now, was to assist Austria to give
72
the greatest freedom and autonomy to her subject nationalities.' The 
Smuts-Mensdorff conversations confirmed the foreign office's pessimism 
about a separate peace because Mensdorff refused to discuss the subject,
Scott diary, 28 Dec. 1917» Scott Mss. 509°4*
^  Smuts, 'Peace Conversations', 13 Dec. 1917, F»0. 800-214*
^  Smuts memorandum, 18-19 Dec. 1917, P.O. 371-2864—246162. Lloyd George, 
War Memoirs, p.246l.
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confining his remarks exclusively to a general peace* Smuts, not permitted 
to discuss a general peace had to confine himself to a very general state­
ment of British intentions towards the future of Austria-Hungary, and so
73repeated the ideas set out in hie earlier memorandum* Ho progress was 
made towards a settlement and no baBis established for further negotiations* 
The government had correctly assessed the Austrian desire for a negotiated 
peace but had misinterpreted it as the desire for a separate peace*
In response to the negotiations at Brest-Litovsk, the Smuts-Mnsdorff 
conversations, and unrest in the labour movement, Lloyd George addressed 
to the Trade Union Congress, on January 5, 1913, the most important state­
ment of war aims since the reply to President Wilson*^ Smuts, Hankey,
Cecil and Philip Kerr, a private secretary to Lloyd George, some of the 
major advocates of a separate peace and the representatives of the most
pro-Austrian element in the government, devoted considerable effort to
75the text of the speech. 1'  In their recommendations, Smuts and Hankey
76overlooked the subject nationalities*' Cecil suggested stating that 
the destruction of the monarchy was not a British aim but that the Poles 
should be given independence and the other nationalities should be given
^  Rumbold to F.O*, 20 Dec. 1917, F*0. 800-200. Smuts, 'Peace Preparations', 
26 Dec. 1917, Cab. 1-25-27* War cabinet, 2 Jan. 1918, Cab. 23-16.
Balfour to Wilson (draft), 28 Dec. 1917, F.O. 371-3133-3465*
74
War cabinet 313, 3 Jan* 1913, Cab* 23-5* Ormesby Gore to Hankey,
1 Jan. 1918, Lloyd George Ms. F23-2-1. Henderson to Lloyd George,
20 Dec. 1917, Lloyd George its. F27-3-22. Guest to Lloyd George,
13 Dec. 1917, Lloyd George Ms. F21-2-10.
75
Lord Hankey, The Supreme Commandt 1914-1918. London 1961, pp*734-8. 
Roskill, Hankey. p.479* Malcolm to Balfour, 5 Jan. 1918, Balfour 
Mss. 49748.
^ Smuts, 'War Aims', GT3180, 3 Jan. 1918, Cab. 24-37* War cabinet 308,
31 Dec. 1917, Cab. 23-13.
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77^elf-govemment. All that Kerr recommended on this subject was a
statement that*
They 2?he AlliejJ also feel that a settlement of the racial 
problem of South Eastern Europe on the basis that the various 
nationalities therein contained should be as far ae possible 
grouped in autonomous units with securities for religious and 
language rights of minorities to be an essential of lasting 
peace* As to the relations which exist between these national 
entities they have no fixed ideas, provided they are not brought 
under the political and military domination of Berlin* 7®
In the actual speech Lloyd George warned the Russians that if they
made a separate peace, Britain would not fight to restore their losses.
He also told the Austrians that his government had no desire for the
79destruction of the Habsburg monarchy* According to the war cabinet 
minutest 'His main object was to give a clear indication to Austria that
we did not wish to destroy her, and to make her people lukewarm in the
80
war, thus deterring her from using her strength actively against us.'
A statement that a strong Austria was desirable had been considered but 
rejected. Following Cecil's recommendation Lloyd George also stated*
'We believe, however, that an independent Poland, comprising all those 
genuinely Polish elements who desire to form part of it, is an urgent 
necessity for the stability of Western Europe.' At a meeting of the 
war cabinet on January 3, 1918? Lloyd George said* 'Some reference ought 
to be made in our statement to such races as the Italians, Croats, Slovaks, 
Czechs, and etc. who are under Austrian rule, and who seek same form of
Ql
autonomy•' In the speech he stated*
77
Cecil memorandum, 3 Jan. 1918, Cab* 24-37*
^  Kerr meiaorandum, 29 Dec. 1917> Lloyd George ms. F89-1-12*
^  'The Prime Minister's Speech', 5 Jan* 1918, F*0* 800-199*
War cabinet 314, 4 Jan. 1918, Cab. 23-5*
ft 1
War cabinet 312, 3 Jan. 1918, Cab. 23-5*
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Similarly, though we agree with President Wilson that the breakup 
of Austria-Hungary is no part of our war aims, we feel that, 
unless genuine self-government on true democratic principles is 
granted to those Austro-Hun0arian nationalities who have long 
desired it, it is impossible to hope for the removal of those 
causes of unrest in that part of Europe which have so long 
threatened its general peace.
If compared with the reply to President Wilson, this speech gave the
definite impression that the government was backtracking on its previous
statements, and that it was prepared to abandon the subject nationalities.
/  / Q2
The speech was so interpreted, with complete justification, by the emigres. 
But the previous statement had been propaganda, directed at the American 
public, which reflected certain preferences within the government but not 
a policy that it was determined to follow. If anything, it bad represented 
the government’s maximum programme but not one to which it was committed.
The speech to the Trade Union Congress represented the government’s minimum 
programme and was, therefore, more indicative of government policy. The 
statements in the speech on the subject nationalities involved no commitment, 
and Lloyd George made it quite clear that the destruction of the monarchy 
was not a British war aim. But neither did he commit himself to its 
survival* The speech accurately reflected the dominant trend of government 
thought throughout 1917 on the future of eastern Europe. It stands out 
because, following the reply to President Wilson, it was the first precise 
public statement by the government showing its willingness to accept lesa 
than national self-determination. This speech indicated the strength of 
the government’s desire for a negotiated peace in that it risked alienating 
the subject nationalities whose support might be necessary for the success­
ful conduct of the war.
c>2 ’ 11 " ~  —
Cecil to Des Graz, 9 Jan. 1918, F.O. 371-3149-6573• fiorodyski to Keynes, 
10 Jan. 1918, P.O. 8OO-385. Milner to Cecil, 11 Jan. 1918, F.O. 371- 
3149-8527.
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Despite the failure of the Smuts mission the government did not, as 
shown by Lloyd George's epeeoh, abandon the idea of negotiations with 
Austriai-Hungary. Smuts, Hankey and kilner remained incurable optimists. 
Lloyd George, however, began to agree with the foreign office that a 
separate peace was impossible and that negotiations could only be used as
Q T
a weapon to weaken the Austrian war effort. After February 1918 many 
who had supported the purBuii of a separate peace became pessimistic and 
began to lose interest. On February 15> 1918» Cecil wrote! 'My own 
impression is that we should do well to hold our hands so far as Austria 
is concerned, and allow events to produce their inevitable effect in that
.84country*1
In March 1918 the government made another attempt to begin negotiations.
Kerr was sent to Switzerland to meet another Austrian agent in an attempt
to follow up the Smuts-Mensdorff oonver sat ions. ^ As in the previous
case, Kerr's mission failed to establish any basis for further negotiations
86because the Austrian agent refused to discuss a separate peace. Kerr 
only succeeded in confirming the results of the Smuts mission* On Maroh 
21, 1916, the GeimanB launched their great offensive on the we&tem front, 
and the sheer force of events began to overtake the idea of a separate 
peace* When Horace Kumbold, the minister in Berne, suggested, on
Roskill, Hankey. PP*503-7* War cabinet, 4 Feb. 1918, Cab* 23-16.
Milner to Lloyd George, 27 Feb* 1918, Lloyd George Ms. F38-3-16.
84
^  Cecil to Findlay, 15 Feb. 1918, Cecil Mss. 51091.
^  Hankey to Lloyd George, 2 Mar* 1918, Cab* 23-16. Balfour to Kerr,
6 Mar. 1918, F.O. 371-3133-41211. F.O. to Rumbold, 6 Mar. 1918,
F.O. 371-3133-41211.
86 Rumbold to F.O., 11 Mar. 1918, F.O. 371-3133-45538. Rumbold to F.O.,
14 Mar. 1918, F.O. 371-3133-47443. Kerr report, 19 Mar. 1918,
Cab. 1-26-10.
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March 26, 1918, that if approached again by an Austrian agent he should
87
reject the idea of future conversations, the foreign office approved.
The British government now ceased to pursue actively negotiations with
Austria-Hungary, although the desire and the willingness to make a
88separate peace on the terms already discussed still remained. But the 
government, unable to solve its strategic problems by negotiations with 
Austria-Hungary, now began to turn to the alternative it had always 
maintained.
.during 1917 the primary British policy relevant to the future of 
eastern Lurope was the pursuit of a separate peace with AuBtria-Hungary.
It was not a policy designed for the future of eastern Europe but one 
produced by military necessity. Since Austria-Hungary would never 
negotiate for a separate peace, the foreign office was correct in thinking 
the policy impossible. In seeking a separate peace the government was 
pursuing a mirage. But even if Austria-Hungary had wanted such a peace 
there is good reason to assume that it would not have been able to detach 
itself from Germany. For the Allies the problem of Italian opposition 
to discussions with austria-Hungary remained unsolved. Kven the military 
advantages of a separate peace, never disputed within the government, are 
subject to some doubt. If the Austrians withdrew from the war, the 
Yugoslavs, Czechoslovaks, Poles, Serbians, Rumanians and Italians might 
follow their example, and the blockade of Germany would be broken. The 
Allies would still be faced with their major problem of defeating the 
German army on the western front. Throughout the war the British
^  Rumbold to F.O., 26 Mar. 1918, F.O. to Rumbold, 23 Mar. 1918, F.O.371- 
3133-55733*
88
War cabinet, 15 April 1918, Cab. 23-16.
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government sought painless solutions which would produce a q.uick victory* 
This tendency was dangerous, involving as it did attempts to by-pass the 
unavoidable problem of defeating the German army on the western front, 
luch was the pursuit of a separate peaoe. But even had the policy been 
successful it is uncertain whether the Allies would have derived from it 
the benefit they supposed. The government did not have a good record, 
considering its previous expectations of Italy and Rumania, in estimating 
military advantages*
There can be absolutely no doubt that the strategic situation was the 
primary reason why the government sought a separate peace* Military 
considerations, as the determining factors, overrode the preferences within 
the government* Many advocates of a separate peace, like Hankey and 
Robertson, showed no interest whatever in the future structure of eastern 
Lurope* Others, however - Milner, Smuts, Cecil and eventually Drummond - 
did prefer maintaining the Habsburg monarchy. Hut they did not propose 
tuis as a solution to the problems of eastern Lurope until after the 
government sought negotiations which would obviously result in the survival 
of Austriar>Hungary. They might be suspected of merely rationalizing the 
anticipated results of a policy already agreed upon for other reasons*
Hever at any time did they suggest that negotiations should be conducted 
for the precise purpose of saving the HabBburg monarchy* Like those with 
a preference for national self-determination, they did not campaign 
enthusiastically for their preference, which in any case was conditional 
upon a definite assurance that the monarchy would become anti-German.
That assurance could only be given by Ausiria-hungaiy deserting its ally, 
and if that did not happen, even the pro-Austrian advocates of a separate 
peace assumed that dritain would let events take their own course. Those
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who stated a preference for the survival of Austria-Hungary were influential 
within the (government, but not decisive. In a government headed by Lloyd 
George, who did not share this preference, the pro-Au~trian group cannot 
be said to have determined policy. Luring 1917 the discussions on the 
future of eastern Europe show that the government was not in favour of 
preserving the Habsburg monarchy but was conditionally willing to accept 
its survival as being consistent with British interests. That position 
can be seen in British policy from the very beginning of the war, and was 
precisely expressed in Lloyd George's speech to the Trade Union Congress.
The preference within the government for the maintenance of the Habsburg 
monarchy had as little influence on British policy during 1917 as the 
much stronger preference for national self-determination had had between 
1914 and 1916. 'The government remained uncommitted to either the preser­
vation or destruction of the Habsburg monarchy', and prepared to accept 
whichever alternative contributed most to the conduct of the war.
Giost of those who preferred national self-determination accepted the 
idea of a separate peace because it might shorten the war. Only the 
intelligence bureau opposed a separate peace because of national self- 
determination, but it had no significant influence on policy. Opposition 
within the foreign office was based not on national self-determination 
but on other considerations. Among the policy makers, the cause of the 
subject nationalities was never considered or suggested as an obstacle 
to a separate peace. The speculation on the possibility of autonomy for 
these nationalities must be dismissed as fantasy designed either to save 
the government's face or soothe guilty consciences. It is more than 
probable that the Habsburg government would never have accepted dictation 
on its own internal affairs and that the Allies would not have insisted an
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autonomy had agreement been reached on other issues. Even if Austria*-
Hungar^ had accepted such conditions there is no reason to assume that
they would have been implemented* The Allies would not have resumed
hostilities with Austria-Ilun.ar^ for the sake of the subject nationalities.
On January 2, 1918, Cecil wrote:
I am afraid I attach very little importance to the Emperor Karl's 
alleged Liberal leanings. Even supposing them to be not only 
sincere but enduring, Autocrats and their Ministers have very 
little power* The policy of Austria-Hungary will always be the 
policy of its German and Magyar populations. 89
Luring 1917» while the government sought a separate peace, its 
relations with the nationality organizations continued along lines already 
well established by the end of 1916. In most cases the pursuit of a 
separate peace, which definitely had priority over the cause of the 
nationalities, did not affect relations between the government and the 
nationality organizations. The government continued to use the national­
ities as weapons of war, and in some cases, developed what were already 
standard practices even further. The major effect of the pursuit of a 
separate peaoe in the government's relations with the nationalities was 
that of reinforcing the quite natural desire to avoid commitments on 
national self-determination. As long as a separate peace seemed possible 
the government would not undertake commitments which would hamper or 
preclude negotiations. This unwillingness to undertake commitments 
limited but did not prevent the use of the nationalities. By maintaining 
its close relationship with the nationalities the government reserved the 
alternative of using them against the Central powers if it failed to use 
Austria-Hungary against Germany.
89 Cecil minute, 2 Jan. 1918, F.O. 371-3133-3465.
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By the end of 1916 the government was using the nationality organi­
zations extensively in the production and distribution of propaganda,
90
particularly in the United States* In January 1917* following hie
return from the United States where, on behalf of the government, he had
worked on the recruiting of American Poles for the Canadian army and the
political organization of the Polish-Americans, Horodyski recommended to
Drummond that greater organization was needed in the distribution of
91propaganda in the United States. At this time Wellington House was
distributing propaganda through the Bohemian National Alliance, the Polish
National Alliance, the Polish Information Committee and possibly other
organizations. To some extent these activities were supervised by Gaunt
92in New York and by Namier in London* Probably as a result of this
suggestion, although evidence on this subject is extremely scarce, the
Bohemian National Alliance established the Slav Press Bureau under the
93directorship of Voska sometime before June 1917* It seems that this 
organization was designed to co-ordinate the distribution of British 
propaganda among the nationality organizations in the United states* It 
would be reasonable for the government to use the Czeohs, the most trusted 
and reliable of the nationalities, for work among the other nationalities 
in the United States. Although it is impossible to determine precisely 
when the organization was established, it had already , by June 1917,
See Chapter III.
Drummond minute, 18 Jan. 1917» F.O. 800-384*
^  Namier to Koppel, 31 a^r. 1917, F*0. 395-75-68868. Roxborough to Namier, 
26 June 1917, F.O. 395-67-124735*
^  Bayley to F.O., 22 June 1917, F.O. 395-67-124735* Wiseman memorandum,
30 June 1917, Wiseman Mss. 91-112* Voska, Spy, p.103* Capek, Ceohs. 
P.272.
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94distributed at least 40,000 pamphlets. During this period the Czechs 
continued to be a useful source of information and even expanded their
distribution of pamphlets to include various eastern European communities
95in South America.
'The American election in November 1916 showed that a counterweight
to the German-American vote was no longer necessary, and the later
American declaration of war ended the problem of German plots in the
United tates. Nevertheless, British propaganda in the United States
continued} first to maintain public support to reinforce the government’s
benevolent neutrality, and later to promote American determination to
fight the war vigorously to its conclusion. But the propaganda changed
in two important respects. During the first years of the war British
propaganda was directed against Germany but had the effect, though not
the aim, of bringing eastern Europe to the attention of the Amerioan
public. In 1917 educating the Americans on the problems of eastern Europe
became a primary aim of British propaganda in the hope that American
96interest in eastern Europe would lead to involvement. Before 1917 
British propaganda had helped the cause of the nationalities without 
explicitly advocating national self-determination. Following the Entente’s 
reply to President Wilson, which the war cabinet instructed the propaganda 
agencies to publicize to the fullest extent, and in line with the text of 
that note, Wellington House now began to campaign for the cause of the
^  Bayley to F.O., 22 June 1917, Montgomery to Bayley, 26 June 1917,
F.O. 395-67-124735* Ashcroft to Roxborough, 4 July 1917, F.O. 395- 
7&-133102. Thwaites to Butler, 30 Nov. 1917, F.O. 395-85-223899*
25 Zelenka to Sykora, 30 Mar. 1917, F.O. 395-75-68668. Namier to Butler,
8 Feb. 1917i P.O. 395-108-51960.
96y War cabinet 25, 2 Jan. 1917, Cab. 23-1-
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nationalities. fhe text of the reply was used as a basic guide for
the contents of future propaganda, and was interpreted in its marlmum
sense so that liberation meant complete liberation and not autonomy* For
this reason the pamphlets produced during 1917 were far more explicit than
their predecessors on the subject of national self-determination* it was
now openly advocated as the best solution for the problems of eastern
Lurope. In A hasting Peace G.W. Prothero wrote* 'We have therefore
stipulated for the emancipation of the Czechs of Bohemia and Moravia, the
Slovaks of Northern Hungary, the Slavs of Croatia and other districts,
98and their formation into independent States*’ This pamphlet was only
one of a number in which the change in the contents of British propa^an-a 
99can be seen. Since the government was pursuing a separate peace with 
Austria—Hungary which would necessitate abandoning national eelf-detezv* 
mination at exactly the same time that Wellington House was campaigning 
for that cause, there was an obvious divergence between policy and 
propaganda which is best explained by insufficient political control over 
a department in part staffed by sympathizers of the nationalities.
The government's use of emigres in espionage also continued according 
to established patterns. In addition to his work in Polish affairs, 
Horodyski continued as a trusted agent of the foreign office, gathering
^  SI088 (Chicago Daily News) to Montgomery, 12 Jan. 1917, F.O. 395-5- 
247960. Montgomery minute, 6 Jan. 1917> F.O. 395-65-5642. Butler to 
Montgomery, 22 Mar. 1917, F.O. 395-76-63597* News department to Namier, 
27 Mar. 1917, F.O. 395-76-65520. Butler to Dmowski, 3 April 1917,
F.O. 395-76-67726.
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Q.W. Prothero, A Lasting Peace. London 1917, P*33«
99 L.B. Namier, The Case of Bohemia. London 1917, The Czeoho-Slovaks,
London 1917*
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loopolitical information in Europe. Through sources in Switzerland he
supplied the government with information on Austria-Hungary and was at
times involved in the attempts to initiate negotiations for a separate
p e a c e . T h e  foreign office considered Horodyski a reliable and useful
102agent while Drummond, his contact, considered him a personal friend.
Although some, like hankey, disagreed with this estimate, there can be no
doubt that in the closeness of his relations with the foreign office
horodyski had a position that was 'unique among the emigres.*0^
In the united states the Czechs under tfoska continued to work for
tiiseman although there is little documentary evidence as to their 
104
activities. In 1917 Wiseman proposed sending American Czechs,
ilovaks and Poles to Russia in a joint British and American sponsored
105venture to combat pacifist propaganda. The American government
immediately accepted the plan, but the foreign office hesitated, hoping 
that the American government would act alone and thereby incur all the 
risks of exposure. On June 19, 1917 it informed wisemanj 'Dual control
is difficult, and we feel it would be better that we should not in any
100
Rumbold to Campbell, 6 Dec. 1919» F.O. 800-329* Horodyski travelled 
with a British passport.
Drummond minute, 15 Jan. 1917, F.O. 300-384*
102
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Roskill, Hankey. p*465* Drummond memorandum, 13 June 1918, F.O. 37*- 
3282- 106670.
Agent 45 to embassy, 26 Feb. 1917, F.O. 115-2183. B.H.A. to Lansing, 
20 April 1917> Wiseman Mss. 91-112. Agent 45, ’Bohemian and Slovak 
^iuestion', 23 April 1917* wiseman Mss. 90-7*
 ^^  Wiseman memorandum, 18 May 1918, Wiseman Mss. 91-112. Osborne to 
Wiseman, 19 1917? Wiseman to Osborne, 24 hay 1917, F.O. 115-2322.




way appear even unofficially.' After being informed that Wilson was
interested in the project, and that the Americans would not proceed
alone, the foreign office gave its approval and placed fiT59QOO at Wiseman1 b 
107
disposal. In trying to convince the foreign office to co-operate
wiseman wrote* 'I do not think that they 2.*ke Americans/ will proceed 
unless we participate, because the schema depends on the help of certain 
Slav Societies here, with whom the United States Government have no means
10g
of dealing without me*' Although he was probably exaggerating his
own importance, the statement is a reflection of the intimacy that
existed between Wiseman and the nationality organisations.
The mission to Russia was headed by W. Somerset kaugham (code name
Somerville), who had been working for ^.I.lc in Switzerland, and included
Voska, two members of the bohemian national Alliance and one member of
109the Slovak League of America. y Receipts show that Maugham received 
at least $21,000 and Voska $4f0Q0.XX^ Through Masaryk, who, assisted 
by the british government, had travelled to Russia in July 1917 to organize 
a Czechoslovak array from the Czechoslovak prisoners of war, the mission 
established contact with the extensive Czechoslovak organization in 
Russia-XXX In this organization which comprised an estimated 1200 agencies
X 6^ F.O. to Wiseman, 19 June 1917, F.O. 800-209-
Wiseman to Drummond, 20 June 1917, F.O. to Wiseman, 29 June 1917,
F.O. 800-29.
Wiseman to Drummond, 20 June 1917, F.O. 800-209*
Maugham to Wiseman, 7 July 1917, Voska to Lansing, 13 July 1917,
Voska memorandum, 30 June 1917, Wiseman Mss. 91-112.
XXt) Wiseman to Drummond, 22 Aug. 1917, Wiseman Mss. 90-42. Voska receipt,
16 July 1917, Voska receipt, 21 July 1917, Maugham receipt, 18 July 
1917, Wiseman memorandum, 12 July 1917, Mau^iam to Wiseman, 14 July
1917, WiEoman Mss. 91-112.
XXX Hardinge to Hall, 19 May 1917, F.O. 371-3008-96719* s (Maugham) 
report, 3-16 Sept. 1917, Wiseman iiss. 91-112*
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with an approximate membership of 70,000, the mission had at its disposal 
a large and well-disciplined apparatus for the collection of information 
and distribution of propaganda. Earlier action might have produced 
worthwhile results but it is probable that when the miaeion arrived in 
Russia on i eptember 2, 1917» it was already too late* Maugham was able 
to indulge in some espionage, but by the time a comprehensive programme
was formulated for the distribution of propaganda it was too late to acts
112
the Bolsheviks had seized power. On November 4, 1917> Maugham left
roissia convinced that the tide in favour of the Bolsheviks was so strong
as to make the mission's original arm of counteracting pacifist propaganda
in Russia no longer p o s s i b l e . T h i s  particular episode but not the
use of Czechs in espionage and propaganda came to an end with Maugham's 
114departure. fhere is some evidence wnioh suggests that the government
/ /
might have made even more extensive use of the emigres in espionage and
. 115propaganda*
112
Wiseman memorandum, 11 Sept. 1917$ House Mss. 20-45*
Wiseman memorandum, 21 Oct. 1917, House Mss. 20-46* Voska memorandum,
6 Nov. 1917, Wiseman Mss. 91-112. Wiseman memorandum, 19 Jan. 1913» 
Wiseman Mss. 91-113. Koukol to B*tf*A*, 20 Mar* 1913, Wiseman Mss. 
91-114.
Maugham memorandum, 18 Nov. 1917, Lloyd George Ms. F6Q-2-36* Maugham 
described his work for the secret service in a novel entitled 
Ashenden, or the British Agent. London 1927* It contains six stories 
one of which deals with his work in Russia. Originally there were 
twenty Ashenden stories but fourteen were never published, on the 
insistence of Churohill, and were eventually destroyed. R*A. Cordell, 
Somerset Maugham, Bloomington 1969, p.283*
Wiseman to Murray, 8 June 1913, Wiseman Mss. 91-35* Thwaites 
memorandum, 4 Nov• 1917, Wiseman Mss. 91-106* Czech agents also 
appeared in novels, other than Ashenden* about the First World War*
•k1 A frince of the Captivity* London 1933, Buchan, who was in a 
position to know, wrote: 'He is a Czech, and the Czechs having no
fatherland at present, are the greatest secret agents in this war.’ 
P*71*
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In the first months of 1917, while the United i tates was still neutral, 
the arrangemente established in 1916 for recruiting Yugoslavs in America 
for the Serbian army continued to function* In the United States the 
recruiting was done by South Slav and French agents who sent their 
recruits to Canada* The British government agreed to share the costs 
with the French government and were responsible for the recruits from 
the time they entered Canada until they reached the Serbian army* Because 
of the danger of alienating the limerican government, however, the British 
government absolutely refused to be involved in any' manner whatever with
115
the actual recruiting in the United States. After the American
declaration of war British officials in the United States began to assume 
a more active role in Yugoslav recruiting* On September 5, 1917, Balfour, 
hoping that the American government would accept, if not participate in, 
the recruiting of Yugoslavs of both Austrian and American nationality,
asked Spring Rice to bring the matter to the attention of the American
117authorities. Having difficulties organizing its own army, the govern­
ment of the United States refused to participate in such recruiting but
it agreed to allow recruiting of Yugoslavs not subject to service in the 
118American army. On this basis the original arrangements continued but
119now with the open support of the British government. Unfortunately
116
F.O. to Fleurian, 11 Jan. 1917, F.O. 371-2870-4989• Nicolson minute,
14 April 1917, F.O. 371-2870-80515*
117
Ricolson minute, 2 Sept. 1917, Cab. 24-25* Balfour to Spring Rice,
5 Sept. 1917, F.O. 115-2321.
Spring Rice to Balfour, 6 Sept. 1917, F.O.115-2321. Balfour to Spring 
Rice, 19 Sept. 1917, F.O.115-2322. Spring Rice to Balfour, 21 Sept. 
1917, F.O.115-2322. Spring Rice to Balfour, 26 Get.1917, F.0.115-2322.
Balfour to Spring Rice, 14 Nov. 1917, F.O* 115-2322. Spring Rice to 
F.O., 20 Bov. 1917, F.O. 115-2322. F.O. to Spring Rice, 5 Jan. 1918, 
F.O. 371-3144-1245.
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there are no reliable figures on the numbers recruited.
Yugoslav recruitment was not a peripheral issue because the continued
existence of the Serbian army depended upon securing replacements. For
that reason Balfour told Spring Rice* 'The matter is of considerable
120
urgency and importance.' Italy had the greatest potential for
supplying replacements for the Serbian army because of the number of its
Yugoslav prisoners of war, but Sonnino was reluctant to release them.
Although he claimed that there was a danger of Austrian reprisals it is
obvious that he had no deBire to strengthen Italy's potential rival on 
121the Adriatic. The placing of Yugoslavs in the Serbian army might be
interpreted as acceptance of the idea that the South Slavs were one
nation, and that was unacceptable to Sonnino. The war office considered
the matter significant enough to be brought to the attention of the war
cabinet and, after the original request for the release of Yugoslavs was
122
rejected, Rodd was instructed to apply pressure on Sonnino. But such
measures failed to move the Italian foreign minister whose obstinance
considerably annoyed the British government. Cecil noted on one despatch*
'I wonder if the presence of Baron Sonnino at the Ministry of Foreign
123Affairs is really an advantage.' Both the British and French govern­
ments continued to pressure Sonnino to change his attitude but without 
124success.
120 Balfour to Spring Rice, 5 • 1917, F.O. 115-2321.
121 F.O. to firBkine, 29 Sept. 1917, F.O. 371-2885-185676. Erskine to F.O., 
3 Oct. 1917, F.O. 371-2885-190147-
122 V»ar cabinet 294 , 7 Bee. 1917, Cab. 23-4* Hodd to F.O., 8 Dec. 1917, 
F.O. 371-2885-233317* Hodd to Balfour, 24 Bee. 1917, F.O. 371-2885- 
244599*
123 Cecil minute, 29 Bee. 1917, F.O. 371-2885-244599*
124 F.O. to Rodd, 21 Feb. 1918, F.O. 371-3149-31933*
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During 1916 the Czechs in England, who, because of the recommendation
of the London Czech Committee, were not subject to internment were singled
out b^ the war office for the distinction of being allowed to serve in the
British army. The authorities did not directly recruit Czechs but worked
125through the London Czech Committee. x In fact the Czechs were given a
126
choice between military service, national service or internment. By
the end of May 1917 at least 321 had been recruited from the Czech community
in Britain, which numbered approximately 1000, and at least six who opposed
military service were interned on the recommendation of the London Czeoh 
127Committee. In July 1917 the French government began to establish a
separate Czech array for which it hoped to gain recruits from all the
128
Allied countries. Recruiting began by Bov ember 1917 > and, as in the
ca^e of the Jugoslavs, French and Czech agents worked in the United States
where they got an estimated 30,000 volunteers.^^ On December 16, 1917#
the French government officially announced the creation of a Czechoslovak
army under the political authority of the Czechoslovak National Committee
130but under the military command of the French army. The British govern­
ment eventually co-operated in the formation of this array by releasing
Waller to Bigham, 26 Feb. 1917> Waller to Sykora, 13 Mar. 1917#
Sykora to aller, 11 April 1917, H.O. 45-10831-326555.
126
Waller to : ykora, 9 May 1917, H.O. 45-10831-326555*
Metropolitan police to H.O., 23 May 1917? Waller minute, 29 May 1917, 
H.O. 45-10831-326555*
Western and General Report 24, 11 July 1917, Cab. 24-146*
Benes, Memoirs, pp.101, 182.
D. Persian, The Shaping of the Czechoslovak State. Leiden 1962, p.35.
J. Bradley, Allied Intervention in Russia. London 1968, p.66.
C. Mackenzie, Dr. Benes, London 1946, p.89. Bene£ memorandum, 13 May 
1918, F.O. 371-3135-84727.
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for service its Czech prisoners of war.*^* The French also wanted the
Italians to release their Czech prisoners for this army, but instead the
Italian government followed the French example and established its own 
132
Czech army* In March 1918 the Italian government agreed to establish
this army on the same terms as the ara^ y in France in that while under
Italian military command it was subject to the political authority of
the Czechoslovak National C o m m i t t e e . W h i l e  serving on different
fronts the Czechoslovak military forces were recognized as one anqy with
one political allegiance.
Early in the war the Russian government had foimed Czeoh military
units from the Czeoh communities in Russia. In 1916 these had been
expanded by recruiting the Czechs who had deserted in large numbers from
134the Austro-Hungarian army* After the revolution in Maroh 1917 these
forces had been expanded even further by the Provisional government until
they reached the size of an army corps. * ^  In July 1917 Masaryk travelled
to Russia with the assistance of the British government to work on the
organization and expansion of this army.*^ It has been claimed that he
War office, Statistics of the Military Effort of the British During 
the Great War. 1914-1920, London 1922 9 pp.634 £35• hundred Austro-
Hungarian prisoners were released for military service but it is 
probable that not all of them were Czechoslovaks.
’Western and General Report’, 12 Sept. 19171 Cab. 24-146. Rodd to 
Balfour, 24 Dec. 1917. F.O. 371-2885-244599*
Rodd to Balfour, 10 Mar. 1918, F.O. 371-3149-49674* Spiers meraorandna, 
13 Mar. 1918, F.O. 371-3149-49226. Cubitt to F.O., 2 April 1918,
F.O. 371-3149-58584* Spiers memorandum, 30 Mar. 1918, F.O.371-3149-
58590.
134 Bradley, Intervention, p.65.
R.H. Ullman, Aiulo-Soviet Relatione, 1917-19211 Intervention and the 
Vsar, Princeton 1961, p*151 •
Steed to Buchanan, 12 May 1917> F.O. 395-109-97534* Hardinge to Hall, 
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went at the request of the British government and as its paid agent, but
137this cannot be substantiated by documentary evidence. There can be
no doubt that the government would not have hesitated to use Masaryk in
this fashion had its interests been at stake, but in July 1917 it showed
no interest in the formation of Czech units in Russia* As president of
the Czechoslovak National Committee Masaryk was able to establish his
authority over the Czeoh anny in Russia so that by the Spring of 1918
the committee possessed the allegiance of all Czechoslovak forces fighting
138for the Entente.
The British government was in no way involved with this Czechoslovak 
army until November 1917 > when tho Prench government suggested supporting
it and other military units in Russia prepared to continue the war against
139the Central powers* The collapse of the Russian army after the failure
of the July offensive in Galicia exposed the right flank of the Rumanian
army and relieved the enemy of pressure on the eastern front. The proposal
to support a number of military unitB in Russia determined to continue
the war was designed to organize these forces and so reconstruct an
eastern front. The proposal appealed to the foreign office but Clerk warned!
As regards the Czeohs, the risks they run if oaptured by the enemy 
are obvious, but if they are willing to incur them, we need not 
worry* But in return the Allied Govts, will be considered pledged 
to support Czech aspirations to the best of their power* Bohemia 
is the buckle of the Slavonic belt which we need to draw across 
Eastern Europe, but her liberation involves highly complex political 
and military problems, which cannot be lightly undertaken. ±40
137 Bradley, Intervention, p*65*
1^8
Seton-Watson, Masaryk, pp.100-101.
Gilman, Anglo—Goviet, pp*40-57» memorandum, 26 Oct* 1917» F*0. 371— 
289 -^216380.
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The declared intention of the Bolshevik government to make peace with
the Central powers weakened the strategic position of the Allies even
further, and intensified the need to organize whatever forces were available
in eastern Europe to combat the enemy. On December 14, 1917, the war
cabinet decided that*
Any sum of money required for the purpose of maintaining alive in 
South East Russia the resistance to the Central powers, considered 
necessary by the War Office in consultation with the Foreign Office 
should be furnished, the money to be paid in instalments so long 
as the recipients continued the struggle* *41
Arrangements to carry out this policy in conjunction with the French 
government were worked out at a conference in Paris on December 23, 1917,
attended by Ceoil, Milner and General G.d.W. lacaonogh, the director of
142military intelligence. 1 From this time the Czechoslovak army in Russia
was financially supported by the French and British governments and
according to one source, by June 1918 it had received £80,000 from the
British representatives in R u s s i a B y  the end of March 1918 there
were about 42,000 men in the first Czechoslovak corps and a second was 
144being formed*
Before 1917 the British government had used the emigres primarily in 
espionage and propaganda. Although emigres had been recruited in 1916, 
that policy was not fully developed until 1917 when military service 
became the major form of co-operation between the government and the
^ Abraham, ’Policy of the War Cabinet Relative to Revolutionary
Governments at Petrograd’, 23 Feb* 1916, Milner Mss* box B , cited in 
Ullman, Anglo-Koviet, p. 52*
142
Ullman, Anglo-Sovietf pp*54-55*
^  Graham to treasury, 26 Jan. 1918, F.o. 371-3283-14389* v^ ardrop 
to F.O., 18 Mar. 1918, F.O. 371-3323-50420. Bradley, Intervention,
p.65.
144 D.li.1, to P.O., 30 iar. 1916, F.O. 371-3323-57780.
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nationality organizations. This use of the Yugoslavs and Czechoslovaks 
was the direct outgrowth of the co-operation which had existed in the 
early years of the war. In most cases it was carried out by the same 
officials, both in the government and the nationality organizations, and 
was the logical extension of their earlier policies. Once the government 
had begun to use the nationalities in espionage and propaganda, it was 
natural and probably inevitable that it would use them to form military 
units.
The successful use of the nationalities depended upon the willingness 
of the emigres to co-operate with the government. In fact the leaders of 
the nationality organizations not only volunteered their services, but 
also suggested many of the forme of co-operation which were later adopted.
?or example, the idea of creating Czechoslovak military units originated
/  /
with the emigres who had campaigned for such a policy lofcg before it was 
145adopted. Once the Allied governments agreed to form such units their
success depended almost entirely upon the emigres who undertook the task 
of recruiting. In his memoirs denes explained the emigres' willingness 
to co-operates
The Allies could desert us only if we ourselves were to desert 
beforehand. This meant a perpetual struggle, and the gradual 
establishment of our independence during the war by means of 
our own work and the sacrifice of our own blood. *46
/ j
The political influence of the emigres increased because the more 
the Allies used them, the more dependent upon them they became. By the 
spring of 1916 the Czechoslovak lational Committee had political control 
over three Czechoslovak armies. The possession of such military force
Benes, Uemoirs, p.l82. Masaryk, I t a t e . p.65*
Benes, Memoirs, p.l89-
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was one step on the road to statehood and it increased enormously the 
political influence of the Czeoho lovok emigres in Allied countries* Now 
the Czechoslovaks could, if they chose, make demands upon the Allied 
governments which could not he easily brushed aside* 'The Yugoslavs were 
not to fortunate since Yugoslav volunteers had always been oont to the 
Serbian army over which the emigres had no control* There was no separate 
Yugoslav army and therefore no lever with which the Yugoslavs could pxy 
concessions from the Allied governments*
The pursuit of a separate peace obviously did not cause the government 
to abandon the nationalities who were indeed used more than before* If 
a separate peace with Austria-Hungary proved impossible, the government 
could always intensify its use of the nationalities in political warfare 
against Austria-Hungary* The government's attitude towards the emigres 
and their British supporters reflected the contribution of the nationalities 
to the war effort rather than the desire for a separate peace* During 
1917 good relations existed between the officials and the emigres, as one 
might expect in view of their co-operation, and the government did what 
it could to assist than* There were a number of incidents which reflected 
government support for the nationalities despite the fact that the govern­
ment was seeking a separate peace. The foreign office, for example,
facilitated the transfer of funds to i&asaryk from the bohemian alliance
XA7
and made the arrangements for hie trip to Russia. In February 1917
Supilo, who in October 1914 bed been exempted from the restrictions which
applied to enemy aliens, got into difficulty with the special Branch of 
1A8
Scotland Yard. Both the ±,oliee and the home office wanted to treat
147 Gaselee minute, 23 Jan. 1917, F.O. 371-2862-12976. Hardinge to Hall, 
15 ^ay 1917, F.O. 371-3008-96719*
14b Thomson to F.O., 8 Feb. 1917, F.O. 371-2^63-38799*
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him like any other enemy alien but were prevented from doing so by the 
149foreign office. In fact, Clerk and Kicoleon, who were responsible
for the intervention of the foreign office, were considerably annoyed by
150the police harassment of iupilo. ^  According to Clerki
... Mr. Supilo is none the less a serious leader of the Jugo­
slavs and should be treated with all possible consideration, 
as not only is he heart and soul with the Allies, but he has 
more common sense and more idea of what is practical than any
of the other members of the Jugo-blav Committee. 151
The government also assumed a very lenient, if not protective,
attitude towards Seton-Wateon, despite his criticisms of the policy of
152the government and its allies. ' While not protecting itself from the 
attacks of Leton-Watson, it often protected him from the attacks of his
many enemies. In March 1917 one of his severest critics was interned,
153apparently on his recommendation. On March 30, 1917, Seton-iatson
was called up for military service and it appeared as if his political
and journalistic activities had come to an end. It is possible that the
call-up was arranged by his political opponents, for on March 4, 1917,
J. King, a member of parliament associated with the Union of democratic
Control, noted* ’Leton-Watson has now joined the R.A.M.C. - thanks to me.
154I hope this may curb his baneful activities.1 ^  If this was an attempt
49 Thomson to F.O., 27 Feb. 1917, H.O. to F.O., 9 Mar. 1917* Graham to 
H.O., 19 Mar. 1917, F.O. 371-286>-52214. Clerk to fupilo, 9 April 
1917, F.o. 371-2863-70830.
dicolson minute, 13 Mar. 1917, F.O. 371-2863-52214.
151 Clerk minute, 14 Mar. 1917, F.O. 371-2363-52214.
The Itew Europe, vol. IV, no. 47, 6 Sept. 1917*
Mttller minute, 23 Jan. 1917 Oaselee minute, 30 Jan. 1917, F.O. 395- 
139-14565*
1-^4 H.N. Fieldhouse, •woal Buxton and A.J.P. Taylor's The Trouble Maker’s, 
in A Century of Conflict. 1350-1950. Lssays for A.J.P. Taylor,
M. Gilbert (ed..), London 1966, p.188.
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to neutralize his influence, it failed because, according to the minutes
of the war cabinet*
The War Cabinet had under consideration the case of Mr. Seton- 
Watson, the authority on Serbian affairs, who was serving as a 
private in the Royal Army Medical Corps, and whose servioes as 
an expert were required by the Information Department* The War 
Cabinet decided that - Private Seton-*atson should be attached 
for duty to the Information Department. 155
The government took no action against Seton-toatson's periodical
The Hew Europe* even though it received complaints that some of the
156articles were anti-Italian. It also adopted a similar attitude
towards Jugoslav propaganda. When the director of special intelligence
requested permission from the foreign office to prohibit the export of 
Yugoslav propaganda, the latter refused except in those oases where the 
propaganda included direct attacks on the Italian government, and 
reserved for itself the right to decide in all cases whether the offending 
pamphlet should be prohibited.*-^ Within Britain, the Yugoslavs remained 
free to publish without restriction. The Russians or the Serbians 
usually assumed the responsibility of protecting Yugoslavs in neutral 
countries but since neither had representatives in Peru, the foreign
158
office accorded unofficial protection for the Yugoslavs in that country. 
These incidents are of little importance in themselves, but they do 
reflect the government’s support, and possibly sense of responsibility! 
for the nationalities.
During 1917 the relations between the government and the nationality
155 War cabinet 119, 16 April 1917, Cab. 23-2.
Hutton to Montgomery, 31 May 1917, Nicolson minute, F.O .395-98-108461•
Cockerill to Hardinge, 7 Feb. 1917, Hardinge to Cockerill, 13 Feb.
1917, F.O. 395-141-30311.
Crowe to Rennie, 31 Aug. 1917, F.O. 371-28TO-166836•
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organizations centred almost exclusively on their co-operation in espionage, 
propaganda and the formation of military units. There was little inter­
change of ideas between the officials and the emigres. During 1915 and
*  /
1916 the emigres had presented their political programmes to the foreign 
office and had won at least the limited support of a number of officials.
But the period of proselytizing in official circles was past. There was 
little to be gained by the reeubmission of the same programmes since the 
fate of the nationalities depended more on the sucoess of their efforts 
to co-operate with the government and upon the course of the war. During
1917 the Czechoslovaks and Yugoslavs did not press their views on the 
government, did not try to prompt discussion in official circles of 
their political programmes and did not attempt to force the government 
to adopt a policy favouring national self-determination.
The Yugoslavs had the least contact with the government for reasons 
peculiar to their own movement. The connection that was weakened by
Supilo's resignation from the Yugoslav Committee in June 1916 was severed
159by his death in September 1917* Since the Yugoslav Committee sub­
ordinated itself to the Serbian government, the British government tended 
to deal with South Slav affairs through the latter. The subordinate 
relationship of the committee to the government, the reason for Supilo's
v / 1
resignation, was confirmed in June 1917 when Pasic and Trumbio signed the
declaration of Corfu which announced their support for the union of the
160
Serbs, Croats and Slovenes under the Karageorgevid dynasty.
Seton-W&tson to Vesnic, 10 Jan. 1917* Seton-Iatson Mss. VIII. Clerk 
minute, 29 Mar. 1917, F.O. 371-2870-64572. See above, p. 119•
160 /Ostovic, Yu^slavia, p.83« Seton-Watson memorandum, 15 Sept. 1917>
F.O. 371-2889~l808l5* Seton-Iatson memorandum, 6 July 1917>
F.O. 371-3081-133073.
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Had the nationalities seriously attempted to promote the discussion 
of national self-determination within official circles, they would have 
had little success. The attention of the government was obviously 
devoted almost entirely to a separate peace with which national self- 
determination was utterly irreconcilable. Even if the Allies achieved 
their maximum aims in a separate peace, the Czechoslovaks and Yugoslavs 
would gain nothing more than autonomy, a solution totally unacceptable to
X /
the emigres who had staked everything on national self-determination.
Indeed, they mi^it even be entirely abandoned. Since national self-
determination for the Yugoslavs and Czechoslovaks now seemed impossible
there was little desire or inclination within the government to discuss
it. Whenever the issue was brought up, it was only within the context
of a separate peace and, therefore, on terms which were a negation of
the principle itself.
In October 1917, following the recognition of the Czechoslovak
National Committee by the Italian and French governments, Benes sought
some act from the British government to reaffirm its support of the
Czechoslovak cause. Approaches on his behalf were made to Balfour and,
on October 25, 1917 > he submitted a memorandum to the foreign office
161after discussions with Clerk on the subject of recognition. It is
important to note the manner in which Benes approached the government 
because the tactics of Benes and liasaryk probably explain, to seme extent, 
why the British officials tended to prefer the Czechs to the other emigres. 
In his discussions with Clerk, Benes began by stating that the Czechs 
were united and committed to the Entente. Their support was absolute not
^^Hoare to Balfour, 1 Nov. 1917, Clerk minute, F.O. 371-2864-207239.
conditional. Ee then reminded Clerk of the Czeoh contribution to the 
struggle and requested that some encouragement be given to the Czechs 
in the form of a public statement alluding to their desire for indepen- 
dence. The significance of hie approach ie that, unlike the Polish
emigres, he neither made demandE upon the government nor threatened it 
with loss of Czechoslovak support if it failed to act upon his suggestion. 
Clerk agreed that something should be done to encourage the Czechs and 
added; ’I believe that we are under a great obligation to Czech organi­
zations in America, both for information* documents, and frustration of 
acts of violence and sabotage.' Balfour brought the issue to the 
attention of the cabinet on Sovember 21, 1917 and stated*
As far as his personal sympathies were concerned, althou^a he 
did not in any way wish to minimise the efforts of many of the 
Poles, he thought the Bohemians were deserving of the greatest 
consideration from the Allies. They had made great sacrifices 
for the AllieB, but he feared that, owing to their geographical 
position, the ideal of independence appeared chimerical; the 
utmost that they could hope for being home rule within the 
Austro-Hungarian Empire. 163
But the Czechs received no public encouragement whatever, for the 
government did not even consider accepting a commitment to their causej 
neither they nor the Yugoslavs were mentioned in the speech to the Trade 
Union Congress# The British government was under no compulsion to 
recognize the Czechoslovak National Committee since, unlike the French 
and Italian government a, it was not forming a separate Czechoslovak army 
in Britain. As long as the government was intent on a separate peace 
it would not create unnecessary obstacles to negotiations with Austria- 
Hungary and could, therefore, scarcely satisfy the emigres. By pursuing
102 Clerk to Hardinge, 26 Oct. 1917, F.O. 371-2664-207244.
103 War cabinet 279, 21 Nov. 1917, Cab. 23-4.
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a separate peace while using the nationalities as a weapon of war, the 
government was following a policy that was ultimately contradictory, hut 
it was free to follow this policy without resolving the contradiction 
because the Yugoslavs and Czechoslovaks did not demand a commitment in 
exchange for their services. This situation could not, however, last 
indefinitely. As the emigres' contribution to the war, and henoe their 
power, increased, they would be in a better position to make demands and 
would almost inevitably do so.
The government' s failure to give any public assurance to the Czechs 
was certainly not the result of any ill-will* Hot everyone in the govern­
ment was pro-Csech but, on the other hand, it is remarkable that no one 
in the government ever seems to have commented adversely about them. 
Statements like Ceoil's 'The Poles always were a most unreliable people,'
of whioh numerous examples can be found in the official documents, never
I64
appear to have been made in reference to the Czechs* The undeniable
popularity of the Czechs in dritish official circles probably resulted
in part from the personal qualities of their leaders, particularly Masaryk,
and in part from their services to the Entente. In any case, among the
various nationalities, they made the greatest positive impression on
dritish officials. Maugham's opinion of the Czechs, formed when he
worked with them in Huesia, may not have been typical but is worth quoting*
here I see a patriotism that fills me with amazement. It is a 
passion so single and so devouring that it leaves room for no 
others. I feel that awe rather than admiration is due to these 
men who have sacrificed everything for the cause, and not in 
twos or threes, fanatics among an apathetic herd, but in tens 
of thousands} they have given everything they had, their 
peace, their home, their fortune, their lives, to gain inde­
pendence for their country. 165
1 4  Cecil minute, 19 Mar. 1918, P.O. 371-3280-49989.
Id5
W.S* Maugham, A Writer's Notebook, London 1949, p.142.
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The lack of comment on the fate of the nationalities in Lloyd. George's 
speech to the Trade Union Congress caused a resurgence of Yugoslav activity. 
On January 9, 1918, Jovan Jovanovic, the Serbian minister and a supporter 
of the Yugoslavs, asked Ceoil if the speech meant that the Yugoslavs had 
been abandoned* Cecil, although not a supporter of national self-deter­
mination, replied that*
if we had a complete victoiy and were able to dictate any terms 
we pleased I should favour the establishment in some form or 
other of a Yugo-Slav state as also the granting of independence 
to the Czechs; though how feu: any such object would be obtain­
able depended on the future of the war. 166
The Serbian government did not find such statements reassuring and
continued to press for a British pronouncement on the future of Yugoslavia^
There was, of course, no possibility that the government would make any
meaningful statement on the future of the Yugoslav cause as long as a
separate peace with Austria-Hungary seemed possible, fiven if the lack of
action annoyed the Louth Slavs and weakened their war effort, the govem-
168
ment would not create new obstacles to a separate peace. In response
to one request by Jovanovic Hardinge commented* 'This sort of "demarche"
is in reality "window dressing" for Servian consumption. The Minister
169must know that under present conditions such aims cannot be realized.1
It might appear during 1917 as if the government was following two 
separate and contradictory policies on the future of eastern Europe. If
166
Cecil to Dee Graz, 9 Jan. 1918, F.O. 371-3149-6573.
Jovanovic to Balfour, 26 Jan. 1918, F.O. 371-3149-16711* Jovanovic 
to Balfour, 25 Jan. 1918, F.O. 371-3149-16712. Des Graz to F.O.,
7 Mar. 1918, F.O. 371-3154-44197-
Balfour to Page, 20 .ar. 1918, F.O. 371-3154-48660. Troubridge to 
Milner, 30 Mar. 1918, W.O. 32-5130.
^°^ Hardinge minute, 26 Jan. 1918, F.O. 371-3149-167212.
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the government's action is analysed, on the assumption that it reflected 
the government's political aims in eastern Europe then that action 
becomes incomprehensible * the pursuit of a separate peace gives the 
impression that the government desired the maintenance of the Iiabeburg 
monarchy, while its support of the nationalities gives the impression 
that it favoured national self-determination. The apparent contradiction 
cannot be explained in terms of the structure of the government or the 
confusion that undoubtedly existed within it during the war because the 
actions giving the impression that there were two policies were carried 
out by the same departments and often by the same men. The assumption 
that government action in these affairs reflected its political aims 
must, therefore, be rejected. If, however, it is assumed that the 
government's action was based on immediate strategic calculations, then 
that action at once appears consistent and comprehensible* The pursuit 
of a separate peace and the government's relations with the nationalities
r
were two aspects of a policy designed to derive the maximum strategic 
advantage from the political problems of eastern Europe, which were, in 
any case, of secondary importance to the British government.
In iiarch 1918 the government was still prepared to accept either the 
survival of the Habsburg monarchy or national self-determination, as long 
as neither solution increased Geitaan power. But it was not committed to 
either solution and was not absolutely convinced that one was intrinsically 
better than the other. During 1917 it bad pursued a separate peace in 
preference to, but not to the exclusion of, national self-determination 
because this course of action seemed to offer the maximum strategic advan­
tage. nut the government was still prepared to accept national self­
determination and, because it had maintained its relatione with the 
nationalities, wa& still in a position to do so.
221
Chapter VI
The Recognition of the Polish National Committee, 1917
During 1917 the Poles were in a position entirely different from that 
of the Jugoslavs and Czechoslovaks. The declaration of the Central powers 
on November 5, 1916, of the creation of an independent kingdom of Poland 
internationalized the Polish problem by altering the territorial settlement 
of the Congress of Vienna. This act escalated the competition among the 
belligerents for Polish support and focused that competition, hitherto 
restricted to the Polish community in America, on Poland itself. The 
Russian government mi^t still refuse to recognize that Poland was an 
international problem, but it could not overlook the military significance 
of this declaration.
Before November 1916 the British government considered the Polish 
problem primarily as an aspect of Anglo-American relations. The foreign 
office had avoided involvement in Polish affairs in Europe, but had sought 
the support and the assistance of the Polish-American community. Anglo- 
Polish relations, insofar as they existed, developed within the context of 
the political warfare in the United States but divorced from the Polish 
problem in Europe.* That problem remained frozen as long as the Russian, 
German and Austro-Hungarian governments maintained the Polish settlement 
by treating it as an internal problem and avoiding any action which would 
constitute internationalization. The political warfare which made the
* See Chapter I I I .
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Polieh issue important in Anglo-American relations continued after 1916, 
but ceased to supply the context in which Anglo-Polish relations developed. 
The emergence of the Polish problem in Europe now supplied that context 
while the Polish aspects of Anglo-American relations became less important 
and relatively unimportant.
Changes in the nature of the Polish problem did not change the British 
approach to Polish affairs* it remained as it had been since 1914• Since 
the Polieh nation was a weapon which could be used by either side, the 
primary concern of the British government was to maximize its military 
advantages from the Polish situation, while minimizing those of the Central 
powers. On one hand the Allies were under constant pressure, created by 
enemy initiatives, to undertake measures to counteract German attempts to 
win Polish support while, on the other, the worsening strategic situation 
forced the Allies to use every means available, including the nationalities, 
to increase their military strength. These two factors motivated almost 
every British action in Polish affairs during 1917* While the government 
used the Polish nation as a weapon of war, it remained determined to avoid 
embarrassing commitments on the future of Poland. Such commitments had 
always been avoided because of the attitude of the Russian government, and 
because, by limiting future alternatives, they were always inexpedient. 
During 1917 the natural desire to avoid commitments was reinforced by the 
Entente’s loss of faith in its ability to win the war and by the possibility 
which now emerged of a separate peace with Austria-Hungary • But in contrast 
to Czechoslovak and Yugoslav affaire, Polish affairs were not significantly 
influenced by the possibility of a separate peace until December 1917? 
when Poland ceased to be in any sense whatever a Russian problem.
British policy was determined by basic military considerations and
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not by any desire for Polieh independence* In fact almost no thought was 
given to independence, the form it might assume, or its potential signifi­
cance for European relations* As that independence became more likely, the 
desire developed within the British government for a Poland consistent with 
British interests and therefore hostile to Qermany* But this desire must 
not be mistaken for a desire for an independent Poland, for it could be 
satisfied by a number of alternatives not involving independence* Although 
personal preferences existed, the government remained uncommitted to any 
particular solution to the Polish problem and prepared to accept any of the 
alternatives as long as it did not involve an increase in German military 
potential* In fact, the government was prepared to accept whatever alter­
native produced the greatest immediate strategic advantage* The general 
policy of using the Poles as weapons of war was never clearly enunciated 
and did not entirely represent the views of those offioials who were pro- 
Polish. But the following analysis of British action in Polish affairs 
shows clearly that the government supported action designed to thwart 
German policy in Poland, that it initiated and supported other attempts to 
gain military advantages from the Polish situation, that it consciously 
and assiduously avoided commitments on the future of Poland and that it 
was prepared to barter the future of Poland in exchange for immediate 
strategic advantages.
Before November 1916 the British government had ample warning that
the Central powers were considering the establishment of an independent
2
kingdom of Poland and the creation of a Polish army. The attitude of the
2
Drummond memorandum, 16 Aug* 1916, F.O. 600-96. Howard to F.O., 16 Aug* 
1916, F.O. 371-2747-161698. Grant Duff to de Bunsen, 7 Sept. 1916,
F.O. 371-2747-177705* Howard to Hardinge, 2 Bov. 1916, Hardinge Mss.27. 
Rumbold to F.O., 4 Nov. 1916, F.O. 371-2747-222019.
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Russian government made action to forestall this threat impossible but the
foreign office could at least take comfort in the thought that it might
finally force the Russians to assess the Polish situation realistically.
According to Clerk* 'Any interference by us would be resented in Petrograd
and might easily make things worse* The best hope is that the Austro-
German offer, when made, will force even the reactionaries to see that
Russia must make a counteibid’.3
In the latter half of 1916 developments in Russia caused a considerable
degree of uneasiness within the foreign office and strengthened the resolve
of the government to maintain its reserve on the Polish issue. The dismissal
of Saaonov in July 1916 was attributed to his liberal attitude towards 
4
Poland. The appointment of Boris Httlmer, a reactionary hostile to Polish 
reform, as his successor justifiably reinforced the ever-present fear within 
the foreign office that Russia might agree to a separate peace with the
Central powers rather than continue a war which might eventually result in
5
the loss of Poland. Grey was particularly apprehensive and wrote on 
October 14, 1916* ’The Germans are no doubt holding up the proclamation of 
an autonomous buffer state of Poland because it would be fatal to separate 
peace with R u s s i a * W h e n  the Central powers finally acted, the foreign
3 Clerk minute, 16 Aug. 1916, F.O. 371-2747-161698.
4 Howard to F.O., 16 Aug. 1916, P.O. 371-2747-161698. Bertie diary,
17 Aug. 1916, F.O. 800-178. Buchanan to Hardinge, 18 Aug. 1916, Howard 
to Hardinge, 23 Aug. 1916, Hardinge to Buchanan, 26 Aug. 1916, Hardinge 
Mss. 24* Pares, 'A Memorandum on the Present Political Conditions in
Russia', 16 Sept. 1916, Lloyd George Ms. E5-1-8.
 ^Grey to Bertie, 24 Aug. 1916, P.O. 371-2804-170012. Fischer, German.v*s 
Aims, pp.228-236.
^ Hardinge to Buchanan, 2 Sept. 1916, Hardinge Mb s .25* Hardinge to Howard,
27 Oct. 1916, Grey minute, Howard to Hardinge, 14 Oct. 1916, Hardinge 
Mss. 26.
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office, primarily concerned about a separate peace, reacted almost with 
relief, despite the military advantages the Central powers might gain from 
this proclamation* Seeing the proclamation as a tactical error Hardinge 
wrote to Bertie> 'I think, that the fears held in high quarters of a
7
separate peace between Russia and Germany are now greatly diminished,...' 
following the proclamation of an independent kingdom of Poland, the
g
Central powers began to work on the formation of a Polish army. Unless the
Poles were to be totally abandoned to the Central powers the proclamation
necessitated some response from the Entente. Although the initiative had to
come from the Russian government, there was never any doubt that the British
9
would co-operate* The military significance of enemy policy in Poland was
clearly understood when Robertson reported to the cabinet that there were
about 700,000 men in occupied Poland available for military service*10
Following a request by the Russian government on November 12, 1916, the
foreign office issued a statement charging that the proclamation was a
violation of international law.11 Prom Paris Asquith, in concert with
brianu, also issued a protest which included, at his insistence, a reference
12to the Grand duke's promises of 1914• This reference, which might have 
annoyed the Russians, was probably suggested by Clerk* He had accompanied
7
Hardinge to Bertie, 14 Nov. 1916, Hardinge to Howard, 16 Nov* 1916, 
Hardinge M b s * 27*
g
Fischer, Germany's Aims, p.245,
^ Bee above, pp. 128-129.
10War committee, 7 Nov. 1916, Cab* 42-23-9*
11Hardinge to crey, 12 Nov. 1916, P*0* to Buchanan, 13 Nov* 1916, F.O.371- 
2747-227662. Buchanan to F.O., 15 Nov. 1916, F.O. 371-2747-230354*
F.O., ’Official Communique', 10 nov. 1916, F.O* 395-26-233257*
1^The Times* 18 Nov. 1918. Bertie to Grey, 13 Nov. 1916, F.O. 800-178. 
Hankey, ’Note on Paris Conference1, 15 Nov. 1916, Cab. 28-1-12.
Hardinge to Grey, 18 Nov. 1916, F.O. 371-2747-233027*
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Asquith to Paris and on November 6, 1916, had writteni ’I belive that the
German proclamation will be the beet form of Allied propaganda, especially
if followed, as it should be, Russia renewing the assurances of the
Grand Duke’s jmanifesto' .*3 By protesting against the action of the Central
powers the British government was acting according to Russian policy* Even
though something more than a protest was obviously necessary if the Central
powers were to be deprived of Polish support, the British government,
passively hoping that the Russians would themselves respond to the challenge
more decisively, and afraid of offending the Russian government, still
14refused to take the initiative in Polish affairs. The Russians were not
unaware of the military significance of German policy and, like the British,
realised that some positive action was necessary* The tsar's Order of the
Day of December 25, 1916, stated that peace negotiations were impossible
because Russian aims, such as the creation of a free Poland consisting of
15its three component parts, had not yet been achieved* On January 5» 1917?
the tear told Count tiielopolski, the leader of the Polish Realist party,
that 'free' as used in his Order of the Day meant a Poland with a ooneti-
16tution, diet and anqy* ' It certainly appeared as if the Imperial government 
was moving in the direction, long desired by the British government, of an 
autonomous Poland*
Despite these measures the British government was losing patience with
13 Clerk minute, 6 Nov. 1916, F.O* 371-2747-225639- Clerk minute, 21 Nov. 
1916, F.O. 371-2747-238962.
^  Clerk and Grey minutes, 21 Nov. 1916, F.O, 371-2747-238962. Howard to 
P.O., 1 Deo. 1916, F.O. 371-2747-243033* Eumbold to F.O., 16 Dec. 1916, 
F.O.371-2747-256841. Buchanan to F.O., 24 Dec. 1916, F.O.371-2747-260969.
Komamiokl, Rebirth, p.47- HalecldL, Poland. p,468.
Buchanan to Hardinge, 19 Jan. 1917? Hardinge r e s. 29•
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the Russian attitude towards Poland* when Mikhail Pokrovskii, the Russian
foreign minister, was saown the text of the intents’s reply to President
Viilson, which had been drafted at the Anglo-French conference in London, he
protested that the reference to the tsar’s Order of the Lay tended to give
the Polish issue an international character. Buchanan replied to Pokrovskii
that* 'so fax* as Posen and Galicia were concerned that question oould not
17be divested of its international character He also wrote to
Hardinge the next day* *1 think that we ou^t to tell the Russians quite
18plainly that that question has now assumed this character'. The foreign
office, now directed by half our, who does not appear to have shared Grey's
fear of Russia, was no longer prepared to accept objections of this type
from the Russian government and, following Balfour*b instructions, Buchanan
continued in league with Maurice Paleologue, the French ambassador, to
insist upon the original text of the note.^ In finally accepting the text,
however, Pokrovskii warned the Allies that there were limits to what his
government would accepts 'I iaust however make it quite clear that my
Government expressly understands that elaboration of future status of
Poland must be reserved exclusively to Russia and that question cannot
20
fora subject of International discussion.'
On January 18, 1917, despite this warning and unaware of Wielopolski* b 
interview with the tsar, the cabinet instructed Milner, who was about to
17 Buchanan to P.O., 1 Jan. 1917, F.O. 371-507>-1290.
18
Buchanan to Hardinge, 2 Jan. 1917, Hardinge Mss. 29*
19
Balfour to Buchanan, 3 Jan. 1917, F.O. 371-307>-2031. Balfour to Buchanan, 
6 Jan. 1917, F.O. 371-307>4>88. Buchanan to P.O., 5 Jan. 1917, 
F.O. 371-307>->269.
20
Buchanan to P.O., 8 Jan. 1917, F.O. 371-3073-6675. Pokrovskii to 
Buchanan, 8 Jan. 1918, F.O. 371-3000-16233.
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embark for Russia*
to exercise his discretion as to the extent to which he might be 
able to urge upon the Russian authorities the importance of con­
ciliating Polish opinion, from the point of view both of Germany'e 
efforts to organize a Polish army, and of the influence of the 
large Polish element in the United States. 21
On January 14* 1917, the Central powers established a Polish Council
22of State and pressed forward their plans for a Polish army. The foreign 
office was kept informed of these events by Polish emigres, who constantly 
warned that the dangers presented by enemy action in Poland could only be
23averted by the Entente’s open and declared support for Poli&u independence.
The emigres did not hesitate to take advantage of the opportunity, presented
by the action of the Central powers, to play one side off against the other.
but the foreign office did ;iot immediately respond to these warnings because
the Russian government was already acting on the Polish question. Following
the interview of January 5, 1917, the tsar set up a special commission under
24rtielopolsid. to work out plans for the future structure of Poland. After
discussions with Wielopolski and other Polish emigres when ho accompanied
Milner to Russia, Glerk concluded that:
the first essential in any advance towards Polish unity and 
independence, / j i n j namely, that the initiative depends on, and 
must come from, the Russian Government. Unless Russia herself 
of her own volition, and without pressure from other Powers, 
offers all the Poles a measure of independence, such as that 
outlined in the Emperor*s announcement to Wielopolski, Poland 
can never start fair on her progress to self-government. *5
21 Vliar cabinet 37, 18 Jan. 1S17, Cab. 23-1.
22
Komamicki, Rebirth. pp.115-116. Halecki, Polandt p.469*
Howard to Hardinge, 18 Jan. 1917, Hardinge Mse. 29* Howard to F.O.,
22 Jan. 1917, F.O. 371-3000-18454. Rumbold to P.O., 5 Feb. 1917,
F.O. 371-3000-28868.
Buchanan to Balfour, 5 Feb. 1917, F»0. 371-3000-47422. Lindley,
•Summary of Events’, 5 iJiar. 1917, F.O. 371-2996-48291*
^ Clerk to Milner, 1 Mar. 1917, Cab. 28-2. Lockhart to Buchanan, 13 Feb. 
1917, Cab. 1-24-10.
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Shortly after this re-affirmation of the policy of non-intervention in
Polish affairs the entire situation changed because of the outbreak of
revolution in Russia. Between November 1916 and inarch 1917 the British
government had remained passive in Polish affairs while welcoming Russian
attempts to win Polish support. The foreign office had hoped for Russian
26
action on thiB problem since 1915* For the future of Poland, the foreign
office still preferred autonomy within the Russian empire, as set out by
27
Balfour's war aims memorandum. Even Drummond, who was particularly pro-
Polish, admitted that a united Poland under the Russian crown would be the
best solution since Polish independence as advocated in the Paget-Tyrrell
28memorandum was, under existing circumstances, quite unattainable. The 
Balfour solution would weaken Germany by making Poland, beyond any doubt, 
an internal Russian question. It would be an innovation in Russian internal 
affairs, but would not introduce a new factor into international relations. 
But the future structure of Poland and its potential role in international 
relations were not considerations, in any sense, for the British government. 
Its desire for Russian action on the Polish issue and its exasperation at 
the failure of the Russian government to act quickly and decisively to 
satisfy the Poles was based upon the fear, clearly shown in the cabinet's 
instructions to Milner, that the Central powers would win Polish support 
and use it against the Entente.
The establishment of a liberal government in Russia after the revo­
lution gave the Entente the opportunity to act on the Polish issue. Possibly
26
See above, pp. 128-130.
27 See above, pp. 150-151. Clerk minute, 21 Nov. 1916, F.O.371-2747-238962. 
Hardinge to Beaumont, 1 Feb. 1917» Hardinge Mss. 29*
28 Drummond memorandum, 12 Feb. 1917, Cab. 24-6.
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sensing the weakness of thG Provisional government, the British government
/ /
now acted on the warnings from i olish emigres about the progress of the
29enemy's Polish policy. On March 22, 1917) Bmowski submitted a memorandum
to the foreign office in which he claimed that German efforts to create a
Polish army had met with some success and that, freed from their oath of
allegiance by the abdication of the tsar, the Poles might turn to the
Central powers if the Provisional government continued to treat Poland as
30an internal problem. While probably not swallowing Dmowski's nonsense 
about the oath of allegiance, Balfour forwarded this report to Buchanan with 
the comment that it was worth consideration.^ On March 25, 1917, in con­
versation with Paul Miliukov, the new Russian foreign minister, Buchanan 
tried to overcome Miliukov's misgivings about Polish independence by
olairaing that* 'Such a proposal would win over Poles at once to side of the
32
Allies and would be received with enthusiasm in America' • In reporting 
this conversation to the foreign office, Buchanan asked permission to raise 
the question again and to point out to Miliukov the serious danger of the 
Poles turning to the Central powers. Clerk greeted Buchanan's suggestion 
enthusiastically, supported the idea of Polish independence, and stated that 
Russian fears as to the future policy of an independent Poland could be 
overcome by a military alliance between the two countries,33 Hardinge fully 
realised the military necessity of some act to appease the Poles but was 
more hesitant than Clerk about independence because he shared Russian fears
 ^Barclay to Balfour, 19 Mar. 1917, P.O. 115-2317* Spring Rice to P.O.,
18 Mar. 1917, F.O. 115-2317-
^  Draowski memorandum, 22 Mar. 1917, F.O. 371-3000-62097*
31 Balfour to Buchanan, 22 ilar. 1917, P.O. 371-3000-62097.
32 Buchanan to P.O., 25 Mar. 1917, P.O. 371-3000-63340.
33 Clerk minute, 26 May 1917, P.O. 371-3000-63340.
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that an independent Poland might be drawn into the German orbit* He
suggested, therefore, that Russia be urged to go as far towards independence
34as possible while establishing guarantees as to future Polish policy. On
-larch 28, 1917» Balfour wrote to Buchanan*
I agree that in our treatment of the Polish question we must keep 
Russia with us* But it is very important that Russian Government 
should bear in mind certain aspects of that question which deeply 
affect the allies, (l) The Poles have it in their power to add 
enormously to Germany's strength by joining the German forces either 
as soldiers or as workmen**** (2) The re-creation of Poland in any 
satisfactory shape must affect Austria and Geimany as well as Russia.
In other words the Polish question is necessarily international and 
not merely Russian* Bearing these two points in mind would it not be 
desirable to Bound the Russian Government as to policy of making some 
declaration about Polish freedom which would give reasonable satis­
faction to the Poles and making this declaration not merely in the 
name of Russia but in fact of the Allies generally? 35
Balfour was oautious enough to refer to Polish freedom, not indepen­
dence. Although ouchanan'f comments of March 25, 1917, have influenced
Miliukov's declaration on Poland of March 29, 1917, Balfour's telegram
36probably arrived after his decision. Nevertheless the telegram was si^ii-
ficant in showing that the British government was no longer prepared to
treat Poland as an internal Russian problem, that it was primarily concerned
about the military aspects of the problem and that, while hoping to avoid
a breach with Russia, it was no longer prepared to leave the initiative
37entirely to the Russian government.
On March 29, 1917, Miliukov declared that the Russian government 
intended to create an independent Poland comprising those areas inhabited
34 Hardinge minute, 26 Mar. 1917, F.O. 371-3000-6 3340.
^  Balfour to ^uchanan, 28 dar. 1917, F.O. 371-3000-63340.
^  Buchanan to P.O., 29 Mar* 1917, F*0* 371-3000-66637*
Iiorodyski memorandum, 7 Mar. 1917, F.O. 371-3118-50659* Rumbold to 
Drummond, 28 Mar. 1917, Drummond to Rumbold, 28 Mar. 1917, F.O. 371- 
3000-66364* Drummond to Balfour, 28 Mar* 1917, F*0. 395-76-63597*
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by Poles, possessing its own constitution and ante, and linked to Russia 
by a aiilitary alliance, fie added the reservation, however, that this 
programme would be subject to revision by a future Russian constituent
■ ) Q
assembly. This solution was called independence although it sounded
more like autonomy. According to Lrummond the declaration satisfied
Balfour, whose original fear that an independent loland would release
Germany from Russian pressure was mollified by the proposed military 
39alliance. Once Bmowski and Horodyski had expressed their approval, the
foreign office seemed satisfied with the declaration. Hardinge commented.
’On the whole, it gives the impression of a generous and statesmanlike
measure’. Since the Russian government had acted independently', the
41original suggestion for a joint declaration was abandoned. But the ever­
present Polish emigres informed the foreign office that unless the British
goverraaent associated itBelf with the declaration, it would have no effect 
42
in Poland. On April 1917, the foreign office instructed Buchanan to
inform Miliukov that:
His kajeEty'e Government are happy to give their complete adherence 
to the principle of an independent and united Poland, which they 
recognise has now been rendered possible by the liberal and states­
manlike pronouncement of the Provisional Russian Government and 
Great Britain is ready to make every effort in unison with Russia 
to secure its attainment 43
38 Buchanan to P.O., 29 Mar. 1917, P.O. 371-3000-66637- 
Druianond to House, 28 April 1917, P.O. 800-208. 
Clerk and Hardinge minute, 30 Mar. 1917, P.O. 371-3000-66637- Clerk 
minute, 31 Mar. 1917, P.O. 371-3000-66640. Rumbold to P.O., 1 April 1917, 
Lloyd George Me. F59-9-2. Rumbold to P.O., 4 April 1917, P-0. 371-3000- 
70714- 
4  ^Buchanan to P.O., 29 Mar. 1917, P.O. 371-3000-66640. Clerk minute,
31 Mar. 1917, P.O. 371-3000-67338.
42 Rumbold to P.O., 1 April 1917, bloyd George Ms, F59-9-2. Clerk minute,
31 Mar. 1917, P.O. 371-3000-67338. Rumbold to Balfour, 4 April 1917,
F.O. 371-3000-70417. 
43 P.O. to Buchanan, 5 April 1917, P.O. 371-3000-68947*
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Had the original Russian declaration not been somewhat equivocal, and
had this statement, drafted by Clerk, been without the phrase 'in unison
44with Russia', it rai^ it have committed the government to a great deal. On
April 26, 1917, Andrew Bonar Law, the chancellor of the exchequer, in reply
to a question in the house of commons, welcomed the Russian proclamation
with a statement that had been approved by the cabinets 'Our efforts in the
war will be directed towards helping Poland to realize her unity on the
lines described in the Russian proclamation, that is to say , under conditions
45which will make her strong and independent'. The original text of this 
statement had been suggested by Clerk after a conversation with Braoweki and 
was worded< 'The efforts of Creat Britain in the war would be directed to 
helping Poland to realize her union and independence under conditions which 
would make her a strong and independent State ...*4^ Following a request 
by miliukov this text was modified and considerably weakened, so that the 
final statement delivered to the house of commons was far less committal 
than the one originally proposed by Clerk.4 1 Nevertheless the government 
seemed committed to work with the Russians for the fulfillment of the 
promises to Poland.
Following the pattern established in 1916, the British government 
continued to prefer the conservative Poles of ftielopolski's Realist party 
and Bmowski’s National democratic party, with whom Horodyski, Alma-Tadema,
44 Clerk minute, 3 April 1917, F.O. 371-3000-68947•
4^ War cabinet, 23 April 1917, Cab. 23-2. Bonar Law, 26 April 1917,
F.O. 371-3000-86957•
46 Clerk minute, 31 Mar. 1917, F.O. 371-3000-67338. Clerk to Ceoil,
16 April 1917, F.O. 800-384*
4^ F.O. juchanan, 13 April 1917, Buchanan to P.O., 19 April 1917, F.O.
800-205.
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Smulski and Paderewski were associated, to the left wing represented by
48Zaleeki and the Polish Information Committee. This preference was clearly
shown by most of the officials in contact with Poles, and in the government’s
49daily handling of minor aspects of Polish affairs. In those areas where
Namier had influence there were exceptions, but these were insignificant
and can be explained in part by the confusion and lack of co-ordination,
resulting from overwork, which existed within the government and which gave
50
Namier some freedom of action. Since the foreign office refused to have 
any relations whatever with Polish emigres in Britain not associated with 
Dmewski, most of its information on developments in Poland came from Polish 
conservatives, who were thus in an ideal position to influence the develop­
ment of foreign policy. Pmowski and Ladislas Sobanski passed information
directly to the foreign office, while two of hmowski's lieutenants, Maurice
51Seyda and Erazm Piltz, channelled information through Rumbold. The one 
exceptional source of information was Esme Howard, the minister in Stockholm,
who established contact with representatives of the Polish left-wing in
52German-occupied Poland. Information that German policy was achieving
See above, pp.129-138.
49 D.S.I. to Hardinge, 9 Feb. 1917, F.O. 395-143-33158. Waller minute,
13 Mar. 1917, H.O. 45-10831-326555* Rumbold to Balfour, 16 Mar. 1917,
F.O. 395-108-62108. F.O. to Litwinski, 23 Mar. 1917, 3utler to 
Montgomery, 23 Mar. 1917, F.O. 800-210. Waller minute, 12 April 1917,
H.O. 45-10836-330095. Alma-Tadema to Dmowski, 27 April 1917, F.O. 371- 
3012-88528.
Rumbold to Balfour, 9 April 1917» Buchan to Davidson, 29 ^ay 1917,
F.O. 395-108-104074.
->1 Rumbold to Balfour, 11 June 1917, F.O. 371-3001-119498. Rumbold to 
Balfour, 4 July 1917, F.O. 371-3003-138638. Halecki, Poland, p.51.
^  Howard to Hardinge, 10 May 1917, Hardinge Mss.32. Howard to Hardinge,
16 May 1917, F.O. 371-3001-99577* Howard to F.O., 27 July 1917,
F.O. 371-3001-149032. B. Howard, Theatre of Llfei Life Seen from the
stalls. 1905-1936, London 1936, p.263.
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some success in Poland dnd that action was necessary to prevent the Poles
/ /
from supporting the enemy invariably came from Polish emigres who stood
to gain the most from Allied countermeasures?. The fact that Dmowlski’s
followers, who were widely dispersed throughout Allied and neutral countries,
were permitted to communicate through the facilities of the British govern-
53ment is an indication of the strength of their position* Among Dmowski’s 
supporters Horodyski’s influence on the British government was the greatest, 
greater even than Bmowski's. Because of his work for the government, he,
more than any other Polish emigre, was trusted and respected by the foreign
54office*' As Polish fortunes improved Dmowski’s aims increased* On 
inarch 26, 1917? following the abdication of the tsar, he informed the 
foreign office that Polish autonomy within Russia was no longer sufficient,
anu that he was now working for a large, independent Poland with access to
55the sea.
Bmowski's rise was accompanied by the eclipse of Kamier, his most
bitter antagonist in official circles, whose slight inxluence on the foreign
office disappeared during 1917* As an employee of Wellington House Namier
never had official access to the foreign office, but when Polish affaire
56were discussed his views were presented anu defended by Percy Since
Percy, as an expert on America, dealt with Polish affairs only when they 
were part of >*nglo-American relations, his involvement declined when the
^  Rumbold to Spring Rice, 29 April 1917> Drummond to Cecil, 20 May 1917?
F*0. 115-2302.
^  Drummond memorandum, 13 June 1918, P.O. 371-3282-106670. See above,
PP-77-78, 113-115? 133-136.
^  Bmowski memo random, 26 iiar* 1917? P.O. 371-30vX>-63741* .maowski to 
Balfour, 1 April 1917? F.O. 371-3016-194676. 
^  See above, pp.93-94? 130-139-
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centre of attention in Polish affairs shifted to Europe. This development
limited Rainier*b unofficial accede to the foreign office and his reports
for Wellington House, although circulated, appear to have had little 
57influence. In reference to the conflicts between Namier and Dmowski, 
Druumond wrote*
Of course I know about Namier, and Eustace Percy vouches for his 
absolute honesty. At the same time I regard him with considerable
suspicion. I disagree with a great aeal of wh&t he writes ... his 
attack on Dmowski and other Poles is, in spite of what he says, 
purely personal and quite unjust. 58
In answer to similar charges hander once wrote to Kerr*
lou know me well enough to believe me that I am not actuated here 
by personal resentment against Dmowski and his whole Polish Black 
Hundred crew. After ail from the very beginning it was not a 
personal question. I have never known any of their leaders 
personally and merely distrusted them as one disliked and dis­
trusted their Russian reactionary confreres. 59
Despite his lack of influence in the foreign office, Namier did not 
lose all possibility of influencing foreign policy* his friendship with 
Kerr gave him at least potential access to the prime minister. When 
Wellington House was merged into the new department of information in 
February 1917 Namier began to write weekly reports on Polish affairs for
^  Namier, * Memorandum on Poland', 3 May 1917, F.O. 371-3001-92381.
Namier, 'PoliBh Conference at Stockholm', 15 May 1917, F.O. 371-3001- 
99688. Namier, 'Crisis in Poland', 24 May 1917, F-0. 371-3001-104735- 
Namier memorandum, 6 June 1917, F.O. 371-3001-107526.
Drummond to Kerr, 6 April 1917, F.0.800-384- l!he historian C.W.C. Oman, 
who was advising the foreign office on Polish affairs, wrote of Namier 
in one of his memoranda: 'I know Namier well, having examined him 
when he was an Oxford undergraduate, and seen him a good many times in 
later years. He is quite sincere, but very self-centred and disputatious* 
he used to consider himself as the only authority in England on the 
Ruthenian question, and to resent any one having independent views upon 
it.* Oman memorandum, 26 Sept. 1917, F.O. 371-3016-194676.
^  Namier to Kerr, 2 April 1917, F.O. 800-384 =
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its intelligence bureau. Regardless of the foreign office, and much to 
its annoyance, these reports were circulated to the secretary of the war 
cabinet. ^ This practice gave Namier access to the centre of power and 
he remained at least a potential threat to Dmowski,
After the Russian proclamation, which momentarily satisfied the Polish 
emigres, the foreign office was able to devote its attention to the military 
aspects of Polish affairs. In October 1916 Horodyski was sent to the United 
States as a paid agent of the British government to recruit American Poles 
for the Canadian army - a task at which he seemed to achieve some success.^* 
The records show that he received a payment of £2,000 in May 1917* Probably 
influenced by the example of the Central powers, Horodyski submitted a 
memorandum to the foreign office on March 7, 1917» In which he recommended
the formation of a Polish army recruited in neutral countries, under
62British command and recognized as an ally. Although interested, the 
foreign office rejected the proposal as being too far-reaching in the 
existing circumstances.^ But the formation of a liberal government in 
Russia on March 12, 1917? and the American declaration of war on April 6, 
1917? removed the two major obstacles to the creation of such an army.
On April 22, 1917? Balfour embarked for the United States on a mission
60 Intelligence bureau, 'Office Orders', 1 June 1917, F.O. 395-148-117714. 
Oliphant to Montgomery, 28 May 1917, F.O. 371-3010-105964.
61 Long to F.O., 15 Jan. 1917, Graham to W.O., 23 Jan. 1917, F.O. 371-3003- 
11832. Drummond memorandum, 16 Jan. 1917? F.O. 800-384* Derby to Cecil, 
1 June 1917, F.O. 371-3003-106300. Drummond to Campbell, 17 May 1917, 
F.O. 115-2302. There is also a receipt for £2,300 for September 1917* 
F.O. 115-2322. In Dec. 1916 there were twenty-three American Poles 
enrolled in the University of Toronto Canadian Officers Training Corps. 
S.R. Pliska, 'The Polish American Army, 1917-1921', 'Hie Polish Review, 
vol. X, no. 3, 1965, P«5°.
^ Horodyski memorandum, 7 Mar. 1917, F.O. 371-3118-50659*
Drummond to Hardinge, 26 Mar. 1917, F.O. 371-3118-50659*
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to establish closer relations in the conduct of the war.^ In an interview 
with Balfour shortly after his arrival, Horodyski again raised the proposal
for a Polish army and acquired Balfour's approval for submitting a memorandum
65on the subject to the Amerioan secretary of war* It waB now proposed, in 
the sli^itly altered plan set out in the memorandum, to establish a separate 
and distinctive unit within the American army of about 100,OCX) Poles 
reoruited in America* To avoid confusion in American military planning, it
was also suggested that this unit could be trained in Canada where adequate
66
facilities were available* On May 21, 1917, General G*T*M* Bridges, the
military representative of the Balfour mission, explained the plan to House
67
and urged its immediate acceptance* On the following day Balfour, in an
interview with Robert Lansing, the secretary of state, argued in favour of
the proposal, for, as he wrote to the foreign office*
Quite apart from the fighting value of such an army its creation 
ought to have a very favourable effect upon the international 
situation in central Europe and it would greatly hamper if not 
entirely defeat any German attempts to get an important section 
of the Poles either to fight for them or to work for them*
During this interview Lansing informed Balfour that his government
approved the plan in principle* But between that approval in principle
and the commencement of recruiting, there were about three months of
negotiations, in which the plan was fundamentally altered* The French
64
Fowler, British-American Relations* pp*25-31*
^  'General Military Report', 11 June 1917, W*0. 32-5403*
66
Memorandum, 9 May 1917, Wiseman Mss* 91-103* Drummond to Cecil,
16 May 1917, Drummond to Ceoil, 20 May 1917, F*0* 115-2302*
^  Balfour mission report, 21 Lay 1917, W«0* 32-5403•
66 Balfour to F.O. (draft), 23 May 1917, F.O. ll>-2302* Bridges to Balfour, 
23 May 1917, Cab. I-25-5. Spring Rice to F.O., 24 May 1917, F.O. 371- 
3003-104267. Macdonogh to F.O., 26 May 1917, F.O. to Buchanan, 31 May 
1917, F.O. 371-3003-106300.
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government immediately complicated the situation by announcing on May 28,
691917, the formation of a Polish army in France. This independent French 
action, which had not been preceded by consultation with the British 
government, was probably the result of simultaneous approaches to the 
Allied governments by Dmowski*s subordinates. Horodyski caused further 
confusion with a proposal, entertained by the American government, for the
creation of a Polish army, not as part of the American army, but as a
70separate legal entity in international affairs.* The foreign offiee
disliked both developments because, while having no particular preference
for the type of army created, it wanted immediate action before the military
71 —and political advantages evaporated* On June 21, 19171 Drummond tele­
graphed Horodyski 1 'Present proposal that Polish army should become legal
international affair ... seems to offer endless possibilities for delay
72
and friction and I know that our people would much prefer original scheme'.
As the negotiations continued it became obvious that the French
government wanted all available Polish recruits in the French-Polish anny,
that the Poles disliked the idea of exclusive French control, and that
the American government was having second thoughts about the formation of
73a Polish army as part of the Amerioan army. By August 1917, the British
69 Langley to W.O., 4 June 1917, F.O. 371-3003-108187. Memorandum on 
French Polish array, 25 June 1917? W.O. 106-964*
^  Horodyski to Drummond;, 19 June 1917, F.O. 800-384. Horodyski to 
Drummond, 20 June 1917, F.O. 371-3082-123459•
f l F.O. to Buchanan, 31 May 1917, F.O. 371-3003-106300. Langley to 
Canibon, 16 June 1917, F.O. 371-3003-115713* Drummond to Balfour,
23 June 1917, F.O. 371-300>-123703.
^  Drummond to Horodyski, 21 June 1917, F.O. 371-3082-123459*
^  Wiseman to Drummond, 29 June 1917, F.O. 371-3082-132447* Rumbold to 
F.O., 4 July 1917, F.O. 371-3003-132679. Wiseman to Drummond, 14 July 
1917, Wiseman Mss.91-105* Spring Rice to F.O., 23 July 1917, F.0.115- 
2302. Drummond to Balfour, 7 Aug. 1917? F.O. 800-204. Paderewski to 
Horodyski, 28 Aug. 1917, F.O. 371-3001 I69054.
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government, probably following the path of least resistance in an attempt
to settle the affair quickly, began to favour the i'brenoh programme* The
firet steps in that direction cam© when the government arranged to ehip
Polish volunteers from Holland to Prance and to allow recruitment among
74the Poles interned in Britain for the French-Polish anqy. By the end
of the war 1,588 Polish civilians and prisoners of war had been released
for service in this Polish anny.7^ On August 28, 1917, Drummond,Clerip,
Horodyski and Macdonogh met and worked out a compromise in which a Polish
army financed by the Entente would be formed in the United States, trained
76
in Canada and put under French command. This plan was slightly modified
after Spring Bice informed the foreign office that while the American
government would permit recruiting in the United States for the Polish
army, it would not assist in its creation because of the confusion this
77would cause in American military planning* In October 1917, after
arrangements had been made with the Canadian authorities, recruiting for
78
the Polish army began with the sanction of the American government. By
74 Graham to H.O., 24 July 1917, H.O. to P.O., 8 Aug. 1917, H.O. 45-10740- 
262173. Langley to Bertie, 6 Aug. 1917, F.O. 371-3012-152470. Graham 
to Henderson, 16 Aug. 1917, P.O. 371-300 3-155737. 
7^ 'Aar Office, Statistics, pp.634-635* 
76 F.O. to D.M.I., 25 Aug. 1917, F.O. 371-3003-163638. Clerk minute, 
27 Aug. 1917, P.O. 371-3003-166721. Drummond to Cecil, 29 Aug. 1917, 
F.O. 800-197* Drummond to Macdonogh, 30 Aug. 1917, F.O. 800-384*
77 Spring Rice to Balfour, 6 Sept. 1917, F.O. 115-2321. Spring Rice to 
F.O., 15 Sept. 1917} Spring Rice to Devonshire, 15 Sept. 1917, F.0.115-
2302.
78 Spring Rice to F.O., 27 Sept. 1917, F.O. 371-3003-187302. Spring Rice 
to F.O., 7 Oct. 1917, Devonshire to Spring Rice, 3 Oct. 1917, Spring 
Rice to Devonshire, 26 Sept. 1917, F.O. 115-2302. Balfour to Spring 
Rice, 27 Sept. 1917, F.O. 371-3001-188061. Waller to O'Leary, 22 Sept. 
1917, H.O. 45-10836-550095.
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February 1918 there were about 6,000 Polish recruits in Canada awaiting
79transport to Prance. This recruiting was organized by Paderewski,
Horody ski, &nulski and other Polish leaders in co-operation with the
00
French authorities in the United i'tates. It was to be of the greatest 
political sigiificanoe that the Poles involved were all followers of 
Dmowski•
The extent to which the British government was motivated to support 
the Polish army by pure military considerations should not be under­
estimated. The advantage of the army was that it allowed access to 
hitherto untapped sources of manpower such as Polish prisoners of war, 
enemy alien Poles and . oles in the United States not subject to conscrip­
tion. Vfcile interested in the political advantages, such as the effect 
it would have on German attempts to create a Polish army, the British
government was not prepared to release Poles already enlisted in the
3lnritish and Canadian armies. In terms of Anglo-iiussian relations, it 
is also significant that the Russian government was informed but not
seriously consulted about the creation of this army. At one point the
Russian government was asked to supply experienced Polish officers, but
02
after this request was refused it was not consulted again. The Polish 
army as it finally emerged was recruited by the Poles, trained by the
^  Martin to GwatldLn, ^ Jan. 1918, Martin to GwatkLn, 10 Feb. 1918,
F.O. 115-2430. S.R. Pliska, 'The Polish American Army, 1917-1921',
The Polish Review vol. X, no. 3, 1965, P*53*
Spring Rice to Devonshire, 10 Oct. 1917, F.O. 115-2302.
Langley to Gambon, 16 June 1917, F.O. 371-3003-115713• Gregory minute,
Kozicki to Gregory, 24 Sept. 1917, F.O. 371-3098-185969*
^  F.O. to Buchanan, 31 ^my 1917, F.O. 371-3003-106300. Buchanan to 
F.O., 28 June 1917, Cab. 24-143.
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Canadians, transported by the British and commanded by the French•  ^ Thee# 
arrangements tended to give France the most important role and created the 
impression that the Polish army was exclusively a French affair* Although 
Wiseman objected to the prominence this gave the French in Polish affairs,
the foreign office was completely satisfied to allow France to appear to
84play the leading role. The British government was not solely responsible 
for the creation of the army, but it played a key and far more decisive 
role than has been indicated in any previous account. Its involvement can 
be traced back directly to the decision to send horodyski to the United 
States in October 1916.
The development of this Polish arnty, associated exclusively with the 
National Democrats, had important consequences for eubsequent relations 
between the British government and Polish emigres. Possessing the political 
allegianoe of this anqy, the National Democrats' position in Allied countries 
vis-a-vis their political opponents was enormously strengthened because they 
could now approach the Allied governments, not as supplicants, but as men of
authority. Early in these negotiations it became evident that the creation
of an army almost necessitated the creation of some complementaxy political 
organisation. Proposals for the recognition of a Polish committee arose 
from the negotiations, and, as in the case of the army, could be justified 
by political as well as military considerations. The long and difficult 
process which led to the recognition of the Polish National Committee began,
Q ^
Spring Rice to Drummond, 5 Oct. 1917, F.O. ll>-2302. Spring Rice to 
F.O., 7 Oct. 1917, F.O. 371-3001-193261. Oraham to C.O., 23 Nov. 1917, 
F.O. 371-3003-218483. F.O. to Spring Rice, 22 Dec. 1917, F.O. 371- 
3003-241326.
84
Wiseman to Drummond, 24 tept. 1917, Wiseman Mss. 91-105* F.O. to
Wiseman, 4 Oct. 1917, F.O. 800-204.
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however, on April 30, 1917? when Dmowski suggested to Clerk that Polish 
committees be fonned in Allied countries to cany out consular functions.
He argued that this step was necessary because, since the Russian declara­
tion of Polish independence, the Russian officials were beginning to treat
ft r
all Poles as foreigners. ^ The foreign office referred the proposal to
86the home office, where it disappeared for two months.
On June 15, 1917, while the home office was pondering the question, 
Spring Rioe informed the foreign office that the American government was 
considering the establishment of a Polish provisional government, an act of
far greater political significance than the recognition of consular cora-
87
mittees. The foreign office disliked the idea, for reasons which were
88not yet evident, but seemed hesitant to oppose it. On July 8, 1917> Clerk
revived Dmowski*s original proposal, possibly in an attempt to forestall
the oreation of a provisional government, by suggesting that the Allies be
consulted on the recognition of consular committees. He argued that the
recognition of a Polish committee would have beneficial politioal reper-
cuBeions in Poland but added, possibly in reference to the proposal for a
provisional governments ’It is not necessary as yet to go further than to
create Polish Committees in the various Allied countries which should, ...
be allowed to protect, and vouch for, individual Poles in those countries,
89whatever their teohnical nationality'. The foreign office accepted 
Qk ...
^ Dmowski to Clerk, 30 April 1917, P.O. 371-3012-88528.
86 H.O. to F.O., 5 July 1917, H.O. 45-10740-262173.
87 Spring Rice to F.O., 15 June 1917, P.O. 371-3001-119346. Barclay to 
Balfour, 28 June 1917, P.O. 115-2302. Komarnicki, Rebirth, p.170. 
Horodyski to Drummond, 19 June 1917, P.O. 800-384*
88 Drummond to Horodyski, 21 June 1917, P.O. 371-3082-123459* Drummond
to Balfour, 23 June 1917, P.O* 371-3003-123703*
89 Clerk minute, 8 July 1917, P.O. 371-3012-133576.
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Clerk’s proposal and on July 21, 1917, instructed its representatives to
consult the respective Allied governments to which they were accredited
on the recognition of committees charged with consular responsibilities.
Following the text of Clerk’s original proposal, the communication stated*
From such information as His Majesty's Government possess of recent 
events in Poland it is clear that the situation in that country has 
been the cause of serious preoccupation to the Central Powers, and it 
seems to His Majesty's Government that the Poles should be stiffened 
in their demands for liberty and independence and encouraged by all 
possible means to refuse all promise from our enemies of a mock 
independence, ... His majesty's Government would therefore propose 
that the Allied Governments should henceforth openly recognize as 
friends and potential allies all Poles in their respective countries< 
... This would not only be an earnest to the Poles themselves that 
the Allies supported their claim to an independent Polish Htate but 
it would also tend to bring home to public opinion in Allied countries 
the conception of a separate and independent Polish State and nation. 
These ends would be greatly furthered if there were set up in each 
country a representative Polish Committee, which, if approved by the 
Government, might be treated as the main channel of communication 
with Polish patriots. 90
With the exception of the Russian government, which feared that the
Polish situation was getting out of control, the Allies responded favourably
91to the British proposal. At the suggestion of the French government,
however, further action was postponed, pending the results of a conference
of Polish conservatives in Lausanne. In August 1917 representatives of the
National Lemocratic and Realist parties met in Lausanne, and created the
92
Polish National Committee, under the presidency of Lmowski." They
F.O* to Buchanan, Rodd, Bertie, Spring Rice, 21 July 1917, F.O. 371- 
3012-133576.
^  Spring Rice to F.G., 23 July 1917, P.O. 115-2302. Buchanan to F.O*,
24 July 1917, F.O. 371-3001-146480. Bertie to F.O., 1 Aug. 1917,
F.O. 371-3001-151514.
^  F.O. to consul general in San Francisco, 21 Aug. 1917, F.O. 371-3001- 
164526. F.O. to Spring Rice, 22 Aug. 1917, F.O. 371-3001-163770.
’Message to Poland Sent as the Result of the Conference held by Polish 
Leaders at Lausanne', 12 Aug. 1917, F.O. 000-384* Mackray, Poland, p.82.
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undoubtedly anticipated Allied recognition of some committee and were
93confident that it would be their organization. Although Dmowski later 
made the ridiculous claim that the consnittee represented ninety percent of
Polish opinion, it was in fact entirely conservative and largely National
94Democratic. Other than Dmowski, its more prominent members were 
Paderewski, beyda, Piltz and bobanski.
Dmowski* s supporters could be optimistic about recognition because 
the foreign office never seriously considered recognizing any other Polish 
organization. The conservatives were the only Poles with whom the government 
conducted any relations, and Allied attempts to create a Polish army depended 
upon their support. There was, however, a possible drawback to giving the 
conservatives official recognition. Despite Dmowski*s extravagant claims,
95the foreign office suspected that he represented only a minority of Poles.
The suspicion was unsubstantiated but, if it was accurate, there might be 
little political advantage in recognizing the Polish National Committee.
One of the original aims of recognising a committee had been to thwart 
German attempts to win support in occupied Poland, but this aim might be 
jeopardized by recognizing a committee which did not represent Polish 
opinion. The alternative to the Polish National Committee seemed, however, 
even more unacceptable.
On January 14, 1917, as part of their plan to establish a Polish anny, 
the Central powers created the Council of State as an advisory body on 
government in Poland. The Polish left-wing, never averse to limited
^  Horodyski to Paderewski, 21 Aug. 1917, F*0. 371-3001-164526.
Cecil memorandum, 3 Sept. 1917, F.O. 800-205.
^  Namier memorandum, 3 May 1917, F.O. 371-3001-92381.
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co-operation with the Central powers, supported the counoil and participated
in it.^ Zaleeki and Aleksander Lednicki, the leaders of the Polish left-
wing in England and Russia respectively, recognized the Council of State
as the nucleus of the future government of Poland, adhered to its pronounce-
97ments on policy, and sought recognition for it from the Allied governments.
In the European conflict the Council of State claimed to follow a policy of
neutrality, but was obviously willing, and had little choice but, to under**
take limited co-operation with the Central powers. Within Poland itself
the council agreed to the formation of a Polish army to be used exclusively
98against Russia but only if it was created under a Polish government. In
an attempt to enforce a policy of neutrality on those Poles beyond its reach,
the Council of State opposed active Polish participation in the war against
99the Central powers, and the formation of Polish armies outside of Poland. 
Although it was always impossible to verify the claims of Polish politicians, 
the Council of Ctate could claim, as convincingly as the Polish Rational 
Committee, to represent the majority of Poles. The Allies could, therefore, 
recognize either the Polish National Committee or a committee associated 
with the Council of State. The political advantages of recognizing the 
former were debatable, since it mi^ht not represent Polish opinion, but at 
least it represented those Poles who, having clearly shown their commitment
^ Pidhaini, Ukrainian - Polish Problem. p. 31*
^  Zaleski memorandum, 16 July 1917* F.O. 371-3012-141126. Howard to 
Hardinge, 16 May 1917, P.O. 371-3001-99577*
^ Komamicki, Rebirth, pp.116-117*
99 Namier memorandum, 3 May 1917, F.O, 371-3001-92381. Namier 'Crisis in 
Poland', 24 May 1917, F.O. 371-3001-104735* Fischer, Oermarur's Aiaia, 
p.453* Kozicki memorandum, 31 May 1917, F.O. 371-3001-108369* Namier 
memorandum, 4 June 1917, Cab. 24-15* Howard to Hardinge, 10 May 1917, 
Hardinge Mss. 32.
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to the Entente by supporting the creation of a Polish army, wore trusted, by 
the Allies* A committee associated with the Council of 8tate might represent 
Polish opinion, but it would not be committed to the Entente and oould be 
suspected of being pro-Geraan or pro-Austrian. Its recognition might hamper 
German attempts to exploit the Council of State, but it would mean abandoning 
plans for a Polish army*
When Zaleski sought Allied recognition for the Council of State, in 
July 1917j Clerk admitted that that organization might have the support of 
the majority of the Poles, but attributed this to the conditions of war which 
made it difficult for the National Democrats to remain in contact with the
xoo
people of Poland* He argued that, as an instrument of the Central powers,
the Council of State oould not be recognized by the Entente, and proposed*
that His Majesty's Government should whole-heartedly support the 
policy of Hi* Dmowski and his helpers, and should recognize them as 
the people to whom «*• the destinies of Poland are entrusted until 
a reconstituted, free and independent Polish nation has the
opportunity of deciding its own fate.
Hardinge agreed with Clerk, and Drummond wrote* ' I think we ought 
to be very careful of accepting any views expressed by M. Zaleski on the
JOS
war. The Council of State is after all a purely Austro-German institution.^" 
The foreign office also reacted unfavourably when it learned that Zaleski 
was planning to give a public lecture at King's College.*03 On this subject 
Drummond wrote to Kerr* 'We do not think that the people who are getting 
up this meeting should be encouraged. I am rather doubtful as to their
100
Zaleski memorandum, 16 July 1917> F»0. 371-3012-141126.
101 Clerk minute, 18 July 1917* F.O. 371-3012-133576*
102
Hardinge minute, 4 July 1917> Drummond minute, 4 Aug. 1917* 371-
3001-147721*
103 Nicolson, Clerk and Drummond minutes, 8 Aug. 1917, F.O. 371-3015-162614.
104pro-Ally sentiments.’ Instead of sanctioning the meeting, the foreigji
office asked the director of military intelligence to investigate Zaleski’s 
105
activities. '  In October 1917 Macdonogh sent the foreign office the
results of this investigation, along1 with a recommendation for legal action
against the Polish Review published by Z a l e s k i . T h e  investigation
presented no positive evidence that Zaleski was pro-German, despite the
numerous accusations levelled against him by the National Democrats. But,
accepting these accusations, the investigators remained convinced that
Zaleski was pro-German becau e they did have evidence that he was in contact
with other Poles suspected of being pro-German or pro-Austrian. One report
ended with the statements 'ueanwhile we are continuing the oheck on Zaleski* s
107correspondence in the hope that it may yield useful results’. Military
intelligence failed to realise that almost all of the Polish emigres,
including Dmowski, were in contact with, or even in some cases related to,
pro-Austrian 'oles. Obviously influenced by the accusations of norodyski
and Alma-Tadema, military intelligence acted on the incredibly stupid
assumption that anyone opposed to Dmowski was pro-German, an assumption
which led them to make the preposterous accusation that Seton-Wateon was
108
publishing pro-German articles in The New Burope. One of the reports 
ended with the recommendation that Zaleski be removed from politics by 
deportation or conscription. The foreign office accepted the views advanced
104 
Kerr to Balfour, 17 Aug. 1917> Drummond to Kerr, 20 Aug. 1917» F.0.800- 
199-
105
Drummond minute, 9 Aug. 1917, Korr to Nioolson, 17 Aug. 1917, F*0. 371-
3015-162614. Nicolson minute, 1 Sept. 1917, F*0. 371-3015-170851.
106
Macdonogh to P.O., 10 Oct. 1917, Bray, ’Report on August Zaleski*,
20 Sept. 1917, M.I, 74 memorandum, 14 Sept. 1917, F.O. 371-3016-195993*
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by military intelligence, but after momentarily considering conscripting
Zaleaki into the British array, rejected the idea because such action might
109make him a martyr. With Balfour’s approval, however, legal measures
were initiated to suppress the Polish heview.1*0 There was obviously
never any question of giving official recognition to Zaleaki or anyone
associated with him*
In contrast, Lednicki in Russia was far more successful* When, as a
result of the revolution, Vsielopolaki and Dmowski lost their influence in
Russian official circles, they were replaced by Lednioki and hie Polish
Democratic Club, whose views were in far greater harmony with those of the
Provisional government.*** Shortly after the revolution, the government
appointed Lednioki chairman of the Liquidation Coimnittee oharged with
112formulating plans for the separation of Poland and Russia. When Dmowski’e
supporters in Russia began to agitate for the creation of Polish military
units within the disintegrating Russian army, the Provisional government
rejected the idea because of the danger that such troops might be used for
111counter-revolution. Following the policy of the Council of State,
Lednicki supported the government in its opposition to Polish military 
114units. The divergence between the Russian government and its allies on
Nicolson minute, Clerk minute, 12 Oct* 1917* F*0* 371-3016-195993* 
Montgomery to Donald, 13 Oct* 1917* F.O. 395-108-197963*
110 P.O. to kacdonogh, 17 Oct. 1917, F.O. 371-3016-195993*
Howard to Hardinge, 4 Sept. 1917, Hardinge Mss*34* Namier memorandum,
4 Sept. 1917* Cab.24-25* Halecki, Poland* p*468. Mackray, Poland* p.48.
112
Namier memorandum, 3 May 1917, F*0.371-3001-92381. Mackray, Poland, p*51*
^  ^  Blair to kacdonogh, 18 June 1917* Cab. 24-17* Buchanan to F.O.,
26 June 1917, Cab. 24-143* Dmoweki to Clerk, 14 May 1917, F.O. 371- 
3003-98006. Lindley, 'Fortnightly Summary of Events', 28 Aug* 1917,
F.O. 371-^997-176585*
114 Namier memorandum, 4 June 1917, Cab. 24-15* Kozicki memorandun, 31 May 
1917, F.O. 371-3001-108369* Howard to F.O., 11 Sept. 1917, F.O. 371- 
3001-177555*
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the Polish issue was obviously growing and it was unlikely that the Russian
government would look with favour on Allied recognition of a Polish committee
115dominated by conservatives who had previously supported Russian autocracy.
The foreign office considered Lednicki no better than Haleski.
Although Howard, the only British official in contact with the Polish left- 
wing, sent the foreign office favourable reports about Lednicki, these had 
no effect upon its attitude and his recommendations were never accepted.
When he stated in one report that recognition of the Polish national 
Committee would cause dissension among the Poles, Clerk wrote in reference 
to the Council of States 'But their whole attitude ... has been one of 
compromise and making terms with the occupying Power and neither the 
Regency nor the oause of Poland would be safe in their hands'. He went on 
to attack the council's policy, adhered to by Lednioki, against the form­
ation of Polish armies, and concluded! 'I entirely agree with Sir Esme 
Howard that it is undesirable to sow dissension among the various Polish
parties, but I submit that to support those whose policy helps our enemies
117
is even worse, ... Subsequent events showed that Clerk expressed the
ll8
view of the foreign office. It is obvious that Zaleski and Lednioki 
were never considered an alternative to the Polish Rational Committee.
That committee might not have the support of the majority of the Poles, 
its recognition might not produce all of the anticipated political
115 Buchanan to F.O., 1 Oct. 1917, F.O. 371-3001-189230. Buchanan to F.O.,
24 July 1917, F.O. 371-3001-146480.
11 Howard to Hardinge, 8 Sept. 1917, F.O. 371-3001-175905* Howard to
Hardinge, 4 Sept. 1917, Hardinge mss.34. Howard to P.O., 10 Sept.1917, 
F.O.371-3001-175906. Howard to F.O., 11 Sept.1917, F.O.371-3001-177555*
Howard to F.O., 8 Sept. 1917, Clerk minute, 10 Sept. 1917, F.O. 371-
3001-175906.
118 F.O. to Howard, 14 Sept. 1917, F.O. 371-3001-175906.
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advantages but, ©specially if the allies wanted a Polish army, there was 
no alternative*
When the PoliBh National Committee, on August 28, 1917, officially
informed the British government of its creation, the foreign office
119immediately wanted to recommend its recognition to the Allies. x It 
hesitated, however, because the American ambassador, waiter nines Page, 
had again raised the proposal for a Polish provisional government. On this 
occasion the opposition of the foreign office to the idea of a provisional 
government was clearly explained by Ceoil in the description of hie con­
versation with Page*
I said that it seemed to me a very difficult thing to create a 
Provisional Government of Poles in the United States without 
consulting the people of Poland, and 1 took the opportunity of 
pointing out that any such Government would necessarily define 
what it conceivea to be the future limits of Poland and that 
these would include, among other things, the port of Bantzig.
If we recognized a Provisional Government claiming the port of 
Bantzig, we should be more or less bound to struggle for the 
inclusion of Bantzig in the future Poland, and that, I thought, 
would be a great burden on the Allies. I therefore thought the 
proposal, in itself, of doubtful advisability. 120
Instead of a provisional government the foreign office still preferred 
the politically less significant recognition of the Polish National Com­
mittee. The original proposal for a committee charged only with consular 
functions was now, however, altered to include representation of Polish
interests in Allied countries and responsibility for political issues
121arising from the Polish army. The fact that, on this basis, the 
oommittee would carry out many of the functions of a provisional government
119 Polish National Committee to Balfour, 28 Aug.1917, F.O. 371-3001-169539*
F.O. to Spring Bice (.cancelled), 29 Aug. 1917? Cecil to Page, 30 Aug. 
1917, F.O. 371-3001-170618.
121
F.O. to Spring Hice, 2 Sept. 1917, F.O. 371-3001-169539*
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without being recognised as such probably explains why Page now withdrew 
122
his proposal. The problem of possible Russian opposition to recognition
of the Polish National Committee was solved simply by not consulting the
123
Russian government. After some delay from negotiations over th9 actual
formula of recognition, the French government recognized the Polish National
Committee on September 20, 1917, and the British government followed suit,
124
in terms similar to those used by the Frenoh, on October 13, 1917* The
American government, alone among the Allies intent upon consulting the
125
Russian government, delayed its recognition until November 10, 1917*
By that time the Provisional government, opposed to the x^olish National
126Committee until the end, no longer existed*
In view of the opposition of the foreign office to the proposal for
a Polish provisional government, it is necessary to examine closely the 
terms on which it recognized the Polish National Committee, and the inter­
pretation it placed on the act of recognition* The actual letter of 
recognition to Sobanski, the representative of the Polish National Committee 
in London, stated* ’I am to inform you *.* that Ilia Majesty’s Government 
are very willing to recognize this official Polish organization and that
Cecil to Spring Rice, 3 Sept. 1917, F.O. 371-3001-17 3380. Spring Rice
to P.O., 8 Oot. 1917, F.O. 115-2302.
123 Buchanan to F.O., 1 Oct. 1917, F.O. 371-3001-189230.
Gregory minute, 28 Sept. 1917, F.O* 371-3016-195992* F.O. to Wiseman,
1 Oct. 1917, F.O. 800-204. Bertie to F.O., 10 Oct. 1917» F.O.371-3001- 
194981. Graham to Sobanski, 15 Oct. 1917, F.O. 371-3001-193915*
12^ Spring Rice to F.O., 15 Oct. 1917, F.O. 371-3001-198261. Spring Rice
to F.O., 25 Oct. 1917. F.O. 115-2302. Drummond to Balfour, 13 Oct.
1917, Balfour to Spring Rice, 13 Oct. 1917, F.O. 371-3001-193915*
Buchanan to F.O., 18 Oct. 1917, F.O. 371-3002-201591. Terestchenko to 
Buchanan, 24 Oct. 1917, F.O. 371-3002-209774* Buchanan to P.O., 25 Oct. 
1917, P.O. 371-3011-207190. Buchanan to Balfour, 1 Nov. 1917, F.O.371-
3012-218506.
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127they note that the headquarters of the Committee are in Paris*. Clerk
later explained this rather vague statement*
as regards recognition, this has, for practical purposes, been
accorded to a Committee of Poles working in the Western Capitals
of Europe, but neither gives that Committee the status of repre­
senting all Poland nor excludes recognition of other equally pro- 
Ally organizations. 128
In other words the committee had been recognized as nothing mare than
an official Polish organization. In practice the government, showing no
inclination to recognize any other Polish organization, treated it as the
only official Polish committee. Nevertheless, it had minimized its
commitment to the Polish National Committee and had retained the option
129of recognizing other Polish organizations in the future. In addition 
the foreign office did not consider that recognition implied any commitment 
on the future of Poland. When Cecil expressed his apprehension about 
recognition Drummond replied* *1 agree with Lord R# Cecil as to the 
inadvisability of making the reconstruction of Poland ... an allied war 
aim on the same plane as Belgium or Servia, but I do not see that the
recognition of the Polish National Committee commits us to this in any
, 130 way’.
Great significance might be read into the act of recognition by 
others, particularly Poles, but it is obvious that the foreign office did 
not agree. This conclusion is borne out by the arrangements which followed
127 Graham to Sobanski, 15 Oct. 1917, F.O. 371-3001-193915- Mackray, 
Poland, p.84*
128
Clerk minute, 8 Oct. 1917, F.O. 371-3001-193261. Clerk minute, 7 Nov. 
1917, F.O. 371-3002-209774.
129 Balfour to ^eardale, 22 Nov. 1917, F.O. 800-210.
Cecil minute, 9 Oct. 1917, Drummond minute, 13 Oct. 1917, F.O. 371- 
3016-193872.
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the recognition of the committee and which indicate the degree to which the 
government was prepared to allow the committee to act as a provisional 
government. On January 8, 1918, at a conference attended by Clerk, Sobanski, 
Stanislas Kozicki and representatives of the war office and home office, 
arrangements were made to give the Polish National Committee consular 
privileges.*3* The foreign office had already rejected a politically more
significant proposal put forward by Gregory to give the committee full
132
diplomatic privileges. As a result of this conference the government 
agreed to recognize Poles, regardless of their origin, as alien friends if 
they possessed a certificate issued by the committee. These certificates 
could be used as passports but, in return, the holders were obliged to 
volunteer for national service.^33 Sobanski wanted the certificates to 
state that the holder was of Polish nationality, but this was rejected by 
the officials who preferred that the certificates state Bimply that the 
bearer was a Pole.^34 At the conference Clerk explained to Sobanski that 
until an independent sovereign Poland existed it was impossible to recognize 
Polish nationality.*3  ^ Sobanski was obviously trying to derive the maximum 
political advantage from these arrangements, but the government, while 
prepared to grant convenient privileges to the committee, was equally
131 Balfour to Sobanski, 22 Feb. 1918, F.O. 371-3280-33950. Moylan 
memorandum, 8 Jan. 1918, F.O. 371-3280-7341* Rumbold to F.O., 20 Nov. 
1917, F.O. 371-3002-221738. Sobanski to Gregory, 22 Nov. 1917, P.O.371- 
3012-224146. Kell to Clerk, 4 Jan. 1918. F.O. 371-3280-5738.
132 Sobanski to F.O., 18 Oct. 1917, F.O. 371-3001-200151. Gregory minute,
24 Oct. 1917, F.O. to Macdonogh, 2 Nov. 1917, F.O. 371-3017-209310. 
Maodonogh to F.O., 14 Nov. 1917, F.O. 371-3017-218625.
133 Home office circular, 12 Mar. 1918, H.O. 45-10890-355329* Home office 
circular, 5 Feb. 1918, H.O. 45-10889-352661.
134 Sobanski to Kell, 31 Bee. 1917, F.O. 371-3280-5738.
*3"* Moylan memorandum, 8 Jan. 1918, F.O. 371-3280-7341.
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determined to minimize the legal significance of both recognition and the
arrangements which followed.
The manner in which consular privileges were given to the committee
also showed that the officials suspected that the National Democrats would
use these privileges against their political opponents. For that reason
the government reserved the right to issue certificates to Poles not
approved by the committee. The home office report on the conference stated*
'It was further made clear that the Polish National Committee was only an
official Committee, and that there might be others, and that the National
Committee had not, therefore, the exclusive right of issuing the certificate
136in question or similar certificates.' Although British officials tended
to acoept the accusations made by the National Democrats against their
opponents, they obviously did not trust the committee to use its power
with impartiality. On this point Clerk; wrote* 'This is of course necessary
to ensure that the Committee should not use its certificates as a means for
political pressure and to maintain the position we have consistently
adopted, namely that the Committee is an official Polish Organization but
137not necessarily the only one'.
Although in practice the government treated the committee as the only 
Polish organization, it obviously intended to maintain its freedom of action. 
It also wanted to protect itself from the attacks of Dmowski’s opponents 
by not appearing too closely associated with the National Democrats. To 
some extent these arrangements represented no more than official recognition 
of existing practices. Since 1916 the Polish ExileB Protection had exercised
Moylan memorandum, 8 Jan. 1918, F.O. 371-3280-7341*
137
Clerk to i&oylan, 8 Jan. 1918, H.O. 45-10889-352661.
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138t o  a la c e e r  degree s im i la r  c o n s u la r  p r iv i le g e s .  A n o th e r e x is t in g
p r a c t ic e  was g ive n  o f f i c i a l  r e c o g n it io n  when the  foreign office agreed to
139a l lo w  Sobanski to send correspondence  th ro u g h  B r i t i s h  d ip lo m a t ic  pouches.
In the U n ite d  S ta te s  th e  N a t io n a l D em ocra ts, now under the authority of the
P o l is h  N a t io n a l Committee, c o n tin u e d  t h e i r  w o rk  on recruiting for the Polish 
140arm y.
The re c o g n it io n  of th e  com m ittee  le d ,  how ever, to one v e ry  s ig n i f i c a n t  
in n o v a t io n .  The com m ittee needed funds for propaganda, i n t e l l i g e n c e ,  admin­
i s t r a t i o n  and r e c r u i t in g ,  b u t wanted to  a v o id  b e in g  cha rged  b y  i t s  opponents
141as b e in g  p a id  agents o f  th e  A l l i e s .  I t  th e r e fo r e  asked th e  A l l i e d
governm ents f o r  a lo a n  o f  £12,000 p e r  m onth, presum ably  to  be re p a id  a f t e r
th e  e s ta b lis h m e n t o f  a P o lis h  governm ent. In  Ja n u a ry  1918 th e  B r i t i s h
governm ent agreed to  pay i t s  share o f  £3,000 p e r  m onth w ith  paym ents
1A2
b e g in n in g  in  February 1918. These paym ents were unrelated to  the c o s t 
o f  th e  P o l is h  army w hich  was a ls o  a r e s p o n s ib i l i t y  o f  th e  A l l i e d  go ve rnm en ts . 
The appo in tm en t by th e  A l l i e d  governm ents o f  a g en ts  to  s u p e rv is e  the 
f in a n c e s  o f  th e  P o lis h  N a t io n a l Committee show th a t  repaym ent o f  this so - 
c a l le d  loan was not e xpec ted .
138 «See above, pp. 125-127.
15 j an . 1918, F .O . 371 -3277-6702 . Graham to  S o b a n sk i,
19 O c t. 1917, P .O . 371-3001-200151.
140 „See above, pp. 240-241.
141
C le rk  m in u te , 12 Dec. 1917, H a rd inge  m in u te ,  14 Bee. 1917* Graham to 
t r e a s u ry ,  22 Dec. 1917, F .O . 371-3002-236697* Memorandum for 
30 D ec. 1917, Wiseman Mss. 9 1 -10 6 . T h w a ite s  memorandum, 4 N ov . 1917, 
Wiseman Mss. 91-106. Wiseman to  Drummond, 5 F eb . 1918, Wiseman M ss .91-105*
Chalm ers to  P.O., 28 D ec. 1917, T 1 2 -3 8 . Balfour to Spring R ic e , 3 Jan.
1918, F.O. 371-3002-244929* Sobanski t o  C le rk ,  28 J a n . 1918, F .O .371- 
3277-18075* Chalmers to  F .O ., 22 Feb. 1918 , T 1 2 -39 -
143 Derby to  P .O ., 8 June 1918, P .O . to  D e rb y , 11 June 1918, F .O .3 7 1 -3 2 7 7 -
102644*
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with the formation of a Polish army in France and the recognition of
the Polish National Committee Dmowski and the National Democrats had
achieved a position of some importance* They reached the zenith of their
influence on the British government, however, at the beginning of 1918,
as a result of developments in Russia following the Bolshevik revolution*
Despite the opposition of the Provisional government, the Russian military
authorities, in collusion with the National Democrats, had created by
August 1917 a Polish corps, under General Jozef Dowbor-Musnicki, within
144the Russian army* The British war office, after initially disapproving 
of the disruption of the Russian army in order to create national units, 
began to take an interest in the Polish corps as the Russian army disinte­
grated after the failure of the Galician offensive in July 1917** ^ By
November 1917 the government was seriously considering the possibility of
146
supporting a Polish army in Russia directed againBt the Central powers.
Just before the Bolshevik seizure of power, Horod^ski suggested the 
formation of Polish and Cossack units to assist the Rumanians, whose right 
flank was exposed by the collapse of the Russian anny.147 The plan was 
not unanimously supported by the military expert.the military attache 
in Petrograd thought it would only lead to civil war and wrote to Macdonoghi 
'I believe Poles simply wish to organize force to protect Polish landlords
^ u o h a m m  to F.O., 29 May 1917, F*0. 371-3003-108390. M.I. 2e, ’Russian 
Policy towards Poland in Connection with the Polish Army in Russia’,
27 April 1918, F.O. 371-3286-78150.
145Wf.O. to F.O., 4 June 1917, F«0. 371-3003-111457. Macdonogh to Drummond,
4 July 1917, F.O. 800-204. W.O. to Knox, August 1917, F.O. 800-384.
Knox, ’Memorandum on National Aimies', 15 Nov.1917, F.O.371-3012-218506.
146F.O. to Bertie, 26 Nov. 1917, P.O. 371-3018-225397.
147Spring Rice to F.O., 31 Oct. 1917, F.O. 371-3017-209501.
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against their Russian peasantry'• But suoh opinions had little effect 
on the British government once it became apparent that the Russian govern­
ment intended to make a separate peace which might end all resistance to
149the Central powers in eastern Europe. A b already explained in the 
previous chapter in reference to the Czechoslovak anay, tbs war cabinet
deoided on December 14» 1917» to support all militaxy unitE in Ruseia
150prepared to continue the war against the Central powers. The Allies 
sought to reconstruct some form of eastern front without the aid of the 
Bolsheviks by using the existing Polish, Czechoslovak, Cossack and Rumanian 
military forces. Dowbor-kuanicki'e Polish corps was one of these units and 
on January 4f 1910, Bertie reported that the French government had allotted
to it ten million roubles.*-^ On January 9» 1918, the foreign office asked
. 152
the treasury to agree to share these costs with the French government.
The establishment of this Polish army particularly enhanced the political 
influence of the National Democrats because, as one of the few armies on 
the eastern front still prepared to fight the Central powers, it appeared 
to be of major strategic importance. Frequent discussions about this army
in the war cabinet, which almost never discussed other aspects of Polish
153affairs, are an indication of its importance.
Buchanan to Balfour, 14 Dec. 1917 > F.O. 115-2318.
J.W. Wheele]>-Bannett, Bre st-Lit ovskt The Forgotten Peace. London 1938,
PP *75-99*
Bee above, p. 209*
War cabinet 306 , 26 Dec. 1917; Cab. 23-4* Bertie to F.Q., 4 Jan. 1918, 
F.O. 371-3277-3658.
Langley to treasury, 9 Jan. 1918, F.O. 371-3277-2658. War cabinet 341, 
8 Feb. 1918, Cab. 23-5*
153 War cabinet 262, 1 Nov. 1917, Cab. 23-4- War cabinet 316, 7 Jan. 1918, 
Cab. 23-5.
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In the negotiations which led. to involvement in Polish affafc, the 
British government was primarily motivated, by strategic considerations and 
not by the desire to pursue any particular programme for the future of 
Poland* Each initiative by the government was inspired by the need either 
to thwart Geiman policy in Poland or to use the Poles, particularly in 
military units, as weapons of war. Although of secondary importance in 
the foimation of policy, just as the Polish problem was of secondary 
importance to the conduct of the war, the government was not devoid of 
attitudes and even intentions on the future of Poland*
By making Polish independence possible, the Russian revolution added
to the uncertainties of the Polish problem, uncertainties which reflected
those within Russia itself. In the Provisional government's proclamation
of March 29, 1917, the idea of autanooy within Russia was abandoned in
favour of an independent Poland linked to Russia by a military alliance.
The British government weloomed and supported the proclamation as it
represented a solution to the Polish problem which would win Polish support
while being consistent with British interests and on lines favoured by
154
those in the government involved in PoliBh affairs* The officials, 
when dealing with polish affaire, now began to speak in terms of indepen­
dence, but never made any attempt to explain the meaning of that term as 
it would actually be applied in the geographic area of Poland. Such 
problems, not clearly understood and complicated by uncertainty, were 
easier to avoid than solve. In any case the issue was not of immediate 
importance as it was by no means clear that independence could be achieved.
During 1917 Dmowski presented the foreign office with his programme
154
^  See above, pp.230-233*
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for the future of Poland, setting out territorial claims to which the Poles
155had only a debatable ethnographic oate- Namier attacked the claims of
the National Democrats, whom he labelled ’Polish Imperialists*, on the
grounds that many of the areas were inhabited predominantly by Lithuanians,
156Byelorussians or Ukrainians* Although the foreign office, with a weak­
ness for the nationality principle, thought of Poland in ethnographic rather 
than historic terms, there is no evidence that it paid anything more than
scant attention to these numerous memoranda about problems obviously not
157of immediate importance. Within tne foreign office, the only branch
of the government in which the proposition was seriously discussed, oppo­
sition to a more forward policy on Polish independence was based almost 
entirely on the practical difficulties and not on any theoretical objections 
to independence. To varying degrees Balfour-, Hardinge, Drummond, Clerk and 
Gregory all preferred the independence of Poland, not as an essential war
aim of the British government, but as the best solution to the Polish 
158problem. The one exception was Cecil, who supported the government’s
policy of using the nationalities as weapons of war while disliking
159nationalism and national self-determination. In essence the government 
seemed prepared to accept any solution to the Polish problem which did not 
increase German strength and which was acceptable to both the Poles and
' ^  Draowski memorandum, 26 Uar. 1917, F.O. 371-3000-63741* 
Namier minute, 6 June 1917» F.O. 371-3001-107526. Namier memorandum, 
24 Aug* 1917, Cab. 24-24* Namier memorandum, 9 Sept. 1917, F.O. 371- 
3016-194676.
Oman, ’Memorandum on the Boundaries of Poland*, 3 April 1917, F.O.371-
3016-194676.
Drummond and Balfour minutes, 9 Oct. 1917» F.O* 371-3016-193872.
Balfour to Lansdovme, 22 Nov. 1917, Cab. 24-34* Clerk minute, 25 Jan. 
1918, F.O. 371-3277-16767.
159 Cecil to Strachey, 13 Nov. 1917, F.O. 8OG-I96.
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the Russians. Rut no one ever suggested continuing the war for the sake 
of Poland. For that reason the government scrupulously avoided commitments 
on the future of Poland during the negotiations on the formation of a 
Polish army and the recognition of the Polish National Committee.
During 1917 the war cabinet was hardly concerned with the negotiations 
on Polish affairs conducted, with its general approval, by the war office 
and the foreign office. The members of the cabinet, faced with a multitude 
of more important problems, showed little interest in Poland. The foreign 
office and the war office could do as they liked with the Poles as long as 
they made no commitments. Only then would it become a cabinet issue. The
government's reluctance to accept commitments on the future of Poland
resulted from the commonly held belief that if Russia collapsed such commit­
ments could never be fulfilled.*^0 Even if the Allies achieved victory in 
the west, itself by no means certain, the possibility of influencing, let 
alone dictating, the settlement of eastern Europe without an army there 
loyal to the Entente seemed remote indeed.According to Ameryi 'without
Russia we are powerless to dispute the settlement of the Polish, Roumanian
l62
and Serbian problems according to the wishes of the Central Powers ••••' 
Similar pessimism inspired Cecil to write* 'At this stage in the war to 
adopt and proclaim as one of our war aims as essential as the restoration 
of Belgium, the creation of an independent Polish Kingdom which would cut 
Prussia in two seems to me sheer lunacy'.*^3 In September 1917, Lloyd George 
See above, pp. 183-185.
Amery, 'Possible Terms of Peace', 11 April 1917, Cab. 24-10. Cecil to
Balfour, 10 July 1917, Cab. 1-25-4*
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Amery, 'The Russian Situation and Its Consequences', 20 May 1917,
Cab. 24-14.
163 Cecil minute, 9 Oct. 1917, F.O. 371-5016-193872.
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explained the problem quite clearly to Scott*
Who is going to restore it ^ PolandT• The Soviet and Russian govern­
ment will not or cannot lift a finger and are we to do the work for 
them* We cannot he more Russian than the Russians* If Germany is 
asked to surrender all her gains on the East as well as to retrocede 
Alsace-Lorraine she will fight on for years and, with access to 
certain comlands of Russia, she can do it. 1^4
The seriousness of the situation was evident when the war cabinet, on 
September 24, 1917* considered the possibility of peace negotiations with 
Germany and expressed its willingness to consider any offer put forward by 
the Germans. The cabinet was fully aware that in such negotiations the
only real inducement they could offer Germany for the restoration of Belgium
165was a free hand in eastern Europe. Whether the cabinet would have ever 
made such an offer in actual negotiations is debatable but the proposition 
certainly was considered. As long as victory was in doubt, the government 
could not undertake commitments on Poland which it might never have the 
power to honour and whioh would make a negotiated peace impossible. There 
is insufficient evidence to reveal the cabinet*s attitude, if such existed, 
on the future of Poland. If the cabinet had a preference it might have 
agreed with the foreign office in sympathizing with the cause of Polish 
independence. But, above all, it had no intention of continuing the war 
for the sake of Poland.
let the government could not entirely avoid the question of some 
commitment to the Polish oause unless it was prepared to abandon the Poles 
to the Central powers. On September 12, 1917? the Central powers replaced 
the Council of State with a Regency Council designed to act as the head of 
state of the kingdom of Poland. They also delegated to the Regency Council
164 Scott diary, 26-28 Sept. 1917, Scott Mss. 50904.
165 War cabinet, 24 Sept. 1917, Cab. 25-16.
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the administration of certain aspects of Polish internal affairs and pushed
166 / /forward their own plans for a Polish army. The emigres who kept the
government informed of these developments continually emphasized the need
167for some new Allied declaration on the future of Poland. On October 3,
1917» Gregory explained, in a long minute, that the Polish National Committee
wanted a declaration that* 'we consider the restoration of United Poland
with free access to the sea as one of the essential objects of the war and
an indispensable condition of peace and the balance of Europe'• He argued
that such a declaration was impossible because * 'As things are at present,
the prospect of our wresting PoBen from Germany is not a good one, and it
is clear that not one of the Allies would be willing to prolong the war by
a day in order to do it'. He concluded, reluctantly, that the only
declaration possible would be one expressing nothing more than a pious
aspiration which would carry little conviction, have little effect on the
168Poles and do nothing to prevent them from supporting the Central powers.
More optimistically Clerk maintained that a pious statement involving no
commitment would satisfy the Poles, and Hardinge concluded* ’So long as
169
it is only a pious aspiration it does not much matter what is said'.
On October 15, 1917, with the permission of the foreign office and, in this 
case, of the prime minister, Buchanan associated himself at a public 
meeting with a statement by the Russian foreign minister that the creation
166
Fischer, Germany1s Aims, p.455*
l6T Howard to P.O., 26 Oct. 1917, F.O. 371-3002-206047* Howard to Hardinge,
4 Sept. 1917, Hardinge Mss. 34* Howard to F.O., 8 Sept. 1917, F.0.371- 
3001-.175905-
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Buchanan to E.G., 1 Oct. 1917, Gregory minute, 3 Oct. 1917, F.O. 371-
3001-189230.
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of an Independent and indivisable Poland was one of the conditions of a
170solid and just peace. The Poles had received their declaration of
pious aspiration and, as intended, it was worthless.
As Gregory had so easily predicted the Poles found the statement
completely unsatisfactory and continued to press for a commitment on the
future of Poland. Howard, relying on his Polish sources, continued to
report on the enemy’s progress in forming a Polish army and urged that
some Allied declaration was necessary to counteract what appeared to him
a very real danger that the Central powers would gain Polish support and
171successfully form a Polish army* Balfour opposed issuing another
declaration and commented on one of the reports! 'I do not understand why
our recent very definite statements about Poland are systematically 
172ignored.' Further action on the question was postponed until the 
meeting of the supreme war council in Paris at the beginning of December 
1917* Since the beginning of the war the British government had followed, 
in its relations with the nationalities, the policy of using them while 
maintaining the option, by avoiding commitments, of pursuing such other 
alternatives as a separate peace with Austria-Hungary. At first the idea 
of a separate peace was totally unrelated to British policy in Polish
1Tu Buchanan to F.O., 11 Oct. 1917, F.O. 371-3001-196716. Buchanan to P.O., 
18 Oct. 1917? F.O. 371-3001-199530. Lindley, 'Summary of Events',
30 Oct. 1917, F.O. 371-2997-218507.
171 Howard to P.O., 29 Oot. 1917, F.O. 371-3002-207473. Howard to F.O.,
26 Oot. 1917, P.O. 371-3002-211205. Howard to P.O., 12 Hov. 1917, 
Hardinge minute, 14 Nov. 1917? F.O. 371-3002-216593* Howard to Hardinge, 
17 Nov. 1917, Hardinge Mss. 35* Howard to F.Q., 16 Nov. 1917* F.0.371-
3002-219884.
Balfour minute, 14 Nov. 1917 ? F.O. 371-3002-216593* Buchanan to F.O.,
10 Nov. 1917? F.O. 371-3002-218639* Howard to F.O., 16 Nov. 1917,
F.O. 371-3002-219884. War cabinet 279 , 21 Nov. 1917, Cab. 23-4*
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affairs because Poland was still considered a Russian sphere, and it was
naturally assumed that in a separate peace the Habsburg monarchy would
have to cede dalicia to Russia, whereupon it would be included in whatever
173form the new Poland assumed. In August 1917 the government learned, 
through unofficial contacts, that the Bnperor Karl was interested in a 
Habsburg confederation which would include a re-united P o l a n d . T h i s  
knowledge gave the government an additional reason for avoiding commitments, 
for concessions on the future of Poland might prove useful in negotiations 
with Austria-Hungary. The announcement of an armistice between the 
Bolshevik government and the Central powers on November 30, 1917» by 
releasing the Allies from their obligations to Russia, made such concessions 
possible. When the supreme war council met in Paris on December 1, 1917* 
the British government was about to embark on the Smutb-Mensdorff conver­
sations. These conversations represented the greatest opportunity yet 
presented to the Allies for a negotiated peace with Austria-Hungary, and
as such undoubtedly influenced the British contribution to the discussion
175of a declaration on the future of Poland.
At the meeting of the supreme war council Stephen Pichon, the French
foreign minister, proposed issuing a declaration on Polish independence
and was supported by House, the American representative. According to
the minutes, after Balfour raised some objections to the proposal*
Mr. Llo^d Ceorge said he was sorry to differ from his colleague 
pichon/, but he hoped we would not inorease our obligations at 
the very moment when our military strength was debatable •••• 
the present moment was most unpropitious, when we had almost
173 Drummond memorandum, 12 Feb. 1917, Cab. 24-6.
174 Beak to LanJlajr, 21 July 1917, F.O. 371-2864-155578-
175 Balfour to Rumbold, 30 Sov. 1917) F.O* 371-2861-227704-
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broken with Kussia and had some hopes from Austria* He could 
understand the United States taking some such action, because 
they had a large Polish population, but he askedi Was the United 
States prepared to send an aimy to Poland? It wae impossible to
co n te m p la te  ke e p in g  the w ar g o in g  for two years to set up a 
Polish State. W
The proposal was dropped at this meeting but was raised again by
Balfour at a conference of Allied foreign ministers on December 3, 1917*
Balfour presented the text of a declaration which he believed would have a
good effect in Poland without adding to Allied war aimst 'The creation of
a Poland, independent and indivisible, constitutes one of the conditions
of a solid and just peace, and of the regime of right in Europe* The
proper development of an independent State requires unrestricted access
to the sea'* The statement was absolutely worthless as Balfour himself
admitted when he added* 'The propositions contained in it were undeniable,
and would not be embarrassing to us in the future'* He also explained,
although it was hardly necessary, that access to the sea did not necessarily
imply possession of part of the Baltic coast because it could be achieved
by making the Vistula an international waterway. After some modifications
because of objections from Sonnino, the following text was accepted by the
conference* 'The creation of a Poland, independent and indivisible, under
such conditions as will ensure her free political and economic development,
constitutes one of the conditions of a solid and just peaoe, and of the
177regime of right in Europe.'
Allied agreement on this proposal left the problem unsolved because 
the text was unacceptable to the Polish national Committee. The committee
Supreme war c o u n c i l ,  2 Dec. 1917, Cab. 2 8 -3 *
*  C on ference  o f  fo r e ig n  m in is te r s ,  3 D ec. 1917> Cab. 2 3 -3 *
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claimed that its publication would only have an adverse effect in Poland,
and ao after consultation the declaration was not p u b l i s h e d . T h e  Poles
wanted a clear, unmistakable commitment and were not Btupid enough to be
deceived by a statement which entailed no obligation whatever* Despite
oontinued warnings that come statement on Poland was necessary, the question
179was momentarily set aside. On December 7, 1917, Hardinge wrote to Howardi 
'Our principle object has been to encourage as much as possible those 
elements which we know to be in favour of the defeat of the Central Powers, 
but we have never been able to see our way sufficiently clear to adopt 
publicly a definite line*.
Before 1917, because the emigres were not powerful enough to make 
demands on the government and because the alternatives to national self- 
detemanation were as yet only hypothetical, the government had encountered 
little difficulty in using the nationalities while maintaining its freedom 
of action. But the use of the nationalities implied, at least to the 
emigres, support for national self-determination. If the emigres decided 
to make their support contingent upon the government's acceptance of a 
commitment, the latter would have no choice but to forgo that co-operation 
or risk destroying the possibility of a separate peace with Auetriar-Hungary. 
This problem did not arise with the Yugoslavs and Czechoslovaks because 
they made no demands on the government and maintained that their support 
was not conditional but absolute* By the end of 1917 the Polish emigres
178 Clerk minute, 12 Dec. 1917, F.O. 371-3002-234811. Clerk minute,
12 Dec. 1917, P«0. 371-3002-236697*
17"' Rumbold to F.O., 6 Dec. 1917, F.O. 371-3002-34811. Rumbold to F.O.,
3 Dec. 1917, F.O. 371-3002-230348. Howard to Hardinge, 27 Dec. 1917, 
Hardinge Mss. 35*
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were in a position* because of the existence of two Polish armies, to make 
demands which the government could not ignore* The Polish leaders did not 
make direct demands upon the government, or threaten to withdraw their 
support, but they constantly warned the government, probably quite correctly, 
that if it did not accept a commitment it would definitely lose the support 
of the bulk of the Poles. However much the government might prefer to 
seek a separate peace with Austria-Hungary while simultaneously using the 
Poles, the course of events and the pressure from the Polish emigres for* 
a commitment forced it to make a choice between a negotiated peace or the 
use of the nationalities in total war*
The government chose a separate peace, accepting the risk of losing 
Polish support. The teiras upon which it would have made peace, given the 
opportunity, can only be a matter of speculation. But there can be no 
doubt that in December 1917 it considered terms that were absolutely 
unacceptable to the Polish national Committee. On December 10, 1917> in 
his memorandum on possible terms of peace, Drummond recommended negotiating 
on the basis of a reconstituted Habsburg monarchy which would include a 
re-united Poland. He maintained that this solution would be in the best
interests of eastern Europe and consistent with the interests of the
1 ftl
British government. On December 13, 1917, in setting out for the cabinet 
the basis upon which he thought his discussions with *iensdorff should 
proceed, Smuts accepted Drummond’s suggestion and, in reference to Poland, 
wrote* 'Cession of Oalicia to Russian Poland; Poland thus reconstructed
as Independent State to be linked in personal and commercial union to
182Austria-Hungary as third state of Empire'.
1 Si
Drummond memorandum, 10 Deo. 1917? F.O. 800-200.
Smuts, 'Peace Conversations', 13 Dec. 1917, F.O. 800-214*
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In the first months of 1918 the government’s primary aim in eastern 
Europe was a separate peace with Austria-Hungary. It continued to use the 
Poles, hut they were of secondary importance* Nevertheless French and
18 •j
American pressure for a meaningful declaration on Poland was increasing.
By forming the Polish army, the Allies had exposed themselves to the
inevitable claims that they were indebted to the Poles* This approach was
first used by Gregory on December 14, 1917*
It has moreover to be considered in this connection that the Allies 
have declared themselves favourable to the creation of a Polish army 
to fight on the Western front and the first steps have been taken to 
call such an army into existence. The Allies owe to this army a
formal act by which it may be assured that it is not going to fight
in vain and that in return for its services in the common cause an 
Allied effort at least will be made to secure the particular and 
which makes its recwuitment possible. 1^ 4
A commitment might be postponed, but it could not be postponed
indefinitely without the loss of Polish support* On January 5, 1->18,
Lloyd George, in speaking to the Trade Union Congress, tried once again
to satisfy the Poles without committing the government * 'We believe,
however, that an independent Poland, comprising all those genuinely Polish
elements who desire to form part of it, is an urgent necessity for the
185stability of Western Europe'. It was almost as if the government
believed that an unacceptable statement would become acceptable by being 
repeated. But the Po}es wanted a statement of intent, not belief. On 
January 10, 1918, the foreign office instructed Francis Lindley, the first 
secretary in Petrograd, to make a declaration to the Polish Council, the 
National Democratic organization in Russia, along the lines of the hitherto
183 Clerk minute, 12 Dec. 1917, F.O. 371-3002-236697*
184 Gregory minute, 14 Dec. 1917, F.O. 371-3002-236695*
185 »The Prime Minister's Speech’, 5 Jan. 1918, P.O. 800-199* War cabinet 
312, 3 Jan. 1918, Cab. 23-5*
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unpublished statement formulated by the Allies in December 1917* This 
declaration left the .British government still uncommitted on the future 
of Poland.
186 P.O. to Lindley, 10 Jan. 1918, F.O. 371-3277-3379*
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Chapter VII 
Commitme at by Implication. 1918
On November 13, 1917, Sobanski suggested to Balfour that the Allies
launch a political offensive against Austria-Hungary in order to drive her
out of the war* The methods used by the Germans to create chaos in Russia
might be used with equal success against the Habsburg monarchy.1 The
government did not seriously consider the proposal at this time because a
programme designed to promote internal disorder within the Habsburg monarchy
appeared to necessitate a commitment to the nationalities incompatible with
the pursuit of a separate peace* As Gregory pointed outs 'There are only
two apparent forms of "political offensive" possible, a separate peace with
the lesser Powers of the enemy coalition or the stirring up of nationalist
2
strife within the Dual Monarchy.' Should a separate peace prove to be 
unattainable, the use of the nationalities in a total war against Austria- 
Hungary was the obvious alternative. If Austria-Hungary could not be used 
against Germany, then the nationalities would be used against Austria- 
Hungary* If Austria-Hungary would not leave the war, she would be driven 
out*
The government did not realize at any decisive moment that a separate 
peace was impossible but only came to this conclusion gradually* In the 
same way it did not decide at any particular moment to use the nationalities 
in a total war against Austria-Hungary* Such significance cannot be
1 Sobanski to Balfour, 13 Nov* 1917, F.O. 371-3002-218943.
2
Gregory minute, 18 Nov. 1917, F.O. 371-3002-218943*
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attributed to an*/ one decision. The more extensive use of the nationalities 
during 1918 developed gradually, simultaneous with the realization that a 
separate peace was impossible, and as the direct outgrowth of the earlier 
co-operation between the government and the nationalities. While a decision 
to use the nationalities to destroy Austria-Hungary was never taken, a host 
of less significant decisions, when combined in their historical context, 
had the same effect.
The change in British policy was a shift in emphasis rather than the 
complete abandonment of one course of action and the acceptance of another. 
In 1917 the government had not completely co mmitted itself to tho policy 
of a separate peace and had maintained its relations with the nationalities. 
During 1918 it did not totally abandon the idea of a separate peace, but 
instead, it gradually shifted the emphasis in its general policy, which was 
to uBe the problems of eastern Europe to its own strategic advantage, away 
from a separate peace and towards the disruption of the Habsburg monarchy. 
The shift went so far by November 1918 that the government was in essence 
supporting national eelf-determination in eastern Kurope without ever 
having made a formal decision to do so.
As the government realized between December 1917 ancl April 1918 that 
a separate peace was impossible, it gradually began to consider negotiations 
not as an honest attempt to make peace with Austria-Hungary but as a means 
to weaken the Austrian war effort and embarrass the Central powers.^ In 
December 1917 this view prevailed in the foreign office, but by March 1918 
it prevailed throughout the government. According to the minutes of the 
war cabinet for March 1, 1918*
 ^Nicolson memorandum, 5 Dec. 1917> ^.0. 371-3086-230895*
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Mr. Balfour said he was certain that Austria would not accede to 
a peace such as we wanted. The Prime Minister agreed, but pointed 
out that, by continuing conversations a very important secondary 
object might be achieved, namely Austria might be deterred from * 
making an attack and gradually reduced to a etate of inactivity...•
This attitude towards negotiations was the first discernible step in
the shifting of emphasis in British policy; the second can be seen in the
changes in Allied propaganda. Before 1918 British propaganda had been
directed entirely at Allied and neutral opinion, and no attempts had been
made to influence public opinion in enemy countries. Offensive propaganda
was impractical at the beginning of the war because it could only be
effective when the enemy was almost exhausted. In December 1917 Christopher
Addison, the minister of reconstruction, urged Lloyd George to adopt this
5
type of warfare. The suggestion was not original - Tyrrell was thinking 
along similar lines - and sufficient records would probably show that, as 
a result of the apparent effects of German pacifist propaganda in Russia, 
the idea had a certain common currency.** In February 1918 the government 
established the department of Propaganda in Eneny Countries with its head­
quarters at Crewe Iiouse and under the directorship of Lord Northcliffe, the
7
newspaper publisher.
It was almost inevitable that this department would attempt to 
influence foreign policy and that it would disagree with the foreign office. 
Northcliffe was responsible only to the prime minister, and while his 
department was expected to co-operate with other branches of the government
^ ft'ar cabinet, 1 Mar. 1918, Cab. 23-16.
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it was subservient to none of them. Combined with this freedom of action,
not unusual for a propaganda agency, Crewe House had its own opinion,
different from that of the foreign office, on what British war aims in
eaEtem Europe should be. Northcliffe appointed Wickham Steed and Seton-
Watson as the co-directore of propaganda against Austria^-Hungary, and their
9
views on war aims became those of Crewe House.' Since, by the very nature 
of the situation, effective propaganda against Austria-Hungary had to be 
ba»ed on national self-determination, it was quite reasonable that the two 
foremost exponents of that doctrine should be appointed to conduct suoh 
propaganda. Had Crewe House been as willing as Wellington House to accept 
dictation from the foreign office on matters of foreign policy, there would
have been fewer problems. But Northcliffe, Wickham Steed and Seton-Watson,
*
a dangerous combination of me*lomania, self-righteousness and crusading 
spirit, were reluctant to accept dictation from the foreign office, and, 
because of their independence, not obliged to do so. According to Peter 
Chalmers Mitchell, the liaison officer between Crewe House and the war 
office, Northcliffe was responsible for a major innovation in Allisd propa­
ganda in that: 'The inspiring principle of the new operation was that 
propaganda should depend upon policy.’*° This claim is not strictly 
accurate because Wellington House had always sought to tailor its propaganda 
to the government's policy and had only failed to do so, as in the oase of 
national self-determination, when that policy was not clearly defined. 
Northcliffe*s innovation was not that he made propaganda consistent with
Pile on activities of Crewe House, Seton-Watson ass. IV.
^ Steed to Northcliffe, ^ Liar. 1918, Steed des. H.W. Steed, Through Thirty 
Years, London 1924, vol.II, pp.165-220. Stuart, Crewe House, p.ll.
^Mitchell, 'Propaganda', Inf. 4-4a, p*12.
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policy but that he tried to alter foreign policy to make it consistent 
•with propaganda formulated by Seton-.atson and Wickham iteed.
On February 24, 1918, Northcliffe informed Balfour, in a letter drafted 
by Wickham -teed, that Austria-Hungary was the best target for propaganda 
and enquired as to the nature of Allied policy towards her.** He suggested 
that his department (and the government) had two alternatives! *(a) To work 
for a separate peace ... or (b) To try to break the power of Austria-Hungary, 
as the weakest link in the chain of enemy States, by supporting and encour­
aging all anti-German and pro-Ally peoples and tendencies•' Northcliffe 
himself was certain which policy should be followed: 'The (a) policy has 
been tried without success •••• It remains to try the b^) policy.' The 
ultimate aim would be 'not to form a number of -mall disjointed States, 
but to create a non-German Confederation of Central European and Danubian 
-tates.' In order to carry out this policy it would be necessary for the 
Allied governments to state clearly their determination to secure 'govern­
ment by the consent of the governed' for the subject nationalities, to 
avoid all statements which might give substance to the belief that they did 
not wish to dismember Austria-Hungary, and to work for a reconciliation 
between the Yugoslavs and the Italians. Through the Bohemian National 
Alliance, the Yu0oslav Committee and various Polish organisations, Crewe
House already had at its disposal the facilities to disseminate propaganda
12in Austria-Hungary. All that was necessary was official approval.
This letter, which Brummond considered 'pure Steed', tried to force 
on the foreign office the dilemma of having to make a clear and irrevocable
** Steed, Thirty Yearst pp.191-205, Fifth Arm, pp.15-31.
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choice between Austria-Hungary and the subject nationalities.”*”3 The foreign
office hau always sought to avoid this decision because, as long as a
separate peace was possible, any choice would limit ihe government’s freedom
of action. In Cecil’s opinions 'The (b) policy as stated seems to involve
14an indefinite prolongation of the war.' But, as Drummond suggested to
Balfour, the two courses of action proposed by Northcliffe were not
necessarily, in the initial stages, mutually exclusive* For the moment
Crewe house could base its propaganda on national self-determination without
any decision from the government on the fate of Austria-Hungary. Following
this suggestion, Balfour replied to Northcliffej
As you point out with unanswerable force, everything which encourages 
the anti-German elements in the Habsburg dominions really helps to 
compel the hmperor and the Court to a separate peace, and also 
diminishes the efficiency of Austria-Hungary as a member of the 
Middle-~<urope combination. The Emperor, by these means, might be 
induced or compelled, fundamentally to modify the constitution of 
his own State* If he refused to lend himself to such a policy, the 
strengthening of the non-German elements might bring about the same 
and even more effectually than if he lent his assistance to the 
process. But in either case the earlier stages of that process are 
the same, and a propaganda which aids the struggle of the national­
ities now, subject either to Austrian Germans or to Magyar Hungarians 
towards freedom and self-determination must be right, whether the 
complete break-up of the Austrian Empire or its de-Germinieation 
under Habsburg rule be the final goal of our efforts. 15
Hot unnaturally Northcliffe was dissatisfied with this decision and he
repliedi
The two policies may not be mutually exclusive, in the last resort,
but it is very important that one or the other of them should be
given absolute precedence. It would place me in an awkward 
predicament if, after basing vigorous propaganda on the (b) policy,
I were confronted with some manifestation of the (a) policy on the 
part of the British or other Allied Government. 16
13 Drummond to Balfour, 25 Feb* 1918, F.O. 800-213*
14 Cecil minute, 25 Feb. 1918, F.O. 800-213*
15 Balfour to Northcliffe, 26 Feb* 1918, Cab. 24-43-GT 3762.
lo Horthcliffe to Balfour, 27 Feb. 1918, Cab. 24-43-GT 3762.
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On *»larch j 9 1918, the war cabinet settled the issue by authorising North—
oliffe's plan for a propaganda campaign on condition that*
a. No promise should be made to the subject races in Austria which 
we could not redeem* for example, we must not promise complete 
independence if the best we could get was autonomy* b. Lord North­
cliffe agreed to show the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs the 
leaflets he proposes to issue, in order to ensure that it might not 
be possible later on to charge the British Government with a breach 
of faith. IT
Crewe House began the campaign against Austria-Hungary by concentrating
its efforts on the Italian front where the Austriane were most accessible.
before the major enemy offensive expected within two months, Crewe House
hoped to weaken the enemy's military capacity through propaganda aimed at
iihe subject nationalities within the Austrian army, particularly the South 
18
blavb. But this propaganda could only be conducted successfully with the 
co-operation of the Yugoslav Committee and the Italian propaganda author­
ities. nefore the actual campaign could begin, therefore, Crewe House had 
to reooncile the two hostile groups so that they would be able to work 
to0ether. Steed had, in fact, been working on such a reconciliation for
some time, but now, with his appointment to Crewe House, these activities
19
became ciuasi-official. In March 1918, at the instigation of Crewe House, 
representatives of the Yugoslav Coaaaittee and the Italian department of 
propaganda met in uondon and worked out an agreement later entitled the 
pact of home. In the agreement, signed on i&aroh 7, 1918, the Italians 
accepted the unity and independence of Yugoslavia, the Yugoslavs accepted 
the completion of Italian unification, and both accepted the division of
20Habsburg Auriatic territories according to the principle of nationality.
17 \*ar cabinet 359, 5 Mar. 1918. Cab. 23->
16 Northcliffe to Balfour, 27 Feb. 1918, Cab. 24-43-GT 3762.
^  Steed Thirty Years, pp.168-185.
20
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The agreement was the first stop in a superficial reconciliation, but it
lacked official significance because the participants had no authority to
speak for anyone other than themselves. On March 9» 1918» whan Truobic
presented the agreement to the foreign office at an interview arranged by
Steed, Cecil stated that the British government was pleased that the
Italians and Jugoslavs had agreed but was careful to avoid any further
21
comment on the pact. Seton-Watson and Wickham Steed might be employed by
the government, but the foreign office did not consider that their action
reflected or affected foreign policy. Since the Italian government took
the same attitude towards its propaganda agents, any agreement between them
and the Yugoslavs, considered operative only in the field of propaganda,
22in no way affected either Italian war aims or the treaty of London.
The initial agreement between the Italians and the Yugoslavs was 
followed by the Congress of Oppressed Nationalities, - the Czechoslovaks, 
iugoslavs, foies, Rumanians and Italians - which took place in Rome in 
April 1918. Seton-Watson and Wickham - teed participated in the calling of
this congress, and both attended supposedly as representatives of Great
21Britain, but not of the British government. when questioned in the 
house of commons about tneir presence at the congress, Cecil replied!
'^ord Northcliffe, after consultation with the a oreign Office, delegated 
mr. Steed to proceed to Italy as his representative to study there certain 
aspects of questions relating to propaganda.'"’
Cecil to Balfour, 9 ^r. 1918, Cecil m b . 51093*
22
Zeman, Habsburg Monarchy, p.191•
^  Hanak, Great Britain, pp.260-261. May, Habsburg Monarchy, pp.596-604. 
Cecil to Rodd, 18 *lar. 1918, Cecil Me s. 51093* Steed to Cecil, 19 Mar. 
1918, F.O. 371-3135-75021. Steed to Northcliffe, 13 April 1918, F.O. 
371-3135-66616. Rodd to Balfour, 10 April 1918, F.O. 371-3135-66462.
24
Parliamentary .Debates, Common s. vol. 105, col. 188, 16 April 1918.
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The Congress of Oppressed Nationalities was an affair in which Crewe
House alone was involved? the foreign office was scarcely interested. It
was considered an aspect of Allied propaganda but not otherwise related to
foreign policy. On April 29, 1918, Balfour told the house of commons that
'the conference was not official, and there has been no question of the
25adoption of the resolutions by the Allied Government.' The Italian
government adopted a similar attitude by refusing either to appoint offioial
26representatives to the congress or to recognize its resolutions. The
congress did, however, achieve its immediate aim of a reconciliation between
the Yugoslav emigres and the Italian propaganda authorities sufficient to
enable them to co-operate in the anti-Habsburg propaganda campaign. But
the real differences remained unresolved.
While in Italy Steed assisted in the creation of the Inter-Allied
Propaganda Commission to co-ordinate the attack on Austria-Hungary and
27arranged for the production of propaganda leaflets. After consultation
with the Italian authorities and the British military representatives, it
was agreed that the best way to appeal to the subject nationalities in
the Habsburg army would be for the Czechoslovaks, Poles and Yugoslavs to
issue proclamations of independence which would be recognized and publicized
28
by the Allied governments. On April 4, 1918, the foreign offioe, acting 
on a request from Steed, agreed to recognize such declarations but added 
that it could not undertake to fulfill thera.2^ This decision signified a
2^ Parliamentary Debates, Commons, vol. 103 col. 1270, 29 April 1918.
26 "
Zeman, Habsburg Monarchy, p.192.
27 r 
May, Habsburg Monarchy, pp.604-9* Hanak, Great Britain, pp.276-8.
28 Steed, Thirty Years, p.203.
2^ Delme-Radcliffe to B.M.I., 2 April 1918, Northcliffe to Steed, 4 April 
1918, P.O. 371-3134-39242. Steed, Fifth Arm, p.29.
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elight modification of the restriction placed on Crewe House by the war 
cabinet that it was not to promise independence to the subject national­
ities, but it does not appear to have been taken very seriously by the 
government* It was certainly never invested with the importance that Steed 
attributes to it* The foreign office never referred to it again, and did 
not consider it either as a reflection of foreign policy or as an act 
involving a commitment* Crev/e House could embarrass the government by 
making promises that could not be fulfilled or by misrepresenting British 
policy, but it had no power to commit the government*
The campaign against Austria-Hungary began in April 1918 and consisted 
largely of the dissemination of leaflets, either smuggled across the lines 
or dropped from aircraft, throu^i the Austrian army* This propaganda was 
designed to appeal to the separatist tendencies within Austriar-Hungary so 
as to demoralize the army and encourage the desertion of soldiers belonging 
to the subject nationalities. In May 1918 Seton-Watson was sent to 
Switzerland to arrange for the smuggling of propaganda into Austria-Hungary 
through the Czechoslovak system of communication which offered extensive 
facilities for the dissemination of propaganda.^ In reporting to Lloyd 
George, Northcliffe stated*
Though no binding assurances have been given, or engagements 
entered into, a very precise impression has been conveyed, 
under my responsibility, that this country, at least, favours 
a policy of liberation of the Habsburg subject races with a 
view to their constitution, in the event of an Allied victory, 
into a non-Genaan polity, or Lanubian Confederation* ^2
 ^ Northcliffe memorandum, 14 May 1918, H*0. 139-37* Steed memorandum,
27 May 1918, Steed Mss. Committee for Propaganda in Enemy Counbies,
27 May 1918, F.O. 371-3474-99386.
-1 F.O. to Rumbold, 20 May 1918, F.O. 371-3135-90068. F.O. to Humbold,
27 May 1918, F.O. 371-3474-94400.
32 „
Northcliffe to Lloyd George, 28 April 1918, Lloyd George Ms. F41-8-8.
May, Habsburg Monarchy« p.6o8.
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It has always been believed that the campaign against the Austrian 
army substantially contributed to the failure of the Austrian . iave 
offensive in June 1918.33 The governments decieion to use the national­
ities and to appeal to their separatist tendencies through propaganda 
against Austria-Hungary illustrates the shifting of emphasis during the 
spring of 1918 away from the idea of a separate peace and towards the 
destruction of the Habsburg monarchy* Balfour*e reply to Northcliffe on 
February 26, 1918 on the subject of offensive propaganda clearly reflects 
the official attitude of the moment . ^  Determined to avoid an absolute 
auid possibly irrevocable decision on the future of Austriar-Hungary, the 
government would not completely abandon the prospect of a separate peace 
but was prepared to sanction greater use of the nationalities* This 
shifting of emphasis in official policy continued after February 1918 as 
the course of events seemed to confirm the impossibility of a separate 
peace* After the failure of the Kerr mission in March 1918 and after the 
French government published the Sixte letter in April 1918, only the most 
die-hard optimist could still advocate negotiations.3^ On May 21, 1918, 
the foreign office, with Lloyd George*s approval, informed Lord Derby, 
the new ambassador in Paris, thats
We feel that policy of trying to detach Austria from Germany must be 
abandoned as both inopportune and impracticable**** ¥»e think that 
best plan is to give all possible support to oppressed nationalities 
in Austria in their struggle against Genaan-Magyar domination*
Austria may thus be reduced to a reasonable frame of mind* 80
33 May, Habsburg monarchy* p*7l8.
^  See above, p. 276.
3^ Wiseman to Drummond. 3 June 1918, F.O* 800-223. May, Habsburg Monarchy, 
p.631* See above, pp. 193-194*
36 F.O. to Derby, 21 May 1918, F.O. 371-3135-89828.
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The A l l i e s  encountered some d i f f i c u l t i e s ,  however, i n  giving all
possible support to the nationalities, and, in return, using them against
the Central powers* On January 26, 1918, Dowbor-Musnicki*s Polish arwy in
Russia, which the Allies had agreed to support if it continued to fight
37against the Central powers, came into conflict with the Bolsheviks. 
According to the minutes of the war cabinet Lloyd George was not interested
in paying Poles to fight bolsheviks*
In regard to the polish movement, he gathered that the Polish armies 
in question were engaged not in fighting the Germans and Austrians, 
but in fighting the bolsheviks. This was no concern of ours, and thoy 
could only be regarded as our friends if they diverted their armies 
against the Germane or Austrians or, as was suggested, to the 
assistance of our Roumanian Allies. 38
On February 25, 1918, Dowbor-Musnicki signed an agreement with the
39Germans which ended his army’s involvement in the conflict. In the words
of General Sir henry Wilson, the chief of the imperial general staff, it
40was an act 'tantamount to joining the enemy.' For the National Democrats 
who had urged the government to support this army, Dowbor-Musnicki'e 
desertion was a setback because it gave their opponents an opportunity to 
cast doubt on their loyalty to the Entente. For the foreign office, which 
had always supported the National Democrats against their critics, it was, 
to say the least, an embarrassment. The foreign office had good reason to 
look upon this incident with chagrin because if it had understood Polish 
affairs, it might have predicted Dowbor-Musnicki's desertion. Bsfore 
37 M.I. 2e, 'Russian Polioy towards Poland in connection with the Polish
Army in Russia', 27 April 1918, F.O.371-3280-78150. Knox to D.M.I.,
6 Feb. 1918, F.O.371-3280-2^758. Drummond to Reading, 7 Feb. 1918,
F.O. oOG-222. P.2. v.andycz, Soviet-Polish Relations1917-1921.
Cambridge 1969* PP*M~57«
War cabinet 341, 8 Feb. 1918 Cab. 23-5-
39
Wardrop to F.O., 2 Mar. 1918, Namier memorandum 22 Feb.1918, Cab.24-41* 
^  War cabinet 358, 4 Har. 1918, Cab. 23-5*
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deciding to support this army the government had been warned by its military
attache in Petrograd that the xoles were not interested in fighting the
Germans but only in protecting their own property*4  ^ On December 27, 1917*
Howard had written to Hardingei
I am afraid the Poles, that is to say all the propertied classes, 
are rapidly drifting away from us. If the Russian revolution has 
brought the working-classes closer to Russia it has certainly had 
the effect of making the propertied classes look to Germany as their 
only hope for saving something out of the general wreck •••• I have 
been told that even ir. Dmoweki now shares this view, but this of 
course may be only a canard. 4^
Before the Russian revolution the conservative Poles had supported
Russia, and therefore the Entente, while the Polish left-wing, inspired
by a hatred of reactionary Russia, had gravitated towards the Central
powers. But the Russian revolution, by replacing Europe*s most reactionary
government with its most radical, turned Polish politics upside down,
reversing what had come to be accepted ae a static pattern. The natural
political affinities of the conservatives now lay with the Central powers
while those of the Poli&h left-wing with Russia. Ae successive Russian
governments became more radical, the various Polish political parties
gradually adjusted their positions according to the new situation. In
Russia, Lednicki replaced wielopoleki as the Polish leader most closely
associated with the Russian goverwaent .4 ' In Poland, Pilsudski withdrew
his support from the Council of State in July 1917 while the National
44democrats gradually began to co-operate with it. The British government
4* fee above, p.257.
Howard to Hardinge, 27 Dec. 1917> Hardinge Mbs. 35*
4  ^iee above, pp.249-50.
44 Rumbold to P.O., 19 April 1918, F.O. 371-3278-69989. Komamicki.,
Rebirth, p.117*
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was aware of the chants in Polish politics in Russia but does not appear
45to have understood the situation in ^oland. For that reason, the action 
of National democrats in Poland never caused it to doubt the loyalty of the 
Polish National 0 omit tea. Since the army had been formed by the National 
democrats, it had a definite conservative bias which made conflict with the 
Bolsheviks more likely than conflict with the Germans. Dowbor-Musnicki's 
apparent desertion to the Central powers was perfectly reasonable given the 
situation in which he, a former tsarist officer, operated* As Namier 
explainedi
They have formed that Aim under conditions and on lines which in 
the long run could lead to one result only. Nature takes its 
course, politics have their iron laws no less than physics. The 
Polish National democrats stand for social Conservatism and Polish 
Imperialism. Since the Russian Revolution Germany has been the 
stronghold of social Conservatism in Eastern Europe, and conquests 
at the expense of Russia can obviously never be made otherwise 
than with German help .... Considering the interests for which the 
Polish Army stood and was meant to stand by its organisers, the 
compromise which they have concluded with Germany must be described 
as the logic, and not as an irony, or history.
The foreign office had no immediate reason to distrust the Polish 
National Committee because the Russian revolution did not cause the j. oles 
in Britain to reverse their positions. Before 1917 the Polish left-wing 
in Britain under Zaleski had not striotly adhered to the policy adopted by 
its counterpart in Poland which co-operated with the Central powers. Zaleski 
had to adopt a position more favourable to the Entente or risk internment. 
After the revolution the National Democrats in western Europe maintained 
their coomitment to the Entente regardless of the actions of their 
supporters elsewhere. Dmowski and his associates on the Polish National 
45 See above, pp.249-50.
Namier memorandum, 21 Mar. 1916, Cab. 24-46—GT 4016.
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Committee were too involved, in the war against Germany to change their
position. Nevertheless, the British government, without fully comprehending
recent developments in Poland, gave official recognition to a Polish
committee dominated by conservatives at almost the precise moment that
political developments were occurring elsewhere which might weaken their
support for the Entente or cause them to change their political allegiance.
Dmowski and Horodyeki made a mistake by maintaining overt contact with
their associates in Russia who were unable, because of local conditions,
to follow the policy of the Polish National Committee. Since Horodyski had
convinced the British government to subsidize Dowbor-Musnicki• s army, its
actions could not but reflect unfavourably upon him and the Polish National 
47Committee. Dowbor-Musnicki• s timing was unfortunate for ho acted just
when the foreign office was having eecond thoughts about its recognition 
of the committee. In the latter part of 1917 the foreign office had been 
criticized for its close association with the National Democrats by a 
number of groups who preferred Zaleeki and the Polish Information Committee. 
On September 6, 1917* Ceton-Watson had, in the Dew Europe, warned the 
government of the dangers of accepting Dmowski* o Polish policy with its 
extensive territorial aims. In July and November 1917 similar warnings 
had come from the Jewish community which could not approve of the govern­
ment's close relations with a political movement openly and rabidly anti-
•emitic, and on December 7* 1917* the Manchester Guardian criticized the
49government's official recognition of the Polish National Committee.
4 ^ War cabinet 429? 11 June 1918* Cab. 23-14*
4 Dew Europe, vol. IV, no. 47* 6 Sept. 1917*
49 Wolf memorandum, 9 July 1917, P.O. 371-3001-147721. Wolf to Cecil,
26 Nov. 1917, P.O. 371-3019-226666. H. Frenkel, Polandi The Struggle 
for Power, London 1946, pp.82-83*
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This oppoeition had no effect on the government * e decision to recognise
the committee or on those officials, like Gregory, who were such partisans
of Dmowski that they considered his opponents the enemies of the Entente•
But it seems to have affected Cecil who had never been enamoured with
51Dmowski and who found anti-Semitism extremely distasteful • He could not 
accept the accusation that Dmowski* s opponents were necessarily pro-German
and on December 279 1917, wrote*
The whole question seems to me to be whether Lednicki or Dmowski
represents the majority of the Poles. My own impression is that
Lednicki does and if so I see no sense in our pitting ourselves 
in opposition to him - though I have no wish to quarrel with
Dmowski either - unless his plans will really help our enemies* ^
It appears th-t Cecil was not alone in suspecting the National Democrats 
and that such suspicions prevented the foreign office from completely 
committing itself to the Polish National Committee* It had only reco^ized
the committee as an official Polish organization and had carefully reserved
53the right to recognize other Polish organizations. A number of incidents
show that the foreign office had no desire to eliminate completely its
contact with Dmowski’s opponents. On December 24, 1917» the foreign
54office rejected a request from the war office to deport Laleski. On 
Deceiaber 26, 1917, in reference to the problem of aid for Polish refugees 
in Russia, Balfour decided that it should be given to all refugees regardless
50 Gregory minutes, 29 Nov. 1917, 10 Dec. 1917, F«0. 371-3019-226666.
^  Cecil minute, 29 Nov. 1917, F.O. 371-3019-226666. Cecil minute, 12 Dec.
1917, F.O. 371-3019-226994.
Cecil minute, 27 Dec. 1917, F.O. 371-3019-241740. Cecil minute, 5 Jan.
1918, F.O. 371-3277-3361.
^  Lee above, p.255*
54 F.O. to W.O., 24 Dec. 1917, F.O. 371-3019-226994*
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of their political affiliationsj
Such action might give an opportunity for the Council of Regency 
and Poles in ±oland itself to try to get into closer touch with 
Allies than they have hitherto done* It would also tend to counter­
act belief that we were backing one party only and not Poland as a 
whole. 55
Dowbor-Musnicki1 s desertion was a setback for the National Democrats
but, despite the doubts expressed about them in the foreign office, it did
not substantially weaken their influence on those government departments
with which they had always had close relations* The monthly payments to
the Polish National Committee were continued, and the foreign office
assured Reading thats 'Vie have every reason to maintain our confidence in
the Committee and give it our support. Its policy is entirely favourable
to the Allied Cause and is constantly directed towards keeping the Poles
56from a compromise with the Central Powers*'-^  HorodyBki’s relations with
the foreign office remained unimpaired as is indicated by the fact that
when the ministry of information was seeking a Polish agent, in March 1917»
57Drummond recommended him and praised his work for the Entente* When the 
leaders of various Polish organisations associated with Zaleski formed the
Council of the Polish Community in Great Britain and protested against the
privileged position of the Polish National Committee, the foreign office
supported the home office in opposing any ohangeB in the consular privileges
58
of the Polish National Committee or the recognition of any other committee*
^  Balfour to Spring Rice, 26 Dec. 1917* F.O. 115-2303.
56 P.O. to Reading, 23 April 1918, F.O. 371-3277-70004.
57
Beaverbrook to Hall, 4 Mar. 1918, Drummond to Beaverbrook, 7 Mar. 1918, 
Drummond to Maodonogh, 22 April 1918, Macdonogh to Drummond, 8 May 1918, 
F.O. 8OO-385. 
58 F.O. to H.O., 13 May 1918, F.O. 371-3280-81294. Majdewicz to H.O., 
H.Q., 18 Mar. 1918, H.O. 45-10889-352661.
288
The home offioe, which had long been under the influence of the National
Democrats, was convinced that Dmowski'e opponents were both corrupt and
59pro-Geiwian. Military intelligence also continued to support the National
Democrats and in May 1918, with the approval of the foreign office, banned
the export of Zaleski's periodical The Polish Review.**0 When the foreign
office received reliable reports about the fate of Dowbor-Musnicki's army,
Gregory wrote, with greater charity than had ever been shown towards Zaleski*
It is evidently impossible to judge the action of these independent 
and isolated corp^ by our standards. They appear to be full of 
inconsistency and compromise. But the Poles are very subtle and 
have got their own ideas as to the line they intend to pursue - 
which will probably be neither pro- nor anti-German. At all events 
we ought to suspend judgement and revise our conclusion that Dowbor- 
Musnicki has gone irrevocably over to the enemy.
The cabinet which, unlike the foreign office, had never had olosn
contact with the Polish emigres was not as willing to exouse Dowbor-Musnicki’s
desertion. On the next occasion upon which Horodyski presented proposals
to the war cabinet, they were not well received. According to its minutes*
In the one matter in which Count Horodyski had been tried he had 
failed us. The Prime Minister referred to a Polish airay which 
Count Horodyski had induced us to support and which had eventually 
turned around and joined with thf enemy. That was the one real 
test we had of his bona fidec. ^
Although Horodyski*s relations with the foreign offioe remained 
unimpaired, he was discredited in the eyes of the cabinet. With such a 
scapegoat, however, the cabinet did nothing to alter the official relation­
ship with the Polish National Committee. There were, however some
^  Crowe to H.O., 9 May 1918? Waller minute. 29 Mar. 1918, H.O. 45-10889- 
352661.
60 D.M.I. to P.O., 11 May 1913, P.O. to D.M.I., 17 May 1918, P.O. 371-3281- 
84759-
61 Gregory minute, 11 April 1913, P.O. 371-3280-63936.
62
War cabinet 429» 11 June 1918, Cab. 23-14*
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developments at this time which might, over a long period, weaken the
position of the National Democrats.
In 1916 criticism of official policy surpassed anything experienced
by the government in the first years of the war. The Union of Democratic
Control was particularly active in attacking official policy on peace
negotiations, war aims and Anglo-Russian r e l a t i o n s N o e l  Buxton found
the government's association with the National Democrats an obvious target
when, on April 16, 1918, he asked Cecil in the house of commons* 'Can the
loble Lord explain how it came about that Hr. Dmouski's / e t c /  party, which
proved to be the most disloyal section of the Poles, was selected by the
Foreign Office as the most loyal section?' Cecil replied* 'I do not think
it would be fair to Ur* Dmouski /sic to identify him with the most disloyal
section.' ^ There is no evidence that such criticism had any positive
effect on foreign policy in the sense of causing actions or decisions in
relation to the National Democrats which would not have otherwise been
taken. This criticism certainly did not cause the government to withdraw
support from the Polish National Committee. But it is evident that the
foreign office now, for the first time during the war, became sensitive to
public opinion and to attacks on it in parliament. It now felt constrained
65to avoid actions which would obviously provoke further criticism. J It is
possible that in the absence of ^uch criticism the government would have
associated itself even more closely with the Polish National Committee.
6 ^
May, Habsburg Monarchy. pp.547-53- Also see M. Swartz, 'The Union of 
Democratic Control in British Politics curing World War I*, Yale Ph.D.,
1969.
^  Parliamentary Debates, Commons, vol. 105, col. 188, 16 April 1919*
65 Gregory minute, 17 May 1918, F.O. 371-3281-84759* Clerk minute,
26 July 1918, F.O. 371-3281-135129.
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In February 1913 the intelligence bureau of the department of infor­
mation v&b transferred to the foreign office and became, under Tyrrell, 
the political intelligence department.^ The significance of thie 
reorganization should not be overestimated ae the personnel, powers and 
functions of thie department remained largely unchanged. During the rest 
of the war it produced more verbiage than almost any other department of 
the foreign office without causing substantial changes in policy. But, ae 
part of the foreign office, it was at least in a better position to work 
for a reorientation of British policy. This reorganization helped Zaleski 
because the department, under Namier’s influence, opposed Dmowski and for 
the first time gave Zale&ki support within the forei^i office. Namier 
continued, as he had always done, to attack Dmowski*s territorial aims in 
eastern Europe which he contended included areas inhabited by Lithuanians, 
Byelorussians, and Ukrainians He argued that it was not in British 
interests to eupport Dmowski because Polish expansion at the expense of 
Russia would necessitate Polish dependence on Germany 1
Poland lies between Germany and Russia and never can be equal in 
strength to either, still less superior to both together. She 
can make conquests only in one direction. Any aggrandisement at 
the expense of Russia implies therefore dependence on German
protection. ° 'J
The foreign office disapproved of Polish expansion at the expense of 
Russia as much as Namier. As the Balkan negotiations had shown, it believed 
in the nationality principle - the drawing of frontiers according to
66 War cabinet 349, 19 F.b. 1918, Cab. 23-5-
^  Namier memorandum, 26 April 1918, F.O. 371-4359-PH*72. Namier memorandum, 
3 lAay 191B, P.O. 371-3278-74361. Namier memorandum, 25 April 191$>
Cab. 24-50-GT 4439*
^  Namier, ’Weekly Report on Poland*, 21 Mar. 19lB» Cab. 24-46-GT 4016.
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nationality - and had always thought of a reconstructed Poland in enthno-
graphic terms. It had never sanctioned Dmowski's territorial claims, and
Balfour himself was adamantly opposed to Polish acquisition of non-Polish
69
areas* But while fundamentally agreeing with Namier, the foreign office
did not accept his assessment of the National Democrats* As it appeared
to involve longterm British interests, Namier considered Dmowski'e
territorial claims the fundamental issue in ^nglo—Polish relations, hut
the foreign office, more concerned about immediate problems in the conduct
of the war, considered the territorial question of minor importance. None
of Namier's arguments could outweigh the fact that the Polish National
Committee was apparently following a more anti—Ceroan policy than its
opponents and, above all, that it was making a considerable contribution
to the war effort. Just as Dmowski was too committed to the Entente to
reverse his policy, the Entente was now too committed to the Polish
70National Committee to abandon it in favour of its opponents*
£«ven if the foreign office had considered the territorial question as
seriously as did Namier, it probably would not have accepted his conclusions.
In formulating its Polish policy the foreign office was always plagued by
its failure to find an adviser whose knowledge and objectivity inspired it
with confluence. Those, including Namier, who knew something about Poland
seemed biased, while those who were objective were ignorant of Polish
affairs* As Clerk explained!
There is unfortunately no prominent authority on whom one can 
rely for accurate information as to political sentiments in 
Poland* There is no one from whom we can derive information as 
to the cross currents of Polish politics and the underlying aims
^  See above, pp*259-61.
70
' F.O. to Rumbold, 2 July 1918, F.O. 371-3278-92307.
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of Polish political leaders, as for instance Dr. Eeton-Watson has 
enabled us to do in the car e of the Jugoslavss nor is there any 
Pole in a position in any way analogous to that of Professor Masaryk 
among the Czechs, who can speak with recognized and impartial 
authority. 71
In practice the foreign office and military intelligence often relied
upon Horodyski for advice on Polish politics and particularly for his
judgement of the bona fides of other Polish emigres. This practice gave
uorodyeki immense influence ana, in part, explains why the national
democrats were able to win the good opinion of the government while
72
blackening their opponents' reputations. On February 8, 1918, acting on 
Balfour’s instruotions, Drummond, sought an independent opinion by asking
73the director of naval intelligence to undertake a study of Polieh politics.
j4ilitary intelligence had already been so influenced by the Rational
Democrats that it was incapable of objectivity. But, since the results of
the investigation by naval intelligence were not complete until June 1918,
the foreign office had to work until then with advisers and information in
which it lacked complete confidence.^ It was therefore unlikely to
sacrifice the immediate advantages of Polish co-operation because of
Gamier's possibly faulty calculations of long-term British interests.
Bven if namier’s facts were accepted, the most ardent of Dmowski* s supporters
in the foreign offioe, like Drummond, were prepared to argue that hiB
fears were groundless because as long as a reconstituted Poland included
75Posen it would be esti'anged from Germany.
71 Cleric minute, 18 July 1917, F.O. 371-3012-133576.
72
See above, pp.134-36.
73 Drummond to Hall, 8 Feb. 1918, Hall to Drummond, 19 Feb. 1918, P.O. 
800-204.
7^ Cecil minute, Damier memorandum, 12 April 1918, F.O. 371-4359-?ED22.
7^ Drummond to Balfour, 4 May 1918, F.O. 371-3278-74361.
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The incorporation of the P.I.D. into the foreign office did not effect 
a reorientation of Britain’s Polish policy, but it did afford Namier greater 
protection from the attacks of the National Democrats* When Dmowski*s organ, 
the Tygodnik Pol ski, attacked Namier, the foreign office warned Dmowski that 
further attacks on officials of the foreign offioe would result in the dis­
continuation of financial support for the Polish National Committee.^ It 
also resulted in the establishment of contact between the foreign office 
and the bureau Polonais de Freese in Berne which was associated with the
77Council of Regency in opposition to Dmowski1 s America Polonaise Cent rale.
During the first half of 1918 the National Democrats were able to 
maintain their predominant position in Allied countries, although in the 
defection of Dowbor-ausnicki' s army they lost one of their greatest assets. 
They came under increasing public criticism and even attack from within 
the government itself, but they were reasonably secure as long as they 
were useful to the Allies in the conduct of the war.
The shifting of emphasis in British policy away from a separate peace 
is clearly evident in the government’s relations with the Yugoslavs and 
Czechoslovaks. In April 1918 British interest in the Yugoslavs centred on 
the problem of recruits for the Serbian army . The French and British 
governments had been attempting to pressure Sonnino into releasing Yugoslav 
prisoners of war for this army since December 1917 but without success.
76
Namier memorandum, 15 May 1918* Hardinge to Drummond, 16 May 1913,
F.O. 371-4i63-PlD137* Drummond to Dmowski, 17 May 1918, P*0. 800-329*
^  Sargent to Oliphant, 16 April 1913 Tyrrell to Sargent, 13 May 1913,
P.O. 371-3281-74529* Rumbold to Balfour, 17 May 1913, P.O. 371-3278-
92307. Rumbold to Balfour, 19 April 1913, P.O. 371-3278-74361.
^  See above, p.205»
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As an alternative the Entente began to recruit Yugoslavs in Canada, but
this was an inadequate and unfeasible solution to the problem of replace-
79
laents for the Serbian army. Allied tonnage was so limited that if
Yugoslav recruits were shipped fiom Canada, they would displace American
SOtroops destined for France. Since there were an estimated 13,000
potential Yugoslav volunteers in Italian prison camps, the Allied govern­
ments continued to press the Italian government for their release. The 
Italian decision to form Czechoslovak units gave some reason to hope that
Sonnino would adopt a more reasonable attitude on the question of Yugoslav 
8l
recruits. On April 5» 1918, at the height of the Ludendorff offensive,
the foreign office instructed Rodd*
Present situation of all the Allies is 00 critical that political 
considerations cannot be allowed to override military necessities, 
anu you should therefore, as soon as your French colleague receives 
similar instructions, urgently press the Italian Government to
reconsider their previous attitude. 82
The Italian government finally conceaed to Allied demands only after 
Pichon raised the issue of replacements for the ierbian army at a meeting 
of the supreme war council on July 4, 1910. It agreed to release 
Orthodox herbs for the Serbian army but refused to release Croats and 
Slovenes whomit now planned to form into a separate Yugoslav unit. The
Hardinge to Maurice, 22 April 1918, Maurice to Hardinge, 23 April 1918,
F.O. to treasury, 9 May 1918, F.O. 371-3144-7978?. Devonshire to Long, 
5 July 1918, F.O. 371-3144-13129.
>0 Ministry of shipping to a.Q., 8 May 1916, F*0. 371-3323-84358-
81 F.O. to Bodd, 8 Oct. 1918, F.O. 371-3149-168047• Rodd to Balfour,
10 Mar. 1918, F.O. 371-3149-49674- Cubitt to P.O., 2 April 1918,
Hied son minute, 3 April 1918, F.O. 371-3149^58584.
62 F.O. to Rodd, 5 April 1918, F.O. 371-3149-58584* Bertie to F.O.,
9 April 1916, F.O. 371-3149-63085.
83 F.O. to Rodd, 22 June 1918, F.O. 371-3135-110595* P.O. to Rodd, 7 July 
1918, F.O. 371-3149-116401. Supreme war council, 4 July 1918, Cab. 28-
14* F.O* to Bodd, 19 July 1918, F.O. 371-3228-124860.
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Yugoslavs were not averse to the proposal to form a separate army, as it 
would increase their bargaining power vis-a-vis the Serbian government, 
but the British government was dissatisfied because, since most of the
prisoners were Croats or Slovenes, it would leave the problem of replace-
84ments for the Serbian army unsolved. As Macdonogh pointed out, the 
intention was obvious * '••• Sonnino's suggestion would, if put into
practice, defeat the aim of Jugo-Slav unity by separating Serbs from
85Croats and Slovenes#f In August 1918 the Italians released four hundred 
Orthodox Serbs, but after that Sonnino would make no further concessions
and the war ended before the Italian government was able to form a Yugoslav
86ariqy. If such an army had been created, the Yugoslavs might have been 
able to wring political concessions from the Allied governments, but 
without it they were never very successful at converting their services to 
the Entente to their own political advantage. Their only influence stemmed 
from their importance in anti-Habsburg propaganda.
The government encountered fewer difficulties in the more extensive 
use of the Czechoslovaks but found that this entailed, at the insistence 
of the emigres, irrevocable steps towards national self-determination# The 
more the Allies used the Czechs, the more they became committed to the 
cause of Czechoslovakia# The Czechoslovaks were in a more powerful 
position than the Yugoslavs because they represented an army of an estimated 
100,000 men# In addition to the army in France, there were about 70*000
84 Nicolson minute, 22 July 1918, F.O. 371-3149-127287# F.O. to Rodd,
8 Oct. 1918, F.O. 371-3149-168047*
85 Maodonogh to F.O#, 18 July 1918, F#0. 371-3228-124860.
86
Graham minute, Oct. 1918, F.O. 371-3149-174605#
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troopE in Russia and about 12,000 in the artqy being formed in Italy. 
Difficulties arose between the Allies over the fate of the Czechoslovak 
army in Russia because the French government wanted it transferred to
France under French command while the British government preferred to
88leave it ir* Russia. The French plan was fraught with difficulties 
because of the shortage in Allied tonnage and was obviously motivated by 
political rather than military considerations because tonnage allotted to
tho Czech army would have to be diverted from the transport of American
89troops to France. Although Balfour thought the French plan absurd, the 
British government reluctantly agreed, on .lay 2, 1918, at a meeting of
the supreme war council at Abbeville, to transport the Czechoslovak army
90to France. Despite its acceptance of the French plan, the British
government was still extremely dissatisfied and sought to circumvent it
' / 91
by appealing to the emigres to leave their forces in Russia.
At the beginning of May 1918 the British government was already
involved in negotiations with the Czechs arising from the formation in
Italy and France of Czechoslovak armies under the political jurisdiction
92
of the Czechoslovak National Council. On April 24, 1918? Colonel Milan 
Stefanik, the Slovak member of the National Council, asked the British
^  Granville Barker memorandum, 30 April 1918? F.O. 371-3135-82126.
Stanhope, 'The Czecho-Slovak Movement', 22 April 1918, F*0. 371-3443- 
80235-GT 4414*
88 Spiers to W.O., 31 Mar* 1918, F.O. 371-3323-57780. F.O. to Lockhart,
20 April 1918, F.O. 371-3323-68874.
^  Macdonogh to F.O., 30 Mar. 1918, F.O. 371-3323-57780. Ministry of 
Bhipping to F.O., 8 May 1918, F.O. 371-3323-84358.
Supreme war council, 2 May 1918, F.O. 371-3323-79525*
^  Smuts-Milner memorandum, 'Intervention in Russia', 11 May 1918, Cab.23-6. 
Amery memorandum, 14 May 1918, Milner Mss. 118.
92
Spiers memorandum, 30 Mar. 1918, F.O. 371-3149-58590.
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government to recognize the Czechoslovak army under the political authority
of the National Council, to give it all possible moral and material assis-
A 93
tance and to appoint a military attache to its headquarters* Since the
Italian government had just signed a similar agreement, made necessary by
its use of Czech fbrces, an Anglo-Czech convention as suggested by Stefanik
would merely bring British policy in line with the position adopted by
94 ythe other Allies. Stefanik* s proposal was supported by the war office
and strongly endorsed by the chief of the British military miesion in
Italy, General Charles Delme-Radcliffe, who, under the influence of Wickham
Steed, had become a supporter of the nationalities.9-* On April 4* 1918,
Lelme-Radcliffe had suggested the creation of provisional government e for
each of the nationalities because they would facilitate both the use of
Czechoslovak troops and the campaign of offensive propaganda directed
against the Habsburg aimy.9^ The foreign office saw no objection to
Stefanik’ e proposals and did not seem to consider them particularly 
97significant. But the issue arose just when it was seeking some way to 
circumvent the Abbeville agreement on the fate of the artqy in Russia.
At a meeting arranged by Steed on May 10, 1918, Benes followed up 
Stefanik* s initiative by presenting Balfour with proposals that the British 
government should
93 Delme-Radcliffe to C.I.O.S., 24 April 1918, F.O. 371-3135-75654*
94 Rodd to F.O., 8 May 1918, F.O. 371-3135-82446.
95 Macdonogh to Hardinge, 26 April 1918, F.O. 371-3135-75654. Delme- 
Radcliffe to Macdonogh, 4 May 1918, F.O. 371-3135-81475* Steed report,
27 May 1918, Steed Mss.
9^ Delme-Radcliffe to C.I.G.S., 4 April 1918, Milner Mss. 118. Delme- 
Radcliffe memorandum, 4 May 1918, F.O. 371-3135-81475*
9^ Cecil, Hardinge and Balfour minutes, 26 April 1918, F.O.371-3135-75645*
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1) reserve to the National Council the same treatment as has 
been accorded to it by the French, Italian and the ancient Russian 
Governments, that is to say ... in so far as its action concerns 
British interests and territory; 2) ... take account of the 
existence of a national Czecho-Slovak Army, ••• and to give 
adhesion to its constitution both from the political and military 
point of viewt a) by recognising the Czecho-Slovak Rational 
Council as the supreme political organ not only of the Czecho-Slovak 
movement for independence, but also of the national Czecho-Slovak 
Aimy; b) ... by appointing an officer of liaison or a military 
attache ... 3) • •• give to the Rational Council oertaih political
rights concerning civil affairs of our compatriots, similar to those 
already accorded to the Polish national Committee. J#
Nothing was decided at thie meeting, but Banes records that Balfour
99expressed the desire to retain the Czechoslovak army in Russia. In 
giving the council consular privileges; these proposals were more compre-
y
hensive than Stefanik's, and, in the wording of the second point proposing
the recognition of the counoil 'as the supreme political organ not only of
the Czechoslovak movement’, they might be politically more significant.
Phis wording oould be interpreted as meaning more than the recognition of
the council ae the political authority of the aitay and the representative
of Czechoslovak interests in Allied countries.
On May 17, 191$, tbs war cabinet again discussed the question of the
Czechoslovak anqy and instructed Cecil to ascertain from Bene£ whether
100
the National Council would agree to its retention in Russia* On May 18, 
1918, Cecil explained to Benes the reasons far wanting to keep the army in 
Russia, and, according to Cecil, Benes stated that the army would obey the 
orders of the National Council. He added, however, that if the army was 
asked to remain in Russia*
^  Steed report, 27 May 1918} Steed Mss. Benes to Balfour, 11 May 1918,
F.O. 371-3135-85869.
99 yBenes, Memoirs, pp.373-4-
100tfar cabinet 413, 17 May 1918, Cab. 23-6.
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the Allied Government e should, take an opportunity of recognising 
in public the Gecho-Slovak JjA o J movement and their national 
Council. He did not ask that any promises should be made, but 
he did wish that they should be acknowledged as a nationality 
with just claims to independence* 101
The foreign office favoured Benes' proposals and wanted immediate
action because a solution to the problem of using the Czechoslovaks in
102
Eussia could not be postponed* There was little discussion of the 
details of these proposals because they did not seem to involve any 
commitment for the government* As Cecil notedi 'The Czechs do not 
desire any promise or guarantee which they recognize to be useless.'*03 
Namier alone commented extensively on the proposals, and he argued that 
since the other Allies had already maue similar agreements with the 
Czechoslovaks, these proposals, which mi^t otherwise have been significant, 
were not particularly important.*0^ On May 27, 1918* at a meeting of the 
war cabinet, Cecil proposed addressing a letter to the Czechoslovak 
National Council which 'while giving them the measure of recognition
v jc
desired, would not commit the Government to any increased War obligations.^ 
With the cabinet's assent Balfour wrote to Benes on June 3, 1918, that the 
government t
will be glad to give the same recognition to this movement as has 
been granted by the Governments of France and Italy* His Majesty's 
Government will thus be prepared to reoognise the Czecho-Slovak 
National Council as the supreme organ of the Czecho-Slovak movement 
in Allied countries, and they will also be prepared to recognise 
the Czecho-Slovak Army as an organised unit operating in the Allied 
cause and to attach thereto a British liaison officer as soon as 
the need may arise* His Majesty's Government will at the same time
*°* Cecil memorandiia, 18 day 1918, F*0 * 371-3443-89880.
Nicoleon, Oliphant and Clerk minutes, 20 May 1918, F#0.371-3135-89425*
103 Cecil minute, 22 May 1918, P.O. 371-3135-90542.
lGd
Namier memorandum, 18 day 1918, F*0 . 371-3135-89425*
105 la x  cabinet 418, 27 Aag 1913, P.O. 371-3135-89425* Cecil memorandum,
25 May 1918, Cab. 25-52-OT 4647*
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be prepared to acoord to the National Council political rights 
concerning the civil affaire of Czecho-Slovaks similar to those 
already accorded to the Polish National Committee. 106
It is interesting to note that in condensing and revising Benesfs 
original proposals Cecil eliminated the clause whioh might have been 
interpreted as recognition of the council as the supreme political organ 
of the Czechoslovak movement in all countries. Before 1918 the Czecho­
slovaks had had the least success among the emigres in gaining political 
recognition from the Allied governments. But by June 1918, because of 
the foxmation of Czechoslovak armies, they gained the success that eluded 
the Yugoslvas and almost equalled the success of the Polish National 
Committee. The foreign office explained its decision by sayings
we have been obliged to take this action in view not only of active 
co-operation being afforded to Czeoho-Slovaks on Italian and
Western Fronts, but also of the fact that there are some 50,000
Czecho-Slovaks in Buasia composed partly of prisoners and deserters, 
whom we have every hope of organizing into an effective force to 
combat the enemy either in the Eastern or Western theatre of war.l°7
It is doubtful whether the issue of the army in Russia was decisive
in prompting the government to recognize the Czechoslovaks. Since the
foreign office did not exhibit at any time during the negotiations the
slightest opposition to such recognition, the government probably would
have eventually followed the example of France and Italy regardless of
the situation in Russia. But this situation probably explains the timing
of this recognition. It was hardly a coincidence that Cecil raised the
issue in the cabinet and that it agreed to recognition on the day prior
to an Anglo-French conference in London at which the fate of the army in
106 Balfour to Benes, 3 June 1918, F.G. 371-3135-89425. H.O. 4>-1076l- 
269578. D.H.I. to F.O., 21 May 1918, F.O. 371-3218-90995*
107 F.O. to Reading, 5 June 1918, F.O. 371-313^*89425.
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Russia was to be discussed. At that conference the British representatives
tried to use Benes' assent to the maintenance of the army in Russia in
order to convince the French government to alter its decision to transfer
108the army to France. Although the French representatives adamantly 
refused to alter the Abbeville agreement, the fate of this Czechoslovak 
army was no longer at the disposal of the Allies* On May 25, 1918, it came 
into conflict with the Bolsheviks making its evacuation from Russia 
difficult if not impossible.*0^
By May 1918 the government was willing to give general recognition to 
the aspirations of the subject nationalities* The Polish National Committee, 
with the support of the <unerioan and r ranch governments, had been Beeking 
an Allied declaration on Poland since the autumn of 1917***° Pasic, 
obviously worried about the danger of a peace with Austria-Hungary at the 
expense of Serbia, had sought reassurances about Britain's intentions on
111 v*
the louth Slav question* On May 16, 1918, Benes had requested public
recognition of the CaechoSlovaks as a nationality with just claims to 
112independence* These requests had been vigorously but unsucces&fully 
supported by the British military representatives in Italy and by Crewe 
House whose campaign to disrupt the Kabsburg monarchy necessitated a 
forthright statement by the British government in support of national
108 Cecil to Clemenceau, 18 May 1918, F.O. 371-3443-89881. Anglo-French 
conference, 28 May 1918, F.O. 371-3334-115335*
109 Lockhart to F.O., 23 May 1918, F.O.371-3323-95495* Bradley,
Intervention* p*91*
**° See above, pp. 262-67.
ill ' a
Des Graz to F.O*, 7 Mar* 1918, F*0* to Bes Graz, 11 Mar* 1918,
P.O. 371-3154-44197* Balfour to Page, 20 Mar. 1918, F.O.371-3154-48660. 
Troubridge to Milner, 30 Mar. 1918, W.O. 32-5130* Graham memorandum,
2 April 1918, F.O.37I-344O-60266.
**^ See above, p. 299*
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self-determination.**'^ British resistance to such declarations, based
primarily on the desire for a separate peace, would have been important
had it prevented the other Allies from recognizing the aspirations of the
subject nationalities. But, on January 9> 1918* Wilson announced, as one
of his fourteen points, that:
An independent Polish State should be erected which should include 
the territories inhabited by indisputably Polish populations, 
which should be assured a free and secure access to the sea, and 
whose politioal and economic independence and territorial integrity 
should be guaranteed by  international covenant. 114
As hope for a separate peace faded, the foreign office began to
consider a similar declaration, and on March 8, 1918, it instructed its
representative in Pumania to inform rolish emigres, in reference to the
Brest-Litovak negotiations, ’of the determination of His Majesty's
Government to support all Polish attempts to obtain union and independence 
115f o r  Poland.' Despite the governm ent's willingness to consider stronger 
declarations on the subject nationalities, however, it was still unprepared 
to undertake commitments. When Piohon, at an Anglo-French conference on 
haron 28, 1918, proposed the recognition of Polish and Bohemian independence, 
Lloyd George still insisted that the Allies avoid pledges that might be 
unredeemable: 'We would try to free them, but we could not say that the
independence of Bohemia and Poland was one of our war aims.'****
The issue was not considered again by the Allies until the supreme 
war council met in June 1918, and, by this time, if any opposition to such 
111
J Steed to Lloyd George, 30 May 1918, Lloyd George Ms. F41-8-15.
114 Dickinson, Documents, p.llo.
**^ Drummond to Balfour, 7 Aar. 1918, F.O. 371-3277-43908. Drummond to 
Tygodnik Polski. 7 Mar. 1918, F.O. 800-210. F.O. to Barclay, 8 Mar.
1918, F.O. 371-3277-41169.
**^ Anglo-French conference, 28 Mar. 1918, Gab. 28-3.
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declarations existed within the British government, it remained passive.
On May 21, 1918, the foreign office had informed Derby thati * policy of 
trying to detach Austria from Germany must be abandoned as both inoppor­
tune and impracticable...• we think, that best plan is to give all possible
117support to oppressed nationalities The American government even
increased the pressure on the Allies to make a declaration by announcing,
on May 30, 1918, its earnest sympathy for the freedom of the Czechoslovaks
118
and Yugoslavs. On June 3, 1918, the supreme war council declared that*
1) The creation of a united and independent Polish State with 
free access to the sea constitutes one of the conditions of a 
solid and just peace, and of the rule of right in Europe.
2) The Allied Governments have noted with pleasure the declara­
nt ion made by the Secretary of State of the United States 
Government ana deeire to associate themselves in an expression 
of earnest sympathy for the nationalistic aspirations towards 
freedom of the Czecho-Slovak and Yugo-Slav peoples. 119
Among the emigres, only the Poles found the declaration satisfactory.
Although weaker than Wilson*s thirteenth point, it did contain the phrase
'free access to the sea', considered of the greatest importance by Polish
/  /
emigres. But, contrary to Polish expectations, the declaration was
120
carefully worded, as in the past, to avoid any specific pledge. The 
real significance of the declaration, however, was that it was interpreted 
by the British government as a limited commitment to the Polish cause. On 
July 2, 1918, Balfour wrote to Rumbold* 'This declaration should place 
beyond doubt once and for all the decision of the Allied Governments to 
see Poland's national aspirations fully satisfied, so far as lies within
117 Reading to F.O., 30 May 1918, F.O. 371-3135-96610.
118 F.O. to Derby, 21 May 1918 F.O. 371-3135-89828.
Supreme war council, 3 June 1918, F.O. 371-3135-101920.
Balfour memorandum, 11 Mar. 1918, F.O. 371-3277-46350* Sobanski to 
Gregory, 15 Mar. 1918, F.O. 371-3278-49693-
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121their power, . *•' In the past, when issuing similar declarations on
the Polish issue, the government had always interpreted them so as to
minimize their significance* The Versailles declaration was the governr-
ment's most important statement during the war on the future of Poland
precisely because it interpreted the declaration as a commitment to work
for Polish independence so far as it lay in its power* It was also the
government' s last significant act on the Polish issue prior to the armistice*
After this declaration the P.I.D. - Tyrrell, Namier and Headlam -
intensified its efforts to reorient Britain's Polish polioy by attacking
the National democrats and by attempting to rehabilitate Zaleski and the
122Polish Information Committee* The P*I*D. argued that the charges of
being corrupt and pro-German, levelled against Zaleski and his colleagues
123by the National Democrats, were totally unfounded* Although these
charges had been accepted by the foreign office and military intelligence,
the P.I.D* was supported by naval intelligence whioh in June 1918 completed
124
the report on Polish politics requested by Balfour in February 1918*
The report maintained that these charges were merely unscrupulous libels 
perpetrated by the National Democrats and concluded, after examining this 
type of conduct in Polish politics, that 'it is difficult sometimes for 
the casual observer to avoid the uneasy suspicion that the whole of Polish 
politics is incredibly crude and raw, and has a general character of 
brutality and stupidity which make all parallels and analogies hopelessly
x 1 Balfour to Rumbold, 2 July 1918, F.O. 371-3278-92307
129 „
Tyrrell to liardinge, 22 July 1918, F.O. 371-3281-135128.
Headlam memorandum, 25 June 1918, F.O* 371-3281-135128. Headlam to
Tyrrell, 22 July 1918, F.O. 371-3281-135129*
124 v
See above, pp. 292-93.
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misleading** The report also pointed out, contrary to the belief of the
foreign office, that the National Democrats in Poland were co-operating
with the enemy and that the Socialists were the only group in Polish
125politics unalterably opposed to the Central powers.
On May 31, 1918, Zaleski informed the foreign office that he had been
appointed the representative in London of the Polish provisional government
in Warsaw and requested the initiation of informal discussions between the 
126two governments. Although the foreign office opposed this request,
Tyrrell was able, by arguing that it was necessary to expand the sources
of information on Polieh politics, to convince Balfour, Hardinge and Clerk
to allow at least informal contact with Zaleski.**^ On July 26, 1918, tfa®
foreign office even agreed, at Tyrrell’s instigation, to allow Zaleski to
travel to Switzerland where it was expected he would have greater access
128
to information on developments in Poland* It was agreed, however, that
he would travel only as a private citizen and not as a reoo^iized repre-
129sentative of the Polish provisional government. This decision marked 
a change in the official attitude towards the various Polish factions, and 
it was significant that Clerk, who had previously accepted the views of 
Drummond and Gregory, was now sufficiently satisfied that Zaleski was a
125
Dickson, ’Present Condition of Political Parties in the Kingdom of 
Poland’, 25 June 1918, F.O. 371-3279-169676.
126
Zaleski to Balfour, 31 May 1918, F.O. 371-3278-98133. Rumbold to 
Balfour, 12 June 1918, F.O. 371-3278-108501.
Gregory and Hardinge minutes, 12 June 1918, F.O. 371-3278-108501.
Clerk and Hardinge minutes, 7 June 1918, F.O. 371-3278-98133*
Tyrrell to Hardinge, 22 July 1918, F.O. 371-3281-135128.
Tyrrell to Hardinge, 25 July 1918* Balfour minute, 26 July 1918,
F.O. 371-3281-135129.
129 Clerk minutes, 23 July 1918, 26 July 1918, F.O. 371-3281-135129.
306
supporter of the Entente that he was willing to sanction offioial contact
with hi a. In Septe iber 1918 the foreign office also lifted the embargo on
the export of Zaleski's Polish Review which had been previously banned for
110attacks on the Polish National Committee.
As the war approached its end, the influence of the P.I.D. increased, 
and these measures, carried out at its instigation, were symptomatic of the 
decline of the Polish National Committee* Since that committee had achieved 
its predominant position in Anglo-Polish relations for strategic not 
political reasons, these measures indicated that its influence might not 
outlast the end of the conflict* The trend of events in Poland also worked 
against the committee because, as the foreign office gradually realized, 
there was a danger that when German authority in Poland collapsed, the 
vacuum would be filled not by the Polish National Committee but by those 
opponents of the National Democrats with whom the government had no contact 
except through Zaleski. Despite the views of the P*I*D* which were shared, 
to some extent, by Cecil and Clerk and despite the danger that it might be 
supporting the wrong faction, the foreign office would not abandon the 
Polish National Committee.^3* As long as hostilities continued and as 
long as the Polish army fought in France, the original reasons for recog­
nizing the committee remained valid* The foreign office could not replace 
the faction responsible for the creation of the army, which by November
1918 contained 100,000 men, with another faction known to be conducting
112relations with the Central powers. In the uncertainties of Polish
130 D.M.I. to F.O., 20 Aug. 1918, F.O. 371-3281-145937* D*M.I. to F.O.,
18 Sept. 1918, F.O. 371-3281-159019*
131 Balfour to : obanski, 12 Oct. 1918, F.O. 371-3280-167666.
132 Kumbold to F.O., 23 Aug. 1918, F.O. 371-3278-146017. Clerk minutes,
26 Aug. 1918, 4 Sept. 1918, F.O. 371-3278-148264. S.R. Pliska, 'The 
Polieh- merican Army, 1917-1921', Polish Review, vol.X, No.3, P*56«
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politics it seemed of questionable value to abandon one faction for another.
On September 4, 1918, Clerk wrote i ’I am quite clear that we rauet not be 
drawn into any negotiations direct or indirect with the so-called Polish 
uovernme.'.t. If we were we should risk the sympathies of all other Polish 
opinion. **33
To avoid bein^ caught at the end of the war backing the wrong horse,
the foreign office sought to expand the Polish National Committee to make
134it more representative of Polish opinion. Although a committee repre­
senting all Polish parties seemed to be an ideal solution, the nature of 
Polish politics, as the foreign office quickly learned, raaue it impossible. 
On August 13) 1918, Drummond wrote* *1 naturally agree that a Polish 
Committee representative of all Polish parties would be most advantageous. 
Unfortunately I fear that it iB not practicable to constitute such a
committee under present conditions, we mu&t I think therefore make the
135befct of what material we have.* Despite reservations, the foreign
office did not abandon the 1 olish National committee but continued, as
136
long as the war lasted, its attempts to make it more representative.
For that reason, even though Gregory admitted that the committee 'will
soon have outrun its utility,' the i olish national Committee was able to
137maintain its predominant position until the armistice. It still received
133 Clerk minute, 4 Sept. 1^18, F.O. 371-3278-148264-
Cecil minutes, 6 Aug. 1918, 18 Aug. 1918, Drummond minute, 18 Aug. 1918, 
F.O. 371-3280-148973.
^3** Drummond minute, 15 Aug. 1918, F.O. 371-3280-148973• Namier memorandum,
9 Sept. 1918, F.O. 371-3278-150054. Eumbold to Balfour, 3 Oct. 1918, 
F.O. 371-3279-170725‘
 ^^  acton to P.O., 25 Oct. 1918, Drummond minute, 23 Oct. 1918, P.O. 371- 
3279-177312. Cecil memorandum, 26 Oct. 1918, Cecil M b s . 5IO94.
137 Gregory minute, 14 Oct. 1918, F.O. 371-3279-170725*
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its monthly payment from the British government for October 1918, and at
the armistice it was the only Polish organization recognized by the 
138government.
The British position on the Polish issue at the time of the armistice 
had been determined by the Versailles declaration of June 3, 1918. The 
government was not committed to the Polish national Committee which had 
only been recognized as an official Polish organization and not as a 
provisional government. Although the government considered itself committed, 
in a limited sense, to the independence of Poland, this commitment did not 
have the legal force of, for example, British obligations to Italy under 
the treaty of London. The government also had no specific territorial 
commitments to the future Polish state for even its endorsement of Polish
access to the ;.ea only committed it, by its own interpretation, to inter-
139nationalization of the Vistula. The government had not even decided
on what areas should be included in the Polish state, although it was
aetermineu that Poland should only comprise those areas inhabited by Poles.
At a meeting of the supreme war council on November 2, 1916, Balfour
replied with some annoyance to a suggestion by Pichon that Poland be given
the frontiers of 1772* 'that he had listened to this proposal with some
anxiety. The suggestion was that the roland of 1772 should be that of
140
1919* That was not what we had undertaken to bring about.'
The Poles had fared better in the Versailles declaration than the 
Czechoslovaks and Jugoslavs who, expecting more, were left extremely 
dissatisfied. Balfour later explained to Lorthcliffe that the British and
13^ Treasury to P.O., 19 Oct. 1918, T12-41.
<>ar cabinet 437, 13 Aug. 1918, Cab. 23-7*
140
Supreme war council, 2 *Sov. 1918, Milner Mss. 124-2.
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French had wanted to issue a stronger declaration but had been opposed by
the Italian government. Sonnino did not object to a stronger declaration
on the Czechoslovak issue, but, since it was generally agreed that both
nationalities had to be included in the eamo declaration, the Czechoslovaks
suffered because of Italian opposition to the Yugoslavs.*4 " Balfour
justified the inadequacy of this declaration by saying that while the
French and British governments were willing to raake stronger declarations,
they were also unwilling to advertise a 'fundamental difference of opinion
between Italy on the one side and France and hngland on the other about
l/o
an important point of policy.' In order to overcome the limitations
imposed upon them at Versailles by the attitude of the Italian government,
however, the French and British governments had reserved for themselves the
right to make supplementary declarations on the Yugoslavs and Czechoslovaks.
No sooner had the declaration been published than the foreign office
began to receive indications of the amount of dissatisfaction it created
among the supporters of national self-determination. On behalf of Crewe
House dortkcliffe wrote to Balfour*
Ftay 1 therefore impress upon you very earnestly the expediency of 
making some public statement without delay .... in such terms as 
way reassure our Czecho-Slovak and Yu^o-Slav friends and encourage 
them to persevere in the valuable work they have been doing, and 
are disposed increasingly to do. 143
In response to Northcliffe*s appeal, Balfour asked Benes to publish 
the letter of recognition addressed to him on June 3« 1918, and, on June 11,
*4* Brumraond minute, 3 June 1918, F.O. 371-3135-101920* Belme-Radcliffe 
to D.M.I., 10 June 1918, F.O. 371-3474-105849- Reading to F.O.,
12 June 1918, F.O. 371-3135-105559- Hardinge to Rodd, 17 June 1918,
Hardinge Mss. 38.
142 Balfour to Northcliffe, 8 June 1918, F.O. 800-212.
143 Northcliffe to Balfour, 6 June 1918, F.O. 800-212.
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1918* Cecil stated in the house of commonss
It will be for the liberated Czechs-Slovak and Yugo-Flav peoples 
themselvee to determine their future status* Kis Majesty’s 
Government fully recognise the many proofs given by these races 
of intense national feeling, and cordially acknowledge the 
assistance which the national troops of the CBocho-Slovaks and 
Jugo-Slavs are rendering to the Allied cause. 144
Despite this statement, the Yugoslavs and their supporters remained
dissatisfied as is evidenced by the number of representations made by
them and on their behalf to the foreign office appealing for a stronger
145
declaration on the Yugoslav question. On June 21, 1918, during the 
Austrian Piave offensive, Delme-Kadcliffe informed Macdonogh*
It is essential that strong action by the Allied Governments to
bring all the oppressed nationalities of Austria more completely 
over to our side should be delayed no longer* The importance of 
such a result as affecting the military situation cannot be 
exaggerated. 146
The foreign office clearly recognized the value and necessity of a
further declaration but had to find a suitable opportunity and formula
which would not upset the Italian govern m e n t S o n n i n o  had justified
his opposition to Yugoslav aspirations by claiming that, since the majority
of South Slave wanted only autonoiny within the Habeburg monarchy, a
declaration in favour of a Yugoslav state would only alienate them and
146inspire them to greater efforts on behalf of the Central powers* The
Parliamentary Debates, Commons,, vol. 106, col. 2022, 11 June 1916#
F.O. 371-3135-107939*
14  ^Reading to F.O., 10 June 1918, F.O* 371-3135-103493* Balfour to Des 
Graz, 13 June 1918, F.O. 371-3135-107108. Jovanovic to Balfour,
12 June 1918 F.O.371-3135-106348. Coleville Barclay to Balfour,
4 June 1916, F.O.371-3135-111985* Yugoslav Workman’s Ass. to Balfour, 
27 June 1918, F.O.371-3135-115053* Hohler to Balfour, 12 June 1918, 
F.O. 371-3135-117000.
Delme-Radcliffe to Macdonogh, 21 June 1918, W.O. 106-824*
Hardinge minute, 12 June 1918, F.O. 371-3135-105559• Mcolson minute, 
14 June 1918, F.O. 371-3135-106348. Oliphant and Graham minutes,
29 June 1918, F.O. 37l-313>115053.
■^48 Balfour to Northcliffe, 8 June 1918, F.O. 800-212.
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foreign office doubted this interpretation of the Yugoslav situation, as it 
contradicted most of its previous information, but, before taking further 
action, it requested military intelligence to undertake a thorough re­
analysis of the whole situation. On June 17, 1918, Hardinge wrote to Roddi
Bye the bye Baron Tonnino has really been extremely tiresome over 
the Yugo-Slav question, fee are being bombarded by the Serbians 
and Yugo-Slav committees protesting against the weakness of our 
Declaration and comparing it with that made regarding the Poles.
I understand that Sonnino maintains that the Yugo-Slave do not 
want independence but merely autonomy, and that to declare for 
independence would be to throw the bulk of the Yugo-Slavs into 
the arms of Austria. Our information is totally opposed to this, 
said we are working it out. 149
The report, completed by military intelligence on June 28, 1918,
repudiated Sonnino1s interpretation and, as the foreign office expected,
supported the Yugoslav claims.1^0 The P.I.D. agreed with the report and
the foreign office accepted it as an accurate and unbiased analysis of
151the Italian-Yugoslav problem. The opportunity and even necessity of 
a further act of recognition of Yugoslav aspirations arose in July 1918
when Balfour was invited to address a meeting of the Serbian (Yugo-Slav)
152National War Aims Committee in Great Britain. ^ Drummond and Hardinge 
were somewhat nervous because of the danger that by his attendance Balfour
might be associated with extremist remarks, but, as 2,icolson pointed out,
the invitation could not be refused without seriously offending the already 
sensitive Yugoslavs! •Abstention in the circumstances would assuredly not
Hardinge to Rodd, 17 June 1918 Hardinge Hss. 38.
femperley (M.I. 2e) memorandum, 28 June 1918, F.O. 371*3135-116831 •
151 Tyrrell to Hardinge, 28 June 1918, F.O. 371-3135-116831. P.I.D. 
memorandum, 3 July 1918, Gab. 24-57-GT 5^28. Namier memorandum,
26 June 1918, F.O. 371-3135-111985 Drummond to Rodd, 9 July 1918, 
F.O. 800-385.
Oman to Drummond, 26 June 1918, F.O. 371-3157-114762. Jovanovic to 
Balfour, 6 July 1918, F.O. 371-3157-120332.
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be attributed to simple considerations of tact and caution, but would be
153taken as implying some mysterious reorientation of policy.* Following
Kicolson's advice, Balfour attended the meeting at iiansion House on July
23, 1913, and associated himself with its declared aim of 'independence
154and unity of all Serbs, Croats and Slovenes in a single State.'
Although no one oould have realised it at the time, this was the 
government's last act of recognition of Yugoslav aspirations during the 
war. Following the Inter-Allied Conferenoe on Propaganda in Enemy Countries 
in August 1913, Crewe House requested another Allied declaration recognizing 
'the establishment of a free and united Yugoslav State, embracing the 
Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, as one of the conditions of a just and lasting 
peace and of the rule of right in Europe.'^'* The foreign office readily
accepted this suggestion on condition that it could be negotiated with the
156other Allied governments. Although it anticipated Italian opposition 
to this proposal, on September 25, 1918, the Italian government, aware of 
the importance of Yugoslav propaganda in its forthcoming offensive against 
the Austrian army at Vittorio Veneto, issued a declaration in similar terms
157recognizing the justice of Yugoslav aspirations for an independent state.
1^3 Hicolson minute, 10 July, 1918, F.O. 371-3157-120332. Drummond and
Hardinge minutes, 26 June 1918, F.O. 371-3157-714762.
194 Balfour minute, 25 July 1918, F.O. 371-3135-130170. Steed, Thirty 
Years, p.230. The Times. 26 July 1918.
155 'Propaganda in Enemy Countries* Report of the 1 olicy Committee',
24 Aug. 1918, F.O. 371-3475-151047. Horthcliffe to Lloyd Oeorge,
7 Aug. 1918, Lloyd Oeorge Ms. F41-8-20.
Balfour memorandum, 13 Sept. 1918, Cab.24-63-OT 5677* War cabinet 482,
3 Oct. 1918, Cab.23-8. Balfour to <.iontagu, 31 Oct. 1918, F.O.800-207*
Erekine to F.O., 14 Sept. 1918, F.O. 371-3137-157243. Borghese to F.O.,
20 Sept. 1918, F.O. to ^orghese, 20 Sept. 1918 F.O. 371-3137-158233. 
Rodd to Balfour, 25 Sept. 1918, F.O. 371-3135-166419
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ISven in September 1918 offensive propaganda against Austria-Hungary was 
still an important aspect of Allied strategy because the Allies did not 
realize how close the Central powers were to a complete collapse. The 
Italian declaration gave the British government the opportunity to adopt a 
more forward policy on the Yugoslav question, but a new obstacle arose from 
the growing conflict between the Serbian government and the Yugoslav 
Committee*
In September 1918 the Yugoslav Committee began to request recognition
158
similar to that accorded to the Czechoslovak and Polish committees*
Unlike the others, however, the Yugoslavs oould not bargain from a position
of strength because there was no Yugoslav army • Yugoslav recruits had not
159been formed into a national army but had been placed in the Serbian army.
/ /
The emigres could request recognition, but they could not demand it* Close 
relatione had been established between the Serbian government and the 
Yugoslav Committee by the pact of Corfu in June 1917 which both parties had 
signed as equals, agreeing to work for a South Slav state under the 
Karageorgevic dynasty. These good relations were in the process of breaking 
down throughout 1918 as each party accused the other of violating the 
pact.^^ In essence the conflict developed because the Yugoslav Committee 
wanted an independent position so that it oould negotiate with the Serbian 
government on behalf of the Austrian South Slavs, while Paeic and hie 
government, tolerating no rivals, claimed sole leadership of the South
158 Cecil to Dee Graz, 26 Aug. 1918, F.O. 371-3135-147786* Cecil to 
Balfour, 9 Sept. 1918, F.O. 371-3137-154848.
1^  Cecil to Balfour, 9 Sept. 1918, F.O. 371-3137-154848.
160 / 
Steed, Thirty Years, pp.233-39* Lederer, Yugoslavia., p*39« Ostovic,
Yugoslavia, pp.83-89. See above, pp.213-14*
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Slavs.^ 1  By October 1913 the British government was willing to recognize
a South Slav authority and to give greater endorsement to South Slav
aspirations, hut it insisted on the maintenance of the pact of Corfu in
162which the Serbian government and the Yugoslav Committee were equals.
In interviews with Trumbic and J'asic Balfour made it quite clear that the 
government would not recognize either claim to sole leadership of the 
cause and would only recognize an authority which could speak for all 
South riavs.^^ In fact, the foreign office wanted Pasic to establish
154
a coalition government including members of the Yugoslav Committee.
The inability of the Yugoslavs and Serbians to agree, deBpite the efforts 
of the foreign office to negotiate a compromise, created a stalemate and 
prevented the British government from recognizing any South Slav authority. 
On October 23, 1918, as Austria-Hungary was already beginning to oollapse, 
the foreign office attempted to induce Pasic to compromise by threatening
to recognize the Yugoslav Committee, but, before any further action could
155
be taken, the war had ended.
✓
The knowledge that 3enec was also dissatisfied with the Versailles
declaration led the British and French governments to use the occasion
of the presentation of colours to the Czechoslovak army in France to give
166further recognition to Czechoslovak aspirations. On July 1, 1918, the 
Trumbio memorandum, 7 Oct.1918, Leeper memorandum, 9 Oct. 1918, F.O.
371-il37“l69690•
162
Seton-Watson memorandum, 4 Oct.1918, Phillips memorandum, 5 Oct. 1918, 
Drummond to Balfour, 5 Oct. 1918, F.O. 371-3154-169142.
l3i Balfour to Des Graz 9 Oct. 1918, F.O. 371-3137-171759*
loA Graham to Balfour, 17 Oct. 1918, F.O. 371-3137-176415*
165 F.O. to Derby, 23 Oct. 1918, F.O. 371-3137-176415-
14/
Drummond minute, 3 June 1913, F.O. 371-3135-101920. Pi chon to Balfour, 
28 June 1918, Hardinge to Balfour, 28 June 1918, Cambon to Hardinge,
29 June 1918, F.O. 371-3135-115851-
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president of France declared that*
Le Gouvernement de la Republique, fidele aux principes du respect 
des nationalites et de la liberation dos peuples opprimes pour 
lesquels il combat avec ses Allies, ... et, e’inspirant des senti­
ments de haut ideal exprimes par . le President Wilson considers 
corame justes et fondes lee revendications du peuple Tcheco-Slovaque 
et declare qu‘il appuiera de toute sa sollicitude les aspirations 
a l’independance pour lenquelles ses soldats combattent dans les 
rangs Allies.
At the same time the foreign office published a statement thats 'His 
Majesty's Government desire fully to associate themselves with the senti­
ments so admirably expressed in the speech of the President of the 
R e p u b l i c . * I n  the past, the Allies had expressed sympathy for Czecho­
slovak aspirations, but this was the first statement with which the British 
government associated iteelf which expressed support for these aspirations. 
The statement was subject to interpretation because there was no indication 
to what degree the British government would support Czechoslovak aims, but, 
nevertheless, it was the strongest statement yet made in reference to the 
Czechoslovak cause.
Once the British government realized that a separate peace was 
impossible and that the war would have to continue until the enemy was 
defeated, it quickly abandoned the caution that had marked its previous 
relations with the nationalities and undertook, without opposition or even 
hesitation, measures which it had previously avoided. Compared to its 
hesitation over the preceding three years it agreed with almost surprising 
alacrity to the recognition of the Czechoslovak array, to the Versailles 
declaration and to the supplementary declarations on the Yugoslavs and 
Czechoslovaks. In July 191$* however, when Masaryk, acting through Benefe 
and Steed, requested British recognition of a Czechoslovak provisional
F.O. to Press bureau, 1 July 191&» F.O. j7 1-313>-l 15^51
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168government, caution reasserted itself.
Initially the foreign office, including thore officials favourable
to the Czechoslovak cause, opposed this unorthodox and far-reaching
proposal and was disposed, despite its desire to guarantee Czechoslovak
support for the Entente, to show that there were still limits beyond whioh
it would not go* Nicolson had difficulty in conceiving of a provisional
government lacking territory over which it exercised at least de facto
control and pointed out that recognition of a Czechoslovak provisional
government would only offend the Poles and Y u g o s l a v s T y r r e l l  and
Namier agreed with Nicolson and, while sympathetic to the Czech cause,
170thought the proposal premature and unnecessary* Hardinge speculated 
that if such recognition led to a revolution in Bohemia it might be worth 
consideration, but Balfour ruled that the precedent established in Anglo-
Folish relations of not recognizing a provisional government had to be
171followed in the case of the Czechoslovaks* But, when Cecil pointed
out to Balfour that recognition of a Czechoslovak government might prevent
the Austrians from executing captured Czechoslovak soldiers, a practice
they had hitherto followed, Balfour reconsideredi
If recognition would really save Bohemian lives we might well 
throw logic to the winds and acknowledge the Czecho-Slovaks.
But the course will almost certainly be inconvenient from a 
diplomatic point of view; and unless it is necessary on grounds 
of humanity I do not recoaimend it* I shall be a great deal 
influenced by what Dr* B ^ Beneij^ tells you tomorrow* But of course 
he is a prejudiced witness. 17*
168 Hasaryk to Benes, 15 July 1918, F.O* 371-3135-135132. Benes to Steed,
16 July 1918, F.O. 371-3135-127473* Masaryk, State, p.l83*
169 Nicolson minute, 22 July 1918, F.O. 371-3135-12747 3*
Tyrrell minute, 23 July 1918, Namier memorandum, 23 July 1918, F*0. 
371-3135-127473*
Hardinge and Balfour minutes, 24 July 1918, F*0. 371-3135-127473.
172
Drummond and Balfour minutes, 24 July 1918, F*0* 371-3135-127473*
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In fact the reluctance shown by the foreign office when presented.
with this proposal was a luxury the government could no longer afford.
tfhen he first suggested the proposal to Steed, Benes commented* ’The
173position in Siberia giveB us the right to do it.* Irrespective of 
rights, the situation in Siberia gave the Czechoslovaks the power to make 
such demanus. The outbreak of hostilities between the Czechoslovak ariay 
in Russia ana the Bolsheviks in May 1918 forced the Allies to abandon 
temporarily the plan, which the British government had only reluctantly 
accepted, to transfer this army from Siberia to Prance* The ultimate 
destination of this army ceased to be a question of immediate importance 
because Bolshevik hostility cast doubt on its very suzvival* Since the 
British government wanted to use the Czechs as the spearhead of Allied 
intervention in Siberia, these developments fitted perfectly into its 
military planning.37<!t The previous refusal of the French government to 
use Czechoslovak troops in Russia had been a nuisance, but the real 
obstacle to British plans for intervention in Siberia had been the com­
plete refusal of the American government to co-operate. Prior to the 
outbreak of Czech-Bolshevik hostilities the American government had 
refused to sanction or participate in any form of interventioa, despite 
the strenuous efforts of the British and French governments to convince 
Wilson that intervention was a military neoessity in order to deny the
Central powers control of Siberia and in order to re-establish an eastern
175front. These arguments failed to move iresident Wilson, but the outbreak 
173 Bene6 to Steed, 16 July 1918, F.O. 371-313^-127473.
^7^ Lloyd George to Cecil, 7 June 1918, Cecil Mss* 510J6. Lockhart to F.O*,
2 June 1918, Milner Mss. 110. Ullman, An,Tlo-Soviet« pp.153-90*
See above, pp. 295-301.
^7^ Ullman, Analo-boviet, pp.lup-106, 196-210.
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of Czech-Bolshevik hostilities now enabled the British government to argue
that intervention was necessary in order to save the Czechoslovaks from
destruction. On June 21, 1918, Balfour wrote to Lord Reading, the new
ambassador in Washingtons ’The Czechs are our Allies, and we must save
them if we can. Their position seems to me to render immediate Allied
action on their behalf a matter of urgent necessity. * On July 6, 1918,
responding to this argument, Wilson agreed to intervene in Siberia with
limited forces for the specific purpose of assisting the Czechoslovaks to
177disengage from the Bolsheviks and evacuate their troops. 11 But, unlike
the Americans, the British were not interested in assisting the Czechs to
evacuate Siberia. On June 28, 1918, Balfour had written Bruoe Lockhart,
the British representative in Russia*
I trust you will take every possible step to encourage the Czechs.
In no circumstances should they give up their arms. Nor should 
they abandon oontrol of Western Siberia which is the key to the 
Russian position. We have groat hopes that intervention will 
shortly take place with a view to re-establish an Eastern front 
against the Germans. Czech co-operation should be of the utmost 
importance to the success of this policy and the Czechs cannot serve 
the allied cause better than by standing firm. 178
Although the British government found the scope of American plans
unsatisfactory, it now hoped that limited involvement, once begun, would
179lead eventually to unlimited intervention. If the CzechoSlovaks 
continued to fight the Russians, intervention might be prolonged and the 
Americans might be successfully drawn into committing more troops in 
Siberia, but if the Czechoslovaks evacuated their forces to eastern 
Siberia as quickly as possible, the whole policy of intervention might
176 Balfour to Reading, 21 June 1918, F.O. 371-3324-110145.
Ullman, An^lo-Roviet, p.214.
Balfour to Lockhart, 28 June 1918, F*0. 371-3324-113393 
Ullman, Anglo-Soviet, p.219.
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collapse. For that reason, as Lloyd George wrote to Reading* 'The Czecho-
1 ftn
Slovaks are the key to the position.1 But at the beginning of July 1918 
there was no reason to assume that the Czechoslovaks would stay in Siberia. 
Until hostilities had broken out with the Bolsheviks, the Czechoslovaks 
had refused to fight on Russian soil and had consistently expressed their
- .On
desire to leave Russia. In his letter to Steed in which he proposed the 
recognition of a provisional government, and which Steed passed on to the 
foreign office, Benes mentioned the possibility of the evacuation of these 
forces and insisted that at least some, possibly 5 tQQQ, had to be trans- 
ferred to France. In this situation the British government had every 
reason to give the most serious consideration to Czech demands, and the 
Czechs found themselves in the unprecedented position of being able to 
make demands on the government. The strategic importance of their troops 
in Russia gave the Czechoslovaks power unparalleled among the subject 
nationalities.
On July 26, 1917> Benes, having come to London for negotiations with 
the foreign office, submitted a memorandum explaining his case for the 
recognition of a provisional government. He argued that the National 
Council could only exercise real authority over the Czechoslovak armies 
and could only maintain the morale and effectiveness of these forces if it 
was recognized as a provisional government. The army in Russia would be 
more obedient and more willing to accept orders from its own provisional 
government than from any of the Allied governments. Taking advantage of 
the Siberian situation, Benes pointed out that the Czechoslovak National
180
Lloyd George to Reading, 18 July 1918, Balfour Mss. 49692.
181 F.O. to Jordan, 17 June 1918, F.O. 371-3323-106087.
182 Benes to Steed, 16 July 1918, F.O. 371-313>-127473.
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Council still adhered to the original Allied agreement to transfer the 
Czechoslovak army to France but was prepared to accept the temporary 
retention of this army in Siberia until it could be replaced by other 
Allied forces. The buccess of these arrangements, however, necessitated
in the view of the National Counoil its recognition as a government with
•/
sovereign authority. Benes also argued that recognition would weaken
Austria-Hungary and might lead to a revolution in Bohemia. He ended by
reviewing Czechoslovak services to the Entente and stated that recognition
18 ^
would lead to even greater efforts. Although couched in diplomatic 
language, the message was clear) the price for Czechoslovak services, 
particularly in Siberia, was the recognition of a provisional government. 
Instead of explaining the primary reason for his request, that recognition 
would be of immeasurable value to the Czechoslovaks in their attempts to 
establish an independent state, Bene3 had concentrated exclusively on those 
arguments which he knew from experience would carry weight with British 
officials.
Following the submission of this memorandum, Benes was interviewed
by Cecil and was requested to submit the exact formula of recognition
184desired by the National Council. In the meantime Drummond, to whom
Benes had admitted that recognition would do nothing to save the lives of
captured Czech soldiers, suggested that the Czechoslovaks mi^it be satisfied
185if given all the powers of a government without recognition as such. No 
one in the foreign office opposed extending greater powers to the National 
Council, and since it would avoid the legal and diplomatic problems of
183 Banes memorandum, 26 July 1918, F.O. 371-3130680.
184
^  Cecil to Balfour, 27 July 1918, F.O. 371-3135-135132.
185
J Drummond to Balfour, 30 July 1918, F.O. 371-3135-135132.
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recognizing a provisional government, Balfour found this compromise
186
perfectly acceptable.
On July 30, 1918, Benes submitted the exact formula of recognition
desired by the National Council, the last sentence of which read« 'His
Majesty's Government therefore recognize the sovereignty of the Czecho-
Flovak National Council who at present exercise the rights of a Provisional
i ft 7
Czechoslovak Government.' This sentence was obviously unacceptable to
the foreign office, and Balfour only agreed to accept the declaration as
a whole after he had replaced it with the statement thati 'Great Britain
also recognises the right of the Czechoslovak National Council to exercise
188supreme authority over this Allied and belligerent Army.' When Cecil
gave the revised text to Benes on August 2, 1918, the latter was obviously
disappointed that the most significant sentence had been eliminated, but,
189according to Cecil, he seemed to accept this decision. After consulting
Wickham Steed, however, Benes rejected the text as altered by Balfour
because, as he explained, it said even less than Balfour's letter of June 3,
1918. He also submitted documents relating to Czechoslovak relations with
Italy and France showing that these countries had already extended more
recognition to the National Council than was embodied in the revised 
190declaration. Uninformed of these agreements, Cecil minuted on the 
letter* 'It seems to me in view of the action of France and Italy - of 
which I knew nothing till now - that we might well accept the declaration
186 Balfour minute, 30 July 1918, F.O. 371-3135-135132.
lfc7 Benes to Ceoil, 30 July 1918, F.O. 371-3135-132422.
188
Graham, Hardinge and Balfour minutes, 31 July 1918» F.O.371-3135-132422.
189 Ceoil minute, 2 Aug. 1918, F.O. 371-3135-135135*
190 Benes to Ceoil, 3 Aug. 1918, F.O. 371-3135-135903.
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as originally drafted M. Benet.’^ 9* Had Benes insisted upon hie original
text it might have been accepted, but instead he suggested an alternative.
Following Steed’s advice to avoid the word 'sovereignty’ and use the word
’trustee1, Benes now suggested that the final sentence should reads ’Ureat
Britain also recognises the right of the Czecho-Slovak National Council,
as the supreme organ of the Czecho-Slovak national interests, and as the
trustee of the future Czecho-Slovak Government, to exercise supreme
192authority over this Allied and belligerent Ariay.’
At a meeting of the war cabinet on August 7, 1918# Sir Henry Wilson, 
echoing a constant preoccupation of British officials during these negoti­
ations, expressed great concern that the Czechoslovak desire to leave
193Russia might destroy the plans for intervention. The cabinet considered
the danger serious enough to rule that every effort should be made to keep
these forces in Russia, but this concern was, for the moment, unnecessary.
Drummond informed Hankey on August 8, 1918? that Masaryk had ordered the
194Czechoslovak army to remain in Siberia and fight. On August 9# 1918,
Cecil informed Benes that the government accepted the declaration as
reviaed by him on August 2, 1918, so that in its final fonn it read*
Since the beginning of the war the Czecho-Slovak nation has resisted 
the common enemy by every means in its power. The Czeoho-Slovake 
have constituted a considerable Army, fixating on three different 
battle-fields and attempting, in Russia and Siberia, to arrest the 
Germanic invasion. In consideration of its efforts to achieve 
independence, Great Britain regards the Ceecho-Slovaks as an Allied 
Nation, and recognises the unity of the three Czecho-Slovaks Armies
191 Ceoil minute, 3 Aug. 1918, F.O. 371-3135-135903.
l j 2  Benes, Memoirs, pp.397-410. Steed, Thirty lears. pp.231-233.
 ^War cabinet 455> 7 August 1918, Cab. 23-7*
19^ Jordan to F.O., 6 Aug. 1918, F.O. 800-200. Drummond to Hankey,
8 Aug. 1918, F*0. 600-200.
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as an Allied and belligerent Army waging regular warfare against 
Austria-Hungary and Germany. Great Britain also recognises the ri^it 
of the Czecho-Slovak National Council, as the supreme organ of the 
Czecho-Slovak national interests, and as the present trustee of the 
future Czecho-Slovak Government, to exercise supreme authority over 
this Allied and belligerent Army* ^93
The government also approved in principle a supplementary convention
with the Czechoslovaks which in specific toms gave them the prerogatives
of a provisional government. Benes had submitted a draft of thie convention
on August 2# 1918, a few days after the foreign office haul agreed to grant
196the Czechs at least the powers of a government. The foreign office did
net seriously dispute the clauses of this convention but only approved it
in principle because the war office, home office and treasury had to be
197consulted on those terms which affected them. After extensive revision
necessitated by the fact that in some clauses Benes overreached himself,
198the convention was signed on September 3, 1918. The 3ritish government
recognized the National Council’s authority over the Czechoslovak army and 
its right to be represented at Allied conferences which dealt with Czecho­
slovak affairs. It agreed to extend full consular and diplomatic privileges 
to the council, such as the issuing of passports and the appointment of 
diplomatic representatives, and to treat Czechs in Britain as friendly 
alione and the members of an Allied nation. Finally the government agreed 
to participate in future Allied lean: to the council and to appoint a
J j Declaration, 9 Aug- 1918, F.O. 371-3133-133903- Cecil minute, 9 Aug. 
1918, F.O. 371-3133-138337« Benes to Cecil, 11 Aug. 1918, F.O. 371- 
3133-139628.
196 Cecil minute, 2 Aug. 1918, F.O. 371-3135-135135-
*97 Prummond to Balfour, 7 Aug. 1918, F.O. 371-3133-135135*
195 Graham to H.O., 13 Aug. 1918, F.O. 371-3135-135135- jailer memoranda, 
14-16 Aug. 1918, H.O. 45-10761-269578. F.O. to Benes, 19 Aug. 1918, 
F.O. 371-3135-139628. Benes to Cecil, 28 Aug. 1918, F.O. 371-3136- 
148362. Inter-department conference, 16 Aug. 1918, F.O. 371-3136- 
142344* Home office circular to chief constables, 20 Aug. 1918,
F.O. 371-3136-145968.
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representative to a financial commission which would supervise the council's 
budget.1"
V/
Through the declaration and convention which denes had negotiated 
with the government, the Czechoslovak National Council achieved greater 
success and greater recognition than the Yugoslav Committee or the Polish 
National Committee were able to achieve at any time during the war. When 
an official of the home office questioned the Czechoslovak's special status, 
Cecil repliedt 'that it was intended that this should be so as the Czecho­
slovaks were a more homogeneous body and had done more for the Allied Cause
200than any of the others.' When the Serbian ambassador, on behalf of the 
Yugoslavs, queried this special treatment of the Czechoslovaks, Cecil 
informed himi 'that there were considerable differences between the two 
cases. The Czecho-Slovaks had a large army in the field, and a National 
Council, which was recognised by all the Czech forces, and received
201obedience from them. No such body existed in the case of the Yugo-Slavs.'
The British government was aware that its Czechoslovak policy, as 
embodied in the declaration and convention, might lead to the dismemberment 
of Austria-Hungary. But, in almost recognizing a Czechoslovak provisional 
government, the British government had not become a champion of national 
self-determination or of Czechoslovak independence. The government had 
accepted certain obligations to the Czechs but had avoided any form of 
commitment to an independent Czechoslovakia. As Cecil explained! 'Our
199 'Agreement between Hie Majesty's Government and the Czecho-Slovak 
National Council', 3 Sept. 1918, h.O. 45-l°76l-269578 Graham to 
Benes, 31 Aug. 1918, F*0. 371-3136-148362. Cecil minute, 3 Sept.
1918, P.O. 371-3136-152047•
Waller memorandum, 16 Aug. 1918, H.O. 45-10761-269588
201
Cecil to Bee Graz, 26 Aug. 1918, P.O. 371-3137-147786.
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recognition of the Czechs was very carefully worded and thou^i it would
undoubtedly be consistent with the dismemberment of Austria it does not
202in fact bind ue to that solution.’ The agreements between the British 
government and the Czechoslovak National Council in the summer of 1918
were perfectly consistent with the previous relations between the govern­
ment and the subject nationalities and can be explained in similar terms. 
In their negotiations Benes and Cecil avoided discussion of any crude 
bargain, but Benes made it clear enough that recognition was the price of 
Czechoslovak co-operation in Siberia. The British acceptance of hie 
demands was not based on a belief in national self-determination or in the 
ultimate political advantages of Czechoslovak independence but rather on 
a calculation of the immediate strategic advantages of satisfying the 
Czechoslovak National Council so that it would continue to co-operate in 
Siberia. As Cecil admitted? 'we have felt compelled to endorse their 
claims to independence, and ... we have unquestionably received full value 
for our endorsement.'20^
These agreements mark the end of the Czechoslovak struggle in Britain 
during the war for recognition and support of their right to self-deteli­
mination. When a Czechoslovak provisional government was formed in Paris
204in October 1918, the British government did not recognize it. Before
November 11, 1918, it gave no further recognition to the Czechoslovaks and 
undertook no further commitments to their cause. At the time of the
202
Cecil minute, 2 Sept. 1918, P.O. 371-3136-152102.
20 ^ Cecil memorandum, 7 Aug. 1918, Cecil Mss. 51105*
204 Derby to F.O., 15 Oct. 1918, P.O. 371-3136-173025. Derby to F.O.,
20 Oct. 1918, F.O. 371-3136-175975* Hodd to P.O., 22 Oct. 1918,
F.O. 371-3136-176524.
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armistice it was not committed to Czechoslovak independence or to the 
territorial claims of the Czechoslovak provisional government.
As late as August 1918 the British government expected that the war
205
would continue for another year. For that reason it continued almost
until the end of the war to base its relations with the emigres on strategic
considerations. There seemed to be no urgent need to solve the problem of 
Serbian-Yugoslav rivalry, and in the case of the Poles the government, 
despite considerations of political expediency, would not abandon that 
faction which was making the greatest contribution to the Entente's war 
effort. When the Central powers collapsed, events moved so quickly that 
the government did not have time to alter its relations with the subject
nationalities to suit those aims it wished to pursue at the peace conference.
In fact, on the subject of national self-determination, the government had 
not decided exactly what aims it wished to pursue.
The collapse of the enemy cut short the war-time relations between the 
government and the emigres before they could be developed to their logical 
conclusion. Throughout the war, even while it sought a separate peace, the 
government gradually increased its use of the subject nationalities, had 
the war continued into 1919 it is almost certain that this pattern would 
have continued and would have reached its ultimate conclusion with the 
British government using the emigres to promote revolution in Austria-
Hungary* Sobaneki had suggested such action in November 1917» but at that
206time a separate peaoe still seemed possible. Disintegration and 
revolution were the logical results of the propaganda campaign devised
20^ War cabinet 457, 13 Aug. 1918, Cab. 23-7* War cabinet 458, 19 Aug.
1918, Cab. 23-7, Fisher diary, 15 Aug. 191b, Fisher hes. 8.
See above, p.271*
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by Crewe House and supported by the British military representatives in 
Italy By April 1913 Benes was already discussing with British military
2qq
representatives the Czech preparations for revolution in Bohemia. In 
June 1913 Horodyski informed Drummond that there was considerable unrest
in Galicia and suggested that plans be initiated for a joint Polish-Czeeho-
209
Slovak, revolution in August. The war cabinet, which discussed the
proposal on June 11, 1913, was interested but distrusted Horodyski and
thought a revolution within Austria-Hungary premature. It did not want a
revolution crushed and would only support the plan if it had a reasonable
chance of success. As Balfour explained to Derbys
Clearly an insurrection in Poland or in Bohemia, if an isolated 
event in the war, would ha aasily suppressed by force and the 
spirit of the people cowed; we should thus have wasted a valuable 
potential asset; but if such outbreaks formed part of a larger 
Bcheme the Central Powers might be placed in a serious position.210
Although it withheld imaediate approval, the war cabinet authorized
the foreign office to begin preparations so that it could take advantage
211of the opportune moment when it arose. Because of the natural secrecy
surrounding such plans it is impossible to determine what preparations were
made and to what extent the government was involved. But such involvement
cannot be doubted because on August 23, 1913, Balfour authorized a payment
212
of £4,OCX) to Horodyski to be used in connection with this work. On
August 27, 1913, Benes informed Cecil that preparations for a revolution
Delme-Radcliffe memorandum, 19 slay 1913, F.O. 371-3139-90942.
208
Stanhope memorandum, 22 April 1913, F«0. 371-3443-30239*
Drummond memorandum, 8 June 1918, F.O. 800-329*
210
Balfour to Derby, 13 June 1918, Balfour iiss. 49743*
211
x War cabinet 429, 11 June 1918, Cab. 23-14.
212
'Western and General Report’, 3 July 1918, Cab. 24-148-79* Drummond 
memorandum, 23 Aug. 1918, F.O. 800-389. Roskill, Hankey, p.962.
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were almost complete and that it would take place either in December 1918
211
or April 1919 depending on the strategic situation.
Had the war continued into 1919 and had it been a strategic necessity, 
there can be little doubt that the Allies would have used revolution as the 
ultimate weapon against Austria-Hungary. This course of action would have 
necessitated complete recognition of the subject nationalities and at least 
limited support for their aspirations. In this situation the government 
might have been forced to make a formal decision on the fate of Austria- 
Hungary by giving a general endorsement to the idea of national self-deter­
mination. Such developments would have carried the pattern of British 
relations with the subject nationalities during the war to its ultimate, 
logical and extreme conclusion. But the collapse of the Central powers, 
premature in terms of British military planning, cut short this development 
and left the government in a position which was, to say the least, confused. 
By November 11, 1918, it had not formally endorsed the general application 
of the idea of national self-determination and had not decided to destroy 
Austria-Hungary. Although Balfour suggested, at a meeting of the war 
cabinet on August 13, 1918, that the dissolution of Austria-Hungary would
be the best solution to the problems of eastern Europe, his views were not
214endorsed by his cabinet colleagues. f But it was obvious to astute 
observers that British policy, by implication if not by design, would
probably result in the destruction of Austria-Hungary. On August 7, 1918,
* sCecil explained the government’s policy in its relations with the emigres!
Cecil memorandum, 27 Aug. 1918, F.O. 371-3133-148060.
214 War cabinet 457, 13 Aug. 1918, Cab. 23-7. War cabinet 458» 14 Aug.
1918, Cab. 23-7* War cabinet 459, 15 Aug. 1918, Cab. 23-7* Fisher 
diary, 15 Aug. 1918- Fisher dee. 8. Scott diary, 6-8 Aug. 1918,
Scott Mse. 50905.
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the defeat of Austria is a step towards the defeat of Germany, 
and all the problems connected with Austrian nationalities should 
be considered, as far as we are concerned, from that point of view 
in the first instance. Anything which we can do to weaken Austria 
by stirring up internal trouble, we must do. ... I do not see 
what other military policy we can adopt except to hit Austria as 
hard as we can, hoping either to secure her retirement from the war - 
in which case the settlement of her relations to the Slav national- 
ities might be left for settlement at the general peace j or to 
bring about her destruction as a military force, in which case we 
should probably have to take our chance as to the result of the
complete break up of the Austrian Empire and the setting up of a
number of new Slav States. 215
The British government had made decisions which would contribute to 
the destruction of A us tri a-Hungary, but it was not committed to destruction. 
Even its relations with the nationality organizations were confused. It 
had endorsed the creation of Polish and Yugoslav states but in neither case 
could it find a satisfactory authority to represent these national interests. 
It had almost recognized a Czechoslovak provisional government but had 
never endorsed the creation of an independent Czechoslovak state. It had 
not even decided, and had seldom considered, what territories should be
allotted to these states should they be created. In November 1916 the
British government faced the prospect of peace negotiations from a position 
not based on calculations of its long-teim political interests in eastern 
Europe but determined by its military strategy.
By November 11, 1916, British approval of independence for Poland, 
Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia had become irrelevant. On October 28, 1916, 
Masaryk*s followers began to seize power in bohemia using the revolutionary 
organization that the British government had sought to promote. On October 
29, 1916, the same process began in the Austrian South Slav areas when
Cecil memorandum, 7 Aug. 1916, Cecil Mes. 51105*
Yugoslav leaders in Zagreb declared the severance of constitutional tieB 
with Austria-Hungary and the incorporation of Croatia, Slavonia, Dalmatia 
in a Serbian, Croat and Slovene state. On November 10, 1918, Pilsudski
2l6was released from prison and began to assume political power in Poland. 
Austria-Hungary had ceased to exist raaid.ng British decisions on its fate 
now irrelevant. During the peace conference the Allies could d e te rm in e  
the territorial settlement in eastern Europe but they had as much power 
to deny' independence to these nationalities as they had to deny e x is te n c e  
to the Bolsheviks.
216
Zeman, Habsburg Monarchy, pp.221-245*
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Conclusion
In August 1914 the British government knew little and cared less about 
the subject nationalities of eastern Europe• Everyone interested in 
European affairs knew of the Poles and probably possessed a rudimentary 
understanding of the Polish problem, but there is no evidence that the 
foreign office knew anything about the complexities of Polish politics. 
Serbian politics were better understood, because of the previous Balkan 
crises, but officials were not well informed about the Austrian South Slave 
who were more often referred to ae Bosnians, Serbo-Croatianey Croats, 
Slovenes and Serbs than as South Slavs) the term 'Yugoslav* was a novelty. 
The Bohemians or Czechs were known but very few had heardof the Slovaks; 
Czechoslovakia was not yet even a geographical expression. The government 
knew little of these nationalities because it was not interested in them 
and because it had no reason to be interested in them.
The British government entered the conflict in 1914 in order to 
maintain the existing balance of power in western Europe which would be 
upset either by the violation of Belgian neutrality or by the destruction 
of France as a great power. The Polish and Czechoslovak problems were 
totally irrelevant to the July crisis and to the actions of the British 
government. Although the crisis which precipitated the war stemmed 
originally from the South Slav problem, this was not a factor in the 
British decision to enter the conflict. It cannot be said that Britain 
declared war for Serbia, the cause of national self-determination or the 
purpose of changing the existing structure of eastern Europe.
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Once hostilities began, the British government assumed no specific 
aims, and showed no interest in a general territorial redistribution in 
eastern Europe. It could not be indifferent to territorial changes, 
such as the aggrandizement of one of the great powers, since these changes 
would affect the balance of power in western Europe. But it was reasonably 
satisfied with the status quo in eastern Europe and showed no desire to 
change it. When the leading members of the government - Asquith, Grey 
and Lloyd George - set out to explain their reasons for declaring war on 
Germany, they spoke of the 'public law of Europe' but not of national 
self-determination. The cause they espoused was that of a European 
system in which problems would be solved by negotiation, not by force.
The enemy of that system, which they vowed to destroy, was Prussian 
militarism not because it suppressed subject nationalities but because, 
unwilling to compromise in negotiating European problems, it resorted to 
the use of force. Having declared war to maintain the balance of power 
in western Europe and fighting the war to crush Prussian militarism, the 
government was not interested in plans presented by emigres for a funda­
mental reorganization of eastern Europe. The government was, however, 
interested in promoting any group which might assist it in the conduct of 
the war. For that reason it began to promote relations with the emigres 
as soon as they made themselves known.
The home office found the emigres useful in dealing with enemy aliens; 
the war office saw them as one way to ease the problem of manpower shortages. 
Wellington house, with the assistance of Namier, found the Poles useful in 
propaganda. The foreign office saw the Yugoslav programme as a solution 
to the nationality problems in the Balkans which would facilitate the 
negotiation of a Balkan league* Naval intelligence, working through
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Gaunt, found the Czechs in the United Ftates useful in espionage and counter­
espionage* These branches of the government all acted as if they were 
following a directive from the cabinet to use and encourage all forces 
opposed to the Central powers* But the cabinet had not considered the
question and had not issued such a directive* In most cases the co-op-
/ /
oration between the govemraent and the emigres was well established before 
the cabinet was informed. The initiation of co-operation between the 
government and the emigres was often the work of minor officials who 
consulted neither the cabinet nor their counterparts in other departments. 
Officials like Marnier, Trevelyan, Clerk, Drummond, Gregory, Spring Rice, 
ilacdonogh and Gaunt acted instinctively to take advantage of the oppor­
tunities presented to them. Although they were not acting on any central 
directive, the similarity of their instincts gave a measure of uniforrait, 
to the action of the British government. The non-existent decision to 
use and encourage all forces opposed to the Central powers was carried 
out as thoroughly as any formal cabinet decision.
The Yugoslavs wore the first subject nationality to play a role in 
British foreign policy. From its first contact with the Yugoslavs the 
foreign office realized that their programme might facilitate the negoti­
ations for a Balkan league. If ferbia could be tested by the idea of 
a Yugoslav state to make concessions to Bulgaria in Macedonia, it might 
end the Serbo-Bulgarian hostility which was the major obstacle to a Balkan 
league* For that reason the foreign office promoted the Yugoslav programme 
during the negotiations and even after the failure of this policy continued 
to be attracted to the idea of a Yugoslav state.
The Czechoslovaks and Poles achieved their initial importance in 
foreign policy because of the apparent threat to British interests in the
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United States posed by the German and Irish-Americans. Although the 
seriousness of this threat was exaggerated, the fear of the German and 
Irish-Amerioans was an important factor in British policy towards the 
United ftatee. At first the government attempted to counter this threat 
by propaganda designed to damage the reputations of Germany and Austria- 
Hungary by dealing with their treatment of the subject nationalities.
This was followed by propaganda aimed at the Slav minorities in the United 
States and designed to win their support and promote political organization 
for the purpose of counteracting the effect of the German-American vote.
This task was not left solely to the propaganda authorities for there is 
every indication that Spring dee, Gaunt, Trevelyan and Horodyski also 
played a direct part in encouraging the various American Slavic leaders 
to organize against the Gerraan-Amerieans. This propaganda implicitly 
promoted the cause of national self-determination and there can be little 
doubt that the emerging American interest in eastern Uurope was promoted, 
if not caused, by the competition among the belligerents, particularly on 
the Polish issue, for American support. The seriousness of the German- 
American threat, the importance of the Slavic minorities and the success 
of British propaganda may have been exaggerated by the government, but 
there can be no doubt that, acting in these considerations, it included 
references to the Poles, Czechoslovaks and Yugoslavs in the reply to 
President Wilson's peace note because it believed that such references 
would appeal to Wilson and to the American public. Possibly such references 
were unnecessary or ineffectual, but their inclusion in the note was 
consistent with previous British policy in the conduct of Anglo-American 
relations. The reply to President Wilson in January 1917 was the most 
advanced statement by the Allies on the subjeot of national self-deteiv
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ruination prior to the declaration of the supreme war council on June 3,
1918. It did not represent British policy but rather what the .Hies 
believed the Americans wanted to heir. If they were right the explanation 
can be found, to some extent, in previous British propaganda*
Had the emigres been incapable of contributing to the war effort it 
is unlikely that relations between them and the government would have 
developed* But once the process began it was always easier, and more 
profitable, for the officials to expand the areas of co-operation than to 
withdraw from it entirely* Although the government adopted no commitments
to national self-determination, the co-operation did promote close relations
/ /
between the officials and the emigres with the result that the officials 
were educated on the problems of eastern Europe and often converted to 
the cause of national self-determination* The co-operation helped the 
emigres to establish relations with the government through which they were 
then able to inform the government of their political programmes and of 
the problems of eastern Europe, The initial co-operation in espionage 
and propaganda, which was of infinitesimal significance if compared to the 
total war effort of the British government, provided the necessary basis 
upon which more significant co-operation could be based in 1917*
Since eastern Europe was an area of secondary importance, the British 
government gave very little thought to its post-war settlement* British 
aims were considered only in the most general terms and, in essence, they 
would be satisfied by a settlement which would be conducive to peace and 
stability and which would not increase the military potential of one of 
the great powers* national self-determination was not the only solution 
which would fulfill these criteria - an equally good case could be put 
forwaxxl for the status quo ante bellum - and there was no reason to assume
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that it would be the best solution* Lacking any simple solution to the 
problems of eastern .^ urope, whiok in any case were of secondary importance, 
the government followed a general policy of using these problems to increase 
the military potential of the Entente*
Between 1914 and 1916 this general policy involved the use and 
encouragement of the subject nationalities* It also involved the acceptance 
in the treaty of London, in exchange for Italian support, of terms which 
were generally recognised as politically reprehensible* The Entente could 
achieve the greatest strategic advantage from the problems of eastern 
luurope, however, not through encouragement of the subject nationalities 
but by the elimination of Austria from the war through negotiation* When 
the government believed that a separate peace with Austria-Hungary could 
be negotiated, it ^ureued this policy just as it had previously encouraged 
the nationalities* Even while seeking a separate peace it continued to 
use the emigres* The apparent military position of the entente in 1917 
and 191o was not so strong that it could afford to abstain from the use 
of the nationalities against Austria-Hungary and particularly from the 
use of their armed forces* For that reason, when a separate peace proved 
impossible, the Entente was left with no other alternative than to give 
maximum support to the nationalities and, in return, to use them in every 
conceivable way against Austria-Hungary • In uay 191& the government 
decided to give all possible support to the subject nationalities on the 
assumption that it would either force the Austrians to make a separate 
peace or would destroy Austria-Hungary• Either alternative was perfectly 
acceptable to the government and remained eo until the armistice*
The E n te n te  c o u ld  n o t u&e the  n a t io n a l i t ie s  without becoming somewhat 
dependent upon them* By 191b th e  Poles and Czechoslovaks were in a
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position, because of the formation of national armies, to make demands on 
the government which coula not he brushed aside* Indeed the government 
felt compelled to recognize the Czechoslovaks and Poles and to give at 
least some measure of informal recognition to the Yugoslavs* But despite 
pressure from the nationalities, it was able to avoid commitments to them 
which would have the legal force of the terms of the treaty of London and, 
above all, was able to avoid specific territorial commitments in eastern 
rUTope* It was committed to national ^elf-ue termination in eastern Europe 
onlg by implication*
The uevelopment of British relations with the nationalities during 
the war is an example of the government's handling of an issue of secondary 
importance* fhere is no reason to assume that any other issue was handled 
in a similar fashion but nevertheless the process is itself intrinsically 
interesting. .these relations did not develop according to any clearly 
defineu. comprehensive policy for the treatment of the subject nationalities 
but evolved because of innumerable minor and often unrelated decisions made 
by lesser officials often without consultation with one another* To solve 
immediate problems these officials made decisions which established the 
initial contacts between the government and the emigres* ior example, the 
home office decision not to intern Poles, Czechoslovaks and Yugoslavs was 
taken regardless of considerations of foreign policy because of the immediate 
problems in the internment of enemy aliens* Although this decision 
appeared trivial in 1914 > the emigres could not have campaigned for national 
self-determination from an internment camp* The fabric of British relations 
with the subject nationalities was gradually built up by a series of minor 
decisions each bringing the government and the emigres closer together.
Ono decision facilitated the next, and even before the emigres were brought
to the attention o f  the Gabinet, their relatione w ith  the government had 
evolved iivco a rudimentary hut still discernible pattern* As further 
relations developed they tended to  follow this initial pattern so that 
the government's position in r e la t io n  to the n a t io n a l i t ie s  i n  November
1916 was n o t one which had been p lanned  b u t  one which had evolved as the
/ /
officials turned to the emigres for assistance in living immediate 
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